BRENT MARCEL COLEMAN, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND ANTONIO REMONE TAYLOR v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 1, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001399-MR
BRENT MARCEL COLEMAN, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00664
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2003-CA-001458-MR
ANTONIO REMONE TAYLOR
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00664
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
SCHRODER, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Brent Marcel Coleman Jr., brings Appeal No.
2003-CA-001399-MR from a July 1, 2003, judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court on a jury verdict convicting him of manslaughter
in the first degree and other related crimes.
Antonio Taylor
brings Appeal No. 2003-CA-001458-MR from a June 24, 2003,
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court on a jury verdict
convicting him of complicity to commit manslaughter in the
second degree and other related crimes.
We affirm.
On the evening of April 7, 2002, Coleman and Taylor
were involved in the shooting death of Shan Howell.
The events
that culminated in Howell’s death are not completely clear.
Apparently around 10:30 p.m. that evening, Howell received a
phone call from his daughter, who wanted to be picked up from a
friend’s house at 2069 Tammy Court.
Howell was intoxicated so
his girlfriend, Donetta Tyler, drove him in his white Nissan.
Neither Howell nor Tyler was familiar with the neighborhood so
they stopped at a residence on Ward Drive to ask for directions.
While the two were stopped, Howell noticed a black Chevrolet
pull in behind them.
Howell and Tyler felt they were being
followed so Howell exited the white Nissan and retrieved a
Mossberg rifle from the trunk.
sped away.
The black Chevrolet immediately
Howell returned to his vehicle and he and Tyler
proceeded to pick up his daughter from the home on Tammy Court.
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For disputed reasons, Coleman and Taylor believed that
Howell may have attempted to rob Taylor’s “brother.”
Taylor
went to the house where Coleman was staying and shouted for
Coleman to come with him.
In response to Taylor’s request,
Coleman retrieved a shotgun and left with Taylor.
Coleman,
Taylor, and two others left in the black Chevrolet.
In an
attempt to locate Howell, the four returned to Ward Drive.
Howell had also returned and was spotted by Coleman and Taylor.
Upon noticing the presence of the black Chevrolet,
Howell told Tyler to pull over.
Howell exited his vehicle from
the passenger’s side with a rifle.
It is not clear whether
Howell said anything to the men, whether he pointed the gun at
them or whether he even fired a shot.
What is clear is that
over twenty shots were fired and Howell was dead.
Coleman and Taylor were subsequently indicted by a
Fayette County Grand Jury.
Coleman was indicted upon one count
of murder, three counts of wanton endangerment in the first
degree, one count of tampering with physical evidence and one
count of giving an officer a false name.
Taylor was indicted
upon one count of murder, three counts of wanton endangerment in
the first degree, and one count of tampering with physical
evidence.
Coleman and Taylor were tried jointly.
Crim. P. (RCr) 9.12.
See Ky. R.
Following the jury trial, Coleman was
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found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, tampering with
physical evidence, and three counts of wanton endangerment in
the first degree.
Coleman received a total sentence of ten (10)
years’ imprisonment.
Taylor was found guilty of complicity to
commit manslaughter in the second degree, three counts of wanton
endangerment in the first degree, and tampering with physical
evidence.
Taylor was sentenced to a total of fourteen (14)
years’ imprisonment.
These appeals follow.
Appeal No. 2003-CA-001399-MR
Coleman brings eight allegations of error on appeal.
We summarily reject seven of those allegations as being clearly
without merit; however, Coleman raises one allegation of error
that is somewhat troublesome - whether the circuit court
erroneously qualified the instruction on self-defense with the
initial aggressor instruction.
For reasons hereafter
elucidated, we conclude the trial court properly included the
limiting language of the initial aggressor instruction to the
self-defense instruction.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 503.050 codifies the
defense of self-protection and states, in relevant part, as
follows:
(1) The use of physical force by a defendant
upon another person is justifiable when the
defendant believes that such force is
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necessary to protect himself against the use
or imminent use of unlawful physical force
by the other person.
(2) The use of deadly physical force by a
defendant upon another person is justifiable
under subsection (1) only when the defendant
believes that such force is necessary to
protect himself against death, serious
physical injury, kidnapping, or sexual
intercourse compelled by force or threat.
The limitation of initial aggressor instruction is
found in KRS 503.060 and states, in relevant part, as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS
503.050, the use of physical force by a
defendant upon another person is not
justifiable when:
. . . .
(2) The defendant, with the intention of
causing death or serious physical injury to
the other person, provokes the use of
physical force by such other person[.]
It is well established that before the limiting
language of the initial aggressor instruction may be properly
given, there must be sufficient evidence to justify the
instruction.
Stepp v. Commonwealth, 608 S.W.2d 371 (Ky. 1980).
To determine “whether an instruction on self-defense is proper
or whether an instruction on self-defense with limitations is
proper,” the circuit court must consider the “whole
circumstances” surrounding the incident.
Id. at 374.
In the case sub judice, there was testimony presented
that Coleman and Taylor had planned to confront Howell, that
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Coleman was armed, and that Coleman had intentionally returned
to Ward Drive seeking Howell.
There was also evidence that
Howell never filed a single shot while Coleman unloaded his
weapon.
When considering the “whole circumstances” surrounding
the incident that led to Howell’s death, we are of the opinion
the circuit court properly instructed the jury upon self-defense
with the initial aggressor limitation.
Simply put, there was
sufficient evidence establishing that Coleman provoked the use
of force by Howell and did so with the intent of causing serious
physical injury or death.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial
court properly instructed the jury upon the defense of selfprotection.
Appeal No. 2003-CA-001458-MR
Taylor contends the trial court committed error by
denying his motion for directed verdict of acquittal upon the
charge of criminal complicity to commit second-degree
manslaughter.
We disagree.
A directed verdict of acquittal is proper if viewing
the evidence as a whole it would have been clearly unreasonable
for the jury to have found guilt.
816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991).
See Commonwealth v. Benham,
The elements of manslaughter in the
second degree are set forth in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
507.040 and are, in relevant part, as follows:
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(1)
A person is guilty of manslaughter in
the second degree when he wantonly
causes the death of another person,
including, but not limited to,
situations where the death results from
the person's . . . .
Complicity has been defined in KRS 502.020 as:
(1)
A person is guilty of an offense
committed by another person when, with
the intention of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the
offense, he:
(a) Solicits, commands, or engages in
a conspiracy with such other
person to commit the offense; or
(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid
such person in planning or
committing the offense; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the
commission of the offense, fails
to make a proper effort to do so.
At trial, Derlando Ragland testified that he was a
passenger in the vehicle with Taylor shortly before the shooting
took place.
Ragland testified that codefendant Coleman stated
he was “going to kill him.”
The evidence also indicated that
Taylor carried a “TEC 9” and fired several rounds.
Taylor
points to the fact that Howell’s body contained three pellets
from a shotgun, which was the type of gun carried by Coleman.
However, Taylor admitted that he and Coleman both fired their
weapons.
Both Taylor and Coleman believed the victim had
attempted to rob Taylor’s “brother.”
Taylor and Coleman were in
pursuit of Howell because of this belief.
Based upon these
facts, we are of the opinion that a jury could have reasonably
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found that Taylor was guilty of complicity to commit
manslaughter in the second degree.
Even though shots fired by
his gun did not ultimately kill Howell, the evidence clearly
establishes that Taylor aided and counseled Coleman in the
commission of said offense.
As such, we are of the opinion the
trial court did not commit error by denying Taylor’s motion for
directed verdict of acquittal upon the charge of complicity to
commit manslaughter in the second degree.
Next, Taylor argues the trial court improperly denied
his request for a jury instruction upon criminal facilitation to
commit manslaughter.
Criminal facilitation is defined in KRS
506.080(1) as:
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation
when, acting with knowledge that another
person is committing or intends to commit a
crime, he engages in conduct which knowingly
provides such person with means or
opportunity for the commission of the crime
and which in fact aids such person to commit
the crime.
Essentially, Taylor contends the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury on criminal facilitation as a
lesser included offense of complicity.
An instruction upon a
lesser included charge is proper only if a reasonable jury could
entertain a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt upon the
greater charge, but still believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
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defendant is guilty of the lesser charge.
Luttrell v.
Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1977).
In Skinner v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Ky.
1993), the Court held:
The principal distinctions between the two
offenses [facilitation and complicity] are
that a) facilitation requires knowledge that
another intends to commit a crime, while
complicity requires an intention to promote
or facilitate commission of the offense; and
b) facilitation requires provision of means
or opportunity for commission of the crime,
while complicity requires either
solicitation, conspiracy, assistance,
counsel, etc.
Evidence introduced at trial indicated that Taylor clearly
intended to promote and/or aid Coleman in the shooting death of
Howell.
Howell had allegedly attempted to rob Taylor’s
“brother,” and Taylor admits to firing his gun at the same time
Coleman fired at Howell.
Moreover, the evidence collected from
the scene revealed that Taylor fired his weapon several times.
Clearly, Taylor possessed more than a simple knowledge that
Coleman was going to commit the crime, but rather Taylor
actively aided and engaged in the commission of the crime.
Therefore, we do not believe that a reasonable jury could have
found Taylor guilty of criminal facilitation.
Taylor also argues the trial court committed
reversible error by admitting into evidence the entire
audiotaped statement of Derlando Ragland.
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Following the
testimony of Ragland, the Commonwealth sought to introduce a
previously taped statement of Ragland’s interview with a police
detective.
The Commonwealth argued that this audiotape was
admissible under Ky. R. Evid. (KRE) 801A, as a prior
inconsistent statement.
While portions of the audiotape may
have been admissible under KRE 801A, Taylor maintains it was
error to play the entire audiotape to the jury.
While it may have been better practice for the trial
court to have limited the audiotape to only those portions
containing prior inconsistent statements, we are, nevertheless,
compelled to conclude that any error was harmless.
RCr 9.24.
Considering the evidence amassed against Taylor, we are simply
unable to conclude there exists a reasonable probability the
jury’s verdict would have been different absent the admission of
the entire audiotape.
See Crane v. Commonwealth, 726 S.W.2d 302
(Ky. 1987).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT BRENT
MARCEL COLEMAN, JR.:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David Eucker
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT ANTONIO
REMONE TAYLOR:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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