BILLY EUGENE GLODJO v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 11, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000858-MR
BILLY EUGENE GLODJO
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CR-00594
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, MINTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE.
Billy Eugene Glodjo brings this appeal from an
April 4, 2003, order of the Warren Circuit Court denying his
motion to vacate, set aside or correct judgment and sentence
pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42.
Glodjo asserts his
conviction and sentence should be vacated because his rights
under the United States and Kentucky constitutions were violated
when his trial attorneys provided ineffective assistance during
his trial.
We affirm.
On November 2, 1994, a Warren County Grand Jury
returned a four-count indictment against Glodjo.
The indictment
charged Glodjo with (i) the murder of his girlfriend, Cheryl
Cherry by intentionally or wantonly causing her death after
running over her with an automobile; (ii) first-degree wanton
endangerment and second-degree assault arising from his conduct
against Kenneth Chilson;1 and (iii) being a persistent felony
offender (PFO) in the first degree by virtue of two prior
convictions for first-degree wanton endangerment.
The trial
court dismissed the wanton endangerment and assault charges
against Glodjo.
The murder and PFO charges proceeded to a jury
trial.
On January 30, 1996, a jury found Glodjo guilty of
first-degree manslaughter in connection with Cherry’s death.
Glodjo’s defense throughout the trial was that Cherry’s death
was an accident.
During the penalty phase of the trial, the
jury recommended Glodjo be sentenced to twenty years in prison.
This sentence was enhanced to life imprisonment upon the jury
finding Glodjo to be a PFO.
The trial court, on March 18, 1996,
entered its judgment of conviction against Glodjo and imposed
the jury’s recommended sentence.
On direct appeal, the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed Glodjo’s conviction in Appeal No. 96-SC283-MR on September 4, 1997.
1
Chilson pulled up in front of Cherry’s house shortly after she was run over
by Glodjo’s automobile. Glodjo allegedly assaulted Chilson.
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On August 31, 1998, Glodjo filed an RCr 11.42 motion
to vacate, set aside or correct his judgment and sentence.
In
his motion, Glodjo alleges his trial attorneys, Stephen Todd and
Phillip Kimbel, rendered ineffective assistance by their failure
to do the following: (i) conduct an independent investigation
into the underlying facts behind Cherry’s death; (ii) examine
the physical site of Cherry’s death; (iii) find and produce
evidence which would have contradicted testimony from two
witnesses; (iv) interview potential witnesses; (v) effectively
cross-examine prosecution witnesses; (vi) present a proper
defense; (vii) make necessary objections; and (viii) move to
suppress the admission of the factual content behind his prior
felony convictions.
In a supplemental motion filed August 25, 2000, Glodjo
asserted many of the claims raised in his original RCr 11.42
motion, but further asserted his trial attorneys were
ineffective for not retaining an accident reconstruction expert
and improperly investigating Glodjo’s mental health history.
Based upon all of these allegations, the trial court conducted
an evidentiary hearing on January 12, 2001.
Glodjo called four witnesses, including Todd and
Kimbel, at the evidentiary hearing.
He further called an
accident reconstruction expert and also testified on his own
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behalf.
On April 4, 2003, the trial court entered an order
overruling Glodjo’s RCr 11.42 motion.
This appeal follows.
The standard of review for claims raised in a motion
filed pursuant to RCr 11.42 alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial is limited to issues that were not and could
not be raised on direct appeal.
Furthermore, “[a]n issue raised
and rejected on direct appeal may not be relitigated in these
proceedings by simply claiming that it amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel.”
Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436,
441 (Ky. 2001)(citations omitted).
In Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463 (Ky. 2003),
the Kentucky Supreme Court enunciated the standards for claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel:
The standards which measure ineffective
assistance of counsel have been set out in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); accord
Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37
(1985). In order to be ineffective, the
performance of defense counsel must be below
the objective standard of reasonableness and
so prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of
a fair trial and a reasonable result.
Strickland, supra. It must be demonstrated
that, absent the errors by trial counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the
jury would have reached a different result.
See Norton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d
175 (2001).
In this context, it should also be noted that RCr 11.42 is
intended to provide a forum for known grievances, not to provide
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an opportunity to research for grievances.
Id., citing Gilliam
v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1983).
Guided by this
authority, we now turn our attention to the merits of this
appeal.
First, Glodjo argues his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an adequate
independent investigation into facts and circumstances
supporting his defense that Cherry’s death was accidental.
According to Glodjo, his trial attorneys relied too heavily upon
discovery material provided by the Commonwealth instead of
employing investigators to locate potential exculpatory
witnesses and analyze the crime scene.
We disagree.
Under the Strickland standard, a convicted defendant
is obligated to establish what a more comprehensive
investigation would have produced, what information would have
been obtained from such investigation, what witnesses would have
been discovered, what their testimony would have been, and how
this information would have produced a different result at
trial.
Glodjo failed to present any evidence to support this
claim at the evidentiary hearing.
When an evidentiary hearing
is held on an RCr 11.42 motion, the movant has the burden of
proof to establish each element of every claim.
so amounts to a waiver of any such claim.
Foley v.
Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Ky. 2000).
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Failure to do
At the hearing,
Glodjo’s trial attorneys both asserted that a more thorough
investigation was unnecessary because they possessed more than
enough evidence to present an accidental death defense to the
jury.
Glodjo failed to demonstrate at the hearing how a more
thorough investigation would have aided his defense.
Accordingly, we believe Glodjo failed to satisfy his burden with
regard to this argument.
Next, Glodjo asserts his trial attorneys were
ineffective by not retaining an accident reconstruction expert
to testify at trial.
Again, we disagree.
At the time this case
came to trial in January 1996, an expert’s testimony on
causation in a criminal case was precluded on the ground that it
invaded the province of the jury.
893 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1995).
See Renfro v. Commonwealth,
This rule was later changed in
Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1997), after the
trial of this case.
Additionally, an expert could not have
testified as to Glodjo’s intent (or lack thereof) to drive his
car over Cherry.
In fact, the expert who testified for Glodjo
at the RCr 11.42 hearing admitted he could give no opinion on
Glodjo’s intent to injure or kill Cherry at the time of the
accident.
For those reasons, we believe trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to retain a reconstruction expert.
Glodjo next contends his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to fully investigate the
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relationship between two Commonwealth witnesses, Brandy Sanders
and Bryan Cherry.
Additionally, Glodjo asserts his trial
attorneys failed to adequately impeach the testimony of Cherry’s
neighbor, Billy Benson.
As previously noted, in attempting to
obtain post-conviction relief, the movant must present facts
with sufficient particularity to provide a basis for relief.
Foley, 17 S.W.3d at 878.
Glodjo, however, failed to provide any
evidence to support these claims at the evidentiary hearing.
Thus, Glodjo’s arguments as to these issues are without merit.
Next, Glodjo asserts his trial attorneys were
ineffective in their investigation of Glojo’s mental health
history.
Glodjo believes if his attorneys had properly
presented the jury evidence of his past medical diagnosis for
post-traumatic stress disorder and alcoholism, the jury would
have accepted his defense.
We reject this argument.
Glodjo testified during the evidentiary hearing that
he never discussed his medical or mental condition with his
attorneys.
In their testimony, neither Todd nor Kimbel recalled
ever being informed that Glodjo had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder.
Todd and Kimbel, however, were both
aware of Glodjo’s history of alcoholism.
Prior to trial, Todd
and Glodjo discussed the fact that Glodjo had been treated for
alcohol abuse.
After receiving this information, Todd suggested
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the presentation of a temporary insanity defense at trial.
Glodjo rejected this suggestion.
Kentucky law clearly prohibits trial counsel from
presenting an insanity defense without the consent of the client
unless the client lacks sufficient medical capacity to waive the
insanity defense.
1994).
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 412 (Ky.
Moreover, “[i]t is reasonable and necessary for counsel
to place a certain reliance on its client.
If the client, his
family and friends impede counsel by concealing psychological
problems that might have provided an alternative theory of
mitigation, counsel cannot be faulted for not exploring the
Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619, 625 (Ky.
unknown.”
2000)(citations omitted).
Under this authority, we conclude
that Glodjo himself bore some of the responsibility for not
bringing his mental health history to the attention of his
attorneys.
Notwithstanding, without an absolute defense such as
insanity, the best result Glodjo could have hoped for was a
conviction for first-degree manslaughter due to extreme
emotional disturbance, which was the verdict in this case.
Accordingly, we find no error of trial counsel on this issue.
Glodjo also argues he was denied effective assistance
of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to object to
inadmissible evidence introduced by the Commonwealth during the
penalty phase of the trial.
Specifically, he alleges that his
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counsel failed to object to the deputy court clerk’s reading of
the indictments from his two prior felony convictions.
According to Glodjo, the deputy clerk asserted facts such as
“assaulted” and “wanton” behavior, including acts Glodjo
allegedly took against a police officer.
KRS 532.055(2)(a)(2) permits the Commonwealth in a
sentencing hearing to introduce evidence regarding “[t]he nature
of the prior offenses for which he was convicted.”2
Additionally, in Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860 (Ky.
2002), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that details of the
indictment were admissible in the sentencing phase of the trial
under this statute.
Thus, we find this argument by Glodjo to be
totally without merit.
Finally, Glodjo argues that the trial court improperly
rejected his RCr 11.42 motion because trial counsel failed to
warn him he could be cross-examined regarding his alleged
assault upon Kenneth Chilson.
Kentucky law clearly provides
that, when an accused takes the stand in his own defense, he
thereby subjects himself to cross-examination and waives the
right against self-incrimination for all matters pertaining to
the prosecution.
1968).
Lumpkins v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.2d 535 (Ky.
Glodjo allegedly attacked Chilson after striking Cherry
with his vehicle.
Since this incident arose from the same set
2
We observe that Kentucky Revised Statutes 532.055(2)(a)(6) was held
unconstitutional in Manns v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 439 (Ky. 2002).
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of facts as Cherry’s death, we believe Glodjo was subject to
cross-examination regarding that incident.
If an error did
occur, it was harmless given the charges against Glodjo
pertaining to Chilson were dismissed prior to trial.
Additionally, since Chilson had already testified for the
Commonwealth, Glodjo has failed to show how he was prejudiced
through his cross-examination regarding Chilson.
In sum, Glodjo has failed to demonstrate that
counsel’s performance was below the objective standard of
reasonableness or that he was prejudiced to the extent of being
denied a fair trial.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
the judgment of the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks Tandy
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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