DONNIE MARKWELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 25, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002249-MR
AND
NO. 2003-CA-001741-MR
DONNIE MARKWELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00084
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MINTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Donnie Markwell appeals pro se from orders of
the Hopkins Circuit Court denying two motions seeking RCr 11.42
relief.
For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
On January 18, 1999, a white male with a mustache and
a brown leather jacket entered an automobile service business
known as the Grease Monkey.
The man demanded cash from the
owner and assistant manager, and he threatened to kill them.
After attempts to stall the man failed, the owner gave him $540
and the three men walked from the building to the edge of the
back parking lot, at which time the robber ran away.
The events
were witnessed by another employee who did not realize at the
time that a robbery was in progress.
After a description of the robber was publicized, the
police received a tip that Markwell fit the suspect’s general
description and that he may have been involved in the robbery.
Subsequently, all three of the eyewitnesses reviewed a
photographic lineup of six men and positively identified
Markwell as the robber, even though the robber had a mustache
and Markwell was clean shaven in his photograph.
Subsequently,
after being given his Miranda rights, Markwell agreed to be
videotaped walking and repeating phrases made by the robber.
After viewing the videotape, the owner and the assistant manager
reaffirmed their identifications of Markwell as the robber.
Markwell was indicted on counts of first-degree
robbery1 and intimidating a witness,2 as well as for being a
first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO).3
A psychiatric
evaluation, conducted pursuant to an agreed order, indicated
1
KRS 515.020.
2
KRS 524.040.
3
KRS 532.080.
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that Markwell was competent to stand trial and did not qualify
for an insanity defense.
At trial, the Commonwealth adduced evidence concerning
the robbery, the out-of-court identifications of Markwell, and
the fact that one witness smelled alcohol on the robber’s
breath.
Another witness testified that when she saw Markwell
later on the night of the robbery, he was wearing a brown
leather jacket and he appeared to be freshly shaven.
Several
witnesses testified that Markwell was clean shaven approximately
a week before the robbery, as well as several hours before the
events.
Markwell denied that he committed the robbery or,
indeed, that he had ever entered the Grease Monkey
establishment.
The jury convicted Markwell of second-degree
robbery4 and as a PFO I.5
Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to address
sentencing and the Commonwealth’s pending motion seeking a
formal ruling as to Markwell’s legal competency.
After making
an oral finding that Markwell was competent, the court sentenced
him to a total of ten years’ imprisonment.
Markwell’s
conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.6
4
KRS 515.030.
5
The charge of intimidating a witness, which earlier was severed from the
other two charges, eventually was dismissed.
6
Markwell v. Commonwealth, 2000-CA-00155-MR (unpublished decision rendered on
July 27, 2001).
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In August 2001, Markwell timely filed a pro se RCr
11.42 motion alleging that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel as to several issues including jury
instructions, the examination of witnesses, and the pretrial
investigation.
Markwell’s court-appointed attorney filed a
motion to submit Markwell’s claims for a ruling, stating that
after reviewing the case and discussing the issues with
Markwell, he believed the original memorandum sufficiently set
forth the issues and that no supplementation was needed.
The
trial court subsequently denied the RCr 11.42 motion for relief
and Markwell filed Appeal No. 2002-CA-002249-MR.
While that appeal was pending, Markwell filed a second
pro se collateral motion entitled “Successive RCr 11.42 Motion.”
Markwell alleged that his counsel in the first RCr 11.42
proceeding was ineffective for failing to supplement his pro se
motion with additional claims relating to trial counsel’s
failure to timely and properly identify two witnesses as
required by local rule, and relating to the courtroom use of
videotape depositions rather than live testimony of two defense
witnesses.
The trial court denied the motion, both as being an
improper successive motion under RCr 11.42(3), and based on the
merits.
Appeal No. 2003-CA-001741-MR followed.
In his first RCr 11.42 motion, Markwell raises several
allegations pertaining to due process and ineffective assistance
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of counsel.
First, he asserts that his conviction should be
vacated because his due process rights were violated by the use
of a videotaped demonstration which allegedly was suggestive and
tainted the victims’ identifications of him.
He also asserts
that the record does not show that he was advised of his Miranda
rights before each of his three interviews by a detective.
However, these unpreserved issues could or should have been
raised on direct appeal rather than by collateral attack
pursuant to RCr 11.42.7
RCr 11.42 is neither a substitute for a
direct appeal,8 nor a method by which a convicted defendant may
obtain “an additional appeal or a review of trial errors that
should have been addressed upon the direct appeal.”9
These
issues therefore are not subject to review in this proceeding.
As to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
which generally may be addressed in collateral RCr 11.42
proceedings rather than by direct appeal,10 Markwell must
demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was deficient, and
that such deficiency resulted in actual prejudice affecting the
7
See Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 473 (Ky. 2003).
8
See Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Ky. 2001); Cinnamon v.
Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 1970).
9
10
Commonwealth v. Basnight, 770 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Ky.App. 1989).
See, e.g., Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1998).
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outcome of the proceeding.11
The major focus is on whether the
proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable,12 and the
defendant bears the burden of establishing that ineffective
assistance was rendered.13
In assessing counsel’s performance, the standard is
whether the alleged acts or omissions fell outside the wide
range of prevailing professional norms based on an objective
standard of reasonableness.14
The defendant must overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the
wide range of reasonable assistance.15
A court must be highly
deferential in scrutinizing counsel’s performance, and it must
avoid second-guessing counsel’s actions based on the benefit of
hindsight.16
Further, “‘[a]defendant is not guaranteed errorless
counsel, or counsel adjudged ineffective by hindsight, but
11
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984); Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Ky. 1998).
12
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, 112 L.Ed.2d
180 (1993); Casey v. Commonwealth, 994 S.W.2d 18 (Ky.App. 1999).
13
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066; Commonwealth v. Tamme, 83
S.W.3d 465, 469 (Ky. 2002).
14
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65; Tamme, 83 S.W.3d at
469; Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872, 878 (Ky. 1992).
15
Strickland, 478 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Tamme, 83 S.W.3d at 470;
Bowling, 981 S.W.2d at 551.
16
Harper, 978 S.W.2d at 315; Russell v. Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d 871, 875
(Ky.App. 1999).
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counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance.’”17
If deficient performance is established, a defendant
must also demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.18
It is not enough for the
defendant to show that counsel’s error conceivably had some
effect on the outcome of the proceeding.19
Here, Markwell asserts that he received ineffective
assistance because trial counsel failed to request or tender an
instruction regarding the defense of intoxication.
However, as
noted by the trial court, the assertion of an intoxication
defense would have been contrary to, and would have seriously
undermined, the main defense theory that Markwell did not commit
the crime.
Instead, trial counsel presented testimony to
physically distinguish Markwell from the robber described by the
victims, and to provide a very narrow time window for Markwell’s
possible participation in the crime.
Markwell simply has not
rebutted the presumption that trial counsel made a strategic,
tactical decision not to pursue an intoxication defense.
17
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Ky. 1998) (quoting McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1970)).
18
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 479, 488 (Ky. 1998).
19
See also Moore v.
Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 386 (Ky. 2002).
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Moreover, intoxication provides a defense only if it
negates the existence of an element of the offense, or if it was
involuntarily produced and it deprived the defendant of the
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law.20
Mere drunkenness is not sufficient to constitute a
defense of intoxication,21 and “[a] voluntary intoxication
instruction is justified only when there is evidence that the
defendant ‘was so drunk that he did not know what he was
doing.’”22
Here, a defense witness indicated that Markwell was
sober shortly before the time of the robbery.
Moreover,
although one witness noticed alcohol on the robber’s breath,
there was no evidence that the robber appeared to be highly
intoxicated.
Thus, there was insufficient evidence to support
an intoxication instruction, and Markwell was not prejudiced by
trial counsel’s failure to request such an instruction.
Next, Markwell contends that he was afforded
ineffective assistance because trial counsel failed to insist
upon his presence at some of the pretrial hearings.
A criminal
defendant has Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
20
KRS 501.080.
See Nichols v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Ky. 2004).
21
Nichols, 142 S.W.3d at 688; Rogers v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 29, 44 (Ky.
2002).
22
Rogers, 86 S.W.3d at 44 (quoting Meadows v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 511,
513 (Ky. 1977)). See also Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 867 (Ky.
2004).
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to be “present at all stages of the trial where his absence
might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.”23
Moreover,
RCr 8.28(1) provides that a defendant shall be present at every
“critical stage” of the trial.24
This right also is protected by
Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.25
Further, federal and
Kentucky courts generally have held that pretrial hearings that
involve solely legal issues or arguments, rather than
evidentiary issues, do not represent critical stages which
require the presence of defendants.26
Thus, a defendant’s right
to be present is not implicated where the hearing or conference
concerns only procedural matters.27
Here, as noted by the trial court, Markwell failed to
specifically identify any pretrial conferences which he did not
attend.
It appears from the record that he was present at all
hearings except those which merely addressed scheduling matters,
and he has failed to show that his presence at those conferences
was necessary to ensure their fairness.
Hence, Markwell has not
23
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n. 15,
45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). See also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 107
S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987); United States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525,
534 (6th Cir. 2001); Price v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 885, 892 (Ky. 2000).
24
See also FCRP 43(a).
25
Price, 31 S.W.3d at 892.
26
See e.g., United States v. Cornett, 195 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 653 (11th Cir. 1984); Caudill v.
Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 652 (Ky. 2003); Tamme, 973 S.W.2d at 38.
27
See Clark v. Stinson, 214 F.3d 315, 322 (2nd Cir. 2000); Small v Endicott,
998 F.2d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 1993);
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shown either that trial counsel was deficient, or that he
suffered actual prejudice as a result of his absence from any
pretrial conferences.
Next, Markwell contends that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing.
This
issue is not properly preserved before us since it was not
raised in Markwell’s motion for RCr 11.42 relief.28
In any
event, we note that the record shows that Markwell was found
competent after trial counsel requested a competency evaluation.
Trial counsel stated during the sentencing hearing that he had
spoken with the examining psychiatrist, who had reaffirmed her
written report and the conclusions reached therein.
Further,
counsel indicated below that Markwell had cooperated in the
preparation of his defense case.
Contrary to Markwell’s
assertions on appeal, his performance at trial and his trial
testimony regarding short-term memory loss do not suggest that
he was incompetent to stand trial.
It follows that he was not
afforded ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of
counsel’s failure to request a competency hearing.
Finally, the trial court did not err by denying
Markwell’s second RCr 11.42 motion on both procedural and
substantive grounds.
Although Markwell asserts that the issues
28
See Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 419 (Ky. 2002) (issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel not raised in RCr 11.42 motion was not
properly before the appellate court); Harper, 978 S.W.2d at 318.
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raised in the second motion were not barred by the successive
motions principle, as his appellate counsel allegedly was
ineffective for failing to raise the issues in a supplemental
memorandum to his original pro se RCr 11.42 motion, the Kentucky
Supreme Court previously has rejected such arguments.29
Moreover, as there is no federal constitutional right to legal
representation in a state postconviction proceeding, Markwell is
not entitled to relief on this ground.30
We also agree with the trial court that Markwell’s
second RCr 11.42 motion lacks substantive merit.
Although
Markwell asserts that trial counsel was ineffective, and that he
was prejudiced because his mother and sisters were unable to
testify after counsel failed to comply with a local rule
requiring them to be listed, the alleged error is unlikely to
have affected the outcome of the trial since the testimony of
these two witnesses regarding Markwell’s physical and mental
abilities would have been cumulative.
Further, Markwell’s
contention that trial counsel was ineffective in connection with
the videotaped testimony of two other witnesses, who testified
that Markwell was clean shaven approximately one week before the
robbery, is not persuasive since Markwell fails to demonstrate
29
See Harper, 978 S.W.2d at 318; Vunetich v. Commonwealth, 847 S.W.2d 51 (Ky.
1992).
30
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2566, 115
L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).
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how their testimony might have differed or been more effective
if they had testified in person.
In any event, Markwell has not
shown that trial counsel, who unsuccessfully sought a
continuance in order to obtain live testimony, acted
unreasonably or to his prejudice.
Further, he has not shown
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
these issues in a supplemental memorandum to the original RCr
11.42 motion.
We affirm both orders of the Hopkins Circuit Court
denying Markwell’s motions for RCr 11.42 relief.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donnie Markwell, Pro Se
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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