WILLIAM R. WRIGHTSON v. SVETLANA N. WRIGHTSON AND JOSEPH V. MOBLEY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 11, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002419-MR
WILLIAM R. WRIGHTSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE HENRY F. WEBER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-500050
SVETLANA N. WRIGHTSON
AND JOSEPH V. MOBLEY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER, JUDGE; MILLER, SENIOR
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Dr. William R. Wrightson (“Bill”) appeals
from an October 20, 2003, order of the Jefferson Family Court
that amended the court’s judgment with respect to an award of
maintenance to the appellee, Svetlana N. Wrightson.
1
We affirm.
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
Svetlana, a native of the former Soviet Union, married
Bill in January of 1992.
No children were born of the marriage,
and the couple separated in December 2001.
On January 6, 2003,
the family court entered a decree of dissolution reserving for
resolution those issues relating to maintenance and a division
of the property.
A hearing was held on the remaining issues on April
22, 2003.
On August 18, 2003, the court entered its findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment, awarding to Bill the
marital residence -- along with the first mortgage and line of
credit.
He was ordered to pay Svetlana $7,500.00 for her
interest in the residence.
Svetlana received assets having a
net value of nearly $19,000.00; Bill was awarded assets having a
net value of approximately $16,000.00.
In addition, Bill was
ordered to pay Svetlana maintenance of $500.00 per month for a
period of five years.
Svetlana filed a CR2 59 motion, in which she requested
the family court to modify its judgment by granting the marital
residence to her rather than to Bill.
The court did modify its
judgment and awarded the house to Svetlana.
It ordered her to
pay Bill $7,500.00 for his interest in the residence.
Bill does
not appeal from that portion of the judgment as modified.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-2-
In her motion, Svetlana also objected to the award of
maintenance -- $729.16 less than she needed to meet her monthly
expenses.
She argued that it failed to take into account the
anticipated increase in Bill’s earnings following completion of
his surgical fellowship.
Svetlana asked the court to increase
the maintenance award to $1,000.00 per month and to increase it
again “in June 2005 over the next three year period to recognize
[Bill’s] increased earnings . . . .”
Motion at p. 2.
The
family court granted in part and denied in part Svetlana’s
request:
The court cannot predict what the financial
circumstances of each party will be in two
years. [Bill] may finish his residency and
obtain a teaching position that pays
$140,000.00 per year or he may not.
[Svetlana] may finish her education and
obtain a position as an accountant that
pays considerably more than $40,000.00 per
year or she may not. Although [Svetlana’s]
needs are currently in excess of $1,000.00
per month, [Bill] does not have enough
money to meet those needs at this time.
Therefore, the Court will amend the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment and order [Bill] to pay [Svetlana]
maintenance of $500.00 per month for the
next two years, at which time maintenance
may be amended subject to the provisions of
KRS 403.250. . . .
This appeal followed.
Bill does not contest the language allowing for a
modification of the amount of rehabilitative maintenance after
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two years subject to the provisions of KRS3 403.250 and a showing
by Svetlana of a substantial and continuing change of
circumstances.
However, he contends that the family court erred
by converting the original five-year award into one for
permanent maintenance.
He observes that the court’s findings
established Svetlana’s ability to be self-supporting within five
years of the entry of the judgment; therefore, leaving the
duration of the maintenance award open-ended and amenable to
additional review constituted an abuse of the court’s
discretion.
KRS 403.200 governs maintenance and provides in part
as follows:
(1)
(2)
3
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . the
court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse
only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a)
Lacks sufficient property, including marital
property apportioned to him, to provide for his
reasonable needs; and
(b)
Is unable to support himself through appropriate
employment. . . .
The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for
such periods of time as the court deems just, and after
considering all relevant factors including:
(a)
The financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property
apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his
needs independently. . . .;
(b)
The time necessary to acquire sufficient education
or training to enable the party seeking
maintenance to find appropriate employment;
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4-
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
The standard of living established during the
marriage;
The duration of the marriage;
The age, and the physical and emotional condition
of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet his needs while meeting those of
the spouse seeking maintenance.
KRS 403.250(1) allows the provisions of any decree
regarding open-ended maintenance to be modified “only upon a
showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing
as to make the terms unconscionable.”
“manifestly unfair or inequitable.”
S.W.2d 330, 333 (Ky. 1997).
Unconscionable means
Shraberg v. Shraberg, 939
Determinations made with respect to
an award of maintenance are deferred to the sound and broad
discretion of the trial court.
(Ky.App. 2002).
Bickel v. Bickel, 95 S.W.3d 925
An appellate court is not authorized to
substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court if the
trial court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Combs v. Combs, 787 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1990).
After reviewing the record and the amended judgment of
the family court, we do not agree that the court intended to
convert its original award of rehabilitative maintenance into a
grant of permanent maintenance.
The court’s judgment took into
account Svetlana’s strained emotional and financial condition
and her gradual progress toward a career in accounting.
The
court evaluated Bill’s projected earnings while observing that
-5-
his current financial position made it impossible for him to
provide fair maintenance to Svetlana.
In balancing all of these
factors, the judgment awarded maintenance to Svetlana of $500.00
per month for five years.
In her motion to amend the judgment, Svetlana did not
seek a permanent award of maintenance.
Her objective was a
consideration of Bill’s impending, far more lucrative career
prospects.
While Bill’s resources did not permit him to meet
her present financial needs sufficiently, Svetlana asked that
his position be re-evaluated after the initial two years.
If it
had drastically improved (as both she and Bill both
anticipated), Svetlana argued that she should be entitled to an
increase in the monthly award for the duration of the original
term – specifically alluding to the three-year period remaining
on the award.
The family court was persuaded that Svetlana would be
able to recover from the emotional trauma of the divorce and
would begin to make strides in building her own career.
The
court also believed that Bill was on the verge of a very
successful career and that the parties’ financial conditions
were likely to change dramatically.
The court entered its final
award after reviewing the statutory elements underlying an award
of maintenance, considering its own continuing jurisdiction and
authority under the provisions of KRS 403.250(1) to modify a
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maintenance award under appropriate circumstances, and weighing
substantial evidence projecting that the parties’ financial
conditions would change dramatically in the near future.
We
conclude that the family court did not err by crafting the award
as it did in light of its broad discretion in matters concerning
maintenance.
Substantial evidence bolstered the court’s
reasoning that both parties were in transition financially and
emotionally.
As it retained continuing jurisdiction, the court
refrained from foreclosing future adjustments to the maintenance
award.
The court appropriately exercised its discretion in this
matter showing both restraint and wisdom.
The judgment as amended is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE WRIGHTSON:
Mary Janice Lintner
Louisville, Kentucky
Joseph V. Mobley
Oliver B. Rutherford
Louisville, Kentucky
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