WESLEY LeMASTER and APRIL LeMASTER v. APPLETREE PLAZA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; AUTOZONE, INC.; and BOYLAN, INC. and APPLETREE PLAZA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND BOYLAN, INC. v. AUTOZONE, INC.
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 11, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002773-MR
WESLEY LeMASTER and
APRIL LeMASTER
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL SPARKS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00384
APPLETREE PLAZA LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP;
AUTOZONE, INC.; and
BOYLAN, INC.
APPELLEES
NO. 2004-CA-000033-MR
APPLETREE PLAZA LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND
BOYLAN, INC.
v.
AUTOZONE, INC.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL SPARKS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00384
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART,
AND
REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND HENRY, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: This case involves two separate appeals, one
by Wesley and April LeMaster and the other by Appletree Plaza
Limited Partnership and Boylan, Inc.
Both appeals arise out of
the same set of facts, and both are directed at orders and
judgments rendered in favor of AutoZone, Inc.
For the reasons
stated below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
FACTS
On September 26, 2000, Wesley and April LeMaster went
to the Appletree Plaza Shopping Center to shop at the AutoZone
store.
When the LeMasters arrived at the shopping center, it
was already dark.
As they were leaving the parking lot, Wesley
drove their automobile into an unilluminated light pole located
in the lot.
Both Wesley and April claim that they suffered
personal injuries as a result of the collision.
The shopping center property is subject to a ground
lease from a third party to Arthur Boylan, Jr., and his wife,
Karen.
Arthur Boylan, Jr., in addition to being a general
partner in Appletree Plaza Limited Partnership, is the president
of Boylan, Inc.
The Boylans assigned their lease to Appletree
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Plaza Limited Partnership.
AutoZone subleases one unit of the
shopping center building from Appletree under a 1996 sublease
agreement.
Boylan, Inc., has a management contract with
Appletree.
Under the contract, Boylan, Inc., is responsible for
maintaining the shopping center property.
The sublease between Appletree and AutoZone has
several provisions that are relevant to this case.
Paragraph 3
provides that AutoZone, as the sublessee, is only gaining
control over approximately 6,600 square feet of retail space
inside a building.
Paragraph 12 provides in part that Appletree
will “maintain in good working order and repair throughout the
Term” outside improvements, including the parking lot.
Paragraph 24 provides that Appletree will maintain the common
facilities, including the parking lot, in good repair and ensure
that they are adequately lighted.
This paragraph makes it clear
that Appletree retains control over the common areas, holding
them out for the joint use of all subtenants.
Paragraph 34
contains an indemnity clause which provides in relevant part
that:
Moreover, if either party hereto without
fault is made a party to any litigation
instituted by or against any other party to
this Sublease, such other party shall
indemnify Sublessor or Sublessee, as the
case may be, against and hold harmless from
all costs and expenses, including reasonable
attorney’s fees, incurred by it in
connection therewith.
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When Appletree constructed the shopping center, it
erected two 60-foot light poles in the parking lot.
AutoZone
later added, with Arthur Boylan’s permission on behalf of
Appletree, two additional light poles down the center of the
parking lot directly in front of its store.
The LeMasters’
automobile collided with one of the two poles placed on the lot
by AutoZone.
It was later discovered that the timer switch for
the lights on the pole had not been properly set.1
This switch
was maintained, not in the light pole, but in a separate pole
containing lighted store signs.
It is alleged that this was the
reason the pole was not lighted when the LeMasters’ automobile
collided with it, although it was already dark outside.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Nearly one year after the accident, the LeMasters
filed a civil complaint in the Johnson Circuit Court against
Appletree.
Appletree later filed a third-party complaint
against AutoZone, seeking indemnity for any recovery due the
LeMasters.
In response, AutoZone filed a counterclaim against
Appletree seeking indemnity based on the terms of the sublease.
Later, the LeMasters amended their complaint, adding AutoZone
and Boylan, Inc., as defendants.
This led Appletree and Boylan,
Inc., to file common law indemnity claims against AutoZone.
1
Arthur Boylan testified he was not sure whether his electrician discovered
the switch in October of 2001 or March of 2002.
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Following discovery, AutoZone sought summary judgment
on all claims filed against it.
It also sought summary judgment
on its indemnity claim against Appletree.
On May 6, 2003, the
circuit court entered an order granting summary judgment in
favor of AutoZone on all claims.
The court also directed
AutoZone’s attorneys to submit an affidavit in support of the
amount of attorney’s fees and costs AutoZone was claiming under
the indemnity clause in the sublease.
Postjudgment motions by
the losing parties were rejected by the court in an order dated
June 6, 2003.
AutoZone submitted an affidavit seeking fees and costs
incurred as of November 20, 2003.
The affidavit provided only a
general summary of the type of work done, and it stated
attorney’s fees in the amount of $26,418 and costs in the amount
of $1,204.08.
In response to the court’s request, AutoZone’s
attorneys submitted detailed billing records for in camera
review.
At the request of AutoZone’s attorneys these billing
records were not provided to Appletree for its review.
In a
final order entered on December 16, 2003, the court found the
fees to be reasonable and awarded the full amount sought by
AutoZone.
These appeals followed.
NO. 2003-CA-002773-MR
The first appeal is that of the LeMasters against
AutoZone.
The LeMasters argue that the circuit court
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erroneously granted AutoZone summary judgment on their
negligence claim.
Although the LeMasters settled with Appletree
and Boylan, Inc., on their claims against them, they argue that
AutoZone shared liability with Appletree and Boylan, Inc., for
the injuries they suffered as a result of striking one of the
poles that AutoZone had installed in the shopping center parking
lot.
On the other hand, AutoZone maintains that the court
correctly granted it summary judgment on the LeMasters’
negligence claim against it on the grounds that it owed no legal
duty to the LeMasters concerning the condition of the parking
lot.2
The LeMasters cite Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432
(Ky. App. 2001), to support their argument that AutoZone owed a
duty to them as business invitees.
In describing this duty, the
court in the Lewis case stated that “[u]nder common law premises
liability, the owner of a premises to which the public is
invited has a general duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the
premises in a reasonably safe condition and warn invitees of
dangers that are latent, unknown, or not obvious.”
Id. at 438.
The fallacy in the LeMasters’ argument is that AutoZone, while
it may have been the occupier of a portion of the shopping
center building, was not an owner or occupier of the parking
2
In order for there to be a finding of liability, there must first be an
affirmative duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. See Mullins v.
Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 839 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Ky. 1992).
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lot.
Pursuant to the sublease, Appletree expressly retained
control over the parking lot.
Therefore, it was Appletree, not
AutoZone, that owed the LeMasters and others a duty to exercise
reasonable diligence to keep the parking lot in a safe
condition.
See Davis v. Coleman Management Co., 765 S.W.2d 37,
38-39 (Ky. App. 1989).
The LeMasters cite other authorities in support of
their argument that the court should not have awarded summary
judgment to AutoZone.
First, the LeMaster cite Waldon v.
Housing Auth. of Paducah, 854 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. App. 1991), and
argue that AutoZone had a duty to them under the “universal
duty” rule.
See id. at 778, quoting Grayson Fraternal Order of
Eagles, Aerie No. 3738, Inc. v. Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328 (Ky.
1987).
However, the “universal duty” rule in the Grayson case
“is not without limits.”
(Ky. App. 2002).
James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 891
The court in the James case also noted that
decisions following Grayson “illustrate that the duty has been
narrowly applied[.]”
Id.
Furthermore, in Fryman v. Harrison,
896 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1995), the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected
the application of the “universal rule” in that case and held
that “[t]he question in any negligence action is whether the
defendant owes a legal duty to the plaintiff.”
Id. at 910.
We
conclude that the “universal duty” rule is not applicable to the
facts of this case.
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The LeMasters also argue that AutoZone could not shift
its duty to them to Appletree by the terms of the sublease
agreement.
In support of this argument, the LeMasters cite
Louisville Cooperage Co. v. Lawrence, 313 Ky. 75, 230 S.W.2d 103
(1950).
Because the circuit court correctly held that AutoZone
owed no duty to the LeMasters, it therefore follows that
AutoZone had no duty to shift to Appletree under the sublease.
Therefore, the Louisville Cooperage case is not applicable to
this case.
In the Mullins case, the court made it clear that the
existence of a duty is a question of law.
839 S.W.2d at 248.
Because under the uncontested facts of the case AutoZone owed no
duty to the LeMasters as it related to the parking lot, we
conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting AutoZone
summary judgment on the LeMasters’ claim against it.
NO. 2004-CA-000033-MR
The second appeal is by Appletree and Boylan, Inc.
Like the LeMasters, they argue that the circuit court
erroneously awarded AutoZone summary judgment on the issue of
liability.
Appletree and Boylan, Inc., contend that it
naturally follows from an acceptance of that argument that the
court therefore erred in dismissing their third-party claims for
common law indemnity against AutoZone.
Further, Appletree
argues that the award of attorney’s fees and costs to AutoZone
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should be vacated because Appletree was denied a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the amounts claimed by AutoZone and
awarded to it.
Citing City of Madisonville v. Poole, 249 S.W.2d 133,
135 (Ky. 1952), Appletree and Boylan, Inc., state that a party
in possession of real property may be found to have a tort duty
to disclose hazards on the property, especially to business
Then, citing Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co., 37
invitees.
S.W.3d 770, 776 (Ky. App. 2000), Appletree and Boylan, Inc.,
maintain that the duty to warn or disclose hazards to business
invitees rests with the possessor of the property rather than
the owner when “the tenant is put in complete and unrestricted
possession and control of the premises.”
They further argue
that AutoZone was in “unrestricted possession and control of the
premises.”
Therefore, their argument is that AutoZone, as the
exclusive possessor of the property, had a duty to its business
invitees to make known hazards of which it was aware and which
were not open and obvious.
Appletree and Boylan, Inc., recognize that such a duty
may be shifted to the property owner by either agreement or
warranty.
They then claim that any holding by the court that
the sublease shifted the duty to Appletree was inconsistent with
the proof in the case because there was no proof that Appletree
agreed to maintain the two poles placed in the parking lot by
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AutoZone and because there were fact issues concerning an oral
modification of the sublease.
We conclude that these arguments are without merit.
First, AutoZone was not placed in the “unrestricted possession
and control of the premises.”
Rather, pursuant to the terms of
the sublease, Appletree retained control of all common
facilities, including the parking lot.3
“[W]here the landlord
retains control of a certain part of the demised premises for
the common use and benefit of a number of the tenants he must
exercise ordinary care to maintain same in a reasonably safe
condition.”
Lindsey v. Kentucky Dev. Co., 291 Ky. 253, 163
S.W.2d 499, 500 (1942).
Therefore, AutoZone owed no duty to the
LeMasters, and it had no duty in regard to parking lot
maintenance or safety that it could shift to Appletree.
Second,
there is no fact issue concerning any oral modification of the
sublease.
Any such agreement was subject to the statute of
frauds and was required to be in writing.
See KRS4 371.010.
Since Appletree was unable to show a written modification, the
original terms of the sublease must stand unaltered.
In short, we conclude that the circuit court correctly
awarded AutoZone summary judgment on the claims against it.
3
It
Under Kentucky law, the construction of a contract, as well as the
determination of its legal effect, are questions of law. Morganfield Nat’l
Bank v. Damien Elder & Sons, 836 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Ky. 1992).
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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owed no duty to the LeMasters, and thus a negligence claim
against it could not be maintained by the LeMasters.
As a
consequence, the common law indemnity claims by Appletree and
Boylan, Inc., against AutoZone were properly resolved by summary
judgment in AutoZone’s favor.
Finally, in light of paragraph 34 of the sublease,
AutoZone’s indemnity claim against Appletree was properly
resolved by the circuit court’s entering summary judgment in
AutoZone’s favor.
The award was in the amount of $27,626.18.
Appletree’s remaining argument on appeal is that this award, if
any should have been given at all, should be vacated and the
matter remanded for a hearing because Appletree did not have the
opportunity to challenge the nature and amounts of the fees and
costs.
As we have noted, when AutoZone’s attorneys submitted a
detailed record of fees and costs to the court, the court’s
review was in camera and Appletree was precluded from making any
review or challenge to those matters.
The amount of an attorney’s fees award is generally
within the discretion of the trial court.
A&A Mechanical, Inc.
v. Thermal Equip. Sales, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 505, 514 (Ky. App.
1999).
However, “this discretion is not unlimited, that, in
exercising its discretion, a trial court should require parties
seeking attorney fees to demonstrate that the amount sought is
not excessive and accurately reflects the reasonable value of
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bona fide legal expenses incurred.”
Id.
Such awards are
reviewed by this court for an abuse of discretion.
See Angel v.
McKeehan, 63 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Ky. App. 2001).
Detailed billing records can support a trial court’s
conclusion that the attorney’s fees and costs are reasonable.
A&A Mechanical, 998 S.W.2d at 514.
However, Appletree had a
right to challenge the reasonableness of the fees and costs that
the court ordered it to pay.
Although AutoZone may have
contracted with its attorneys and may owe those amounts under
their contract, that does not mean Appletree is responsible for
the full amount billed.
It is only responsible for the
reasonable fees and costs incurred, and it must be given the
opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of those amounts.
For this reason, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to deny Appletree access to the proof AutoZone submitted
to justify its request.
Therefore, concerning this second
appeal, we affirm in part, but we vacate in part and remand for
further proceedings concerning the reasonableness of the fees
owed by Appletree under the indemnity clause in the sublease.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/WESLEY and
APRIL LEMASTER:
Adam P. Collins
Hindman, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/AUTOZONE:
Catherine Stivers Purdy
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPLETREE PLAZA
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and
BOYLAN, INC.:
David A. Cohen
Lexington, Kentucky
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