KEVIN GEORGE v. MARGARET SEEGER-GEORGE DIANA L. SKAGGS
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RENDERED:
February 18, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002218-MR
KEVIN GEORGE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JOAN L. BYER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-502764
MARGARET SEEGER-GEORGE
(NOW SEEGER-GATTI) AND
DIANA L. SKAGGS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a post-decree order
which awarded appellee attorney fees incurred in defending a
post-decree motion filed by appellant.
Appellant argues that
the post-decree award of attorney fees was improper because:
appellee had already been awarded attorney fees in the parties’
settlement agreement that were intended to be in full
satisfaction of all claims for attorney fees;
the motion for
attorney fees was prompted by appellee’s breach of the
separation agreement; and the award was an abuse of discretion.
We reject appellant’s arguments and thus affirm.
Appellant, Kevin George, and appellee, Margaret
Seeger-George (now Seeger-Gatti), were married in 1999 and
separated in July of 2002.
No children were born of the
marriage, but the record indicates that Margaret had five
children from a previous marriage, some of whom were disabled
and resided with the parties during the marriage.
Kevin filed
the petition for dissolution of marriage on July 9, 2002.
During mediation on October 17, 2002, the parties reached a
settlement agreement which was filed in the record on October
28, 2002, and incorporated into the decree of dissolution
entered on November 1, 2002.
The parties agreed that the
marital residence would be sold upon dissolution.
As to
attorney fees, the settlement agreement provided that Kevin
would pay Margaret $5,000 “as partial reimbursement for her
attorney fees herein.”
Another provision stated that there
could be no modification of the agreement except as agreed in
writing by both parties.
Per the terms of the agreement, Margaret vacated the
marital residence after the decree was entered.
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At this point,
a dispute arose between the parties over certain items of
personal property which Margaret took from the premises which
Kevin maintained were fixtures that were to stay with the
property.
Consequently, on November 27, 2002, Kevin, who was an
attorney, filed a pro se motion to compel, alleging that
Margaret had breached the terms of the settlement agreement by
taking numerous fixtures from the property.
thereafter held on the motion.
A hearing was
On April 8, 2003, the court
entered an order finding that Margaret was entitled to take all
but two of the items in question, a basketball goal and a
ceiling fan.
Margaret then moved for Kevin to pay the legal
expenses and attorney fees she incurred in defending the motion.
After a hearing on the motion, the court entered an order
requiring Kevin to pay $6,336 in attorney fees for Margaret.
This appeal by Kevin followed.
Kevin first argues that allowing Margaret to receive
further attorney fees in effect modified the parties’ settlement
agreement.
Kevin maintains that since the settlement agreement
was intended to be the final resolution of all claims, including
those for attorney fees, Margaret was not entitled to further
attorney fees.
Section 5 of the agreement, entitled “RELEASE”,
provided:
Each party does hereby release and discharge
the other from any and all claims, demands,
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liabilities, obligations, damages, actions,
choses in action whatsoever, including but
not limited to any and all claims for past,
present, and future maintenance (except as
reserved in paragraph 7.1 hereof), dower,
curtesy, descent and distribution and any
and all other claims arising out of the
marriage or otherwise, but excepting from
said releases the obligations contained in
the herein agreement.
Section 6 of the agreement provided:
Each party shall pay his or her own attorney
and court costs. . . . Kevin shall pay to
[Margaret] $1000 per month for a period of
five months commencing November 1, 2002, as
partial reimbursement for her attorney fees
herein.
From our reading of the settlement agreement, the
attorney fees received by Margaret in the agreement were for
fees that she had incurred up to entry of the decree because
those were all fees that could be anticipated at the time of the
agreement.
In our view, the agreement did not bar Margaret from
seeking attorney fees for future litigation because Margaret
could not have foreseen that she would have to defend the postdecree motion filed by Kevin in this case.
It would be
inequitable to restrict Margaret from seeking attorney fees for
unforeseeable post-decree litigation initiated by Kevin,
especially given that Kevin filed the motion pro se and thus did
not incur attorney fees.
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Kevin next argues that he was forced to file the postdecree motion to compel because Margaret breached the settlement
agreement.
Thus he contends he should not be required to pay
her attorney fees when it was her breach of the agreement that
precipitated the motion.
The motion to compel filed by Kevin alleged that
Margaret improperly took fifteen items that were fixtures when
she left the marital residence.
After a full hearing on the
matter, the court ultimately ruled that of the fifteen items at
issue, only two were required to be returned or replaced by
Margaret, a ceiling fan and a basketball goal that Margaret
maintained was a gift to her disabled children.
Hence, the
court partially ruled in favor of Kevin as to only those two
items and one-half of the cleaning costs.
As to all the other
items, the court ruled in favor of Margaret.
In its order, the
court simply granted Kevin’s motion in part; the court did not
adjudge that Margaret breached the settlement agreement.
The agreement did not specify what items were fixtures
and what items Margaret was permitted to take with her.
The
agreement merely provided that Margaret was to receive “[a]ll
household goods and furnishings in her possession and in the
marital residence excepting only the items Kevin is to receive
under paragraph 2.3.3 hereof.”
And under paragraph 2.3.3 of the
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agreement, Kevin was to get “the refrigerator he owned prior to
the marriage, garage shelving and related matter, and the hot
wax/paraffin equipment.”
Since the agreement was not specific
as to what items Margaret was allowed to take from the
residence, it cannot be said that Margaret breached the
agreement when she took certain items.
The motion was simply to
clarify what items were permissible to take from the property
and what items were considered part of the property.
Kevin also argues that the trial court failed to
consider the parties’ financial resources in its post-decree
award of attorney fees to Margaret.
without merit.
This argument is completely
In its order awarding post-decree attorney fees
to Margaret, the court explicitly examined the financial
resources of the parties, adjudging, “After careful
consideration of the evidence before it, the Court finds that
there does exist a disparity in the financial resources of the
parties.
The Court concludes that an award of attorney’s fees
in the requested amount of $6,336.00 is justified pursuant to
KRS 403.220.”
Finally, Kevin argues that the court abused its
discretion in awarding the post-decree attorney fees to
Margaret.
Under KRS 403.220, a court may award attorney fees in
a domestic action if there is a disparity in the financial
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resources of the parties.
1990).
Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky.
In Gentry, the Court also recognized that the trial
court was in the best position to observe the conduct of the
parties, and was permitted to award fees to discourage or
sanction tactics that wasted the court’s time.
Id.
The
allocation of attorney fees under KRS 403.220 is entirely within
Browning v. Browning, 551
the discretion of the trial court.
S.W.2d 823 (Ky. App. 1977).
The evidence in the present case
revealed that Kevin earned approximately $138,828 a year, while
Margaret earned less than $25,000 a year.
Given this disparity
in income and the fact that Kevin was the one who brought the
post-decree motion from which he recovered very little (compared
to what he sought and the costs of the motion), we cannot say
that the court abused its discretion in awarding post-decree
attorney fees to Margaret.
For the reasons stated above, the order of the
Jefferson Family Court is affirmed.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kevin George
Louisville, Kentucky
Diana L. Skaggs
Sandra G. Ragland
Louisville, Kentucky
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