S.R.B. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; J.R.; AND S.R. S.B. AND M.B. v. J.R. AND S.R.R.
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 11, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001659-ME
AND
NO. 2003-CA-002000-ME
S.R.B.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-CI-00271
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
J.R.;
AND S.R.
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 2003-CA-002496-ME
S.B.
AND M.B.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CYNTHIA E. SANDERSON, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-CI-00842
v.
J.R.
AND S.R.R.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, KNOPF, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
On November 10, 2003, the McCracken Family Court
awarded permanent custody of S.S.R.1 and C.N.R.2 (collectively,
“the children”), the minor children of the Appellant S.R.B.,3 to
Appellant’s half-brother, J.R., and his wife, S.R.,
(collectively, “the custodians”) on the grounds that Appellant
is an unfit mother and that it would be in the best interest of
the children that the custodians have permanent custody.
Appellant appeals from that order, as well as two
earlier orders of the McCracken Circuit Court:
the July 14,
2003, order dismissing Appellant’s petition for immediate
entitlement to custody of the children and the August 19, 2003,
order denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the
order dismissing the immediate entitlement petition.
These
three appeals have been combined for consideration in this
opinion.
Because the findings of the Family Court are not
clearly erroneous and it did not abuse its discretion, we affirm
its order granting permanent custody of the children to the
custodians.
The resolution of a petition for immediate
entitlement to custody has no preclusive effect over the
1
S.S.R. was born May 13, 1997. Because this opinion addresses
allegations of parental unfitness and child abuse, we shall use
initials in place of names to protect the identities of the parents
and children involved.
2
C.N.R. was born April 20, 1999.
3
In 2003-CA-002496, S.R.B. is referred to as simply S.B.
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resolution of a subsequent petition for permanent custody.
Consequently, our disposition of the case concerning the grant
of permanent custody renders the issue of Appellant’s earlier
petition for immediate entitlement to custody moot.
S.S.R. and C.N.R. are the children of the marriage of
Appellant S.R.B. and her former husband, H.R.
On July 5, 2000,
Appellant entrusted her children to the care of the custodians
because she required immediate treatment for mental illness.4
Soon after that, the custodians filed a petition in the
McCracken Family Court asserting, via Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) Chapter 620, that S.S.R. and C.N.R. were abused and
neglected children.
At the hearing on that matter, Appellant
and H.R. admitted that they had physically and mentally abused
the children.
They also admitted that an emergency existed; and
they were temporarily unable to care for the children, Appellant
because of mental illness and H.R. because of substance abuse.
The custodians5 were awarded emergency custody of the children by
the Family Court’s July 17, 2000, order and later awarded
temporary custody on August 24, 2000.
The children have lived
4
Appellant voluntarily admitted herself to Lourdes Hospital for
psychiatric treatment on July 5, 2000, where she remained until
July 13, 2000. Appellant then entered the hospital’s partial
hospitalization program (a transitional, outpatient program
involving daily, intensive psychotherapy) for twelve more days.
5
At the time J.R. and S.R were first awarded temporary custody of the
children, they were not yet married but lived together. They later
married in 2002.
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with the custodians since July 5, 2000.
But Appellant has
regularly exercised supervised visitation with the children.
She also paid child support until approximately 2003.6
The custodians’ first petition for permanent custody,
based solely on de facto custodianship, was dismissed on
November 18, 2002, because the Family Court ruled that they were
not de facto custodians.
On March 10, 2003, Appellant filed a
petition for immediate entitlement to custody of the children
under KRS 620.110 in McCracken Family Court. After a brief
hearing on May 1, 2003, the Family Court transferred Appellant’s
petition for immediate entitlement to the McCracken Circuit
Court because it appeared to be, essentially, an appeal of the
Family Court’s temporary custody order.
The Circuit Court then
dismissed Appellant’s petition for immediate entitlement on the
grounds that “K.R.S. 620.110 does not provide a remedy or an
appeal to the Circuit Court for the modification of a temporary
custody order.”
The Appellant filed a timely motion for
reconsideration with the Circuit Court which was dismissed.
She
also filed a timely appeal of the Circuit Court’s order
dismissing her petition for immediate entitlement and a separate
appeal of its order denying her motion for reconsideration.
The
custodians then filed a second petition for permanent custody,
6
At that time, the Family Court agreed to modify Appellant’s child
support obligation because of a reduction in her work schedule; but
the custodians agreed to waive child support altogether.
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this petition based on the ground of parental unfitness.
Appellant also filed her own petition for permanent custody.
On
November 10, 2003, the Family Court awarded permanent custody of
the children to the custodians on the grounds that Appellant is
an unfit mother7 and that it is in the best interest of the
children.8
The Appellant filed a timely appeal of this order as
well.
FAILURE TO FILE BRIEFS
Before discussing the merits, we must address a
potential obstacle to appellate review.
None of the
Appelleesthe Commonwealth, J.R., and S.R.has filed a brief in
any of these three voluminous appeals.
Ordinarily, when an
appellee fails to file a brief, we may accept the appellant’s
statement of the facts and issues as correct, reverse the
judgment if we believe appellant’s brief supports such a result,
or treat the appellee’s failure to file a brief as a confession
of error and reverse the judgment without reaching the merits of
the case.9
While the Appellees’ failure to file briefs in these
7
The Family Court also found that H.R. was an unfit father.
he has not appealed this decision.
8
Notably, the Family Court did not terminate Appellant’s parental
rights. Indeed, it awarded Appellant continued, supervised
visitation rights.
9
Scott v. Scott, 80 S.W.3d 447, 481 (Ky.App. 2002), overruled on
other grounds by Vibbert v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292, 294-295
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However,
appeals frustrates judicial review, invoking any permissible
sanctions for this failure would be “inappropriate in
proceedings affecting the custody of infants.”10
Therefore, we
will address the merits of these consolidated appeals.
MISSING RECORD
An incomplete record also impedes our review.
Appellant specifically designated “[t]estimony given . . . and
exhibits tendered in support of [Appellant’s] Motion for Return
of [Appellant’s] Children in McCracken Family Court juvenile
case nos[.] 00-J-00323-001 and 00-J—00324-001[11] held on 10-3102”12 to be included in the appellate record for 03-CI-00842.
Unfortunately, no videotape, audiotape, or other transcript of
the October 31, 2002, hearing in the DNA cases was certified by
the circuit clerk.
The McCracken Circuit Clerk’s Office has
provided affidavits by three deputy clerks, each of whom avers
that she has searched the circuit and district court records but
has found “no video recording of a hearing held on October 31,
(Ky.App. 2004).
(CR) 76.12(8).
See Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
10
Galloway v. Pruitt, 469 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Ky. 1971).
11
These are the dependency, neglect, and abuse (DNA) cases for each
child.
12
This material from these DNA cases was among the evidence from other
related actions involving the children which the Family Court
adopted for consideration in 03-CI-00842 in its October 1, 2003,
order following a motion by the Appellant.
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2002,” in 03-J-00323—001, 03-J-00324-001, 03-CI-00842, or 03-CI00271.
It is an appellant’s duty to see that the record is
complete on appeal.13
To the extent that the record is
incomplete, the reviewing court must presume that the omitted
portions support the trial court’s order.14
In the event that no
record is available through no fault of the appellant, the
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure specify that an appellant may
file a narrative statement15 or bystanders bill.16
Appellant
asserts that her sworn testimony at the September 11, 2003,
hearing17 recalling and relating her testimony at the October 31,
2002, hearing qualifies as a bystanders bill about what occurred
at the earlier hearing because it allegedly went unchallenged.
We disagree.
Appellant has not followed any of the procedural
requirements for filing a bystanders bill or a narrative
statement.18
In the absence of any record of the October 31,
13
Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Richardson, 424 S.W.2d 601, 603
(Ky. 1968).
14
Id.
15
CR 75.13.
16
CR 75.14.
17
This hearing was conducted as a joint hearing regarding a motion in
the DNA cases and Appellant’s petition for immediate entitlement to
custody of the children.
18
See CR 75.14, CR 75.13.
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2002, hearing or a proper narrative statement or bystanders
bill, we must presume that the evidence presented during that
hearing supports the Family Court’s order granting permanent
custody of the children to the custodians.19
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The right of fit parents to care for and control their
own children is a “fundamental, basic and constitutional
right.”20
In Moore v. Asente,21 the Kentucky Supreme Court
examined how a nonparent can establish a right or entitlement to
custody of a child which is superior to that of the child’s
parent.22
The party seeking custody must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is a de facto custodian,23
that the parent has waived his or her right to superior custody,
or that the parent is an unfit custodian.
In making the
determination that a parent is unfit, the clear and convincing
evidence must be sufficient to support an involuntary
19
For reasons discussed later, we need not address the merits of the
appeals concerning Appellant’s petition for immediate entitlement to
custody.
20
Vinson v. Sorrell, 136 S.W.3d 465, 468 (Ky. 2004).
21
110 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2003).
22
Id. at 359.
23
See KRS 403.270, 405.020.
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termination of parental rights under KRS 625.090.24
Appropriate
factors for consideration are abandonment; evidence of physical
injury, emotional harm, or sexual abuse; moral delinquency;
mental illness; and, for reasons other than poverty alone,
failing to provide essential care for the child.25
If a finding
of unfitness is made, the Family Court then must determine
custody pursuant to the best interest of the child standard.26
The test is not whether this Court would have decided
the matter of custody differently.27
Instead, the standard of
review of a child custody determination is whether the Family
Court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous28 or whether the
Family Court abused its discretion.29
Clear and convincing
evidence need not be uncontradicted evidence.30
“It is
sufficient if there is proof of a probative and substantial
nature carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to convince
ordinarily prudent minded people.”31
Findings of fact are
24
Boatwright v. Walker, 715 S.W.2d 237, 244 (Ky.App. 1986).
25
Davis v. Collinsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1989).
KRS 625.090.
26
McNames v. Corum, 683 S.W.2d 246, 247 (Ky. 1985).
27
Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Rowland v. Holt, 253 Ky. 718, 70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (1934).
31
Id.
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See
clearly erroneous only where they are not supported by
substantial evidence in the record.32
NOTICE OF HEARING
Appellant asserts that the Family Court deprived her
of a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the competing
motions for permanent custody.
She asserts that she did not
have timely notice because she received the Family Court’s order
sua sponte setting the instant case for final hearing only five
days before the hearing.
She asserts that this short notice was
particularly prejudicial because she thought that no hearing
would be conducted.
During the September 11, 2003, hearing on
Appellant’s petition for immediate entitlement to custody, the
Family Court said it was not going to hear all the evidence
again to resolve the matter of permanent custody because the
issues have been exhaustively litigated since June 2000.
Appellant filed a motion complaining of the short notice; but,
notably, she did not seek a continuance to delay this hearing.
Instead, she merely sought to have the Family Court consider
evidence from other related proceedings concerning the children,
which the court agreed to do.
The court explained that the
purpose of the hearing was simply to make sure that there was
nothing further which the parties wanted to add to the already
32
V.S. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, 706 S.W.2d 420,
424 (Ky.App. 1986).
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extensive and thorough record.
Appellant was personally present
at the hearing and represented by counsel.
Given these facts,
we deem that she has waived any possible error concerning the
sufficiency of her notice.
any prejudice.
Moreover, she has not demonstrated
Therefore, we find no deprivation of due
process.
RECUSAL
Appellant also asserts that the Family Court judge,
the Honorable Cynthia Sanderson, erred by denying her motion for
recusal in the action involving the competing petitions for
permanent custody.
Appellant relies on KRS 26A.015(2)(a), which
requires a judge to recuse “[w]here [she] has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings, or has expressed
an opinion concerning the merits of the proceeding.”
Appellant
then cites a series of evidentiary facts, which Judge Sanderson
allegedly knew, as grounds for recusal.
But only prior
knowledge which is derived from an extra-judicial source
requires recusal.33
33
A judge is not required to recuse based on
Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 424, 427-428 (Ky. 1986).
Cf. Woods v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 809, 811-813 (Ky. 1990)
(holding that if circuit judge based his finding that a defendant
was advised of his Boykin rights when entering a guilty plea in
district court on personal knowledge not contained in the record
because he was the district judge who took defendant’s guilty plea,
this would be extra-judicial knowledge requiring recusal).
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knowledge gained during the course of earlier participation in
the same case.34
All of Judge Sanderson’s alleged knowledge of
the case which Appellant has described was gained through her
participation in the case and its interrelated cases, such as
the DNA cases.
This type of knowledge does not require recusal.
Appellant also asserts that Judge Sanderson was
required to recuse because Appellant had filed a judicial
complaint against her.
The Kentucky courts have not
specifically addressed whether a judge is required to recuse
from a pending case whenever a party files a judicial complaint
against that judge.
The general rule is that a judge, under
these circumstances, is not automatically disqualified because
“to hold otherwise would invite the filing of a misconduct
complaint solely to obtain a judge’s disqualification and would
invite judge shopping.”35
We need not decide whether to adopt
this rule, however, because we cannot review this issue.
Because the alleged judicial complaint is not part of the
record, we have no way of knowing when or if such a complaint
was made.
Also, Appellant does not indicate how this issue was
preserved for appellate review.
Her motion to recuse makes no
mention of a judicial complaint, and she does not direct us to
anywhere in the record where this issue was raised before the
34
Marlowe, supra.
35
46 Am.Jur. 2d Judges § 155 (2004) (citations omitted).
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Family Court.
If she means to suggest that Judge Sanderson had
a duty to recuse sua sponte based on the alleged judicial
complaint, Appellant at least needs to show that the judge had
notice of the filing of the judicial complaint.
makes no such showing.
Again, she
Due to Appellant’s failure to provide an
adequate record and failure to show how this issue was preserved
at the trial court level, this issue of recusal is unreviewable.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
SEXUAL ABUSE
One basis for awarding custody to a nonparent over a
parent is a finding that the parent is an unfit custodian.36
In
the instant case, the Family Court determined that Appellant is
an unfit mother.
Appellant challenges this determination by
asserting that it is based, in part, on erroneous factual
findings.
Specifically, she challenges the following factual
findings:
“[Appellant] sexually abused [S.S.R.] by touching her
private body parts inappropriately.
These acts of abuse were
acknowledged by the parents and were substantiated by an
investigator for the Cabinet for Families and Children.”
Appellant denies that she ever sexually abused S.S.R. or that
she or H.R. admitted to her doing so.37
The only evidence in the
36
Davis, 771 S.W.2d at 330.
37
Appellant also asserts that she was not properly notified by the
Cabinet for Families and Children that a sexual abuse claim had been
substantiated against her. The parties stipulated in the final
hearing on permanent custody that Appellant intended to appeal this
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available record supporting the allegation of sexual abuse is
hearing testimony by Cabinet for Families and Children (Cabinet)
social worker Leslie Thorn that Cabinet social worker Stacey
Allbritten and Detective Jim Smith of the McCracken County
Sheriff’s Department “substantiated” the sexual abuse allegation
against Appellant.
However, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held
that “a social worker’s ‘professional determination’ that an
allegation of abuse is ‘substantiated’ is nothing more than
improper opinion testimony.”38
If the appellate record were complete, we would have
to conclude that the Family Court erred in its factual findings
that Appellant sexually abused S.S.R. and that she and H.R.
acknowledged this sexual abuse.
However, the incomplete record
caused by the missing transcript of the October 31, 2002,
hearing changes the situation.
As previously noted, where the
appellate record is incomplete, we must presume that the missing
record supports the trial court’s findings.
Therefore, we must
assume that the evidence presented during the October 31, 2002,
hearing supports the Family Court’s findings that Appellant
ruling of the Cabinet, as well as the issue of her alleged lack of
notice. We need not address those issues here as they are
collateral to the matter at hand.
38
Jordan v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W.3d 263, 269 (Ky. 2002) (quotation
marks in original). See also, Prater v. Cabinet for Human
Resources, 954 S.W.2d 954, 958-959 (Ky. 1997).
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sexually abused S.S.R. and that she and H.R. acknowledged this
abuse.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
PHYSICAL ABUSE AND EMOTIONAL HARM
Even if there were no findings concerning sexual
abuse, there is ample evidence in the record to support the
Family Court’s determination that Appellant is an unfit mother.
We may affirm the trial court for any reason supported by the
record.39
Appellant does not challenge the Family Court’s
findings concerning her physical abuse of S.S.R., including
hitting her with a belt, slapping her so hard that bruises
formed, pulling on her arms, and locking her in a closet.
Although the Family Court made no specific findings of fact to
this effect, the record also establishes that Appellant
subjected the children to mental abuse and emotional harm by
yelling at them; cursing at them; flying into rages; and, once,
by holding a man at knifepoint in front of the children, as
described below.
This evidence supports the Family Court’s
findings of fact concerning physical and emotional abuse and
emotional harm caused by Appellant, and we must assume that the
missing record further supports these findings of fact.
39
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 814 S.W.2d 928, 930
(Ky.App. 1991).
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
MENTAL ILLNESS
The Family Court’s determination that Appellant is an
unfit mother is also supported by the Family Court’s finding
that Appellant “has a long history of mental illness with
numerous hospitalizations due to symptoms of that illness,
including thoughts of harming her children, her husband, and
[herself].”
One ground for terminating parental rights under
KRS 625.090 or awarding custody to a nonparent40 is “mental
illness as defined by KRS 202A.011(9) . . . as certified by a
qualified mental health professional, which renders the parent
consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing
physical or psychological needs of the child for extended
periods of time.”41
KRS 202A.011(9) defines a mentally ill
person as “a person with substantially impaired capacity to use
self-control, judgment, or discretion in the conduct of the
person’s affairs and social relations, associated with
maladaptive behavior or recognized emotional symptoms where
impaired capacity, maladaptive behavior, or emotional symptoms
can be related to physiological, psychological, or social
factors.”
40
Davis, 771 S.W.2d at 330.
41
KRS 625.090(3)(a).
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Appellant does not dispute the fact that she has been
diagnosed as mentally ill within the meaning of
KRS 625.090(3)(a) and 202A.011(9) by qualified health
professionals on more than one occasion.
When she was
approximately 17, she was admitted to Rivendell Psychiatric
Hospital for pulling a knife on her mother.42
diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic.
There, she was
Then, on July 5, 2000,43
she admitted herself to the psychiatric unit of Lourdes
Hospital.
Her symptoms included excessive crying, panic
attacks, mood swings, severe depression,44 and concern over her
inability to deal with an abusive relationship or to care
properly for the children.45
She also heard voices telling her
to harm the children or herself.
Appellant was diagnosed as
suffering from bipolar affective disorder and post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD)46 and having borderline personality
42
The exact date or length of this hospitalization is not in the
record.
43
This is when Appellant first entrusted the custodians with the
children.
44
Appellant had stopped taking prescription anti-depressant
medication.
45
Appellant was described as very candid and remorseful about her
abuse and neglect of the children.
46
The trauma triggering the post-traumatic stress was identified as a
combination of factors: she was sexually abused as a young child by
a man; her mother severely physically and verbally abused her; and
her then-husband, H.R., physically abused her and the children.
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disorder traits.47
Appellant’s hospitalization on this occasion
was, again, precipitated by an act of violence.
Immediately
before she was hospitalized in July 2000, she held a knife to
the throat of a man in her home because she said he had abused
her and she was enraged.
The man called her name repeatedly to
make her take the knife away; but, due to her mental illness,
Appellant felt as if she could not hear him or could not
recognize her own name.
He finally got her attention by
pointing out that the children were watching.
him out of the house.
She then threw
She has no memory of what happened to the
children, who were then 1 and 3, after that.48
Appellant was
treated at Lourdes and after her release with lithium49 and
psychotherapy.
In approximately late May 2001, Appellant suffered a
relapse and was voluntarily admitted into Western State Hospital
for mental illness on May 30, 2001.50
For about a week or so
47
Psychiatrist Dr. Thomas Greisamer, who treated Appellant while at
Lourdes Hospital and periodically after her release from Western
State Hospital, described characteristics of borderline personality
disorder as follows: a tendency toward chaotic personal
relationships, fear of abandonment, poor self-esteem, and the
occasional loss of reality. The main treatment is psychotherapy.
48
This corresponds with testimony that the children were frequently
dirty, hungry, and unsupervised while they lived with Appellant and
H.R.
49
Lithium is used to regulate bipolar affective disorder.
50
Dr. Greisamer speculates that Appellant’s relapse may have been due
to a change ordered by another physician in the dosage of her
lithium.
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before she was hospitalized, Appellant felt that her thoughts
were racing uncontrollably and that she might explode.
She
heard so many voices in her head that people speaking to her
sounded muffled.
More ominously, she felt the urge to
physically hurt M.B., her current husband with whom she was then
living, for no reason.
She also began flying into rages and
destroying household objects.
And she would also hide in
closets from M.B. for hours at a time for no apparent reason.
Despite his awareness of her history of serious mental illness,
M.B. just thought that Appellant seemed a little “jittery.”
told M.B. that she needed her medication changed.
She
However,
there is evidence that Appellant made no move to go to the
hospital until the custodians persuaded her to do so.
Even
then, M.B. recommended that she not make any hasty decisions
about going to the hospital.
However, he now admits that she
should have been admitted to the hospital for an adjustment of
her medication.
While at Western State Hospital, Appellant’s
medication was changed; and, afterward, she received additional
therapy and counseling.
There is no evidence that she has had a
relapse requiring hospitalization since Appellant was released
from Western State on June 12, 2001.
Appellant does not dispute that she has a history of
serious mental illness and continues to need medication to treat
it.
However, she points to the testimony of Dr. Greisamer, who
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offers his opinion that she is now well enough to be a fit
custodian for the children.
She points out that no expert
medical testimony to the contrary was presented.
However, she
cites no authority for the proposition that Appellees are
required to produce such evidence so we do not find this to be
dispositive.
Notwithstanding Dr. Greisamer’s testimony, there
is substantial evidence to support the Family Court’s conclusion
that Appellant’s mental illness still may impair her ability to
care for her children.
His opinion seems based, in part, on his
belief that Appellant is fully compliant in taking her
medication.
However, Appellant has a documented history of not
taking her medication when she lived with H.R.51
And Cabinet
social worker Peggy Howard testified that Appellant has told her
on occasion during home visits that she has run out of
medication.
M.B. testified that Appellant “almost always”
remembers her medication and that he reminds her if she forgets,
but he also admitted that his job keeps him away from the house
sometimes.
Dr. Greisamer also appeared to be under the impression
that Appellant immediately recognized that she was
decompensating in May 2001 and promptly admitted herself to a
psychiatric hospital entirely of her own initiative.
51
But the
H.R. encouraged this behavior, however, by disparaging psychiatry
and psychology and assuring Appellant that she did not need her
medication.
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record shows that neither Appellant nor her husband, M.B., took
swift, appropriate action until the custodians intervened,
approximately one week after symptoms of Appellant’s mental
illness manifested.
If such a situation arose again, the odds
of a mental health professional intervening in a timely fashion
are not good because Appellant is not involved in any regular
psychotherapy or counseling.
She only sees a mental health
professional once every three months to get her prescription
refilled.
We do not mean to diminish Appellant’s efforts to take
charge of her mental illness.
The record shows that Appellant’s
mental health and parenting skills are greatly improved.
But it
also shows that she continues to be seriously mentally ill and
that she does not have an adequate support system to avert
potential mental health crises.
Therefore, there is substantial
evidence in the record to support a finding that she is an unfit
mother because of her severe mental illness.
Regardless of whether we would have reached the same
conclusion, we must affirm the Family Court’s determination that
Appellant is an unfit mother because there is substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact on which
the determination is based. The Family Court did not abuse its
discretion.
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BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN
Appellant also challenges the Family Court’s
determination that it would be in the children’s best interest
that permanent custody be awarded to the custodians.
The
primary basis for Appellant’s challenge is Dr. Greisamer’s
opinion that the children should be restored to Appellant.
We
find it significant that Dr. Greisamer has never met the
children or the custodians, much less observed the children
interacting with the custodians.
So the Family Court was well
within its discretion in discounting his opinion on this matter.
At the same time, there is strong evidence supporting the Family
Court’s finding that the children have formed strong bonds, not
only with the custodians, with whom they have lived since they
were 1 and 3, respectively, but also with the custodian’s
extended family, including their daughter, S.B.’s sister, and
S.B.’s parents.
Moreover, there was expert testimony to the
effect that interrupting these relationships would be especially
traumatic to the children.
Both children have been diagnosed
with PTSD, which makes it more difficult for them to adjust to a
new situation.
Both children are special needs children,
developmentally-delayed in a variety of areas, especially
speech, for which continuing therapy is needed.
These
developmental delays were not diagnosed nor treated until the
children resided with the custodians.
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There is evidence that
since coming to live with the custodians and receiving
appropriate therapies, both children have improved in certain
areas, with C.N.R. making particular progress.52
S.S.R. has also
been diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder, for which she is
now being treated.
There was also evidence presented that the
children were aware of the ongoing custody dispute and found it
stressful.
We find no abuse of discretion in the Family Court’s
determination that it is in the best interest of the children
that permanent custody be awarded to the custodians.
There is
substantial evidence to support this decision.
PETITION FOR IMMEDIATE ENTITLEMENT TO CUSTODY
As previously noted, the Family Court transferred
Appellant’s petition for immediate entitlement to custody of the
children under KRS 620.11053 to the Circuit Court because it
deemed it, in essence, an appeal of the Family Court’s temporary
52
Both of the children were once eligible for S.S.I. payments on the
basis of their disability due to their combination of developmental
delays, but C.N.R. has improved so much that she is no longer
considered disabled.
53
KRS 620.110 states as follows:
Any person aggrieved by the issuance of a temporary removal
order may file a petition in Circuit Court for immediate
entitlement to custody and a hearing shall be expeditiously
held according to the Rules of Civil Procedure. During the
pendency of the petition for immediate entitlement the orders
of the District Court shall remain in effect.
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custody order.
The Circuit Court then dismissed the petition on
the grounds that “K.R.S. 620.110 does not provide a remedy or an
appeal to the Circuit Court for the modification of a Temporary
Custody Order.”
Contrary to both courts’ assumptions, a petition for
immediate entitlement to custody under KRS 620.110 is not an
appeal of a temporary custody order. It is an original action.
There have been no cases construing KRS 620.110 since its
enactment,54 and the legislative history provides no guidance to
the statute’s construction.55
But in determining legislative
intention, courts may look to the act as a whole, the laws of
the state in force at the time of its passage, and to such other
prior or contemporaneous facts and circumstances as may throw
light on the General Assembly’s intention.56
The General
Assembly is presumed to have knowledge of existing laws and
their construction.57
Generally, words and phrases shall be
construed according to the common meaning and usage.58
But words
54
Enact. Act. 1986 ch. 423, § 72, effective July 1, 1987.
55
The statute was passed as one section of an act entitled “An Act
related to the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code,” a large, omnibus act
containing over 280 sections. The section of the Act which became
KRS 620.110 was never amended.
56
Kinser Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Morse, 566 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Ky.App.
1978).
57
Baker v. White, 251 Ky. 691, 65 S.W.2d 1022, 1024 (1933).
58
KRS 446.080(4).
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which have acquired particular meaning in the law as terms of
art must be construed according to that meaning.59
Examining the
common law in existence when KRS 620.110 was enacted makes it
clear that the statute merely codified the common law right for
immediate entitlement as described in Galloway v. Pruitt.60
The
statute employs not only the same term of art for the common law
cause of action but sets forth the same procedures.61
Historically, a common law petition for immediate
entitlement was an original action “in the nature of habeas
corpus.”62
Since the statutory petition for immediate
entitlement under KRS 620.110 merely codified the existing
common law, it, too, is an original action.
Therefore, the
Family Court and Circuit Court both erred in treating
Appellant’s petition for immediate entitlement pursuant to
KRS 620.110 as an appeal of the temporary custody order.
But any error in the treatment of the Appellant’s
immediate entitlement to custody is moot.
A common law petition
for immediate entitlement to custody had no preclusive effect in
a later action to determine long-term or permanent custody; a
59
Revenue Cabinet v. JRS Data Systems, Inc., 738 S.W.2d 828, 829
(Ky.App. 1987), KRS 446.080(4).
60
469 S.W.2d 556, 558-559 (Ky. 1971).
61
Compare Id. and KRS 620.110.
62
Moore v. Dawson, 531 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Ky. 1975).
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court would be free later to award long-term or permanent
custody to another party.63
under KRS 620.110.
The same holds true for a petition
Therefore, even if Appellant had been
awarded custody of the children through her petition for
immediate entitlement, the Family Court could still have awarded
permanent custody to the custodians.
Our disposition of the
Family Court’s order awarding permanent custody to the
custodians on the grounds that Appellant is an unfit mother
renders Appellant’s earlier petition for immediate entitlement
to custody moot.64
Therefore, we need not address the merits of
this appeal related to this petition.
CONCLUSION
There is substantial evidence in the record to support
Appellant’s parental unfitness, including but not limited to
evidence of physical and mental abuse, emotional harm, neglect,
and mental illness.
There is also sufficient evidence to
support the fact that it is in the best interest of the children
that permanent custody be awarded to the custodians, J.R. and
63
Galloway, 469 S.W.2d at 557-559. See also Dake v. Timmons,
283 S.W.2d 378, 379-380 (Ky. 1955) (relying on modified habeas
corpus proceedings to deal with immediate physical custody of a
child, a procedure which preceded the common law petition for
immediate entitlement to custody).
64
A different result might be required if the physical custody of the
children were a factor in the decision to award permanent custody to
the custodians, as it might be if it were based on a finding that
the custodians were de facto custodians.
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S.R., with whom they have bonded and with whom they have resided
since July 2000.
Therefore, we affirm the Family Court’s
November 10, 2003, order awarding permanent custody of the
children to the custodians.
Because our disposition makes the
issue of Appellant’s earlier petition for immediate entitlement
to custody under KRS 620.110 moot, we also affirm the Circuit
Court’s July 14, 2003, order dismissing Appellant’s petition for
immediate entitlement and its August 19, 2003, order dismissing
Appellant’s motion for reconsideration.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Lisa A. DeRenard
Benton, Kentucky
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
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