A.B. McCOWAN v. JAMES ALSIP; SOUTHEAST HAULERS, LTD.; THE ESTATE OF DEXTER SAMS (ANCIL CARTER, WHITLEY COUNTY SHERIFF, ADMINISTRATOR); DENNIS LYNCH AND DENNIS LYNCH v. ACTION NO. 98-CI-OO179 JAMES ALSIP; SOUTHEAST HAULERS, LTD.; THE ESTATE OF DEXTER SAMS (ANCIL CARTER, WHITLEY COUNTY SHERIFF, ADMINISTRATOR)
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RENDERED: March 4, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001161-MR
A.B. McCOWAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00179
JAMES ALSIP; SOUTHEAST
HAULERS, LTD.; THE ESTATE OF
DEXTER SAMS (ANCIL CARTER, WHITLEY
COUNTY SHERIFF, ADMINISTRATOR);
DENNIS LYNCH
APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2003-CA-001223-MR
DENNIS LYNCH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-OO179
JAMES ALSIP; SOUTHEAST
HAULERS, LTD.; THE ESTATE OF
DEXTER SAMS (ANCIL CARTER, WHITLEY
COUNTY SHERIFF, ADMINISTRATOR)
OPINION
AFFIRMING NO. 2003-CA-001161-MR
REVERSING NO. 2003-CA-001223-MR
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEES
BEFORE:
KNOPF and TACKETT, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
These appeals stem from the setting
aside of a jury verdict and entry of a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on appellee James Alsip’s claim for damages to his
personal property in the course of the demolition of a building
sharing a common wall with the building in which his business
was located.
The trial judge concluded that the jury had failed
to follow the instructions and had rendered a verdict clearly
contrary to the evidence when it indicated in its answers to
instruction interrogatories that damage to Alsip’s property was
not foreseeable and the amount of damage sustained was zero.
In
the opinion granting the JNOV, the trial judge specifically
found that damage to Alsip’s property was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the ultra-hazardous nature of the
demolition work; that Alsip had presented un-contradicted
evidence of damages amounting to $32,267.85; and that appellant
A. B. McCowan and appellee Southeast Haulers were jointly and
severably liable for Alsip’s loss.
The granting of a new trial
as to the liability of appellant Dennis Lynch forms the basis of
appeal number 2003-CA-001223.
Because our review of the
evidence adduced at trial disclosed no error on the part of the
trial judge as to the granting of the JNOV or the denial of
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
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McCowan’s motion for dismissal of the claims against him as
time-barred, we affirm the judgment in appeal number 2003-CA001161.
As to Lynch’s appeal, however, we find nothing in the
record that could form a basis for liability on his part, and we
therefore conclude that the portion of the JNOV that grants
Alsip a new trial as to Lynch must be reversed.
The facts are not complex nor in serious dispute.
In
1996, A.B. McCowan purchased a building on Main Street in
Corbin, Kentucky, which shared a common wall with a building
owned by Betty Black and occupied by appellee James Alsip.
Because of the McCowan building’s deteriorating condition and
the fact that bricks from the building were falling onto the
adjacent street and sidewalk, the City of Corbin asked McCowan
to have it torn down.
With the assistance of appellant Dennis
Lynch, appellee Southeast Haulers conveyed an offer to McCowan
to do the demolition work for the sum of $10,000. which McCowan
accepted.
In the course of the demolition work, part of the
McCowan building crumbled, crushing an outbuilding in which
Alsip stored various pieces of equipment and other items.
The
building that shared the common wall was also damaged by debris
from the demolition, causing subsequent rain damage to Alsip’s
business computer, records and other items.
At the time the
demolition work was performed, Southeast Haulers was solely
owned by Dexter Sams, who died prior to trial.
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Appellee Wendall
Benge, a Southeast employee, actually performed the demolition
work.
Alsip testified at trial that the value of the items
damaged or destroyed in the course of the demolition work
amounted to $32,267.85. When challenged on cross-examination as
to the valuation placed on the property, Alsip stated that much
of the documentation regarding the purchase price of the
property was lost in the damage from the demolition.
He also
stated that he was familiar with the value of the items damaged
or destroyed because he had recently purchased them or because
they were items frequently used or sold as part of his business.
No other evidence as to the value of the property was offered.
The jury also heard testimony from the city building
inspector and the city engineer that because of the hazardous
nature of the work and the fact that the McCowan building shared
a common wall with the building occupied by Alsip, the city
conducted a meeting as to how best to accomplish the demolition
without danger to the public and the adjoining building.
McCowan and Lynch both attended this meeting.
The city engineer
also testified that the McCowan building was in such bad
condition that he would not enter the building to inspect it.
Lynch testified that his only connection with the
demolition project was as a long-time friend of Dexter Sams.
He
stated that he had done business with Sams for a number of years
-4-
and that because Sams had had both legs amputated, he frequently
would help him with errands or business transactions because of
Sams’ difficulty getting in and out of his car and into
buildings.
Lynch testified that Sams asked him to approach
McCowan with an offer for Southeast Haulers to do the demolition
work for $10,000.
After McCowan accepted that figure, Lynch
took a contract prepared by Sams and obtained McCowan’s
signature.
Lynch stated that he attended a meeting at city hall
for Sams and also picked up the check for the demolition work,
but denied receiving any compensation for his efforts.
Because
Sams had died prior to trial, his deposition was read into
evidence in which he confirmed the fact that Lynch had no
interest in the demolition work.
McCowan, however, testified
that he dealt only with Lynch, that he had no idea Southeast
Haulers was solely owned by Sams, and that because Lynch, not
Sams, attended the city’s meeting on the demolition, he assumed
that Lynch had an interest in the project or was overseeing the
demolition.
After the jury returned its verdict, the trial judge
questioned them at length on the record as to how they reached
the determination that the damage to the building occupied by
Alsip was not foreseeable and that the damage to his property
amounted to zero.
He then informed the jury that he was
required to declare a mistrial because their answers indicated
-5-
that they had disregarded un-contradicted evidence and failed to
follow the instructions.
The trial judge subsequently entered
the JNOV at issue in this appeal based upon the following
findings:
(1) McCowan contracted with Southeast Haulers to
demolish his building for the sum of $10,000.; (2) in the course
of the demolition project a portion of McCowan’s building
collapsed upon the premises occupied by Alsip, damaging his
personal property; (3) the demolition project was an ultrahazardous activity and damage to Alsip’s property was reasonably
foreseeable; (4) at the time of the demolition, Southeast
Haulers had no assets with which to respond in damages for the
likely injuries to Alsip’s property; (5) Alsip sustained damages
amounting to $32,267.85; and (6) Alsip introduced evidence
supporting the foregoing facts and the Defendants failed to
introduce contrary evidence sufficient to create a jury
question, thus removing from consideration any issue of fact
upon which reasonable minds could differ.
Because the liability
of Southeast Haulers was imputable to McCowan, the trial judge
found them to be jointly and severally liable to Alsip in the
amount of $32,267.85.
The trial judge also granted a new trial
as to the liability of Dennis Lynch.
In appeal number 2003-CA-001661, McCowan argues that
entry of the JNOV was erroneous and that the trial judge erred
in denying his motion for dismissal of the claims against him as
-6-
time-barred.
We find no merit in either contention.
First,
McCowan argues that Alsip’s claim against him must be deemed to
have been filed outside the statute of limitations because he
was not served with summons until the statutory period had
expired.
Alsip maintains that the “good faith” requirement of
CR 32 was fully met based upon the undisputed facts that
summonses were issued at the time of filing the complaint and
delivered to the sheriff for service.
We are convinced that the
fact the sheriff failed to deliver the summonses until
expiration of the limitations period does not bar the action.
As was clearly stated in Asher v. Bishop,3 “[a] civil action is
begun by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of a summons
or warning order in good faith, CR 3, and not by the actual
service of process.”
It thus appearing that Alsip completed in
good faith all steps necessary to commence the action within the
statute of limitations, the trial judge did not err in refusing
to grant McCowan’s motion for dismissal.
Turning now to the primary focus of this appeal, the
propriety of the entry of a JNOV, McCowan asserts that there was
insufficient evidence of inconsistencies in the verdict, juror
misconduct or other irregularity sufficient to remove the case
from jury consideration.
We disagree.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 3.
3
482 S.W.2d 769,770 (Ky. 1972).
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The trial judge offered a clear rationale for
declaring a mistrial:
In due course the jury returned a
verdict which was clearly against the
evidence and, upon inquiry by the court,
contrary to the instructions and contrary to
the jury’s own findings.
Under Instruction No. 4, the jury
checked “no”. However, all who testified
about the matter including the Defendant,
A.B. McCowan, testified that demolition of
McCowan’s building would likely cause damage
to the adjoining property occupied by James
Alsip. Dennis Lynch and A.B. McCowan both
testified to attending a three hour meeting
at City Hall in which the discussion
centered about how to demolish McCowan’s
building without damaging the adjoining
premises.
Clearly the damage to Alsip’s property
was foreseeable as a probable result of the
demolition of McCowan’s building.
Under Instruction No. 6 the jury
answered $0.00. The Plaintiff’s evidence
was that he had been damaged in the sum of
$32,267.85. Defendants produced no evidence
which contradicted that sum. Upon inquiry,
the jury informed the Court that they all
agreed that James Alsip had been damaged but
that they did not want A.B. McCowan or
Dennis Lynch to pay those damages.
The Court thus concludes that the jury
failed to follow the instructions originally
given them, failed to follow the additional
instructions given by the Court during
deliberation, returned a verdict clearly
against the evidence and contrary to the
jury’s own determination that James Alsip
had, in fact, been damaged.
-8-
A careful review of the record supports the trial
judge’s reasoning.
The standard by which appellate courts are
to review such matters was reiterated by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky in Taylor v. Kennedy4:
In ruling on a motion for a directed
verdict or a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, a trial court
is under a duty to consider the evidence in
the strongest possible light in favor of the
party opposing the motions. Furthermore, it
is required to give the opposing party the
advantage of every fair and reasonable
inference which can be drawn from the
evidence. And, it is precluded from
entering either a directed verdict or
judgment n.o.v. unless there is a complete
absence of proof on a material issue in the
action, or if no disputed issue of fact
exists upon which reasonable men could
differ.
The action of the trial court fits precisely within this
standard.
As to whether damage to Alsip’s property was
foreseeable, all the evidence, including the testimony of the
defendants themselves, was uniformly to the effect that
McCowan’s building was in very poor condition, that demolition
would be extremely hazardous and that the common wall with the
building occupied by Alsip’s business posed a particular concern
as to falling debris.
Thus, on this state of the record, we
have little difficulty concluding that no genuine issue of fact
4
770 S.W.2d 415,416 (Ky. 1985).
-9-
existed as to the foreseeability of damage to Alsip’s property.
Entry of the JNOV on that issue was entirely proper.
Next, concerning the amount of damages, we agree that
Alsip did not present particularly strong proof as to the fair
market value of the items damaged or destroyed.5
However,
despite the lack of documentation for the values placed on the
items, Alsip testified that he had personally purchased the
items and was familiar with the value of the items damaged or
destroyed.
In the absence of any contradictory evidence, we
fail to discern any error in the entry of the JNOV as to the
amount of damages claimed.
Finally, in light of the inherently dangerous nature
of the demolition work undertaken on McCowan’s building, we are
in complete accord with the trial judge’s conclusion that
McCowan cannot as a matter of law be absolved from liability for
the negligent acts of his independent contractor.
Section 427
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides definitive support
for holding McCowan liable for the acts of Southeast Haulers:
One who employs an independent contractor to
do work involving a special danger to others
which the employer knows or has reason to
know to be inherent in or normal to the
work, or which he contemplates or has reason
to contemplate when making a contract, is
subject to liability for physical harm
caused to others by the contractor’s failure
5
See, Amlung v. Bankers Bond Co., 411 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1967), as to the proper
measure of damages for destruction of personal property.
-10-
to take reasonable precautions against such
danger.6
The danger to Alsip’s property was acknowledged by all who
testified, including McCowan.
Nowhere in the testimony is there
evidence of “reasonable precautions” having been taken to avoid
such harm.
Appellant Lynch argues in appeal number 2003-CA-001223
that the trial judge erred in granting Alsip a new trial
concerning Lynch’s liability for the loss.
Review of the
evidence adduced at trial failed to supply any legitimate basis
for liability on the part of Lynch.
His only relation to the
demolition work was as a “go-between” for Sams who, because of
his disability, was unable to handle such matters by himself.
Finding no basis upon which Lynch might be liable for Alsip’s
loss, we are persuaded that he was entitled to a directed
verdict of dismissal.
Accordingly, that portion of the judgment granting a
new trial as to the liability of appellant Lynch is reversed.
In all other respects, the judgment notwithstanding the verdict
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
6
See also, Miles Farm Supply v. Ellis, 878 S.W.2d 803 (Ky.App. 1994).
-11-
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT McCOWAN:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Bradford L. Breeding
London, Kentucky
Larry E. Conley
Corbin, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT LYNCH:
Jeffery R. Tipton
Corbin, Kentucky
-12-
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