KENNETH RAY AUDAS v. VIVIAN FAYE AUDAS
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RENDERED: March 11, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002231-MR
KENNETH RAY AUDAS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOAN L. BYER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-FD-001568
v.
VIVIAN FAYE AUDAS
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TACKETT, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order entered by the
Jefferson Circuit Court relating to a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order (QDRO).
For the reasons stated hereafter, we
vacate the court’s order and remand this matter for further
proceedings.
The parties married in 1966 and divorced in 1993.
Throughout the marriage Kenneth was employed by a trucking
company, while Vivian primarily was a homemaker.
When the
parties divorced the trial court signed a QDRO providing for the
equal division of Kenneth’s pension, which at that time was
valued at $700 per month.
In May 1996 the court entered an
amended QDRO providing that Vivian was “entitled to benefit
from” 50% of the “benefit from said Pension Fund which accrued”
during the time of the parties’ marriage, to be paid either on
the date and manner of her choosing, or on the date when Kenneth
began receiving benefits.
The amended QDRO was not appealed.
Vivian elected to delay receiving her share of the
pension until Kenneth retired and began drawing pension benefits
at the end of 1998.
The pension fund’s value substantially
increased between 1993 and 1998, largely due to union
negotiations.
As a result, Kenneth began drawing a pension of
some $2,500 per month when he retired at the end of 1998.
Although Vivian received $350 per month based on the earlier
valuation of the pension fund, she asserted that she was
entitled to more.
She therefore filed a motion in 1999 seeking
an adjustment of the QDRO, claiming that the amount of her
monthly benefits should reflect the increase in the pension
fund’s value.
Multiple motions and orders regarding the QDRO
followed, only some of which are pertinent to this appeal.
On
August 16, 2000, the trial court denied Vivian’s motion to amend
the QDRO but directed that the value of her share of the
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benefits should be recalculated.
Acknowledging that a pension
must be valued as of the date of dissolution, the court held
that Vivian
is entitled to the amount in the pension
that accrued during the parties’
twenty-seven (27) year marriage. The effect
of this valuation, in essence, is to
conceptually separate [Vivian’s] portion
from [Kenneth’s] portion without actually
removing [Vivian’s] property. The language
of the QDRO provides that [Vivian] is
entitled to fifty percent (50%) of
[Kenneth’s] benefits that had vested between
the date of marriage and the date of
divorce. It further provides that [Vivian]
has the option to elect payout at anytime
[Vivian] deems appropriate or [Vivian] may
elect to receive her share of the pension
when [Kenneth] begins to draw on the fund.
After divorce [Vivian’s] share remained in
the pension. [Vivian] declined to elect an
immediate payout. The fact that she did not
make such an election seems to indicate that
she believed that if left in the pension it
would accrue more value with the passage of
time. This conclusion is a reasonable one.
The court distinguished the situation before it from Brosick v.
Brosick,1 which involved a postdissolution increase in a pension
fund’s value as a result of the pension participant’s
“post-decree efforts and contributions.”
Here, by contrast,
there was an increase in the pension’s value
that was not the result of [Kenneth’s]
post-decree efforts. A substantial part of
the increase in the pension’s value resulted
from the collective bargaining contracts
entered into by the Teamsters not from the
efforts of [Kenneth]. [Vivian] is entitled
1
974 S.W.2d 498 (Ky.App. 1998).
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to the increase in her share of the pension
that was determined at the time of divorce
that resulted from the collective
bargaining. [Vivian] is not entitled to any
increase in value that resulted from the
efforts of [Kenneth].
The court declined to amend the QDRO but determined that Vivian
was entitled to increased benefits under the terms of the
existing QDRO.
The parties were directed to “have the plan
administrator determine the amount of the pension to which
[Vivian] was entitled to as of the date of the divorce and the
subsequent increase in the value of that amount resulting from
factors not related to [Kenneth’s] post-decree efforts,” and to
adjust Vivian’s monthly benefits accordingly.
Although the August 16 order initially was made final,
on September 11, 2000, the court sustained Vivian’s motion to
delete the order’s finality language.
Multiple motions and
proceedings followed, including the entry and subsequent setting
aside of a QDRO in July 2003.
On September 23, 2003, the court
both entered an amended QDRO and again finalized the August 16,
2000, order denying an amended QDRO but addressing how the
existing QDRO should be applied.
Kenneth challenged the
internal inconsistency of the court’s order, and he asserted
that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the amended QDRO
absent allegations that Vivian was entitled to relief pursuant
to CR 60.02.
On Kenneth’s motion, “pending further adjudication
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on this matter,” the court set aside the September 23 order on
October 3, 2003.
Kenneth appealed from the September 23 order on
October 21, 2003, despite the fact that the September 23 order
already had been made nonfinal on his own motion.
On November
29, 2004, this court directed the parties to show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed as having been taken from a
nonfinal order.
The parties filed a joint response stating that
after the court entered the October 3 order, they and the court
acknowledged that the September 23, 2003,
Order was not subject to suspension. It now
appears that the Record of the trial court
does not reflect the finality of the
September 23, 2003, Order. Accordingly, the
trial court entered an Order correcting the
impression left by the Record[.]
After considering the response, this court ordered that the
appeal should not be dismissed and that the record on appeal
should be supplemented “to include the record of any proceedings
or documents filed” after the certification of the record on
appeal.
That supplemental record included the trial court’s
nunc pro tunc order of December 17, 2004, vacating the October 3
order and
leaving the Order of Court entered September
23, 2003, as the final and appealable Order
of the Court. Entry of this Order renders
the September 23, 2003, Order as the
pleading from which any appeal filed by
[Kenneth] must have proceeded and removes
any question as to its interlocutory nature.
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Thus, we arrive at this point on appeal.
As Vivian did not file
a brief, we do not have the benefit of her responses to
Kenneth’s contentions.
A pension constitutes a divisible marital asset which
should be valued as of the date of a marital dissolution.2
The
terms of such a property division may not be modified unless the
trial court finds that conditions exist to justify the reopening
of the judgment under Kentucky law.
KRS 403.250(1).
Here, the trial court did not address the issue of how
it retained or acquired jurisdiction to enter a new or amended
QDRO in September 2003 after the previous amended QDRO became
final in 1996.
See CR 59.
Although a trial court is authorized
by KRS 403.250(1) to modify or revoke a QDRO pursuant to CR
60.02, here several years had passed between the entry of the
1996 QDRO and the attempts to modify that QDRO.
Thus, under CR
60.02 Vivian could obtain relief only after showing
(d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other
than perjury or falsified evidence; (e) the
judgment is void, or has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application, or (f) any other
reason of an extraordinary nature justifying
relief.
2
Brosick, 974 S.W.2d at 504; Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56 (Ky.App. 1990).
See also KRS 403.190.
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Vivian did not specifically refer to CR 60.02 in her
motions below, and there is nothing in the record to show that
the trial court addressed jurisdiction and Vivian’s ability to
seek CR 60.02 relief.
In the absence of any findings addressing
the issue of jurisdiction below, this court cannot review
whether the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction to amend
or clarify the existing QDRO.
Thus, the order of September 23,
2003, as well as the nunc pro tunc order of December 17, 2004,
must be vacated and remanded for further proceedings pertaining
to the issue of jurisdiction.
Although this outcome eliminates
the need to resolve the apparent internal inconsistencies of the
September 2003 order, which both amends and denies amendment of
the 1996 QDRO but addresses how that QDRO should be applied, on
remand the trial court should take steps to avoid any further
ambiguities pertaining to the parties’ QDRO.
The court’s order is vacated and this matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views set
out in this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James E. Vonsick
Louisville, Kentucky
No Brief Filed
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