EWG CORPORATION; GEERS DEVELOPMENT, LLC; AND WILLIAM GEERS v. DAVID HILS AND NEIL BLUNT
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RENDERED: JULY 29, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001639-MR
EWG CORPORATION; GEERS
DEVELOPMENT, LLC; AND
WILLIAM GEERS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00393
DAVID HILS AND NEIL BLUNT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI, JUDGE; MILLER, SENIOR
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
EWG Corporation and its sole shareholder,
William Geers (Geers), appeal from a judgment of the Boone
Circuit Court resolving a contract dispute among the parties.
A Special Master Commissioner presided over a four-day hearing
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by Assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
pursuant to a court order and the agreement of the parties.
The
Special Commissioner filed extensive recommended findings and
conclusions in his report, which the court affirmed and adopted
as its own.
The court concluded that Geers was liable to the
appellees, David Hils and Neil Blunt, for sums owed for their
consulting services.
Commissioner erred:
On appeal, Geers argues that the
(1) in excluding from evidence certain
documents relating to his alleged damages and (2) in failing to
conclude that he was fraudulently induced to enter into the
consulting agreement.
Finding no error, we affirm.
The facts underlying this matter involve property
owned by Geers’s late wife, Edna Mae Geers.
Edna Mae inherited
forty-two (42) acres of property from her father.
She had
unsuccessfully attempted to sell the acreage over a period of
years.
After several realtors had failed to find a buyer
willing pay her price, she again listed the property for sale in
1994 with Hils, the owner of Concepts Realty, Inc.
Hils
attempted to find a buyer for the property for many months, but
he, too, could not find a buyer willing to pay the amount sought
by Edna Mae.
Edna Mae became ill.
Because her husband’s employment
frequently required his absence from home, Edna Mae hoped that
Geers would retire.
She also wanted to obtain as much money for
the property as possible in order to provide for her seven
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children upon her death.
Hils devised a plan to accomplish both
objectives of bringing about Geers’s retirement and of realizing
a hefty profit on the property.
He suggested that the Geerses
apply to re-zone for commercial use 11.88 acres of the property
situated along U.S. Highway 25; he urged them to subdivide the
remaining acres into residential building lots.
At a meeting on October 17, 1995, Hils presented his
development plan to the Geerses.
Also present at the meeting
were Dennis Helmer, an attorney, and Blunt, who had recently
retired as the executive director of the Clermont Housing
Authority in Cincinnati.
Hils had prepared a document
containing estimates of the costs for developing the property
along with the potential profit to be realized by the Geerses.
His figure for the total development cost (which included a 7%
real estate commission and a 5.5% consulting fee) was $816,250.
He projected that the Geerses would realize $2,324,000 tax free
-- as distinguished from $594,000 if the property were sold in
its undeveloped state.
Helmer gave the Geerses tax advice and agreed to
assist them with the re-zoning.
The parties reached an oral
agreement that if the property were re-zoned, Concepts Realty
would continue to list the property; Hils and Blunt would act as
project managers for a fee of 5.5% of the gross sales of the
property.
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Through the efforts of Blunt and Helmer, the zoning
change was approved in April 1996.
With the assistance of Hils,
Geers then obtained financing for the project.
Hils introduced
Geers to Ray Erpenbeck of Erpenbeck Engineering, Inc., who
agreed to perform the necessary engineering work for the
development.
The Geerses obtained legal counsel to assist them
in forming a limited liability corporation into which Edna Mae
transferred her interest in the property.
Geers retired from his job in June 1996.
He testified
that since he had no source of income, he advanced money to
himself every month from the line of credit established at
Heritage Bank for the development of the property.
Geers later
testified that he had no idea how much of that money was spent
for his own personal expenses.
Before Erpenbeck began any work, the Geerses learned
that Hils’s estimates were significantly understated.
Although
Geers considered canceling the project at this juncture, he
testified that he decided to continue in deference to Edna Mae’s
wishes.
Construction of the development began in the fall of
1996.
In September of that year, an agent with Concepts Realty
found a buyer for 101 of the 123 residential lots in the
development.
Keystone Home Builders (Keystone) agreed to pay
$2,449,500 for these lots in four installments to begin in the
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late summer of 1997.
After the Keystone agreement was in place,
the parties reduced their oral consulting agreement to writing.
The written terms reflected their previous agreement.
In
consideration for their work in planning the development,
obtaining the new zoning classification, managing the
development, and performing other services, Hils and Blunt were
to receive 5.5% of the proceeds of the sale of the property at
the time of closing.
Blunt had been instrumental in obtaining the zoning
change, and he performed most of the work involved with managing
the development as noted in the findings of fact of the
Commissioner:
The Court finds that Mr. Blunt spent an
exhaustive number of hours on this project
in performing duties considered by him to be
project management. He was certainly on the
job site nearly every day for hours at a
time. Both he and Mr. Hils solicited bids
from engineering companies to prepare a
preliminary plat and a preliminary cost
estimate for the project. . . . Mr. Blunt
generated numerous project reports . . .
These services provided a benefit to the
project.
(Commissioner’s Report (CR) at p. 12.)
Numerous problems developed during the construction
phase.
The contractor hired to clear the property failed to
remove large pieces of trees -- an omission that resulted in
problems with soil compaction.
Consequently, Keystone incurred
-5-
added expenses in securing a proper foundation for the newly
constructed houses.
The road contractor failed to place a
sufficiently thick layer of asphalt on the streets.
unforeseen costs resulted.
More
In addition to these problems, wet
weather caused delays in completing the project as scheduled;
additional interest accrued.
Edna Mae died in May 1997.
The first of the four
closings to transfer ownership of twenty-five residential lots
to Keystone occurred on October 8, 1997.
Hils and Blunt were
paid $31,350 pursuant to the agreement.
However, by December
1997, Geers had become dissatisfied with Hils and Blunt.
He
instructed them not to have any contact with contractors without
his approval.
Geers went to Florida for the entire month of
January 1998.
He did not inform Hils or Blunt that he would be
out of town, and he did not return their phone messages.
Geers testified at trial that Hils and Blunt quit
their jobs while they contended that they had been fired by
Geers.
While finding no evidence either of a formal firing by
Geers or of a voluntary termination by Hils and Blunt, the
Commissioner found that “the parties mutually agreed to end the
contract at that time.”
(CR at p. 10.)
After his return from Florida, Geers actively assumed
management of the project.
completed.
About forty lots remained to be
Keystone purchased the remaining lots under its
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contract on May 4, 1998; November 25, 1998; and June 4, 1999.
At Geers’s insistence, the amount due the appellees from these
closings -- $98,655 in total -- was placed in escrow.
Geers
sold some of the remaining lots without paying or escrowing any
fees for Hils and Blunt.
of his children.
He also gave some of the lots to two
He eventually listed the commercial property
with another real estate broker.
On April 8, 1998, Geers filed a complaint alleging
that Hils and Blunt had breached their contract to supply
certain services relating to the development.
Asking for an
unspecified amount of damages, he also sought to be released
from any further obligation to pay for the appellees’ services.
Hils and Blunt filed a counterclaim, also alleging a breach of
contract and additionally asserting a claim against Geers for
misrepresentation.
Geers responded and filed a claim against
Hils for fraud.
After the pleadings were closed, Hils and Blunt
conducted extensive discovery to determine Geers’s damages.
During a three-day deposition, Geers was unable to articulate
the amount or nature of his damages.
The appellees served him
with interrogatories and requests for production of documents,
seeking “any and all documents that pertain, refer or relate in
any way” to his damages.
On November 11, 1998, in response to
these discovery requests, Geers stated that all documents
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relating to his damages had been produced with the exception of
his tax returns.
He objected to producing his personal income
tax returns for the years in question.
Trial was first scheduled to begin on November 19,
2001.
The trial court granted Geers’s motion for a continuance,
and the trial was re-scheduled for April 9, 2003.
On March 19,
2003, pursuant to an agreement of the parties, the trial court
referred the matter to the Special Master Commissioner.
On April 7, 2003, two days prior to trial, Geers
produced EWG’s corporate tax returns for 1998 and 1999.
Hils
and Blunt learned for the first time that Geers intended to seek
damages from them for the costs associated with the soil
compaction and paving problems.
Meanwhile, Geers already had
two lawsuits pending in the Boone Circuit Court against the
contractors actually responsible for the damages from the soil
and paving troubles.
On April 9, 2003, the morning of trial, Hils and Blunt
filed a motion in limine requesting that Geers be prohibited
from introducing any documents relating to his damages that had
not been previously produced during discovery.
The Commissioner
observed that the corporate tax returns had not been timely
produced to the appellees and granted their motion.
His ruling
pertained to the tax returns as well as to any other documents
related to Geers’s claim of damages that had not been furnished
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in response to discovery requests.
placed in the record by avowal.
However, the documents were
With the exception of the 1997
corporate tax return, none of the documents had been produced by
Geers during discovery when they surfaced two days before trial.
Indeed, some of the documents actually appeared the day
immediately preceding the trial.
After presiding over four days of testimony, the
Commissioner rendered thorough and detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
In addition to those facts already recited,
the Commissioner made the following findings that are relevant
to the issues in this appeal:
The Court cannot conclude [ ] that Mr.
Hils’[s] and Mr. Blunt’s services were worth
only the amount paid to them so far by Mr.
Geers. They contributed to the development
of the project and through Mr. Hils [sic]
idea to develop the property as residential/
commercial, they clearly assisted in
increasing the value of the Geers[es]’
property. Unfortunately, due to their
inexperience and marginal ability to oversee
and develop this project, the project
suffered delay, poor quality soil compaction
and street pavement problems. The
significant underestimation of the
development cost by Mr. Hils and Mr. Blunt
led Mr. and Mrs. Geers to believe their
profit on the development would be much
greater than it actually was. The Court
finds that a competent and qualified project
manager could have prevented or ameliorated
these problems.
. . .
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The Court further finds that Mr. Hils
and Mr. Blunt acted in good faith both in
entering into the agreement with Mr. and
Mrs. Geers and in attempting to carry out
their duties under the contract. They were
simply not very efficient project managers
and the project suffered because of that
fact. The “tax free” language contained in
the original proposal prepared by Mr. Hils
was referred to by Mr. Hils as a misnomer
and the Court accepts this as fact. There
was no evidence that Mr. Geers reasonably
relied upon the “tax free” misstatement
contained in the proposal. Mr. Helmer was
present at the meeting to clear up any
questions about Mr. and Mrs. Geers’ tax
status and there is some evidence that this
was done at least peripherally. Mr. Hils
dramatically underestimated the development
costs and should have first consulted with
an engineer before presenting these
estimates to Mr. and Mrs. Geers. The Court
finds that although quite low, these
estimates were made in good faith by Mr.
Hils.
The Court finds that while Mr. Hils and
Mr. Blunt worked hard, they could not
accomplish what a reasonably competent
project manager should have accomplished
with this project.
That Mr. Hils and Mr. Blunt have thus
far been paid $31,350.00 for their services
to the Geers[es]. This payment was made to
them at the closing of the first Keystone
closing in October 1997. There remains
$98,655.00 in escrow representing 5.5% of
the proceeds of the remaining three (3)
closings under the Keystone contract. Todate, the commercial property construction
is not complete and the entire commercial
acreage remains unsold.
(CR at pp. 16-18.)
The Commissioner concluded that although
they were not very efficient managers, Hils and Blunt had
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labored hard and had conferred substantial benefits to Geers.
They “spent many hours in management in a good faith attempt to
complete their tasks” and “contributed to the increase in value
of the real estate.”
(CR at p. 20.)
The Commissioner also
concluded that they were entitled to the entire balance held in
escrow under the doctrine of substantial performance.
(CR at p.
22.)
The Commissioner found that Geers was not entitled to
recover damages attributable to street repairs or piering to
stabilize the foundations of the houses.
He also denied Geers
any additional interest because of his “failure to provide
documentary evidence . . . prior to trial in response to
discovery requests.”
(CR at p. 21.)
Nevertheless, the
Commissioner determined that Geers was entitled to some relief,
holding as follows:
However, since [Hils and Blunt] did not
fully complete their tasks and those tasks
which they did complete were of questionable
utility; since much of the project was
incomplete when they left the job and
remains incomplete; and, since Mr. Geers was
required to serve as project manager for
approximately one year, the Court concludes
that Mr. Hils and Mr. Blunt are not entitled
under the Contract to any fees associated
with the sale of the 11.8 acres of
commercial property. The Court determines
this is a fair and equitable reduction in
the balance due Mr. Hils and Mr. Blunt in
order to compensate Mr. Geers for his
damages associated with the project
-11-
manager’s failure to fully perform under the
Contract.
(CR at p. 21.)
As to his claim of fraud, the Commissioner concluded that Geers
had failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Hils
and Blunt had engaged in any fraudulent conduct in their
dealings with either Geers or Edna Mae.
(CR at p. 23.)
All parties filed exceptions to the Commissioner’s
report.
Hils and Blunt argued that they were entitled to pre-
judgment interest; Geers contended that the Commissioner erred
in failing to award him damages for the costs associated with
soil compaction, street paving, and interest and for his own
time in finishing the project.
The exceptions were overruled.
On June 27, 2003, the trial court entered a final judgment that
was consistent with the findings and recommendations of the
Commissioner.
This appeal followed.
We observe at the outset that Geers has not complied
with CR2 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and (v) in the narrative portion of his
brief.
He has made no reference to the specific portions of the
evidentiary record supporting his narrative statement; he has
not stated where and how his issues were preserved for review.
Where a reference in his summary was provided, it pertained to a
finding of the Commissioner rather than to the record.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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In fact,
some of the underlying citations to the Commissioner were not
consistent with the finding as referenced.
For example, on page
one of the appellate brief, Geers stated:
[Hils] further represented [at the October
17, 1995 meeting] that [the development]
costs had been reviewed by Ray Erpenbeck
Engineers and were therefore good estimates.
[Special Commissioner Report, R., p. 183.]
Our review of the Commissioner’s report, including page 183,
revealed that the Commissioner made no such finding.
Although
Geers alleged that Hils had advised him and Edna Mae that
Erpenbeck had reviewed his estimates, the Commissioner rejected
Geers’s allegation, finding instead that Hils did not make any
misrepresentations about Erpenbeck in his negotiations with the
Geerses.
Geers’s reference to the Commissioner’s report as
supporting his statement of the case is both mistaken and
misleading.
Other examples of the license that Geers has taken
with the facts are contained on page two of his brief.
Geers
stated that both Hils and Blunt “were essentially realtors.”
Hils was a realtor/broker; however, Blunt, as found by the
Commissioner, had experience as a project manager during his
twenty-year tenure with the Clermont Housing Authority.
stated:
Geers
“Hils and Blunt stood to gain 12.5% of the sale price
[of the development property].”
Actually, it is undisputed that
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the 7% sales commission was shared by Hils and another agent
with his company.
Blunt received nothing from the sale of the
property except his share of the consulting fee.
Even more at variance with the truth is Geers’s
repeated assertion that he had timely provided Hils and Blunt
with EWG’s corporate tax returns in seeking to persuade this
Court that the Commissioner erred by excluding these documents
from evidence.
twice:
He stated that the tax returns “were produced
three days before trial and at the time of the original
document production on November 11, 1998, four years before
trial.”
(Appellants’ brief, at p. 7 and at p. 11.)
(Emphasis
added.)
As discussed above (and as admitted by Geers’s counsel
on the morning of trial), Geers had previously produced only the
1997 and 1998 tax returns in response to the appellees’
discovery requests; the 1999 tax return was not produced until
two days prior to the trial.
In challenging the Commissioner’s evidentiary ruling,
Geers argues that the exclusion of the corporate tax returns
constituted a “grave error” and resulted in a great injustice.
(Appellant’s brief, at p. 7.)
He contends that the tax returns
provided the only evidence of his “lost profits”:
the
difference between what he actually realized from the sale of
the property as distinguished from the amount that Hils
originally had estimated as profit.
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We disagree.
The admissibility of evidence is a matter which is
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
Commonwealth, 771 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. 1998).
Moore v.
Our standard of review
of an evidentiary ruling is abuse of discretion.
“The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.”
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11
S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2001).
In this case, we cannot conclude
that the Commissioner abused his discretion.
Although Geers consistently refused to supplement his
discovery responses and to provide the tax returns prior to
trial, Geers now contends that the corporate tax returns should
not have been excluded.
His argument is based on the omission
by Hils and Blunt to file a motion pursuant to CR 37.01(b)(i) to
compel him to produce his personal income tax returns.
He cites
Poe v. Rice, 706 S.W.2d 5 (Ky.App. 1986) and M.P.S. v. Cabinet
for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114 (Ky.App. 1998) for the
proposition that the appellees should have been estopped from
seeking to exclude previously unproduced documents.
However,
those cases are factually dissimilar, and neither case supports
the estoppel argument.
Geers also erroneously described the motion in limine
as focusing on “Mr. Geers’[s] objection to producing his
personal income tax return.”
(Appellants’ brief at p. 4.)
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However, our review reveals that the basis for the motion in
limine was Geers’s failure to produce the corporate tax returns
and other documents relating to Geers’s damages.
Geers quite
simply disregarded his duty to supplement his discovery
responses as mandated by CR 26.05(b).
Therefore, we find no
abuse of the discretion in the Commissioner’s ruling to exclude
the tax returns.
See also, Greathouse v. American National Bank
and Trust Co., 796 S.W.2d 869-870 (Ky.App. 1990); Fratzke v.
Murphy, 12 S.W.3d 279 (Ky. 1999).
Additionally, we conclude that any arguable error in
excluding the corporate tax returns is moot.
Geers’s alleged
entitlement to lost profits was wholly premised on his theory
that he was fraudulently induced into entering the consulting
agreement.
The Commissioner rejected that claim, concluding
that neither Hils nor Blunt had engaged in fraudulent behavior
and that at all times they had acted in good faith.
Thus, even
if we were to assume that the excluded evidence might have
tended to establish Geers’s lost profits, the Commissioner’s
correct resolution of the fraud claim has rendered the issue
moot.
Geers also argues that that the Commissioner erred in
excluding certain documents which would substantiate his
expenses for two subcontractors.
He contends that most of these
documents were contained in the files of Raymond Erpenbeck
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Engineering, Inc. -– a file which was in the possession and
control of counsel for Hils and Blunt until a week prior to
trial.
He contends that Hils and Blunt were not surprised or
prejudiced by his failure to supplement his discovery with these
excluded documents.
As a preliminary matter, we observe that Geers did not
present this argument to the Commissioner in response to the
motion in limine.
record.
The file to which Geers refers is not in the
Thus, we have no means of verifying this bare
assertion.
However, even if error occurred, we are unable to
conclude that Geers suffered any prejudice by the exclusion of
this evidence.
The Commissioner allowed Geers to testify about
these damages and amply compensated him for the losses he
sustained.
The Commissioner absolved Geers of the obligation to
pay the 5.5% consulting fee on the 11.8 acres of commercial
property and the twenty-two residential lots not purchased by
Keystone.
Thus, he more than off-set the damages sustained by
Geers for these alleged elements of damages.
Finally, with respect to the issue of the
Commissioner’s exclusion of evidence, Geers argues that the
Commissioner both erred as a matter of law and exceeded his
authority by ruling on the motion in limine.
Geers fails to
cite where or how this issue was preserved for review.
Having
reviewed the entire record, we have been unable to find any
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previous suggestion made by Geers -- either before the
Commissioner or the trial court -- that the Commissioner lacked
authority to rule on the evidentiary motion.
the argument was not preserved for review.
Thus, we hold that
Combs v. Knott
County Fiscal Court, 283 Ky. 456, 141 S.W.2d 859 (1940);
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1989).
Geers next argues that the Commissioner erred in
failing to find fraudulent conduct on the part of Hils and Blunt
in inducing him to enter into the consulting agreement.
He
makes numerous allegations in his brief that Hils lied with
respect to the integrity of his original cost estimates; he
charges that both appellees engaged in “puffing” with respect to
their qualifications to act as project managers.
The
Commissioner found that Hils’s cost estimates were extremely low
and that both he and Blunt were inefficient managers.
Based on
their inexperience, the Commissioner relieved Geers of any
obligation to compensate Hils and Blunt for any property not
covered by the Keystone purchase, removing from consideration
any commissions for all 11.88 acres of the commercial real
estate.
However, the Commissioner also found that Geers failed
to present sufficient, credible evidence that either appellee
acted fraudulently.
After examining the record, we agree that
Geers failed to present evidence sufficient to establish that
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either Hils or Blunt engaged in behavior meeting the criteria
for fraud as set forth in UPS v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464, 468
(Ky. 1999).
In a Kentucky action for fraud, the party
claiming harm must establish six elements of
fraud by clear and convincing evidence as
follows: a) material representation b)
which is false c)known to be false or made
recklessly d) made with inducement to be
acted upon e) acted in reliance thereon and
f) causing injury.
There was no evidence that Hils was aware that his
estimates were low or that he falsified them.
When the actual
bids were acquired, Geers knew that the estimates were not
wholly accurate.
Geers could not contend in good faith that he
had relied on the estimates produced by Hils in order to prevail
on his claim of fraud.
The Commissioner’s findings on this
issue are fully substantiated by the evidence.
Additionally, the injury element of Rickert cannot be
shown.
There was no evidence that Geers was injured by the
appellees.
On the contrary, the Commissioner found the efforts
of Hils and Blunt resulted in a significant benefit to Geers -in spite of their low estimates and inexperience.
Geers was
paid $2,449,500 by Keystone; the twenty-two remaining lots were
valued at $514,500; and the 11.88 acres of commercially-zoned
property had an appraised value of $1,336,228 in 1995.
If we
were to assume that Hils underestimated the development costs by
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$1,000,000 (as found by the Commissioner), Geers’s profit from
the development would still exceed $2,000,000.
Thus, we
conclude that the Commissioner’s findings with respect to the
benefits conferred upon Geers and the good faith dealings
demonstrated by the appellees are supported by substantial
evidence and are not clearly erroneous.
Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1998).
Finally, Geers argues that the 5.5% consulting fee was
so unconscionable as to constitute a “badge” of fraud.
He cites
the testimony of his expert, David Hunley, who stated that he
would have charged $30,000 to $40,000 for managing such a
project.
However, Geers’s argument ignores Hunley’s testimony
that he would not have undertaken the project under a
contingency fee contract in the first instance.
Geers testified
that he could not have paid a project manager until the property
sold.
Therefore, under the facts of his situation, an arguable
fee that a more experienced project manager would have charged
becomes irrelevant.
Hils and Blunt took considerable risk and
worked for many months with no compensation for their time and
efforts in planning and managing the development.
These
circumstances wholly support the Commissioner in his conclusion
that Geers was not fraudulently induced into entering the
contract.
The judgment of the Boone Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Joseph L. Baker
Debra S. Pleatman
Steven C. Martin
Covington, Kentucky
August T. Janszen
Cincinnati, Ohio
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS:
August T. Janszen
Cincinnati, Ohio
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Joseph L. Baker
Covington, Kentucky
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