JONATHON MARK ROBERSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF SHYTONE M. ROBERSON v. LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 11, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002513-MR
JONATHON MARK ROBERSON, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
SHYTONE M. ROBERSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN O'MALLEY SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-007743
LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC
COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Jonathon Roberson appeals from a summary
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court which dismissed his
negligence claim against the appellee, Louisville Gas and
Electric Company (LG&E).
Roberson argues that the trial court
erred as a matter of law in concluding that LG&E “did not have a
duty to repair and maintain street lamps in order to prevent
accidents involving third parties.”
(Opinion and Order of
October 23, 2003, p. 1.)
We agree that the trial court erred in
dismissing Roberson’s lawsuit.
Thus, we vacate and remand.
On the evening of February 23, 2001, Roberson’s tenyear-old son, Shytone Roberson, was struck by a motor vehicle as
he attempted to cross Preston Highway near its intersection with
Miles Lane in Jefferson County.
The child died as a result of
the injuries sustained in the accident.
Neither the driver of
the vehicle, Tammy Triplett, nor her passenger, saw the child
before the car ran over him.
They only realized what had
happened by the sound made by the impact.
The police report
described the area where the accident occurred as “dark” and the
highway as “not lighted.”
On November 13, 2001, Roberson filed a complaint
seeking damages from LG&E for the wrongful death of his son.
He
contended that the street light near the intersection was not
working on the night of the accident and that LG&E was
“negligent and careless in maintaining and/or servicing” the
light, and that that negligence resulted in his son’s death.
In answers to interrogatories, LG&E acknowledged that
it owned the street light, that the light was leased to
Jefferson County Fiscal Court, and that LG&E was responsible for
maintaining the street light under its agreement with the
county.
LG&E also revealed that it has no formal or written
policies or procedures for monitoring street lights, relying
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solely on the public to provide notice as to which lights are in
need of repair.
LG&E had not received any notice that the
street light near the accident scene was not illuminated.
In seeking the summary dismissal of Roberson’s
complaint, LG&E convinced the trial court that it owed no duty
to the public -- including the decedent -- either to monitor or
to maintain the street light near the accident.
In its final
order granting the summary judgment, the court agreed, reasoning
as follows:
A “basic element of action of
negligence is the breach of a legal duty.
Without such a duty, there can be no
recovery.” Comm., Transp. Cabinet, Bureau
of Highways v. Roof, Ky., 913 S.W.2d 322,
324 (1996). Other jurisdictions have ruled
a public utility does not have a common law
duty to repair and maintain streetlights.
Sinclair v. Dunagan, 905 F.Supp. 208
(D.N.J., 1995); Vaughan v. Eastern Edison
Co., 719 N.E.2d 520, (Mass.App.Ct.1999);
Martinez v. Florida Power & Light Co., 785
So.2d 1251 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001). However,
the issue is one of first impression for
this Court.
A duty may be imposed by statute, by
contract or by the common law. Kentucky law
does not impose a statutory duty to repair
or maintain street lamps. There is no duty
imposed by contract in this case.
Under common law, a power company’s
duty of repair and maintenance pertains only
to electricity as a dangerous
instrumentality. [Quotation omitted.]
Although the court has ruled a power
company owes a duty to inspect and maintain
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electric lines, considering them as
dangerous instrumentalities, there is no
duty recognized under common law with regard
to repair and maintenance of the nondangerous instrumentality of a street lamp.
On appeal, Roberson contends that the court erred in
concluding that LG&E owed no duty to Shytone with respect to the
illumination of Preston Highway.
He argues that his son was an
intended beneficiary of the utility’s contract with the county.
He also contends that LG&E is liable under the common law.
He
asks us to apply § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965) and based on that authority urges us to determine that
when it undertook the task of illuminating Preston Highway, LG&E
assumed and insured a continuing duty to monitor and to repair
the lighting for the protection of the public -- especially
pedestrians.
The sole issue for our review is whether the trial
court correctly determined that LG&E owed no duty to Shytone
Roberson to maintain and to repair the street lamp near the
accident scene.
The issue of whether a duty exists is a question of
law that we review de novo without deference to the reasoning of
the trial court.
Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85 (Ky.
2003); Murphy v. Second Street Corporation, 48 S.W.3d 571
(Ky.App. 2001).
“When a court resolves a question of duty it is
essentially making a policy determination.”
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Mullins v.
Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 839 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Ky. 1992).
When analyzing whether a duty of reasonable care exists, “[a]n
enlightened legal system . . . . reasons forward from
circumstances, using foreseeability, [and] the gravity of the
potential harm . . . to decide what is reasonable conduct in the
circumstances and what is negligence.”
Perry v. Williamson, 824
S.W.2d 869, 875 (Ky. 1992).
The trial court correctly observed that there are no
reported cases in Kentucky concerning the duties owed by a
utility company to third parties under similar circumstances.
Our research reveals that there is a fairly equal division among
those jurisdictions that have considered the issue.
See, Jay M.
Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Municipal Corporation or
Electric Utility for Injury Resulting from Inoperative,
Malfunctioning, or Otherwise Defective Streetlight, 111 A.L.R.
5th 579 (2003).
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court was
persuaded by the decisions which refused to impose a duty on a
defendant utility.
Those cases focused on the public policy
concern that the utility would be confronted with large and
unpredictable costs as well as the likelihood of a proliferation
of litigation.
In the Massachusetts case of Vaughan v. Eastern
Edison Company, supra, which also involved a pedestrian hit on a
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street where the lights were not operating properly, the court
held:
[W]e conclude that Massachusetts should
adopt the rule applied in the majority of
other jurisdictions – that ordinarily an
electric company under contract to make
repairs and maintain street lights has no
common law duty to third persons who are
injured. “Duty is an allocation of risk
determined by balancing the foreseeability
of harm, in light of all the circumstances,
against the burden to be imposed.” [citing,
White v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 25
Cal.App.4th 442, (1994)] at 447, 30
Cal.Rptr.2d 431. The capacity to bear or
distribute loss is a factor to consider in
allocating the risk. See Prosser & Keeton,
Torts § 4, at 24. We appreciate that
relieving the electric company of liability
may leave the “loss on the shoulders of the
individual plaintiff, who may be ruined by
it.” Ibid. “But the imposition of tort
liability on those who must render
continuous service of this kind to all who
apply for it under all kinds of
circumstances could [also] be ruinous and
the expense of litigation and settling
claims over the issue of whether or not
there was negligence could be a greater
burden to the rate payer than can be
socially justified.” Id. § 93, at 671.
719 N.E.2d at 523-24.
In support of its ruling, the trial court cited the
New Jersey case of Sinclair v. Dunagan, supra.
The Sinclair
court relied on White v. Southern California Edison Co., supra,
adopting its reasoning as follows:
We must take into consideration not only the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff but
also the burdens to be imposed against a
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defendant. In determining whether a public
utility should be liable to motorists for
inoperable street lights, we must consider
the cost of imposing this liability on
public utilities, the current public utility
rate structures, the large numbers of street
lights, the likelihood that street lights
will become periodically inoperable, the
fact that motor vehicles operate at night
with headlights, the slight chance that a
single inoperative streetlight will be the
cause of a motor vehicle collision, and the
availability of automobile insurance to pay
for damages.
905 F.Supp. at 215.
See also, Blake v. Public Service Company
of New Mexico, 134 N.M. 789, 82 P.3d 960 (2003); and, Horneyer
v. City of Springfield, 98 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Mo.Ct.App. 2003),
which held that there was no duty to maintain street lights
except where “illumination is necessary to avoid dangerous and
potentially hazardous conditions.”
Although the trial court also cited Martinez v.
Florida Power & Light Co., supra, in support of its grant of
summary judgment, the Florida Supreme Court actually vacated the
decision of its intermediate appellate court in Martinez and
remanded the case for a reconsidered decision consistent with
its later opinion in Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson,
873 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 2003).
While Florida was previously
aligned with the “no-duty” jurisdictions, it has abandoned that
absolute approach to this issue and has instead adopted the
“undertaker’s doctrine” as set forth in § 324A of the
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Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Id. at 1186.
This section
addresses the duty owed by one who assumes responsibility for
the safety of third persons as follows:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of a third person or his
things, is subject to liability to the third
person for physical harm resulting from his
failure to exercise reasonable care to
protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care
increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty
owed by the other to the third person,
or
(c) the harm is suffered because of
reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking.
Id.
(Emphases added.)
The facts in Clay Electric are identical in all
relevant aspects to those in the case before us.
Clay Electric
involved a fourteen-year-old child, who was walking to his
school bus on a dark morning in an area where the streetlight
was not functioning.
injuries.
He was hit by a vehicle and died from his
Although the driver was operating his vehicle in a
prudent manner, he was unable to see the child in time to avoid
hitting him due to the “extreme darkness at the site of the
collision.”
Id. at 1184.
Although the electric company had
contracted to maintain the light and was paid to do so, it had
no procedures in place to determine whether the light was
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working or not.
The Florida court held that both the “increased
risk” and the “reliance” subsections of § 324A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts were implicated.
Id. at 1187.
In
finding the utility company potentially liable for the child’s
injuries, the Florida court reasoned as follows:
[L]ong before the present accident took
place, the City of Jacksonville determined
that [the street] needed lighting, and
streetlights subsequently were installed.
When Clay Electric undertook the maintenance
of those lights, the company should have
foreseen that proper maintenance was
necessary for the protection of the
plaintiffs. The streetlight at issue was
located in a residential neighborhood, on a
major roadway, and on the pathway to a
school bus stop. There were no sidewalks in
the area and the local children, on a daily
basis, walked in the early morning darkness
in the grassy strip along the roadway’s edge
directly past the streetlight on their way
to the bus stop.
Id.
Again, we note that this is a case of first impression
as to the duty –- if any -- owed by a public utility to a thirdparty beneficiary of its contract with local government.
In
determining whether LG&E owed a duty to Shytone to exercise
reasonable care in maintaining the street light, we believe that
the moderate balancing approach taken in Clay Electric more
correctly harmonizes with Kentucky law.
It is well settled in
Kentucky that “one who volunteers to act, though under no duty
to do so, is charged with the duty of acting with due care.”
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Sheehan v. United Services Auto. Association, 913 S.W.2d 4, 6
(Ky.App. 1996), citing Estep v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Investment
Trust, 843 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Ky.App. 1992).
The Supreme Court of
Kentucky has acknowledged the applicability of § 324A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in appropriate circumstances.
Ostendorf v. Clark Equipment Company, 122 S.W.3d 530, 538 (Ky.
2003).
The facts of this case fall squarely within the
parameters of § 324A.
The street light in question was not
installed solely for aesthetic reasons.
Jefferson County Fiscal
Court –- the local governing body at the time of the accident –had entered into a maintenance agreement with LG&E for the
safety of those persons using Preston Highway.
The record
reveals that the light is near a public high school and a
residential apartment complex.
LG&E voluntarily undertook (for
consideration) to keep the light illuminated “from dusk-to-dawn
every-night” for the protection of pedestrians living near or
attending school in the area.
It was reasonably foreseeable
that lack of lighting in the area might result in a tragedy.
Reviewing the facts as we must in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment, we observe
first that LG&E’s failure to maintain the streetlight increased
the risk of harm to Shytone.
§ 324A(a).
In Clay Electric, the
utility argued that this subsection was inapplicable “because
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[the pedestrian] was no worse off with an inoperative
streetlight than he would have been with no light at all.”
So.2d at 1187.
873
The court disagreed and concluded that such
reasoning “misse[d] the point”:
The plaintiffs did not allege that Clay
Electric negligently installed the
streetlights on an otherwise unlighted
street. Rather, they alleged that Clay
Electric negligently maintained the
streetlights on an otherwise lighted street.
Construing the present record in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, it appears
that Clay Electric undertook the maintenance
of operative streetlights on Collins Road,
and it was the company’s subsequent
negligence that resulted in the roadway
being cast in darkness. (Emphasis in
original.)
Id.
LG&E’s failure to maintain the street light also fits
within subsection (c) of § 324A, the reliance alternative for
imposing liability.
Roberson arguably suffered harm due to the
reliance of both the county government and his parents that the
street lights would be maintained.
Relying on its contract with
LG&E, Jefferson Fiscal Court failed to take additional or
alternate precautions to render the area safe and lighted.
Possibly in reliance on the streetlight, Roberson’s parents
provided no additional precautionary measures for the safe
passage of their son across the highway.
See, also, David v.
Broadway Maintenance Corporation, 451 F.Supp. 877 (E.D.Pa.1978),
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which held a utility company liable for injuries sustained by a
pedestrian due to negligent maintenance of a streetlight.
We hold that LG&E owed a duty to pedestrians,
including Shytone Roberson, for the faulty condition of the
street light resulting from its failure to maintain the light.
There is evidence in the record that the light at issue had been
inoperable for more than two months.
Whether LG&E breached its
duty of care to Shytone Roberson and whether that breach was the
cause of his injuries are matters which must be properly decided
by a jury on remand.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
vacated, and this matter is remanded for additional proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURRING.
for the following reason.
I concur in result only
I do not agree with the majority that
the facts in Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson, 873
So.2d 1182 (Fla. 2003), “are identical in all relevant aspects
to those in the case before us.”
differ significantly.
In fact, I believe the facts
But I do believe that the Louisville Gas
and Electric Company (LG&E) does have a contractual duty to
maintain the light in question.
As the majority points out,
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streetlights are not installed for aesthetic reasons.
Someone
or some entity decided that the streetlight was necessary for a
specific reason – normally for safety.
The Jefferson County
Fiscal Court and ultimately the taxpayer pay LG&E a monthly fee
for each streetlight.
If the light is not functioning, the
safety provided by the light is lost and the taxpayer is paying
for a service not being provided.
If LG&E agrees to install a
streetlight and to collect a monthly fee, then it has a duty to
insure the light is working and the purpose for its installation
is fulfilled.
As such, I concur with the majority in that I
believe the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based
upon its finding that LG&E had no duty to maintain the
streetlight in question or for that matter, any streetlight it
had installed.
However, I differ from the majority in that I
also believe that the facts herein are significantly different
than those of the Florida case relied on by the majority.
While
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings, I would not
preclude summary judgment being reconsidered based upon the
specific facts of this case.
LG&E does owe a duty to maintain
streetlights but may not owe a duty to Shytone Roberson based
upon his actions of crossing a five lane street approximately
112 yards from what should have been a lit crosswalk.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Philip W. McKinley
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward H. Stopher
Angela McNeal Hoyer
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Raymond G. Smith
Louisville, Kentucky
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