ROBERT SCHWARTZ v. BILLY HASTY and KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 11, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000796-MR
ROBERT SCHWARTZ
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00220
BILLY HASTY and
KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING
AND
REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Robert Schwartz appeals from an order of the
Garrard Circuit Court holding that the underinsured motorist
(UIM) benefits received by him were not subject to the
collateral source rule and could be credited against the tort
damages awarded to him in determining the damages recoverable
from Billy Hasty, the tortfeasor.
This is apparently an issue
of first impression in Kentucky law.
We reverse and remand.
On May 29, 2000, Schwartz was severely injured in a
vehicular accident when a car driven by Hasty made a left turn
into a driveway in front of him.
Hasty had vehicle liability
insurance coverage through a policy with Kentucky Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau).
As the policy related
to this accident, the liability limit was $100,000.
Schwartz
had two vehicle liability insurance policies, one with State
Farm Insurance Company (State Farm) on his truck and the other
with Progressive Northern Insurance Company (Progressive) on his
motorcycle.
As the policies were applicable to this accident,
the State Farm policy had UIM coverage for $100,000 and the
Progressive policy had UIM coverage for $25,000.
Schwartz filed a personal injury tort complaint
against Hasty in the Garrard Circuit Court, seeking damages
suffered as a result of the accident.
Hasty filed an answer and
counterclaim alleging contributory negligence.
Schwartz later
filed an amended complaint that added Farm Bureau, State Farm,
and Progressive as parties.
The amended complaint included a
new claim of bad faith against Farm Bureau.
After conducting discovery, Farm Bureau, State Farm,
and Progressive each elected not to participate in the trial.
Schwartz and Farm Bureau also entered into an agreed order
bifurcating the proceeding by first trying the original personal
injury tort claim and reserving the bad faith settlement tort
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claim until resolution of the injury claim.
Schwartz filed a
pretrial motion asking the court to exclude any evidence of
collateral source payments, and the court granted the motion.
The case was tried before a jury, and the jury found
both parties contributorily negligent with Hasty 80% at fault
and Schwartz 20% at fault.
$248,313.
The jury found total damages of
Consistent with the jury’s verdict assessing
contributory fault, the trial court entered a judgment in favor
of Schwartz for $198,650.40 plus costs and interest.
Hasty then
filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s judgment.1
After Hasty filed a notice of appeal, Schwartz settled
his claims against both of the UIM carriers.
He recovered the
policy limit of $25,000 from Progressive and also recovered
$78,614.27 from State Farm.2
Schwartz subsequently filed a
notice to take Hasty’s deposition to inquire as to his financial
assets in order to facilitate collection on the judgment.
In January 2003 Schwartz, Hasty, and Farm Bureau
entered into a partial settlement whereby Farm Bureau paid
Schwartz $160,000, $100,000 of which was related to Hasty’s
liability insurance coverage and $60,000 of which was related to
Schwartz’s bad faith claim against Farm Bureau.
In return,
1
The trial court indefinitely postponed setting a trial date on Schwartz’s
bad faith settlement claim against Farm Bureau.
2
These amounts represented the amount of the judgment exceeding $100,000,
including costs and interest.
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Schwartz released and discharged Hasty and Farm Bureau from all
actions or claims that arose from the accident.
Schwartz also
agreed to indemnify and hold Hasty harmless for any potential
claim of Progressive for indemnity against Hasty for its payment
of UIM benefits to Schwartz.3
The settlement agreement, however,
stated that the parties disagreed as to the effect of the UIM
payments, and it reserved the issue of whether these payments
would offset the jury’s verdict as collateral source payments.
Farm Bureau agreed to be responsible for any additional payments
to satisfy the judgment should resolution of this issue so
require.
Consistent with the settlement agreement, Farm Bureau
filed a motion for order of satisfaction, seeking resolution of
the reserved issue.
Farm Bureau argued that KRS4 304.39-320
limited Schwartz to recovery of an amount equal to the jury’s
verdict reduced by UIM payments.
Farm Bureau asserted that the
UIM payments did not fall within the collateral source rule.
Schwartz filed a response to the motion, maintaining that UIM
benefits do constitute collateral source payments and that KRS
304.39-320 did not apply to Farm Bureau.
3
State Farm had earlier been dismissed from the case following its payment of
$78,614.27 to Schwartz. It apparently agreed not to exercise its subrogation
rights.
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Meanwhile, Progressive filed a motion for declaratory
judgment, seeking indemnification from Hasty for the $25,000 it
paid to Schwartz under its UIM policy based on its subrogation
rights recognized in KRS 304.39-320(4).
Hasty responded that
Progressive was required to file a separate action on its
subrogation claim rather than utilize a summary proceeding.
The
trial court summarily denied Progressive’s motion.
On March 26, 2003, the trial court entered an order of
satisfaction in favor of Farm Bureau.
The order relieved Farm
Bureau of any further obligation on the judgment, holding that
Hasty was entitled to a credit or setoff against the amount in
the jury verdict due to the UIM payments made by State Farm and
Progressive.
The court stated it could find nothing in KRS
304.39-320 to indicate an intent to allow an injured party to
receive a double recovery.
Schwartz has brought this appeal
from the order of satisfaction.
Schwartz contends that the trial court erred by
failing to apply the collateral source rule to deny Hasty a
credit for the UIM payments by State Farm and Progressive.
Farm
Bureau maintains that the court correctly held that the
collateral source rule did not apply and that the rule was
inconsistent with KRS 304.39-320.
The applicability of the
collateral source rule is a matter of law subject to our
independent review.
See, e.g., Weatherly v. Flournoy, 929 P.2d
-5-
296, 298 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996); Paulson v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
665 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Wis. 2003).
Similarly, the interpretation
of a statute is a legal issue subject to de novo or independent
review.
See Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v. Commonwealth,
Transp. Cabinet, 983 S.W.2d 488, 490-91 (Ky. 1998).
Farm Bureau’s major contention is that denying Hasty a
credit or setoff for the UIM payments received by Schwartz would
allow Schwartz to receive a double recovery.
A general goal of
compensatory damages in tort cases is to put the victim in the
same position he would have been prior to the injury or make him
whole to the extent that it is possible to measure his injury in
terms of money.
See, e.g., Kentucky Cent. Ins. Co. v.
Schneider, 15 S.W.3d 373, 374 (Ky. 2000); Paducah Area Pub.
Library v. Terry, 655 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Ky. App. 1983); 22 AM. JUR.
2D Damages § 27 (2003).
As a result, an injured party typically
cannot receive more than one recovery as compensation for the
same harm or element of loss.
See Morrison v. Kentucky Cent.
Ins. Co., 731 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Ky. App. 1987).
However, the
collateral source rule is an exception to the rule against
double recovery.
See Hardaway Management Co. v. Southerland,
977 S.W.2d 910, 918 (Ky. 1998).
The collateral source rule provides that benefits
received by an injured party for his injuries from a source
wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor will
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not be deducted from or diminish the damages otherwise
recoverable from the tortfeasor.
See, e.g., 22 AM. JUR. 2D
Damages § 392 (2003); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 254 (7th ed. 1999);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A(2) (1979).
The collateral
source rule has been long recognized in Kentucky.
See
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Carothers, 65 S.W. 833, 834 (Ky. 1901);
McFarland v. Bruening, 299 Ky. 267, 185 S.W.2d 247, 249 (1945);
Barr v. Searcy, 280 Ky. 535, 133 S.W.2d 714, 715 (1939).
In
Taylor v. Jennison, 335 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1960), the court stated:
The general rule recognized in other
jurisdictions is that damages recoverable
for a wrong are not diminished by the fact
that the injured party has been wholly or
partly indemnified for his loss by insurance
(to whose procurement the wrongdoer did not
contribute). We are convinced this rule is
sound, particularly since there is no
logical or legal reason why a wrongdoer
should receive the benefit of insurance
obtained by the injured party for his own
protection. It is a collateral contractual
arrangement which has no bearing upon the
extent of liability of the wrongdoer.
[Citations omitted.]
Id. at 903.
Various justifications have been presented in support
of the rule.
First, the wrongdoer should not receive a benefit
by being relieved of payment for damages because the injured
party had the foresight to obtain insurance.
See Taylor, 335
S.W.2d at 903; O’Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Ky.
1995).
Second, as between the injured party and the tortfeasor,
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any so-called windfall by allowing a double recovery should
accrue to the less culpable injured party rather than relieving
the tortfeasor of full responsibility for his wrongdoing.
See
Johnson v. Beane, 664 A.2d 96, 100 (Pa. 1995); Bozeman v. State,
879 So.2d 692, 703 (La. 2004); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 392
(2003).
Third, unless the tortfeasor is required to pay the
full extent of the damages caused, the deterrent purposes of
tort liability will be undermined.
See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 901(c) (1979); Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 611 N.W.2d 764,
767 (Wis. 2000).
Another issue often raised with the collateral source
rule involves subrogation.
Especially with automobile insurance
coverage, insurers have an equitable, contractual, or statutory
right of subrogation in the benefits paid to the insured.
See,
e.g., Wine v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 917 S.W.2d 558 (Ky. 1996).
Subrogation is designed to prevent unjust enrichment by
requiring one who benefits from the payment of the debt of
another to ultimately pay it themselves.
Id. at 561.
In the
context of automobile insurance, the doctrine of subrogation
serves dual purposes to prevent double recovery by the insured
and to prevent a windfall to the tortfeasor.
Id. at 562.
While
the legislature deleted a provision in KRS 304.39-320 explicitly
providing for statutory subrogation for UIM benefits, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized insurers’ equitable and
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contractual right to subrogation.
See Coots v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 853 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Ky. 1993).
While the double recovery aspect of the collateral
source rule and subrogation may appear at first to clash, the
two doctrines are compatible.
The collateral source rule and
the principles of subrogation work in tandem by ensuring that
the tortfeasor bears the ultimate responsibility for payment of
damages without diminishment for benefits received by the
injured party from collateral sources, while preventing double
recovery by the injured party where the party providing the
collateral source benefits seeks reimbursement through
subrogation.
See Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 630 N.W.2d 201, 211
(Wis. 2001).
In effect, the collateral source rule addresses
the relationship between the injured party and the tortfeasor,
and subrogation focuses more on the relationship between the
injured party/insured and the insurer, with the subrogee
obtaining the rights of the injured party against the tortfeasor
to the extent of its payments.
The existence of collateral source payments to the
injured party is irrelevant to the issue of “the amount of
damages the plaintiff has incurred and is entitled to recover
from the wrongdoer in the civil action, nor does it matter that
the source of the collateral source benefits may be entitled to
reimbursement from the recovery because of contractual or
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statutory subrogation rights.”
O’Bryan, 892 S.W.2d at 576.
Similarly, any agreements concerning subrogation rights between
the insured and insurer are of no consequence or concern of the
tortfeasor except to avoid his subjection to double recovery
exceeding the amount of tort damages.
See, e.g., Beaird v.
Brown, 373 N.E.2d 1055, 1058, (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Dippel v.
Hunt, 517 P.2d 444, 448 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973); Southard v. Lira,
512 P.2d 409, 414 (Kan. 1973).
Farm Bureau contends that the collateral source rule
does not apply to UIM coverage.
It asserts that unlike certain
other types of collateral sources, such as health and disability
insurance, that are payable regardless of fault, UIM benefits
are payable only upon a determination of fault by a tortfeasor
and evaluation of damages by an adjustor, mediator, or jury.
Farm Bureau argues that the failure to impose an immediate
obligation for payment of benefits under UIM coverage precludes
their characterization as collateral source benefits.
While it is a matter of first impression in Kentucky,
the majority of courts in other states have held that UIM
payments fall within the collateral source rule.
See Voge v.
Anderson, 512 N.W.2d 749, 751 (Wis. 1994); Johnson by Johnson v.
General Motors Corp., 438 S.E.2d 28, 35 (W. Va. 1993); Hernandez
v. Gisonni, 657 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Estate
of Rattenni v. Grainger, 379 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 1989); Peele v.
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Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
But see
Fertitta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 462 So.2d 159, 164 (La. 1985).
The main requirement for qualification as a collateral
source under the collateral source rule is that the source be
“wholly independent” of the wrongdoer.
See In re W.B. Easton
Constr. Co., Inc., 463 S.E.2d 317, 318 (S.C. 1995).
“A source
is wholly independent and therefore collateral when the
wrongdoer has not contributed to it and when payments to the
injured party were not made on behalf of the wrongdoer.”
Pustaver v. Gooden, 566 S.E.2d 199, 201 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002).
In Estate of Rattenni, the court stated, “[w]e find no
persuasive reason to distinguish underinsurance proceeds from
other insurance proceeds that are subject to the collateral
source rule.”
379 S.E.2d at 890.
The view that UIM payments are “wholly independent” of
the wrongdoer is consistent with the nature of UIM coverage
reflected in Kentucky case law.
Kentucky courts have recognized
that UIM coverage is contractual, which is separate and distinct
from the tortfeasor’s liability.
See, e.g., Philadelphia Indem.
Ins. Co. v. Morris, 990 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Ky. 1999); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hatfield, 122 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Ky. 2003).
Coots case the Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
The UIM insurer is a primary obligor for the
UIM insured’s loss by contractual obligation
just as the tortfeasor is a primary obligor
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In the
by reason of his tort obligation. Insofar
as its UIM obligation is concerned, as we
have stated in Part I of this Opinion, the
existence of the tortfeasor, and the amount
of damages caused by the tortfeasor, and the
tortfeasor’s insurance or lack thereof, are
only relevant to measure the loss under the
policy.
853 S.W.2d at 902.
The fact that UIM coverage is based on fault does not
preclude its characterization as a collateral source but is
merely an aspect of its contractual terms.
UIM coverage is,
like uninsured motorist (UM) coverage, “first party coverage,
which means that it is a contractual obligation directly to the
insured[.]”
Id. at 898. (Emphasis in original.)
But the fact
that the insurer’s liability is tied to the fault of the
tortfeasor does not make the tortfeasor a party to the insurance
contract.
Id.
Recognizing UIM payments as a collateral source within
the collateral source rule is consistent with the purposes of
the rule.
While UIM coverage must be offered to policyholders,
it is optional and involves a separate additional payment
premium.
Allowing tortfeasors a credit or setoff for UIM
payments would provide an unintended benefit to the tortfeasor
and relieve him of some responsibility for his actions, while
depriving the injured party/insured of the benefit of his
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payments of premiums for the insurance.
In Burke Enterprises,
Inc. v. Mitchell, 700 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1985), the court said:
It is well settled that a tortfeasor is
not entitled to any credit against what he
owes for payments of medical expenses or
disability benefits paid by a collateral
source to the tort victim pursuant to a
contractual obligation owed to the victim
from the collateral source, whether it be
first party insurance coverage, employment
benefits, or otherwise. [Emphasis in
original.]
Id. at 796.
Thus, we agree with the majority view that UIM
payments fall within the collateral source rule.
In addition to the collateral source argument, Farm
Bureau contends that KRS 304.39-320 entitles Hasty to a credit
or setoff for the UIM payments by State Farm and Progressive
against the jury verdict and that this statute controls over the
more general common law collateral source rule.
The trial court
relied upon, and Farm Bureau cites to, the provision in KRS
304.39-320 which describes UIM coverage as coverage for “such
uncompensated damages as [the insured] may recover on account of
injury due to a motor vehicle accident because the judgment
recovered against the owner of the other vehicle exceeds the
liability policy limits thereon, to the extent of the
underinsurance policy limits on the vehicle of the party
recovering.”
KRS 304.39-320(2).
The trial court viewed the
statute and UIM coverage as a means for an injured party to
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obtain more complete recovery of any damages sustained because
of a motor vehicle accident.
It relied especially on the word
“uncompensated” in concluding that “[n]othing therein indicates
an intent to allow an injured party double recovery.”
KRS 304.39-320 was intended to define the relationship
and obligations between the injured insured and the underinsured
motorist carrier as compared with the tortfeasor’s liability
coverage and the injured insured’s total damages.
The statute
does not explicitly provide credits or setoffs against the
tortfeasor’s liability for the injured party’s damages.
In this
context, the word “uncompensated” necessarily refers to the
amount of damages suffered by the injured party that are not
compensated by the tortfeasor’s liability coverage.
The trial
court’s attempt to include UIM benefits as compensation credited
against the tortfeasor’s liability represents an unwarranted
extension beyond the purpose and language of the statute.
Moreover, such an interpretation is flawed in that it deducts
the amount of UIM payments as compensated damages in deriving
the amount of UIM benefits payable to the insured in the first
instance.
In other words, the amount of uncompensated damages
must be determined before determining the amount of UIM benefits
due the insured.
The statute simply does not address how UIM payments
affect the tortfeasor’s liability other than the recognition
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that the UIM insurer may have subrogation rights in a portion of
the amount of damages due.
If the legislature wanted to provide
a credit benefiting the tortfeasor against the total damages, we
conclude it would have done so with more direct, precise
language.
Even if KRS 304.39-320 explicitly or, as the court
suggested, by implication provided for a credit against the
underinsured motorist’s liability, such a provision would be
subject to constitutional challenges.
The collateral source
rule has two aspects: evidentiary and substantive.
See
McCormack Baron & Associates v. Trudeaux, 885 S.W.2d 708, 710-11
(Ky. App. 1994).
The substantive aspect concerns the above-
discussed statement of the rule that damages are not reduced by
the amount of collateral benefits received by the plaintiff.
Given this substantive aspect, an evidentiary consequence
developed that prohibited the admission of evidence of
collateral benefits as being irrelevant and immaterial.
Id.
In 1988 the legislature in Kentucky enacted KRS
411.188 as part of the omnibus tort reform legislation.
See
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ruschell, 834 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Ky. 1992).
That statute authorized the admission of evidence concerning
collateral source payments, the value of any premiums paid by or
on behalf of the plaintiff, and known subrogation rights in any
civil trial.
In the O’Bryan case the Kentucky Supreme Court
-15-
held KRS 411.188(3) unconstitutional as violating the separation
of powers doctrine.
892 S.W.2d at 578.
While KRS 411.188 directly addressed only the
evidentiary aspect of the collateral source rule, the court
recognized its inevitable impact on the substantive aspect of
the rule as well.
The court indicated that the substantive
impact of the statute would violate Section 54 of the Kentucky
Constitution, which prohibits legislative encroachment on
compensatory damages due tort victims.
Id.
The court noted
that plaintiffs’ right to recover against wrongdoers for
personal injuries was long-standing and constitutionally
protected by the “jural rights” doctrine.
Id.
The court
further stated:
A substantive law change denying damages for
medical expenses and wage loss in a civil
action to those plaintiffs who have access
to collateral source benefits would violate
Section 54. Those plaintiffs receiving
collateral source payments cannot have their
tort remedy denied as punishment for their
prudence in obtaining insurance coverage to
assist them in the event of a catastrophe,
and their misfortune compounded by making
them appear to seek damages for which they
have no need.
Id.
This analysis recognizes the fundamental difference
between the tort damages recoverable from a wrongdoer and the
collateral benefits recovered by an insured on an insurance
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contract.
In short, a diminution of tort damages based on
receipt of collateral source benefits would violate Section 54
of the Kentucky Constitution.
Consequently, the trial court’s
interpretation of KRS 304.39-320 as authorizing a credit or
setoff of UIM payments received by Schwartz against the damages
recoverable from Hasty would violate the Kentucky Constitution.
Progressive has asserted its subrogation rights with
respect to the $25,000 in UIM benefits it has paid Schwartz.
However, there has been no resolution of its claim due to
procedural issues.
Hasty is not entitled to a credit or setoff
against the jury verdict for this amount, but he has an interest
in not being required to pay both Schwartz and Progressive in an
amount exceeding the jury verdict.
Moreover, as subrogee,
Progressive stands in the shoes of Schwartz and should receive
the amount of its payments in place of Schwartz, the subrogor.
As a result, should Progressive be determined to have valid
subrogation rights, any judgment should reflect an award to it
commensurate with its subrogation rights, thereby lessening the
award to Schwartz.
This is a matter of distribution of the jury
verdict, rather than decreasing the damages amount.
On the other hand, the record indicates that State
Farm has waived its subrogation rights and has been dismissed
from the action.
As we noted earlier, any agreement between
Schwartz and State Farm is irrelevant to the obligation of Hasty
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to pay the full amount of the damages.
Consistent with the
collateral source rule, Hasty is not entitled to a credit or
reduction in the judgment for the $78,614.27 paid to Schwartz by
State Farm, even though it may result in a double recovery by
Schwartz.
The order of the Garrard Circuit Court is reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, KENTUCKY
FARM BUREAU:
Don A. Pisacano
Lexington, Kentucky
Guy R. Colson
Casey C. Stansbury
Lexington, Kentucky
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