JAMES ROCKY WRIGHT v. VERTNER TAYLOR; DAVID GILPIN; JAMES COMBS; AND ARCHIE MOORE
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RENDERED:
February 4, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
NO.
2003-CA-001156-MR
AND
2003-CA-001873-MR
JAMES ROCKY WRIGHT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LEE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. TRUDE, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00144
VERTNER TAYLOR; DAVID GILPIN;
JAMES COMBS; AND ARCHIE MOORE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, McANULTY, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
These are pro se appeals from orders of the
Lee Circuit Court dismissing the due process and open records
request claims of appellant James Rocky Wright. In response to
two separate motions below, the court entered orders dismissing
Wright’s claims on both April 9, 2003, and May 12, 2003.
As
Wright’s two appeals from those orders raise identical issues,
the two are herein treated as one.
The circuit court found that
the imposition of a warning and reprimand to inmate Wright by
the Kentucky Department of Corrections (Corrections) merited no
relief, and that Wright’s claim was frivolous and was made only
to harass appellees.
We affirm.
Wright served as a legal aide while he was an inmate
at the Lee Adjustment Center.
On December 2, 2001, Wright was
asked by Officer Billy Little to go to the segregation unit
(unit) to meet with inmates who had upcoming court appearances.
Wright informed Little that he preferred not to go as he was
about to phone his son.
While Wright was on the phone, Little
again approached and informed him that if he did not report to
the unit, he would be written up.
Wright, who indicated to
Little that he would take the write-up, initially was written up
for “refusing to carry out work assignment.”
According to
Wright the Adjustment Committee amended his charge to that of
“failure to abide by any published institutional schedule or
documented rule,” and he was given only a reprimand and a
warning.
After the warden dismissed Wright’s appeal of his
write-up Wright sought a declaratory judgment in the Lee Circuit
Court, alleging that appellees had violated his civil rights.
Wright requested that the court expunge the disciplinary hearing
from his record, to order Corrections to define the elements of
offenses and to require all disciplinary hearing statements and
reports to be sworn statements, to award compensatory and
punitive damages, and to enter orders pertaining to scheduling
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discovery.
The court granted appellee’s motions to dismiss,
finding that the action was frivolous and was made only to
harass appellees.
These appeals followed.
Wright alleges that the circuit court erred in
dismissing his complaint as frivolous and harassing.
Under KRS
454.405 an inmate’s action may be dismissed if the court is
“satisfied that the action is malicious or harassing or if
satisfied that the action is legally without merit or factually
frivolous.”
Here, the trial court found that “an imposition of
a reprimand and warning has no merit before this Court as far as
Petitioner’s due process rights exists,” that Wright had “not
presented an open records claim” and that Wright’s action was
frivolous and harassing to appellees.
First, we note that Wright’s open records claim was
not substantiated by any evidence.
Indeed, he did not even
provide the court with a copy of his open records request.
Thus, the court did not err by denying Wright’s open records
claim.
Further, there is no merit to Wright’s claim that the
disciplinary hearing violated his due process rights.
This
court recently addressed inmates’ rights to make due process
claims as follows:
In order to prevail on a Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process claim, a
party must establish (1) that he enjoyed a
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protected "liberty" or "property" interest
within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause, and (2) that he was denied the
process due him under the circumstances. A
protected liberty interest may arise from
two sources --the Due Process Clause itself
and state law or regulations. Challenges to
prison conditions including segregation or
removal from the general prison population
are based on a potential "liberty" interest,
but not all deprivations of an interest
trigger the procedural safeguards of the Due
Process Clause. For example, disciplinary
segregation typically does not implicate a
liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause itself because it is the sort
of confinement an inmate can reasonably
anticipate receiving.1
Here, Wright was deprived of nothing since his charge
was amended and his penalty consisted of a reprimand and a
warning.
Wright does not dispute that he refused Officer
Little’s instruction to go to another unit.
An Adjustment
Committee is vested with great latitude in taking action to
maintain order in prison, and a reviewing court need not set
aside a decision that has some basis in fact.2
As the facts
underlying the Adjustment Committee’s decision are not disputed,
we cannot say that the decision lacked a basis in fact or that
the trial court erred by failing to set that decision aside.
As
1
Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 749-50 (Ky. App. 2004). (footnotes
omitted).
2
Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985).
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far as Wright’s due process claim, the court in Higgs v. Bland3
determined that where substantial evidence for the Adjustment
Committee’s findings exist, due process rights have been
protected.
Wright argues that Corrections employees cannot
arbitrarily interfere with inmates while communicating with
family members.
The evidence in the record indicates that prior
to Wright’s phone call Officer Little requested that he go to
the segregation unit.
Little approached Wright while he was on
the phone to give him a second chance to follow the instruction
he had previously been given.
This court does not see the
actions of Little as those of a Corrections employee interfering
with the inmates’ communication, but rather as those of a
Corrections officer instructing an inmate as to the outcome of
his behavior.
As for Wright’s following claims, that Corrections
employees should be mandated to swear to statements, and that
policies and procedures of the Corrections lack specificity, we
find that they are conclusory and not appropriate for a
declaratory judgment.
“In order for a declaratory judgment
action to proceed, the movant must show that an actual and
3
888 F.2d 443, 449(6th Cir. 1989).
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justiciable controversy exists involving the specific rights of
the party.”4
Wright fails to make such a showing in this matter.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the dismissal
entered by the Lee Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
James Rocky Wright, Pro Se
Burgin, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES DAVID
GILPIN; JAMES COMBS; AND
ARCHIE MOORE:
G. Edward Henry, II
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE VERTNER
TAYLOR:
John T. Damron
Frankfort, Kentucky
4
Blair v. Hendricks, 30 S.W.3d 802, 805 (Ky. App. 2000) (citing HealthAmerica
Corp. of Kentucky v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 697 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1985)).
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