J.T. OATES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: March 4, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002630-MR
J.T. OATES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SIMPSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00023 & NO. 03-CR-00036
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
James Thomas Oates appeals from an amended
judgment of conviction on a conditional plea of guilty to two
counts of operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license and
one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants.
He
contends that the trial court improperly failed to advise him of
the possible penalty enhancement consequences for future
violations.
1
For the reasons stated herein, we must affirm.
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 100(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
On March 3, 2003, and March 17, 2003, the Simpson
County grand jury returned separate indictments against Oates
charging him with two counts each of driving under the influence
of intoxicants, operating on a suspended license, and first
degree persistent felony offender.
Thereafter, Oates entered
into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, the terms of which
provided that Oates would enter a condition guilty plea to two
counts of operating on a DUI suspended license, 3rd offense, and
one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants, 3rd
offense.
In exchange, Oates would avoid a trial and receive a
sentence of six years in prison, plus license suspension, a $500
fine, and alcohol counseling.
On July 17, 2003, Oates, through counsel, filed a
motion in the instant case seeking to have two prior criminal
judgments (No. 98-CR-00146 rendered on March 29, 1999, and No.
00-CR-00073 rendered on August 21, 2000) set aside.2
As a basis
for the motion, Oates argued that the trial court failed in 1999
and 2000 to advise him of possible penalty enhancements for
future DUI violations.
In the same motion, Oates moved to
dismiss the March, 2000 charges.
Without leave of court, and
2
It is not clear from the record upon what authority Oates sought to have
these three- and four-year-old convictions set aside, since a trial court
loses jurisdiction over a criminal proceeding ten days after the judgment.
CR 59.05; McMurry v. Commonwealth, 682 S.W.2d 794 (Ky.App. 1985). The
motion, which addresses both the 1999 and 2000 convictions, as well as the
then-pending March 2003 charges, did not cite a civil or criminal rule of
procedure and was merely styled “Motion to Dismiss.”
-2-
without any apparent objection by the circuit judge or the
Commonwealth, Oates began styling his pleadings to include the
case numbers of the 1999 and 2000 convictions.
The motion was
denied by way of an order rendered on October 23, 2003.
On December 2, 2003, the trial court rendered a final
judgment of conviction accepting the plea and sentencing Oates
in accordance with the agreement.
On February 2, 2004, it
rendered an amended judgment for the purpose of changing the
terms of the license suspension and amending the Uniform Offense
Report.
This appeal followed.
Oates now argues that the trial court was duty-bound
to advise him of possible penalty enhancements for future DUI
violations.
It is unclear from his appellate brief whether he
is referring to the 1999 and 2000 judgments (which were the
subject matter of his arguments in the July 17, 2000, motion),
or his 2003 conviction (which is how the instant appeal is
styled).
He cites Boykin v. Alabama3 for the proposition that
the defendant must be made aware of all of the consequences of
his plea, and maintains that he is now entitled to have this
conviction (or his prior convictions) reversed because the court
failed to so advise him when it accepted his plea agreement.
seeks a reversal of “the Order”, presumably referring to the
order denying the July 17, 2003, motion.
3
395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
-3-
He
We have closely examined the record, the law, and the
written arguments, and find no basis for tampering with the
judgment on appeal.
We must note from the outset that Oates has
improperly introduced the 1999 and 2000 judgments into the
instant proceeding.
Instead of filing a CR 60.02 motion styled
with the case numbers of the 1999 and 2000 judgments (No. 98-CR00146 and No. 00-CR-00073), Oates began spontaneously making
those arguments in the middle of the instant proceeding.
Further exacerbating the matter is the circuit court’s
failure to curtail Oates’ introduction of the 1999 and 2000
judgments into the instant case, and its ruling on the July 17,
2003, motion even though no civil rule was cited as a basis for
the motion.
Similarly, the Commonwealth stood by idly while
Oates amended the proceeding to his liking.
The Commonwealth’s
appellate brief makes no mention of the 1999 and 2000 judgments
despite that fact that they form the basis of Oates’ July 17,
2003, motion and the instant appeal.
Rather than summarily dismiss the appeal, we will
treat Oates’ July 17, 2003, motion as a CR 60.02 motion seeking
extraordinary relief from the 1999 and 2000 judgments.
states in relevant part that,
On motion a court may, upon such terms as
are just, relieve a party or his legal
representative from its final judgment,
order, or proceeding upon the following
grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise
-4-
CR 60.02
or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59.02; (c) perjury or
falsified evidence; (d) fraud affecting the
proceedings, other than perjury or falsified
evidence; (e) the judgment is void, or has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or
a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (f) any
other reason of an extraordinary nature
justifying relief.
CR 60.02 allows a judgment to be corrected or vacated
based "upon facts or grounds, not appearing on the face of the
record and not available by appeal or otherwise, which were not
discovered until after rendition of judgment without fault of
the parties seeking relief."4
It is meant to provide relief
which is not available by direct appeal or under RCr 11.42.5
In order to be eligible for CR 60.02 relief, the movant must
demonstrate why he is entitled to extraordinary relief.6
In the matter at bar, the claim of error which Oates
now raises should have been brought, if at all, by way of a
direct appeal.
It was not, and this fact taken alone forms a
proper basis for affirming the order denying the July 17, 2003,
motion.
4
Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Ky. 1998), citing Davis v. Home
Indemnity Co., 659 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. 1983).
5
Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983); McQueen v. Commonwealth,
948 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1997).
6
Barnett, 979 S.W.2d at 101.
-5-
Arguendo, even if the matter were properly before us,
we would find no error on the question of whether the trial
courts in 1999 and 2000 improperly failed to advise Oates of the
consequences of future criminal conduct.
Contrary to his
assertion that Boykin supports his argument, Boykin actually
holds that a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver does not
necessarily include a requirement that the defendant be informed
of every possible consequence of a guilty plea.7
“A guilty plea
that is brought about by a person’s free will is not less valid
because he did not know all possible consequences of the plea
and all possible alternative courses of action.”8
On appeal, the burden rests with the Oates to overcome
the strong presumption that the trial court’s rulings are
correct.9
Oates has failed in his burden of persuasion as his
argument was practiced outside the scope of the civil rules and
is not supported by the case law.
Accordingly, we find no basis
for tampering with the judgment on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Simpson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
7
Turner v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.2d 500 (Ky.App. 1992), citing Boykin.
8
Id. at 501.
9
City of Louisville v. Allen, 385 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1964).
-6-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Morris Lowe
Bowling Green, KY
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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