KEVIN J. STRONG v. ROBERT S. STRONG
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RENDERED: March 11, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002406-MR
KEVIN J. STRONG
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-005244
v.
ROBERT S. STRONG
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TACKETT, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Kevin J. Strong appeals from a September 4,
2003, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court that granted in part
and denied in part Robert S. Strong’s motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction.
We affirm.
Kevin and Robert were involved in an intimate
relationship for approximately five years while living in
Indiana.
During that period, the parties “resided together,
purchased property together, contributed their incomes to a
joint account, [and] made joint investments . . . .”
at 1.
Complaint
In February 2000, the relationship ended and Kevin moved
to Kentucky.
Kevin initiated this action by filing a complaint in
the Jefferson Circuit Court on June 13, 2003.
Therein, Kevin
alleged that there were items of “joint” property, both real and
personal, to be divided between the parties.
Specifically,
Kevin asserted the parties jointly owned several items of
personal property and had jointly contributed to investment and
checking accounts.
Kevin also asserted that the parties jointly
purchased a burial plot in a Louisville cemetery.
Kevin further
alleged that Robert engaged in tortious behavior in Kentucky
that constituted an invasion of his privacy.
Robert entered a special appearance and filed a
motion pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 12.02 to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.
Robert claimed to be a resident of
Indiana and asserted that during the relationship both his
residence and business were located in Indiana.
Robert further
asserted that while the parties resided in Indiana, they
accumulated personal property in Indiana, and maintained a
checking account in Indiana.
Robert argued the circuit court
lacked personal jurisdiction over him.
The circuit court conducted a hearing on Robert’s
motion to dismiss.
By order entered September 4, 2003, the
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circuit court partially granted and partially denied the motion.
In its order, the circuit court concluded it could exercise
personal jurisdiction over Robert as to the invasion of privacy
claim.
The court further concluded it could exercise in rem
jurisdiction over the claim related to the burial plot located
in Kentucky.
The court dismissed the remaining claims for lack
of jurisdiction.
Kevin filed a motion to reconsider which the
circuit court denied.
This appeal follows.
Kevin contends the circuit court erred by concluding
it lacked personal jurisdiction over Robert to adjudicate the
claims relating to division of the parties’ assets, including
the investment account, checking account, and personal property.
Specifically, Kevin maintains that the parties, acting as a
“partnership,” transacted business in Kentucky by purchasing the
burial plot located in a Louisville cemetery.1
Kevin contends
that as a result of the partnership transacting business in
Kentucky, the court had personal jurisdiction over Robert as to
all issues related to the “partnership” assets pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 454.210(2)(a)(1).
Kevin
essentially argues that the “partnership” assets included the
investment account, the checking account, and other numerous
items of personal property.
Kevin also asserts that as a result
1
We note that there is nothing in the record to indicate the existence of a
partnership between the parties as defined by Kentucky Revised Statutes
362.175.
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of the tortious invasion of privacy committed by Robert in
Kentucky the circuit court could properly exercise personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes 454.210.
KRS 454.210 states, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) As used in this section, "person"
includes an individual, his executor,
administrator, or other personal
representative, or a corporation,
partnership, association, or any other legal
or commercial entity, who is a nonresident
of this Commonwealth.
(2) (a) A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a claim
arising from the person's:
1. Transacting any business in this
Commonwealth;
. . . .
3. Causing tortious injury by an act or
omission in this Commonwealth;
. . . .
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is
based solely upon this section, only a
claim arising from acts enumerated in
this section may be asserted against
him.
KRS 454.210(2)(a)(1) clearly establishes personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has transacted
business in this Commonwealth but only as to a claim that arises
from such business transaction.
See Tennessee Farmers Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Harris, 833 S.W.2d 850 (Ky.App. 1992).
In the case sub judice, Kevin has not asserted that
the parties’ contributions to the investment account, checking
account and items of personal property arose from the parties’
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business transaction (i.e., the purchase of the burial plot in
Kentucky).
As such, KRS 454.210(2)(a)(1) clearly does not
provide a basis for the circuit court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over Robert as to the claims relating to the
investment account, checking account and items of personal
property.
KRS 454.210(2)(a)(3) provides that personal
jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident defendant who
has caused tortious injury in this Commonwealth but only as to a
claim that arises from such injury.
Kevin has not asserted that
the claims related to the investment account, checking account
and personal property arose from Robert’s alleged tortious
conduct in Kentucky.
As the claims did not arise from the
tortious conduct, KRS 454.210(2)(a)(3) clearly does not confer
personal jurisdiction over Robert as to those claims.
Kevin’s next argument is that the parties’
relationship constituted an implied partnership and the circuit
court erred in refusing to recognize the same.
Kevin argues
Glidewell v. Glidewell, 790 S.W.2d 925 (Ky.App. 1990) recognizes
that implied partnerships may arise from relationships involving
unmarried parties.
In Glidewell, an unmarried couple held
themselves out as husband and wife and were treated as a
partnership implied by law for the purpose of dividing assets
when the relationship ended.
Both parties in Glidewell resided
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in Kentucky at the time the lawsuit was filed.
The circuit
court distinguished Glidewell from the facts of this case noting
that jurisdiction was not raised in Glidewell.
We agree with
the circuit court that Glidewell is not applicable to this case,
and without jurisdiction, we are not in a position to consider
recognition of an implied partnership for the purpose of
dividing assets located in Indiana.
Kevin’s next argument is that the circuit court’s
refusal to apply Glidewell to this case constituted a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of Section 3 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
Kevin argues that he is being punished because he
was engaged in a homosexual relationship with Robert and that
the circuit court failed to apply the rule of Glidewell on the
premise that it only applied to unmarried heterosexual couples.
We find this argument to be a misinterpretation of the circuit
court’s order.
While the circuit court acknowledged in its order that
Kevin and Robert were engaged in a homosexual relationship, the
circuit court clearly distinguishes Glidewell on the basis of
jurisdiction, not homosexuality.
As noted, we agree with the
circuit court’s analysis on this issue and thus believe Kevin’s
arguments under the Equal Protection Clause of the Kentucky
Constitution to be totally without merit and otherwise not
applicable to this case.
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Kevin’s final contention is that pursuant to KRS
362.305 the circuit court could have properly exercised
jurisdiction to dissolve the parties “partnership” and, thus,
divide the assets.
KRS 362.305 merely identifies the
circumstances under which a court shall enter a decree
dissolving a partnership.
The statute, however, has nothing to
do with whether a court may properly exercise jurisdiction over
a partnership under Kentucky law.
Since there exists no express
or implied partnership as to the assets located in Indiana, we
are of the opinion that this argument is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bryan D. Gatewood
JOHNSON & GATEWOOD, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
Davis E. Edwards
Louisville, Kentucky
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