GREGORY KANE GROCE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 18, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2003-CA-001780-MR
GREGORY KANE GROCE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLINTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00022
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TACKETT, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Gregory Groce appeals from the judgment of the
Clinton Circuit Court that he is guilty of fleeing or evading in
the first degree and sentencing him to five years’ imprisonment.
Groce raises numerous issues on appeal, but the dispositive
issue is whether the trial court’s instructions to the jury
deprived him of a unanimous verdict.
Although he failed to
preserve the issue for appellate review by objecting to the
tendered instructions, we choose to review the substantive
grounds for this issue pursuant to the palpable error rule,
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26.
Consequently,
the judgment of the Clinton Circuit Court is reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
In May 2003, Groce’s mother-in-law, Carol Looper,
called 911 about a domestic dispute with her son-in-law.
According to Looper, she and Groce argued after he struck his
four year-old daughter on the arm leaving a red mark.
Groce
then drove away in a white Neon with blue stripes and Looper
wanted police to catch him.
Sheriff Kay Riddle went to Looper’s
home, but Groce’s wife had already taken their children and left
on foot.
Meanwhile, Officer Stephen Martin spotted the Neon and
recognized Groce, so he activated his lights and siren.
Instead
of pulling over, Groce drove away at a high rate of speed,
passing other cars across double yellow lines while Martin
pursued him until losing sight of the Neon.
The next day Riddle
and Officer Brad Cross went to Groce’s home to serve an arrest
warrant on him.
When Groce answered the door and saw the
sheriff on his doorstep, he slammed the door in his face.
The
officers kicked in the door and arrested him, charging him with
fleeing or evading in the first degree.
He was indicted by a
grand jury and convicted of the offense after a jury trial.
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Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 520.095 describes the
offense of fleeing or evading in the first degree as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of fleeing or evading
police in the first degree:
(a) When, while operating a motor
vehicle with intent to elude or flee,
the person knowingly or wantonly
disobeys a direction to stop his or her
motor vehicle, given by a person
recognized to be a police officer, and
at least one (1) of the following
conditions exists:
1. The person is fleeing immediately after
committing an act of domestic violence as
defined in KRS 403.720;
2. The person is driving under the influence
of alcohol or any other substance or
combination of substances in violation of
KRS 189A.010;
3. The person is driving while his or her
driver's license is suspended for violating
KRS 189A.010; or
4. By fleeing or eluding, the person is the
cause, or creates substantial risk, of
serious physical injury or death to any
person or property; . . .
The indictment failed to include the language in subsection
(a)(1) referring to fleeing after committing an act of domestic
violence.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth introduced testimony
from numerous witnesses, much of it hearsay, that Groce had
struck his four year-old daughter and left a mark on her arm
before failing to stop at Martin’s direction.
Groce’s trial
counsel failed to object to the introduction of inadmissible
hearsay evidence.
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At the conclusion of its case, the Commonwealth moved
to amend the indictment to charge Groce under KRS
520.095(1)(a)(1).
RCr 6.16 permits an indictment to be amended
“any time before verdict or finding if no additional or
different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced. . . .”
Indeed, Groce’s trial
counsel agreed to the amending of the indictment, and the jury
was instructed that it could find Groce guilty of fleeing or
evading in the first degree if it believed beyond a reasonable
doubt
a) In this county on or about March 4, 2003,
and before the finding of the indictment
herein he operated a motor vehicle with
intent to flee or elude; and
b) He knowingly or wantonly disobeyed the
direction to stop his motor vehicle which
direction was given by a person which he
recognized to be a police officer; and
c) 1) the Defendant was fleeing immediately
after inflicting physical injury upon a
family member; or
2) that his act of fleeing or eluding
caused or created a substantial risk of
serious physical injury or death to any
person or serious injury to property.
The jury convicted Groce and recommended a sentence of five
years’ imprisonment.
After his trial, Groce obtained new
counsel and filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the jury
should not have been instructed on fleeing after inflicting a
physical injury on a family member.
He contended that he had no
opportunity to prepare a defense against evidence that he had
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injured his daughter immediately prior to evading a police
officer.
The trial court overruled the motion after a hearing,
and this appeal followed.
Groce’s brief lists four issues on appeal: the trial
court’s decision allowing the Commonwealth to amend the
indictment at the close of its case, the trial court’s refusal
to grant a directed verdict of acquittal, the improper admission
of bad acts evidence, and the denial of his right to a unanimous
verdict.
We will examine only the issue of the trial court’s
instructions to the jury; however, we will discuss evidence
supporting other issues as necessary to explain our decision.
Groce made a motion for a directed verdict at the
conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case; however, he failed to
renew the motion after the defense testimony and the
Commonwealth’s rebuttal evidence.
witness to testify for the defense.
At trial, Groce was the only
He stated that he did not
strike his daughter, but he grabbed her by the arm to prevent
her from chasing a go-cart and possibly getting hurt.
Groce
claimed that his mother-in-law, who believed that he had struck
the little girl, pulled a gun on him during their argument, so
he left and walked to a friend’s house.
He contended that he
did not drive the Neon that day because his license was
suspended for driving without insurance and further asserted
that he has to wear prescription sunglasses at all times.
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Groce
testified that he was wearing sunglasses when the officers
arrested him and denied shutting the door in their faces.
He
said he was unaware that the police were at his house until they
kicked the door in.
witness.
The Commonwealth called Cross as a rebuttal
Cross knew Groce because they had been in school
together, and he was present when Groce was arrested.
He
testified that Groce had not worn prescription sunglasses in
school or on the day that he was arrested.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has previously held that
failure to renew a motion for a directed verdict renders the
issue unpreserved for appellate review.
973 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1998).
Baker v. Commonwealth,
Moreover, there was sufficient
evidence to convict Groce of fleeing or evading under KRS
520.095(1)(a)(4) which states that a defendant is guilty if,
“[b]y fleeing or eluding, the person is the cause, or creates
substantial risk, of serious physical injury or death to any
person or property. . . .”
Bell v. Commonwealth, 122 S.W.2d
490, 497 (Ky. 2003) defines “substantial risk” as follows:
a risk that is "[a]mple," "[c]onsiderable in
... degree ... or extent," and "[t]rue or
real; not imaginary." Accordingly, it is
clear that not all risks are substantial-hence the phrase "low risk"--and not every
hypothetical scenario of "what might have
happened" represents a substantial risk. In
any trial, the issue of whether a
defendant's conduct creates a substantial
risk of death or serious physical injury
"depends upon proof" and reasonable
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inferences that can be drawn from the
evidence.
During his testimony, Martin was asked whether he felt
endangered at any time while he was pursuing Groce’s car.
Martin said that he did not take risks because there were other
motorists on the road and that he did not feel endangered.
However, in response to a question about whether Groce’s driving
endangered anyone else on the highway that day, Martin stated
his opinion that it did.
The officer testified that Groce
passed two cars across double yellow lines and drove at high
speeds.
However, Martin also said that he did not know how fast
he and Groce were driving and that Groce’s car did not come
close to the cars he passed.
Nevertheless, taken in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence of Groce’s
driving was sufficient for a jury to determine that it posed an
actual risk of serious injury or death.
Therefore, the trial
court committed no error in denying his motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal based on the theory that he, by fleeing or
evading, caused a serious risk of injury or death to others,
Next, we examine the evidence introduced to prove that
Groce was fleeing or evading immediately after causing physical
injury to a family member.
First, we note that, of all the
Commonwealth’s witnesses, only Groce’s mother-in-law offered
competent evidence that Groce had struck and injured his
daughter.
Before police arrived at Looper’s house, the children
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had all left with their mother.
Thus, no police officer ever
saw the child or heard her describe being struck by Groce.
Nor
was there any evidence of a medical exam.
Neither Groce’s wife,
nor his daughter was called as witnesses.
KRS 500.080(13)
defines physical injury as “substantial physical pain or any
impairment of physical condition.”
Looper testified that Groce
struck his daughter and left a red mark between her elbow and
her shoulder and that the girl said Daddy hurt her.
That is all
the competent evidence that was presented regarding Groce
causing a physical injury to a family member, and it does not
establish that Groce’s daughter suffered “substantial physical
pain or any impairment of physical condition.”
Consequently,
the Commonwealth did not introduce sufficient evidence for a
reasonable juror to find that Groce had injured a family
immediately prior to fleeing or evading.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has previously held that
jury instructions which allow a defendant to be convicted under
alternate theories of guilt deprive him of a unanimous verdict
if there is no evidence to support one of the theories of guilt.
Boulder v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Ky. 1980).
The
instruction in this case allowed the jury to find Groce guilty
if they believed that his conduct created a substantial risk of
serious physical injury or death to any person or property or if
he was fleeing immediately after inflicting physical injury upon
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a family member.
The instruction gives us no way to ascertain
which theory of guilt each juror believed.
Consequently, since
there was insufficient evidence to convict Groce of first-degree
fleeing or evading after committing an act of domestic violence,
this instruction failed to meet the unanimous verdict
requirement of RCr 9.82 and Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85
(Ky. 1978).
Our state Supreme Court has determined that “the
denial of a unanimous verdict--where the error is properly
preserved--is not subject to a harmless error analysis.”
Burnett v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Ky. 2000).
While
Groce concedes that the issue was not preserved for appellate
review, he argues that it is subject to review for palpable error
under RCr 10.26 which states as follows:
A palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new
trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error.
We believe that manifest injustice would result if we allowed
this verdict to stand in light of the fact that Groce was
deprived of his fundamental due process right to have every
element of the charge against him proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Consequently, this case is reversed and remanded for a
new trial.
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TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS.
VANMETER, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION:
VANMETER, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent.
In Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ky. 2002), the
court discussed the standard of review for a claim of palpable
error:
An appellate court may consider an issue
that was not preserved if it deems the error
to be a "palpable" one which affected the
defendant's "substantial rights" and
resulted in "manifest injustice." RCr 10.26.
In determining whether an error is palpable,
"an appellate court must consider whether on
the whole case there is a substantial
possibility that the result would have been
any different." Commonwealth v. McIntosh,
646 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1983).
An appellate court must review the entire case to
ascertain whether the result would have been different absent
the error.
Pace, 82 S.W.3d at 896.
In my view, “a review of
the case absent the error” in this instance requires a review
assuming the jury had been instructed correctly.
So, if the
jury in this case had been instructed correctly, I do not
believe there is a “substantial possibility that the result
would have been any different.”
In fact, the evidence of
appellant’s guilt is much more compelling in this case than it
was in Pace.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
James Havey
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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