ROBERTA DITTOE AND HER ATTORNEY, SUZANNE CASSIDY, ESQ. v. GREGG DITTOE
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 28, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002133-MR
AND
NO. 2003-CA-002199-MR
ROBERTA DITTOE AND HER ATTORNEY,
SUZANNE CASSIDY, ESQ.
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-01226
GREGG DITTOE
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, HENRY, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Roberta Dittoe has appealed from orders entered
by the Kenton Circuit Court following remand from this Court for
the trial court to consider the appellee/cross-appellant Gregg
Dittoe’s employment bonus income in calculating child support
and awarding maintenance.
Roberta has also appealed the trial
court’s distribution of Gregg’s non-qualified pension fund1 and
denial of her motion for additional attorney’s fees.
Gregg has
filed a protective cross-appeal, which is moot since we affirm
the trial court on all issues in Roberta’s appeal.
The parties were married on July 23, 1983.
Two
children were born of the marriage, namely Nicole, born January
3, 1985, and Anna, born February 14, 1990.
Roberta filed a
petition to dissolve the marriage on June 24, 1998, and an
agreed order was entered on August 12, 1998, which provided that
Gregg would pay Roberta child support of $1,500.00 per month and
maintenance of $2,000.00 per month, pendente lite.
At the final hearing, Roberta presented evidence that
the reasonable expenses for her and the children were $4,697.00
per month.
On April 22, 1999, the trial court entered the
decree dissolving the parties’ marriage and awarded Roberta
child support of $1,687.00 per month and maintenance of
$2,000.00 per month to be paid through July 2000.
The trial
court based the child support award on Gregg’s base salary and
investment income, but it did not include Gregg’s employment
bonus income for 1998 of $92,000.00 in its calculations,
characterizing such an award as “a windfall to the children as
opposed to support.”
Rather, the trial court required Gregg to
1
This was not an issue in the original appeal. However, at the time of the
remand hearing, this fund had not been divided and Gregg was holding the
money received from this fund in his checking account.
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pay the costs of the children’s private school tuition,
uniforms, fees, and music lessons, in addition to his child
support payments.
On April 29, 1999, Roberta filed a motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the trial court’s order as to child
support and maintenance.
The trial court entered an amended
decree on September 1, 1999, but the issues addressed therein
are not relevant to this appeal.
On March 15, 2000, the trial
court entered a second amended conclusions of law and decree of
dissolution which denied Roberta’s motion to modify the child
support award, but extended the term of the $2,000.00 monthly
maintenance award until June 2001.
of appeal on April 14, 2000.2
Roberta then filed a notice
This Court rendered an Opinion on
October 12, 2001, vacating the trial court’s orders for failure
to consider Gregg’s bonus income in determining child support
and maintenance and remanding for additional findings.3
2
Gregg
Case No. 2000-CA-000934-MR.
3
In December 2000, due to Gregg’s increased income, the parties agreed to
modify his child support obligation. Since the appeal of the initial
determination was pending, the parties agreed to utilize his same income
figures in recalculating the support. The modified agreement was entered on
December 21, 2000, and provided that Gregg would pay from January 1, 2001, to
June 30, 2001, $1,983.00 per month, plus $234.00 for activity fees; and
beginning July 1, 2001, he would pay $2,391.00 per month, plus $234.00 for
activity fees. During this time, Gregg continued to pay Catholic school
tuition for the children, as well as sports-related fees and other costs.
The parties agreed to share other discretionary spending for the children in
proportion to their incomes, which at the time varied from a 70/30 ratio to a
80/20 ratio. Other than this voluntary change, Gregg never sought a review
of his support obligation due to changed economic circumstances. However,
Roberta filed motions for modification of child support on May 30, 2002, and
July 11, 2002.
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filed a motion for discretionary review with our Supreme Court,
which was denied on June 6, 2002.
On remand, the trial court held a hearing on October
15, 2002, at which time it addressed the issues that are the
subject of this appeal and cross-appeal.
The trial court
entered an order and judgment on May 13, 2003, which provided
that Roberta did not qualify for an extended duration of
maintenance as she had received her Bachelor of Arts degree in
May 2000, among other educational endeavors.
However, the trial
court increased the original maintenance award to $4,000.00 per
month for the entire duration of the award.
The trial court also increased the child support award
to $2,554.00 per month from the date of dissolution, April 22,
1999, through June 2001; the sum of $3,129.00 per month from
July 2001 through February 2002; and the sum of $978.00 per
month from March 2002 through May 2003.
The trial court went
further to establish the amount of child support to be paid
beginning June 2003 upon emancipation of the parties’ oldest
child, reducing the award to $671.00 per month.
In ordering the
increases in the maintenance and child support, the trial court
gave Gregg credit for all prior maintenance and child support
paid, including the monies paid in lieu of child support by
Gregg for Catholic school tuition, uniforms, fees, and music
lessons, that had been based on his bonus income.
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On May 23, 2003, Roberta filed a motion to alter,
amend, or vacate asking the trial court to order Gregg to
transfer one-half of the value of his non-qualified pension fund
as of the date of dissolution to Roberta; to modify the
effective date and amount of the child support award that the
trial court ordered to begin March 1, 2002; to vacate the child
support award the Court ordered to begin June 1, 2003, until
proof is offered as to the parties’ current earning capacities;
to modify the credits Gregg received for payments for the
children outside of the child support award, to only those
deductions in proportion to the parties’ respective incomes
during the applicable periods; and to modify the maintenance
award as to amount and duration.
The trial court entered an
order on September 9, 2003, awarding Roberta one-half of the
value of Gregg’s non-qualified pension fund as of April 22,
1999, and establishing the value on that date as $48,283.00.4
The trial court further found that Roberta was entitled to onehalf of any growth occurring in the pension fund after the date
on which she would have been able to have the benefit of it had
it been paid to her at that time, but that she was not entitled
to any portion of the fund contributed from Gregg’s non-marital
4
The trial court had originally awarded Roberta one-half of the value of this
account and established that value as $34,167.00 as of April 22, 1999.
Additional evidence was provided to the trial court at a later hearing that
the actual value on the date of the divorce was greater than originally
disclosed and the trial court amended its orders accordingly.
-5-
funds.
Once the value of Roberta’s one-half interest in the
fund was established, Gregg was to receive a credit for one-half
of the taxes which Gregg had been required by federal law to pay
on his receipt of the distribution.
The trial court concluded that it had discretion to
revise the original child support award on remand based on this
Court’s Opinion rendered October 12, 2001.
The trial court
concluded that the additional evidence of the parties’ then
current financial status merited an amendment of the revised
child support award from March 2002 through May 2003 to
$1,286.00 per month and beginning in June 2003 to $867.00 per
month.5
The trial court again allowed Gregg to offset past-due
child support amounts by the amounts he had paid under the
original decree for school tuition, school fees, including book
and lunch charges; but excluding charitable contributions to the
schools, school uniforms, tutoring, and music lessons.6
The
trial court further declined to reconsider its revised
maintenance award and denied Roberta’s motion for attorney’s
fees.
This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
5
There was no amendment to the revised award of child support from April 22,
1999, through February 2002, by the trial court on Roberta’s motion to alter,
amend, or vacate.
6
The trial court further prohibited
any other expenses, including sports
and clothing as they were considered
original order of the trial court as
bonus income.
Gregg
fees,
gifts
items
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from deducting amounts paid for
photographs, cell phones, cars,
and were not included in the
to be paid as support from Gregg’s
During the marriage, Gregg had a successful career,
and at the time of divorce, he was president of national network
development for his employer, Advo.
Except for a period early
in the marriage, Roberta did not work outside the home.
During
the marriage, the parties had a very comfortable lifestyle
including, a private home, membership to a private club, and
vacations.
The parties’ children attended private schools and
participated in various extra-curricular and social activities.
The parties had approximately $1.2 million in assets, and debt
in the approximate amount of $530,000.00 on their real estate.
At the time of the divorce, Gregg was earning approximately
$21,500.00 per month, including regular annual bonuses and a car
allowance, with all travel expenses reimbursed by his employer.
In the four years following the parties’ divorce,
Roberta’s income was $13,910.00 in 1999, $27,202.00 in 2000,
$49,239.00 in 2001 (which included her maintenance, which ended
June 30, 2001), and $26,805.00 in 2002.
Roberta graduated from
college in June 2002, obtained a real estate license, and
attended court reporter school.
In her first job out of
college, she earned $27,000.00 annually, but it required
significant travel.
Her subsequent employer went out of
business in May 2002, and at the time of the hearing in May
2003, she was receiving $341.00 a week in unemployment benefits.
Her supplemental income from rent and dividends remained at the
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same level as existed at the time of the divorce, which was
$12,000.00 annually in rental income and approximately
$16,000.00 annually in interest and dividend income.
During
this same time, Gregg’s income based on his tax returns was
$219,083.00 in 1999, $320,126.00 in 2000, and somewhere between
$378,411.00 and $400,108.00 in 20017.
In 2000 Gregg lost his
employment at Advo because of a company restructuring.
He
received a salary that year, a severance package, and a onetime-only stock award.
He then found employment at Mail South,
but lost this job in February 2002 due to a “political”
disagreement with the direction of the company.
He testified
that his anticipated 2002 earnings were $70,000.00.8
However, in
a later hearing, upon production of his 2002 tax return, it was
determined that his income was considerably greater for 2002,
being approximately $100,000.00 to $150,000.00.
He testified
that he had decided not to travel as much so he could spend more
time with his children and he chose not to look for jobs outside
the area for this reason, despite the fact that he remarried in
2002 and his current wife resides in California.
7
Gregg’s actual 2001 income is
finding regarding it. His 2001
and his 2001 amended tax return
claims that his 2001 income was
disputed and the trial court made no specific
tax return indicates income of $400,108.00
indicates income of $389,907.00. However, he
$378,411.00.
8
Gregg received a stock certificate valued at $113,500.00, which he paid
taxes on in 2001, but did not receive its value until 2002. It is unclear if
the trial court treated this as income for 2001 or 2002. It appears on
Gregg’s 2002 tax return as a tax-free event, since he paid the taxes on it in
2001.
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CHILD SUPPORT
Roberta raises three issues regarding the trial
court’s award of child support.
First, she argues that the
trial court’s modification of child support effective March 1,
2002, is not supported by the evidence and the reduction as of
that date is contrary to the facts and the law.
Second, Roberta
argues that because there was no motion to modify future child
support, the trial court erred in setting a child support award
effective June 1, 2003, and that the award was not based on the
parties’ earning capacities.
Third, Roberta argues that the
trial court erred when it granted Gregg 100% credit against his
back child support for his prior payments of school-related fees
for the children, as ordered by the trial court in its April 22,
1999, order.
It is important to note that Roberta is not
contesting the trial court’s revised child support award from
the date of the parties’ divorce through February 2002.
Thus,
this appeal only involves the child support award from March 1,
2002, to present.
KRS9 403.211 and KRS 403.212 provide the guidelines for
calculating child support.
KRS 403.212(5) states that “the
court may use its judicial discretion in determining child
support in circumstances where combined adjusted parental gross
income exceeds the uppermost levels of the guideline table.”
9
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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This level is a combined adjusted parental gross monthly income
of $15,000.00.10
KRS 403.211(3)(e) requires the trial court to
make a written finding or specific finding on the record of any
adjustment to the guideline amount when the combined monthly
adjusted parental gross income is in excess of the Kentucky
child support guidelines.
In this case, it was specifically
found that the parties’ monthly adjusted parental gross income
was approximately $23,500.00, justifying the deviation from the
guidelines.
Since this Court in its 2001 Opinion vacated the trial
court’s 2000 judgment, on remand the trial court made its
determinations as if the parties had been granted a new trial.11
“When a judgment is reversed on direct appeal, it is as though
it never existed.”12
Thus, the trial court was not required to
wait for one of the parties to file a motion to set the child
support award.
Roberta argues that the trial court, after
setting the revised child support award upon remand, went a step
further and modified this award effective March 1, 2002, and
June 1, 2003, without a motion by either of the parties.
Since
Roberta’s motion to modify child support was filed on May 30,
10
KRS 403.212(7).
11
Gill v. Wall, 239 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Ky. 1951).
12
Clay v. Clay, 707 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Ky.App. 1986) (citing Drury v. Franke,
247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 969 (1933); and Knight’s Adm’r v. Illinois Central R.
Co., 143 Ky. 418, 136 S.W. 874 (1911)).
-10-
2002,13 she argues under Price v. Price,14 that the earliest
effective date for the trial court’s modification of its
original child support order upon remand would be the date she
filed her motion for modification.
The trial court in its May
13, 2003, order set Gregg’s child support effective the next
month, June 1, 2003, after acknowledging that the parties’
oldest child, who was eighteen at the time, was to graduate from
high school during May 2003.
Gregg argues that when the case
was remanded, the trial court could make new awards, both
retrospective and prospective, for child support and that the
law in Price is not applicable to this case.
We agree.
The Court in Price stated that “‘[t]he provisions of
any decree respecting child support may be modified only as to
installments accruing subsequent to the filing of a motion for
modification and only upon a showing of material change in
circumstances that is substantial and continuing.’”15
But since
the trial court was allowed on remand to start from the
beginning in setting the child support award, there was no award
to modify.
The trial court was correct in using the historical
account of the parties’ incomes and potential for income, rather
13
Roberta states in her brief that the motion was filed on July 11, 2002.
While there was a motion for modification of child support filed on that
date, the record shows that she had filed one on May 30, 2002.
14
912 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. 1995).
15
Id. at 46 (quoting KRS 403.213).
-11-
than having to rely on estimations of projected income.
It was
proper for the trial court to set child support from the date of
dissolution through the present.
Thus, the trial court, in
starting over, correctly used this information to set equitable
child support for the children based on the instructions from
this Court.
Roberta further argues that the modification was made
without the trial court’s consideration of the parties’ current
incomes or earning capacities.
In reviewing the record, it
appears that the trial court had income information on the
parties through 2002 and undisputed testimony of the parties’
projected 2003 incomes.
Further, there was extensive testimony
as to the parties’ monthly expenses and the children’s
reasonable needs.
Therefore, the trial court properly
considered the parties’ incomes and earning capacities in making
the child support award on remand.
In reviewing a child support award, “an appellate
court will not disturb the trial court absent an abuse of
discretion.
An appellate court is not authorized to substitute
its own judgment for that of the trial court where the trial
court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence” [footnote
omitted].16
The trial court heard the testimony of the parties,
including their ability to financially support their children
16
Bickel v. Bickel, 95 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Ky.App. 2002).
-12-
and to provide for the children’s reasonable needs, and then
made findings that were supported by substantial evidence.
We
do not find an abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s
award of child support upon remand.
The trial court originally ordered Gregg to pay the
children’s school-related expenses in lieu of additional child
support based on his bonus income.
Neither Gregg nor Roberta
cite any legal authority in their briefs to this Court to
support or refute this action by the trial court.
Because the
trial court on remand included Gregg’s bonus income in the child
support award, which we find to be supported by substantial
evidence, we affirm the credit given by the trial court to Gregg
for these payments.
Otherwise, Roberta would be receiving a
“double recovery” from Gregg’s bonus income--once as income for
child support purposes and again as payment of other expenses.
MAINTENANCE AWARD
Roberta argues that the trial court’s award of
maintenance upon remand should have been based on the formula
found in Atwood v. Atwood.17
However, we agree with Gregg that
the method provided in Atwood is only a recommendation and
following this formula is not required in making a maintenance
determination.18
The final determination on maintenance is a
17
643 S.W.2d 263 (Ky.App. 1982).
18
Id. at 266.
-13-
matter of discretion for the trial court.19
Both, the amount
and duration award of maintenance, are within the trial court’s
sound discretion.
This Court will uphold the award unless we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion or based its
decision on factual findings that were clearly erroneous.20
“[U]nless absolute abuse is shown, the appellate court must
maintain confidence in the trial court and not disturb the
findings of the trial judge.”21
Roberta fails to demonstrate
that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the
duration of the maintenance award.
Under KRS 403.200(1), a trial court has discretion to
award maintenance where a spouse lacks sufficient property,
including marital property apportioned to her, for her
reasonable needs, and is unable to support herself through
appropriate employment.
If a spouse is entitled to a
maintenance award, factors relevant to determining the amount of
the award include the financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, the time necessary to acquire education and
training to find employment, the standard of living established
during the marriage, the duration of the marriage, the age and
19
KRS 403.200.
20
Russell v. Russell, 878 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky.App. 1994).
21
Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Ky.App. 1990) (citing Platt v. Platt,
728 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Ky.App. 1987); and Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370, 373
(Ky.App. 1982)).
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physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance, and the ability of the paying spouse to meet his
needs.22
A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether
to award maintenance in the first instance, as well as in
determining the amount and duration of a maintenance award.23
In this case, the trial court found that Roberta had a
gross yearly income of approximately $28,000.00 from rental
income and dividend and investment income and Gregg had a net
income of $9,000.00 per month.
Roberta was awarded
approximately $703,712.00 in marital property, with
approximately $195,000.00 in debts.
She was unemployed for most
of the marriage, but was attending college and expected to
receive her degree in May 2000. Her monthly expenses were found
to be approximately $4,700.00.
The parties were married for 15
years and enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle.
Gregg was
awarded approximately $877,093.00 in marital property, with
approximately $335,000.00 in debts.
His monthly expenses were
found to be $9,950.00, which included maintenance and child
support payments.
Roberta was 40 years of age and Gregg was 45
years of age on the date of the divorce and there was no
evidence that either was in poor health.
Under the
circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the trial
22
KRS 403.200(2).
23
Leveridge v. Leveridge, 997 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1999); Gentry v. Gentry, 798
S.W.2d 928, 937 (Ky. 1990)).
-15-
court’s award of maintenance of $4,000.00 per month for two
years and one month to Roberta was an abuse of discretion.
The trial court determined that Roberta was entitled
to an award of maintenance from Gregg because she met the
requirements of KRS 403.200(1).
Specifically, the trial court
found that she lacked sufficient property, including marital
property apportioned to her, to provide for her reasonable needs
and that she was unable to support herself at the time through
appropriate employment.
However, in May 2000 Roberta received a
college degree and certainly was in a much better position to
support herself through appropriate employment.
Thus, we
conclude there was no abuse in discretion in the duration of the
maintenance award as it extended for one year after Roberta’s
graduation from college and we affirm the trial court’s
maintenance award.
DIVISION OF NON-QUALIFIED PENSION PLAN
In the original decree of dissolution, the trial court
awarded Roberta one-half of Gregg’s “Continuation 401k plan.”24
The findings of fact entered on April 22, 1999, indicated that
the value of this asset was $34,167.00.
Following the
dissolution, it was determined that the asset could not be
divided by QDRO,25 since it was a non-qualified plan.
24
Because
This plan is also referred to throughout the record and this Opinion as
Gregg’s non-qualified pension fund.
25
Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
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Gregg was subsequently terminated from Advo, his former employer
distributed the full amount of the funds in the plan to Gregg,
withholding taxes in the amount of 28% for federal and 6% for
state.
The net distribution totaled $70,244.01, which Gregg
deposited into his checking account.
The trial court found that
each party was entitled to one-half of the net value of this
account.
Roberta raises two issues regarding the distribution
of this pension fund.
First, she argues that her share of the
distribution should be taxed at her marginal rate which was 15%
at the time the money should have been distributed.
Roberta
asserts that she should not be penalized by having to pay taxes
on the funds at a significantly higher rate.
Gregg testified
that this plan was cashed out to him because he was terminated
from his employment.
Upon that event, federal law required that
it be paid out to only the holder of the account and taxed at
the applicable rate.
Because this was not a tax-free
distribution but treated as income to Gregg, we agree that
Roberta is entitled to receive only her share of the after-tax
value of the fund, as that was the net value of the asset Gregg
received.
At the October 15, 2002, hearing an issue arose as to
the actual value of the funds to be distributed.
The trial
court directed the parties to brief the issue regarding the
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valuation date of the asset.
Roberta submitted authority to the
trial court, relying on Armstrong v. Armstrong,26 which stated
that the valuation date of the account should be the date of
dissolution.
It does not appear that Gregg provided any support
for the valuation date.
This Court in Armstrong stated, “‘a
trial court retains broad discretion in valuing pension rights
and dividing them between parties in a divorce proceeding, so
long as it does not abuse its discretion in so doing. . . .’”27
We hold that the trial court correctly determined the valuation
date of the asset to be the date of dissolution of the marriage,
April 22, 1999, and thereafter correctly valued the asset.
Gregg paid Roberta $14,967.14 from the proceeds of the
fund at the end of the July 2003 hearing, as that amount was not
in dispute.
During the hearing on July 15, 2003, Roberta
stipulated that the total marital portion of the undistributed,
non-qualified plan, after taxes, was $60,877.80.
This sum
included the marital contribution noted by the trial court and
the growth of the marital portion of the fund between the date
of the parties’ decree and the distribution of the fund in a
lump sum to Roberta.
The trial court ruled that Roberta was
entitled to receive $30,438.90, less the $14,967.14 she had
already received, or $15,471.76.
26
The trial court further
34 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky.App. 2000).
27
Id. at 87. (quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 724 S.W.2d 231, 234-35 (Ky.App.
1987)).
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directed Gregg to pay Roberta at that time 34% of this
$15,471.76, leaving a balance owed of $10,211.36.
We disagree
with Roberta’s assertion that she should receive $13,151.00,
which is the balance owed less her 15% marginal tax rate.
We
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
dividing the pension fund and affirm on this issue.
ATTORNEY’S FEES
Prior to the hearings in July 2003, Roberta filed a
motion to compel discovery, in which she also asked for
attorney’s fees.
She had previously been awarded $2,000.00 in
attorney’s fees by the trial court.
She also requested
additional attorney’s fees at the hearing and the trial court
stated that it would take it into consideration.
In its order
entered on September 9, 2003, the trial court denied this
request.
Under KRS 403.220, a trial court in a dissolution
action may order one party to pay a “reasonable amount” for the
attorney’s fees of the other party if there is a disparity in
the financial resources of the parties.
“But even if a
disparity exists, whether to make such an assignment and, if so,
the amount to be assigned is within the discretion of the trial
judge” [citations omitted].28
In this case, the decree divided
the marital property equitably.
28
As anticipated in the decree,
Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Ky. 2001).
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Roberta has received a college degree and she also received
significant income producing property as the result of the
parties’ asset division.
Roberta has not shown that the trial
court’s failure to award her additional attorney’s fees
constituted an abuse of discretion.
Thus, we affirm.
GREGG’S CROSS APPEAL
Since we are affirming on all issues raised by
Roberta, Gregg’s protective cross-appeal is moot.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the orders of the
Kenton Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Suzanne Cassidy
Covington, Kentucky
Beverly R. Storm
Robert L. Raper
Covington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
Beverly R. Storm
Covington, Kentucky
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