STEEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ESTATE OF MELISSA GAYLE CONGLETON; JACOB CONGLETON; SAMANTHA CONGLETON; AND SENTRY SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY
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MODIFIED:
JUNE 24, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
OCTOBER 21, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002090-MR
STEEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GALLATIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STANLEY BILLINGSLEY, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CI-00162
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CI-00172
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CI-00180
ESTATE OF MELISSA GAYLE CONGLETON;
JACOB CONGLETON; SAMANTHA CONGLETON; AND
SENTRY SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MINTON AND TACKETT, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
Steel Technologies, Inc. appeals from
a Gallatin Circuit Court judgment based on a jury verdict that
awarded over $3.7 million in damages to the estate and two minor
children of Melissa Congleton.
Melissa was killed when a steel
coil weighing over 30,000 pounds fell from a tractor-trailer
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
owned by Steel Technologies and struck the pickup truck she was
driving.
The issues on appeal are whether the award of $1
million in punitive damages was supported by the evidence and
fell within constitutionally-permissible limits; whether damages
for emotional anxiety preceding an injury are recognized under
Kentucky law; and whether the loss of parental consortium
damages awarded to Melissa’s two children were supported by the
evidence and were excessive.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The accident that led to these lawsuits occurred on
October 7, 2002.
Ralph Arnold, an employee of Steel
Technologies, was driving a tractor-trailer loaded with steel
coils along Highway 421 in Henry County.
When a van in front of his truck slowed to turn left,
Arnold braked and one of the coils broke loose.
The coil fell
from the trailer and struck an oncoming pickup truck in the
opposite lane.
The driver of the pickup, Melissa Congleton, a
married mother of two, died shortly afterwards.
At trial, Arnold testified that he had used only three
chains to secure the steel coil to the trailer although he knew
that federal regulations required at least five chains.
He said
that he used the lesser number of chains to save time because he
was paid according to the amount of steel he could haul during
his shift.
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Three complaints were filed in Gallatin Circuit Court
following the accident: one on behalf of Melissa’s estate for
wrongful death and personal injuries; one on behalf of her two
minor children, Jacob and Samantha, for loss of parental
consortium; and one by her husband, Jason Congleton, for loss of
spousal consortium.
Prior to trial, the circuit court granted
summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the issue of Steel
Technologies’ liability in all three actions.
The court also
granted Steel Technologies’ motions for summary judgment on the
claim of loss of spousal consortium and the claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress made in Jacob and Samantha’s
complaint.
The court denied Steel Technologies’ motion for
summary judgment on the claim of pain and suffering that was
made in the wrongful death action, and reserved judgment on its
motion for summary judgment on the claim for punitive damages,
stating that “the motion will be denied if Plaintiff produces
credible evidence that [Steel Technologies] had experienced
previous similar incidents, and will be granted if Plaintiff
fails to produce such evidence.”
Because the issue of Steel Technologies’ liability had
already been resolved, the trial, which was held from August 46, 2003, was concerned solely with determining the character and
the amount of the damages.
Testimony was heard from Steel
Technologies’ traffic manager, its safety manager, and its vice-
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president for operations; from the tractor-trailer driver, Ralph
Arnold; from Jason Congleton’s stepmother, a former employee at
Steel Technologies; from the Emergency Medical Services employee
who first treated Melissa at the scene of the accident; from the
Kentucky State Police officer who investigated the accident; and
from Jason Congleton.
The jury awarded a total of $3,767,267.00 in damages,
allocated as follows: for the lost earning capacity of Melissa
Congleton, $660,000.00; for funeral expenses, $7,267.00; for
serious emotional anxiety, $100,000.00; for loss of parental
consortium, $1 million each to Jacob and Samantha; and for
punitive damages, $1 million.
A final judgment reflecting the
jury’s verdict was entered on August 11, 2003, and the verdict
and judgment were subsequently affirmed by an order of the court
denying Steel Technologies’ motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
We are asked to determine whether the award of $1
million in punitive damages was warranted by Steel Technologies’
conduct, whether the award violated the provision of Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 411.184 that places limitations on the
vicarious liability of employers, and finally, whether the
amount of the award violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
which prohibits a state from imposing a “grossly excessive”
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punishment on a tortfeasor. 2
We are next asked to decide whether
the circuit court erred in allowing the estate to recover
damages for emotional anxiety suffered by Melissa in the brief
interval between the time the steel coil fell from the trailer
and struck her vehicle.
Finally, we are asked to determine
whether the evidence supports the damages for loss of parental
consortium awarded to Melissa’s two minor children, and whether
those damages were improperly calculated to compensate the
children for loss of parental consortium during their entire
lifetimes.
Steel Technologies does not challenge the amount of
damages awarded for lost earning capacity or for funeral
expenses.
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
1. Evidentiary Basis
Under KRS 411.184(1)(f), “punitive damages” are
defined as “exemplary damages [that is] damages, other than
compensatory and nominal damages, awarded against a person to
punish and to discourage him and others from similar conduct in
the future.”
The United States Supreme Court has explained that,
[i]n our federal system, States necessarily
have considerable flexibility in determining
the level of punitive damages that they will
2
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562, 116 S. Ct. 1589,
1592, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996), citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454, 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718, 125 L. Ed. 2d 366
(1993).
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allow in different classes of cases and in
any particular case. Most States that
authorize exemplary damages afford the jury
similar latitude, requiring only that the
damages be reasonably necessary to vindicate
the State’s legitimate interests in
punishment and deterrence. 3
Steel Technologies argues that insufficient evidence
was produced at trial that the corporation acted with
sufficiently wanton disregard for the lives and safety of others
to warrant the imposition of punitive damages.
The company
further claims that the evidence that was admitted served
improperly to inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury.
In examining the evidence supporting a judgment
entered upon a jury verdict, our standard of review is highly
deferential.
[Our role] is limited to determining whether
the trial court erred in failing to grant
the motion for directed verdict. All
evidence which favors the prevailing party
must be taken as true and [we are] not at
liberty to determine credibility or the
weight which should be given to the
evidence, these being functions reserved to
the trier of fact. The prevailing party is
entitled to all reasonable inferences which
may be drawn from the evidence. Upon
completion of such an evidentiary review,
[we] must determine whether the verdict
rendered is palpably or flagrantly against
the evidence so as to indicate that it was
reached as a result of passion or prejudice.
If [we] conclude that such is the case, [we
are] at liberty to reverse the judgment on
the grounds that the trial court erred in
3
Id., 517 U.S. at 568 (citations omitted).
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failing to sustain the motion for directed
verdict. Otherwise, the judgment must be
affirmed. 4
At trial, Charles West, the traffic manager for Steel
Technologies, and Gary Lucas, the safety manager, testified
about three episodes preceding the Congleton accident in which
steel coils fell from trucks.
The first episode involved a
truck delivering steel coils to the Steel Technologies facility
in 1993.
The truck was neither owned by Steel Technologies nor
driven by one of Steel Technologies’ employees.
broke and a steel coil fell off.
the driver.
The trailer
The truck rolled over, killing
The second episode occurred in 2001, when a Steel
Technologies driver, who was hauling a load of steel coils, went
into a corner too quickly.
The trailer tilted and two coils
broke free and hit the road.
The third episode occurred on
September 1, 2002, approximately one month before the Congleton
accident.
A Steel Technologies’ driver swerved because he could
not stop in time to avoid a car slowing in front of him.
The
trailer jackknifed and a coil broke free, but it did not fall
into the roadway.
Charles West testified that following this
incident he scheduled safety awareness meetings, but none were
held before the Congleton accident.
Steel Technologies argues that the first incident,
which resulted in the death of the driver, served only to
4
Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Co., 798 S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Ky. 1990)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
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inflame the jury’s passion and prejudice against corporations.
It further argues that the other two incidents were so different
from the Congleton accident that they served only to punish
Steel Technologies for dissimilar acts, a practice specifically
condemned by the United States Supreme Court in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell. 5
We disagree.
These other episodes served to show that Steel Technologies was
on notice that steel coils could break free from trailers when
their drivers had to stop or swerve suddenly.
Furthermore,
prior instances are not the only circumstances under which
foreseeability, and thus a duty to protect, may exist.
To so
hold would make the first incidence of a falling bridge or a
collapsing building excusable.
And, in any event, federal
safety regulations put Steel Technologies on notice that loads
of steel coils should be properly secured to insure the safety
of other highway users.
In State Farm, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed an
award of $145 million in punitive damages against an insurance
company for its bad faith failure to settle an automobile
accident claim.
The Court found the award excessive, partly on
the ground that it was used to punish the perceived deficiencies
of the insurance company’s operations throughout the country
rather than the conduct directed specifically toward the
5
538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 155 L. Ed. 2d 585 (2003).
-8-
plaintiffs.
In other words, the punitive damages were awarded
in part to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the
plaintiffs’ harm.
As the Court stressed, “[a] defendant should
be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for
being an unsavory individual or business.” 6
The situation here is distinguishable.
There is no
indication that the punitive damage award was intended to punish
Steel Technologies for the three prior incidents involving steel
coils falling from trucks.
Rather, the incidents served to show
that Steel Technologies was aware that steel coils could fall
from its trailers but failed to take appropriate steps (such as
regular inspections) to ensure that the company drivers secured
the coils with a sufficient number of chains.
We are not persuaded that the account of the first
episode involving another company’s truck and driver inflamed
the jury’s passion and prejudice against corporations in general
or Steel Technologies in particular.
Steel Technologies argues
that this effect was exacerbated by the closing argument of
plaintiff’s counsel who said that
[t]his jury is a lighthouse to this entire
country. It has the power to send a message
and keep the light burning and warn every
truck line hauling these steel coils that it
is beyond the community standards of this
small county, it is beyond the public policy
of this jury, it is beyond the standards
6
Id., 538 U.S. at 423.
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which we’re willing to accept to attempt to
have a thirty-some-odd unit truck line
traveling over the roads, the American
highways, without any safety director in the
seat beside that driver on any day, of any
week, of any month, of any year. It is
beyond the standards that we will accept for
them not to check their loads pursuant to
the CDL [Commercial Driver’s License]
requirements. It can’t be let go.
No contemporaneous objection was made to this
argument.
“The function of the Court of Appeals is to review
possible errors made by the trial court, but if the trial court
had no opportunity to rule on the question, there is no alleged
error for this court to review.” 7
Even had Steel Technologies
not failed to preserve this issue for review, the comments were
not sufficiently inflammatory to mandate reversal of the
verdict.
We reach this conclusion by comparing the comments
with those made by plaintiff’s counsel in the case relied on by
Steel Technologies, Clement Brothers Co. v. Everett. 8
The
Everetts had sued the Clement Brothers’ mining company for
damages to their house allegedly caused by nearby blasting.
Very little evidence was offered regarding the damage done to
the house, yet the jury awarded $5,000.00 in punitive damages.
The Court held that this was partly the result of an improper
argument by plaintiff’s counsel in which
7
Kaplon v. Chase, 690 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Ky.App. 1985), citing Payne v. Hall,
423 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1968); Ky. R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 59.06.
8
414 S.W.2d 576 (Ky. 1967).
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the appellant company was pictured as a
rich, grasping, foreign corporation running
ruthlessly roughshod over the poor, honest,
long-suffering citizens of Barren County;
its attorney as a rich man who would be
upset if it were his “mansion” that suffered
the blasting damage. Repeated references
were made to the appellant’s four-milliondollar contract. The jury was asked whether
it would let “these people from North
Carolina come in here and destroy a good
woman's property?” The appellant was
compared to a wolf devouring a lamb. The
jury was asked to imagine a little child in
the appellees’ yard having been struck and
killed by a large boulder from the blasting
operation. The jurors were told that if
they did not give the requested damages the
appellees “will have to look at your faces
then in their memory.” 9
The remarks made by plaintiff’s counsel in the Congleton case
certainly do not approach this level of impropriety, and they do
not warrant reversal of the punitive damage award.
Steel Technologies also urges us to apply the
reasoning of two Kentucky cases involving accidents between cars
and trucks in which our courts refused to allow punitive damages
even though the owners of the trucks had failed to observe
statutory regulations.
In the first case, Horn v. Hancock, 10 a tractor-trailer
was transporting a heavy piece of equipment that qualified as an
oversized load.
9
10
The truck was without the lead escort vehicle
Id. at 577.
700 S.W.2d 419 (Ky.App. 1985).
-11-
required by statute for loads of that size.
An automobile
driver, Marksberry, who was following the trailer across a
bridge pulled out to see if he could pass.
Maxine Horn, who was
approaching from the opposite direction, became startled when
she saw the wide load and Marksberry’s car.
She tried to brake
or pull to the right, but she struck the curb and bounced into
the trailer.
This Court held that the failure of the company
that owned the trailer to follow the statutory requirement to
supply a lead vehicle was insufficient to warrant an instruction
on punitive damages because there was not a sufficient causal
connection between Mrs. Horn’s injuries and the failure to have
a lead vehicle. 11
Similarly, in Keller v. Morehead, 12 a trailer that was
21 inches over the permissible statutory width collided with a
vehicle being driven the opposite way.
Kentucky’s highest court
refused to reverse the refusal to give an instruction on
punitive damages because there was no evidence that the width of
the trailer, or the failure of its owner to obtain a permit to
allow it to travel the roadways, was the proximate cause of the
accident. 13
11
Id. at 421.
12
247 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1952).
13
Id. at 220.
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In the case of Steel Technologies, however, there was
a clear causal connection between Melissa’s fatal injury and the
company’s failure to take measures to ensure that its driver
secured the steel coil with the requisite number of chains.
2.
Vicarious Liability
Steel Technologies next argues that it was improper to
assess punitive damages against the company for the unauthorized
negligent acts of its employee driver.
KRS 411.184(3) provides
that punitive damages will not “be assessed against a principal
or employer for the act of an agent or employee unless such
principal or employer authorized or ratified or should have
anticipated the conduct in question.”
This statutory section is
founded in the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Vicarious liability, sometimes referred to
as the doctrine of respondeat superior, is
not predicated upon a tortious act of the
employer but upon the imputation to the
employer of a tortious act of the employee
“by considerations of public policy and the
necessity for holding a responsible person
liable for the acts done by others in the
prosecution of his business, as well as for
placing on employers an incentive to hire
only careful employees.” 14
Steel Technologies argues that no evidence was offered
that it had any reason to anticipate that its driver would fail
to secure his load properly.
In fact, evidence was offered to
14
American General Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Ky.
2002), quoting Johnson v. Brewer, 266 Ky. 314, 98 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Ky. 1936).
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show that drivers were paid according to the amount of steel
they were able to haul, thus giving them an incentive to save
time by using fewer chains to secure their loads, that
responsibility for securing the loads rested entirely on the
drivers, that there was no inspection whatsoever (on either a
regular or random basis) of the trailers before they left Steel
Technologies’ facility, and that the driver involved in the
accident with Melissa had received no training on how to secure
loads on the new model of trailer he was driving on that day.
In light of this evidence, the finding of the jury that Steel
Technologies should have anticipated the conduct of its driver
in not using the proper number of chains was not so palpably or
flagrantly against the evidence so as to indicate that it was
reached as a result of passion or prejudice.
3. Due Process Violation
We are also asked to determine whether the amount of
punitive damages violated Steel Technologies’ due process
rights.
Despite the broad discretion that States
possess with respect to the imposition of
criminal penalties and punitive damages, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution
imposes substantive limits on that
discretion. That Clause makes the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive
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fines and cruel and unusual punishments
applicable to the States. 15
Our standard of review for this constitutional claim is de
novo. 16
Steel Technologies contends that the jury instructions
on punitive damages gave the jury “no guidance and unfettered
discretion” to assess an “unlimited” amount of damages.
This
specific argument regarding the instructions was not preserved
for review.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 51 “requires
the lawyers in a case to assist the judge in giving correct
instructions and disallows an ex post facto objection as a means
of obtaining a reversal of the judgment on appeal.” 17
Furthermore, under CR 51(3), objections to jury instructions
must be specific. 18
Finally, we note, the jury instructions on
punitive damages were identical to the proposed jury
instructions submitted by Steel Technologies itself on July 26,
2003.
We shall nonetheless review the instructions, in part
because of the size of the punitive award and also the
seriousness of the claim.
The jury was instructed as follows:
15
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433
121 S. Ct. 1678, 1685, 149 L. Ed. 2d 674 (2001), citing Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972) (per curiam).
16
Id., 532 U.S. at 436.
17
Cox v. Hardy, 371 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Ky. 1963).
18
See International Harvester Co. v. Huber, 359 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Ky. 1962),
citing Johnson v. Gaines, 313 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. 1958).
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Do you, the jury, believe that clear and
convincing evidence has established that the
accident about which you have heard evidence
was the result of Ralph Arnold acting in
reckless disregard for the lives or safety
of others and that Steel Technologies, Inc.
should have anticipated that Ralph Arnold
would so act?
If you have answered “Yes” to the [above]
question . . . you may in your discretion
assess punitive damages against Steel
Technologies, Inc. If you believe from the
evidence that punitive damages should be
assessed in addition to the damages you have
already awarded, you should consider the
following factors in determining the amount,
(a) The likelihood at the relevant time that
serious harm would arise from the acts of
Steel Technologies, Inc.;
(b) The degree of Steel Technologies, Inc.’s
awareness of that likelihood;
(c) The profitability of the misconduct to
Steel Technologies, Inc.;
(d) The duration of the misconduct and any
concealment of it, and;
(e) Any failure of Steel Technologies, Inc.
to remedy the misconduct once it became
known.
“Punitive Damages” are to be awarded for the
sole purpose of punishing the reckless
disregard of lives, safety or property and
discouraging it in the future.
The text of this instruction follows almost exactly
the language of KRS 411.186, the statute that sets forth the
factors to be considered in the assessment of punitive damages.
Although the constitutionality of that statute has not been
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reviewed, the U.S. Supreme Court has approved jury instructions
with substantially similar wording modeled on an Oregon statute
corresponding to KRS 411.186.
The Court observed that “[t]hese
substantive criteria . . . gave the jurors ‘adequate guidance’
in making their award” and noted that in an earlier case the
Court had even deemed instructions where “the jury was told only
the purpose of punitive damages (punishment and deterrence) and
that an award was discretionary, not compulsory”
constitutionally sufficient. 19
Thus, we do not agree with Steel
Technologies’ contention that this instruction gave the jury “no
guidance and unfettered discretion” to assess an “unlimited”
amount of damages.
Steel Technologies goes on to argue that the
application of any of the three guideposts established by the
U.S. Supreme Court 20 to gauge whether an award of punitive
damages is unconstitutionally excessive mandates reversal of the
award in this case.
The first guidepost requires us to review the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct which is determined
by considering whether
the harm caused was physical as opposed to
economic; the tortious conduct evinced an
19
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 442, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2345,
129 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1994), citing Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 18, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1043, 113 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1991).
20
BMW v. Gore, supra, note 2, 517 U.S. at 574.
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indifference to or a reckless disregard of
the health or safety of others; the target
of the conduct had financial vulnerability;
the conduct involved repeated actions or was
an isolated incident; and the harm was the
result of intentional malice, trickery, or
deceit, or mere accident. 21
Steel Technologies admits that the harm in this case
was physical as opposed to economic, but maintains that none of
the other factors indicating reprehensibility were present.
The
Supreme Court has certainly not dictated, however, that all of
the factors must be present to support a finding of sufficient
reprehensibility to support a punitive damages award of this
magnitude.
Furthermore, the evidence supports the view that
Steel Technologies was indifferent to the health and safety of
others in failing to train its drivers and to conduct any
inspection of its trucks even after the company became aware
that the steel coils could become dislodged from the trailers if
the trucks had to stop or swerve suddenly.
Citing the next guidepost, Steel Technologies argues
that the ratio between the compensatory damages ($667,267.00)
and the punitive damages ($1 million) is impermissibly great.
In State Farm, the Supreme Court cautioned that “in practice,
few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process. . . .
21
[A]n award of more than four times the amount of
State Farm v. Campbell, supra, note 5 at 419.
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compensatory damages might be close to the line of
constitutional impropriety.” 22
The award here represents a ratio
of 1 to 1.5 which is well within these limits.
Steel Technologies contends, however, that when the
compensatory damages are substantial, a lesser ratio for
punitive damages is required in order to meet the demands of due
process.
Although we agree that the compensatory damages are
substantial in this case, the injury suffered was the most
serious harm that can befall an individual.
The Supreme Court
has stressed that we “must ensure that the measure of punishment
is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to
the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.” 23
The trilogy of cases in which the Supreme Court has
delineated due process jurisprudence in regard to punitive
damages all involved non-physical harm and punitive damages that
exceeded compensatory damages more than a hundredfold. 24
We
conclude that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in
this case was well within the constitutional parameters
22
Id. at 425.
23
Id. at 426 (emphasis supplied).
24
See BMW v. Gore, supra, note 2 (consumer not informed that his new car had
been repainted, compensatory damages of $40,000.00, punitive damages of $2
million); Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group Inc., supra, note 15
(false advertising of a multipurpose tool, $50,000.00 in compensatory damages
and $4.5 million in punitive damages); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, supra, note 5 (bad faith insurance claim, $1 million in
compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages).
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established by the Supreme Court, particularly when we compare
the harm suffered by Melissa to that suffered by the plaintiffs
in these other cases.
Steel Technologies also argues that the punitive
damages far exceed the maximum civil penalty of $10,000.00 that
could have been imposed on Steel Technologies’ driver. 25
It is
also necessary to consider, that “although the exemplary award
was ‘much in excess of the fine that could be imposed,’
imprisonment was also authorized in the criminal context.” 26
Steel Technologies nonetheless argues that Kentucky
had “no predictable standard for imposition of punitive damages
in October 2002 when the subject accident occurred and had none
in August 2003 when the case was tried, so any award of punitive
damages would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment 27 to the Constitution.”
As has been established,
25
This amount refers to KRS 534.030(1) which provides that the maximum fine
for a felony shall not exceed $10,000.00.
Steel Technologies has also directed us to two sections of the Code of
Federal Regulations. The first section, 49 CFR § 392.9(a)(1), provides that
“[a] driver may not operate a commercial motor vehicle and a motor carrier
may not require or permit a driver to operate a commercial motor vehicle
unless . . . [t]he commercial motor vehicle’s cargo is properly distributed
and adequately secured as specified in §§ 393.100 through 393.142 of this
subchapter.” We fail to see the immediate relevance of this section to the
argument at hand, except as a means of reiterating that Ralph Arnold alone
was solely responsible for Melissa’s death. If anything, however, this
section of the Code suggests that the driver’s supervisor or employer is also
responsible for ensuring that the load is properly secured. The other
citation to the Code was incomplete and could not be located.
26
BMW v. Gore, supra, note 2, at 583 (citation omitted).
27
Steel Technologies’ brief states “Fifth Amendment”; we assume it intended
to refer to the Fourteenth Amendment.
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however, the jury instructions closely tracked the language of
KRS 411.186 that provides constitutionally-sufficient standards
for assessing punitive damages.
II. DAMAGES FOR EXTREME EMOTIONAL ANXIETY PRIOR TO INJURY
Steel Technologies’ next argument concerns damages in
the amount of $100,000.00 that were awarded by the jury under
the following instruction:
If you believe from the evidence that
Melissa Congleton, as a result of the steel
coil falling off the truck and colliding
with her vehicle suffered serious emotional
anxiety arising from the fear of injury, and
that said fear was reasonable, that the
occurence [sic] of such injury was a
reasonable medical likelihood, and the
anxiety was caused by exposure to the risk
for which Steel Technologies, Inc. is
legally responsible, then you may decide to
award damages for emotional distress by
Melissa Congleton, if any, from the time she
may have anticipated said event, and up
until the moment she lost conscionsness
[sic].
The evidence to support this instruction was provided,
in part, by the emergency worker who was the first to treat
Melissa immediately following the accident.
The worker
testified that Melissa “looked like she had seen the steel
coming and her face was fixed in a scream” and that “she was
scared when it fell on her.”
Steel Technologies argues that this jury instruction
and the subsequent award of $100,000.00 for this claim were
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improper on both procedural and substantive grounds.
First,
Steel Technologies contends that no claim for emotional distress
was made in the pleadings, and further, that it could not stem
from the personal injury claim because the trial court granted a
directed verdict on the issue of conscious pain and suffering.
Second, it argues that this claim is based on a cause of action
that is not recognized in the Commonwealth of Kentucky and is
contrary to this state’s case law which demands an “impact”
prior to any incurrence of damages.
Steel Technologies does
not, however, contend that the amount of the award is excessive.
We address first the contention that this instruction
was improperly offered because there was no basis for it in the
pleadings.
The complaint filed on behalf of Melissa’s estate
alleges, in relevant part, that: “Plaintiff [Jason Congleton,
the administrator], on behalf of decedent, brings this cause of
action for 1) lost wages and earning capacity; 2) pain; 3)
suffering; 4) traumatic death; [and] 5) massive and permanent
injury.”
Setting aside for a moment the question of whether it
was proper to allow damages for fear that occurred before the
injury, it is well-established that a plaintiff may recover for
mental suffering as part of a personal injury claim without
making a separate claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
“The words ‘pain and suffering’ as used in the law
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are a term of art meaning the ‘physical pain and mental
suffering’ attendant to a personal injury.” 28
“It is the well-
settled rule that the measure of damages for personal injury is
for physical and mental suffering (and loss of time if asked)
and impairment of earning ability.” 29
It shall be lawful for the personal
representative of a decedent who was injured
by reason of the tortious acts of another,
and later dies from such injuries, to
recover in the same action for both the
wrongful death of the decedent and for the
personal injuries from which the decedent
suffered prior to death, including a
recovery for all elements of damages in both
a wrongful death action and a personal
injury action. 30
Steel Technologies points out that the circuit court
granted a directed verdict on the claim of conscious pain and
suffering.
At the time it granted the directed verdict on this
claim, however, the court also stated that “the period of time
when it started to occur until her consciousness was lost is a
time period . . . subject to the issue of fright.
touching, Kentucky allows fright.
that’s out.
If there’s a
But pain and suffering,
Conscious pain and suffering, that’s out.”
Steel
Technologies raised no objection at the time to the court’s
28
Department of Educ. v. Blevins, 707 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Ky. 1986) (citations
omitted).
29
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Frick, 256 Ky. 317, 76 S.W.2d 13, 15 (1934)
(citations omitted).
30
KRS 411.133.
-23-
announcement that it would instruct on damages for any fear
suffered immediately prior to Melissa’s loss of consciousness.
The court later elaborated that this claim was part of the
personal injury action, stating “it’s the old tort for fright”
and that negligent infliction of emotional distress was implied
in the tort.
The question remains whether Kentucky permits damages
for fear that occurs immediately prior to a tortiously-inflicted
injury, and is caused by anticipation of that injury.
Inasmuch
as there is no Kentucky case law that directly addresses this
scenario, we turn to the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
456 provides that:
If the actor’s negligent conduct has so
caused any bodily harm to another as to make
him liable for it, the actor is also subject
to liability for
(a) fright, shock, or other emotional
disturbance resulting from the bodily harm
or from the conduct which causes it, and
(b) further bodily harm resulting from such
emotional disturbance.
Comment e. is particularly relevant to this case:
The rule stated in Clause (a) is not
limited to emotional disturbance resulting
from the bodily harm itself, but includes
also such disturbance resulting from the
conduct of the actor. Thus one who is
struck by a negligently driven automobile
and suffers a broken leg may recover not
only for his pain, grief, or worry resulting
-24-
Section
from the broken leg, but also for his fright
at seeing the car about to hit him. 31
This view of pre-injury fear as an integral part of a
larger, ongoing ordeal is applicable to the facts of this case. 32
Steel Technologies has urged us instead to apply the holdings of
several Kentucky cases that involved stand-alone claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
We believe that
these cases are not directly relevant because the fact patterns
and claims are significantly different. 33
In Deutsch v. Shein, 34
a physician subjected a patient to X-rays without first
establishing whether she was pregnant.
When she discovered that
she was pregnant and that there was a likelihood that the baby
had been damaged by the X-rays, she had an abortion.
There was
no evidence that the fetus had actually been damaged by the Xrays.
The Kentucky Supreme Court allowed her to assert a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress against the
physician, explaining that the X-rays bombarding her body were
sufficient to establish an “impact.”
31
The Court explained the
Emphasis supplied.
32
See Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd., 718 A.2d 1161, 1169 n. 6 (Md.
1998), citing Thomas D. Sydnor II, Note, Damages for a Decedent’s Pre-Impact
Fear: An Element of Damages under Alaska’s Survivorship Statute, 7 Alaska L.
Rev. 351, 352 (1990).
33
See Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538
U.S. 135, 171, 123 S. Ct. 1210, 1230, 155 L. Ed. 2d 261 (2003), citing with
approval the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 456, including Comment e., and
distinguishing damages for emotional harms that are less direct and may be
recovered only pursuant to a stand-alone tort action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress.
34
597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980).
-25-
rationale underlying the “impact” requirement:
“It is well
established in this jurisdiction that ‘an action will not lie
for fright, shock or mental anguish which is unaccompanied by
physical contact or injury.
The reason being that such damages
are too remote and speculative, are easily simulated and
difficult to disprove, and there is no standard by which they
can be justly measured.” 35
Significantly, the Court was quoting
directly from Morgan v. Hightower’s Adm’r, 36 an early case in
which the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to recover for
emotional distress caused by witnessing a suicide.
Similarly,
in Wilhoite v. Cobbe, 37 another “bystander” case, a mother was
not permitted to recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress caused by witnessing her daughter being hit by a car.
And, in Michals v. William T. Watkins Memorial United Methodist
Church, 38 parents of children exposed to asbestos tried
unsuccessfully to recover for fear of future injury although the
children had not contracted any illness as a result of the
exposure.
These cases all involve a serious degree of
remoteness between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor, raising
issues of proximate cause.
35
Id. at 145-46.
36
291 Ky. 58, 163 S.W.2d 21 (1942).
37
761 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Ky.App. 1989).
38
873 S.W.2d 216 (Ky.App. 1994).
-26-
In Melissa’s case, there is no “proximate cause”
problem.
Her death occurred shortly after the coil slid from
the truck as a result of the defendant’s negligence.
There were
no intervening causes, her death was foreseeable, and there was
no question of fear of future harm that had not yet come to
pass.
The cases cited by Steel Technologies would be of greater
relevance if the coil had fallen from the trailer and narrowly
missed hitting Melissa’s vehicle, and she had subsequently filed
a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Steel Technologies also cites cases from other
jurisdictions where recovery for “pre-impact fright” is not
permitted.
Several of these come from jurisdictions where
recovery for such damages is expressly barred by statute, 39 which
is not the case in Kentucky.
The others generally do not allow
such claims on the grounds that they are overly speculative. 40
number of jurisdictions do, however, allow such claims. 41
A
We
39
See, e.g., Gilbaugh v. Balzer, 2001 WL 34041889 (D.Or. 2001), an
unpublished federal case from Oregon where recovery was barred by Oregon Rev.
Stat. 30.020(2), which limits recovery of damages to the period “between
injury to the decedent and the decedent’s death.” Similarly, in Stecyk v.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Pa. 1999), the
federal court did not allow damages for pre-impact fright because they were
barred under the survival statutes of Pennsylvania and Delaware.
40
See, e.g., Bowen v. Lumbermen’s Mutual Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Wis.
1994), in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused recovery on the ground
that it would “too likely open the way to fraudulent claims.” Other
jurisdictions that do not allow these claims include Illinois, Arkansas and
Kansas.
41
The jurisdictions that allow recovery include Louisiana, New York, Texas,
Michigan, Nebraska, Maryland, Georgia and Florida. For a survey and
-27-
agree with a comment contained in a dissent of the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals (in an opinion subsequently reversed by
the Court of Appeals of Maryland) that it is unfair to allow
tortfeasors to benefit because the injuries they caused were
fatal rather than serious. 42
Furthermore, while “the usual
sequence is impact followed by pain and suffering, we are unable
to discern any reason based on either law or logic for rejecting
a claim because in this case, . . . this sequence was
reversed.” 43
III. LOSS OF PARENTAL CONSORTIUM
Finally, Steel Technologies argues that the award of
$1 million to each of Melissa’s children, Jacob and Samantha,
for loss of parental consortium, was unsupported by the
evidence.
Specifically, the company points to the fact that
neither child testified, nor was any expert testimony on this
subject offered.
The fact that the children themselves did not testify
is not dispositive.
The logical extension of this argument is
that if the children had been infants, they could not have
recovered any such damages because they were not old enough to
discussion of the case law, see Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision, supra, note
32; Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1989).
42
Beynon, supra, note 32, at 1166, citing the dissent in Montgomery
Cablevision Ltd. Partnership v. Beynon, 116 Md. App. 363, 696 A.2d 491, 510
(1997).
43
Id. at 1170, quoting Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 793 (5th Cir. 1976).
-28-
verbalize their feelings.
Furthermore, the record reflects that
testimony was offered as to the children’s emotional state by
their grandmother and father.
There is no need for expert testimony to assist the
jury in assessing damages for loss of parental consortium.
According to Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 702, which governs
the admissibility of testimony by experts:
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
Thus, as the Supreme Court of Kentucky has said,
the test for allowing an expert witness is
whether his testimony would assist the trier
of fact. . . . A witness may become
qualified by practice or an acquaintance
with the subject. He may possess the
requisite skill by reason of actual
experience or long observation. 44
Steel Technologies does not specify the type of expert
or the type of testimony that could have assisted the jury in
determining the amount of damages for loss of parental
consortium.
“The courts and litigants constantly call upon
jurors to use their common sense and life experience during jury
44
Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 36 S.W.3d 368, 388-89 (Ky. 2000)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
-29-
service.” 45
Assessing a loss of parental consortium claim is a
task ideally suited to the life experience of the members of the
jury; the value of a mother’s consortium is something well
within the experience of most jurors and does not require expert
testimony.
Appeals:
We quote from an opinion of the Georgia Court of
"Damages for loss of consortium are not capable of
exact pecuniary measure and must be left to the enlightened
conscience of impartial jurors taking into consideration the
nature of the services, society, companionship and all the
circumstances of the case." 46
Steel Technologies also argues that the jury
instruction on this claim was “open-ended” because it did not
specify that under Kentucky case law, such damages could not be
awarded to cover the entire lifetime of the children, but could
only be awarded for the period ending with their attaining the
age of majority.
Steel Technologies insists that plaintiffs’
counsel said in closing argument that the jury could award
damages extending for the children’s lifetime.
The jury was instructed to
determine from the evidence the sum or sums
of money, if any, that will reasonably
compensate Jacob Congleton and Samantha
45
Tabor v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Ky.App. 1997) (citations
omitted).
46
Mortensen v. Fowler-Flemister Concrete, Inc., 555 S.E.2d 492, 494 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2001) (citations omitted).
-30-
Congleton for whatever loss of services,
aid, society, and companionship as you
believe from the evidence each of them has
sustained or is reasonably certain to
sustain as a direct result of the accident
about which you have heard evidence.
Steel Technologies neither raised this specific
objection to the jury instructions nor asked that limiting
language stating that damages could be awarded only for the
period of the children’s minority be included.
Nonetheless, we
have reviewed the record and disagree with Steel Technologies
that plaintiff’s counsel advised the jury that it could award
damages extending for the lifetime of the children.
Plaintiffs’
counsel asked the jury to award damages “for the love, guidance
and the society that she [Melissa] would give to them had she
been here throughout the remainder of her natural days.” 47
The
only implication we are able to draw from these words was that
the damages should extend for Melissa’s natural lifetime, not
that of the children.
Steel Technologies also objects to comments by
plaintiffs’ counsel that it insists invoked the prohibited
“Golden Rule” by implying that the jury should award damages
equivalent to the value of the services rendered by each juror’s
mother during each juror’s lifetime.
Plaintiffs’ counsel
stated, “I ask myself what I owe my mother – I use that as my
47
Emphasis supplied.
-31-
guide.”
We discern no error in this comment, which was merely
an appeal to the life experience of the jurors.
More
importantly, no contemporaneous objection to this comment was
made by counsel for Steel Technologies.
The issue was not,
therefore, preserved for review.
The damages awarded in this case were considerable,
but in view of the serious consequences of the accident and the
weight of evidence that supported the jury’s finding that Steel
Technologies should have anticipated that its driver would act
with reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others, we
affirm the judgment.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MINTON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
MINTON, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART:
The trial court ruled that a pain and suffering
instruction was not warranted because the decedent died
instantaneously from the impact between her vehicle and Steel
Technology’s runaway coil.
But the trial court instructed the
jury that if it believed from the evidence that the decedent
“suffered serious emotional anxiety arising from the fear of
injury,” then the jury could award damages for “emotional
distress suffered” by the decedent “from the time she may have
anticipated the event [] and up until the moment she lost
-32-
consciousness.”
instruction.
The jury returned a $100,000 verdict under this
And the trial court entered judgment accordingly.
By affirming this judgment, the majority recognizes
for the first time in Kentucky pre-impact fear to be a
compensable component of conscious pain and suffering.
This
claim arose in the context of a survival action under KRS
411.133.
But for prospective application, the holding here
makes no distinction between claims for pre-impact fear in
anticipation of certain death and claims in anticipation of any
actionable injury.
Specifically, the majority embraces the
broadest application of RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
elucidated by Comment e.
OF
TORTS § 456(a), as
So, in reality, we now have opened the
door to increased liability via a new element of damages that is
free of the traditional moorings that have limited recoveries
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.
I most
respectfully disagree with the majority’s adoption of this new
rule; therefore, I dissent.
Our jurisprudence has adhered to the strict common law
doctrine requiring a physical impact or injury that results in
emotional distress in order for the emotional distress to be
compensable.
The traditional “impact rule” for non-intentional
torts has been thus recognized to be the law:
It is a rule of longstanding in this
jurisdiction that we do not permit damages
for mental suffering unless accompanied by
-33-
physical contact or injury; that such
damages are presumably "too remote and
speculative." []. Although the scope of
what should be considered as related to, and
the direct and natural consequence of,
physical contact or injury, has been
expanded [], the rule has not been
abandoned. Emotional distress, or psychic
injury, must still bear some direct
relationship to physical contact or injury. 48
The majority adeptly avoids the application of
the impact rule by categorizing pre-impact fear “as an
integral part of a larger, ongoing ordeal” that now can be
pled and proved as any claim for pain and suffering.
In so
doing, the majority reasons that it has not really departed
from the impact rule; but it has only reversed the sequence
to allow recovery when the impact follows fear, as well as
when the impact results in mental suffering.
But reversing
the usual sequence abandons the rationale of the impact
rule:
any compensated mental pain and suffering must be
caused by a physical impact. 49
The majority cites Deutsch v. Shein in which the court
explained the rationale for the impact rule by stating:
“The
reason being that such damages are too remote and speculative,
48
Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Ky. 1983) (citations omitted).
49
Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 796-797 (5th Cir. 1976) (Gee, J.,
dissenting).
-34-
are easily simulated and difficult to disprove, and there is no
standard by which they can be justly measured.” 50
Admittedly, the concerns expressed in Deutsch about
simulated claims are eliminated by the RESTATEMENT’S requirement of
bodily harm; but the concerns over the speculative nature of the
claim and the lack of an adequate measuring standard remain.
Therefore, I would reverse the damage award for preimpact fear.
I concur in the balance of the opinion.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
Charles S. Cassis
FROST BROWN TODD
Louisville, Kentucky
Meredith L. Lawrence
Warsaw, Kentucky
ON BRIEFS:
Stockard R.
Jeremiah A.
FROST BROWN
Louisville,
50
Hickey III
Byrne
TODD
Kentucky
597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky. 1980).
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