DEBBIE ELLEN REHM, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES DAVID REHM; NICHOLAS JAMES REHM AND CHRISTINA MARIE REHM, BY AND THROUGH THEIR PARENT, GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND, DEBBIE ELLEN REHM v. NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL, A/K/A INTERNATIONAL TRUCK & ENGINE CORPORATION; ALLIED CHEMICAL CORPORATION; AMERICAN STANDARD, INC.; BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION; BROWN-FORMAN CORPORATION; COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY; E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS; FORD MOTOR COMPANY; GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; KENTUCKY UTILITIES; LORILLARD, INC.; LOUISVILLE GAS METALS COMPANY; ROHM & HAAS; THE B.F. GOODRICH COMPANY
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February 25, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2002-CA-001399-MR
DEBBIE ELLEN REHM, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES DAVID REHM;
NICHOLAS JAMES REHM AND CHRISTINA MARIE REHM,
BY AND THROUGH THEIR PARENT, GUARDIAN AND
NEXT FRIEND, DEBBIE ELLEN REHM
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-001344
NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL, A/K/A INTERNATIONAL
TRUCK & ENGINE CORPORATION; ALLIED CHEMICAL
CORPORATION; AMERICAN STANDARD, INC.;
BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION;
BROWN-FORMAN CORPORATION; COLGATE-PALMOLIVE
COMPANY; E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS; FORD MOTOR
COMPANY; GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; KENTUCKY
UTILITIES; LORILLARD, INC.; LOUISVILLE GAS
& ELECTRIC; PHILIP MORRIS, INC.; REYNOLDS
METALS COMPANY; ROHM & HAAS;
THE B.F. GOODRICH COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, JUDGE; MILLER AND PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGES.1
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE:
1
Senior Judges John D. Miller and Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judges
by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the
Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Debbie Ellen Rehm, individually and as executrix of
the estate of James David Rehm, and Nicholas James Rehm and
Christina Marie Rehm, by and through their Parent, Guardian, and
Next Friend, Debbie Ellen Rehm, appeal from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment to appellees
Navistar International (a/k/a International Truck & Engine
Corporation); General Electric Company; Ford Motor Company; Rohm
& Haas Company; American Standard, Inc.; Philip Morris, Inc.;
Colgate-Palmolive Company; Brown Forman Corporation; E.I. Dupont
de Nemours; The B.F. Goodrich Company; Reynolds Metals Company;
Kentucky Utilities Company; Louisville Gas & Electric Company;
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation; Lorillard, Inc.; and
Allied Chemical Corporation, in a lawsuit alleging that James
was exposed to asbestos while working on the premises of the
appellees.
As a result of his exposure to asbestos James
developed an incurable form of cancer, which eventually resulted
in his death.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Because this is an appeal from an award of summary
judgment in favor of the appellees, we review the factual
background in the light most favorable to the appellants’
position in the case.
2
James was employed as a millwright by Rapid
Installation (now Rapid Industries) from approximately 1975
until 1982.
According to James, during the relevant time frame,
Rapid Installation was a company primarily engaged in the
business of manufacturing, selling, installing, and maintaining
industrial conveyor systems and the associated machinery.
In
his job as a millwright for Rapid Installation, James was
involved in the demolition, tearing out, and installation of
conveyors, furnaces, ovens, machinery, and other equipment at
facilities owned by the appellees.
During the jobs at the
facilities owned by the appellees, James was exposed to
insulation products on the pipes, furnaces, ovens, machinery,
and other equipment on the appellees’ property.
In February 2001, James was diagnosed with malignant
mesothelioma, an incurable form of cancer caused by exposure to
asbestos.
On February 23, 2001, James and Debbie and Nicholas
James and Christina Marie, by and through their parents,
guardians, and next friends, James and Debbie, brought this
action to recover damages for personal injuries caused from
James’s exposure to asbestos.
Among other things, the
plaintiffs sued under a theory of premises liability alleging
that the appellees failed to exercise reasonable care in
maintaining their properties contaminated with asbestos.
plaintiffs alleged negligence, gross negligence, willful
3
The
misconduct, and intentional and outrageous conduct in that the
appellees knowingly failed to warn James of the dangers of
working around asbestos products and that their negligence
caused James’s disease.
Within a short time after the action was filed, each
of the sixteen property-owner appellees filed a motion for
summary judgment alleging that the appellants’ claims were
barred under Kentucky Workers’ Compensation law pursuant to the
“up-the-ladder” immunity provisions of Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 342.610 and KRS 342.690.
Under these provisions a
contractor is immunized against common law tort claims brought
by the employees of a subcontractor if, among other things, the
work performed by the subcontractor is a regular or recurrent
part of the contractor’s business.
The plaintiffs attempted to depose the defendants’
corporate witnesses regarding the asbestos located on their
properties; however, based upon the defendants’ motions for
summary judgment, the trial court entered an order limiting
discovery to the defendants’ up-the-ladder defenses.
On May 31, 2002, the trial court entered an order
granting summary judgment to each of the sixteen property owner
defendants who are the appellees in this case.
4
The trial court
determined that each of the defendants was entitled to up-theThis appeal followed.2
ladder-immunity.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is only proper “where the movant
shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any
circumstances.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991) (citing Paintsville
Hospital Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985)).
The trial
court must view the record “in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts
are to be resolved in his favor.”
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480
(citing Dossett v. New York Mining & Manufacturing Co., 451
S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1970)).
However, “a party opposing a properly
supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat that motion
without presenting at least some affirmative evidence
demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact
requiring trial.”
Hubble v. Johnson, 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky.
1992)(citing Steelvest, supra at 480).
This Court has
previously stated that “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that
there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that
the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2
On July 5, 2002, James died of the asbestos-induced cancer. On August 28,
2002, this Court entered an order granting the appellants’ motion to
substitute Debbie Ellen Rehm for James David Rehm as executrix of his estate.
5
There is no requirement that the appellate court defer to the
trial court since factual findings are not at issue” [citations
omitted].
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App.
1996).
UP-THE-LADDER-IMMUNITY ISSUES
The appellants contend that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment to the appellees because there are
questions of fact regarding whether the work performed by James
on each of the appellees properties was a regular or recurrent
part of each business so as to qualify each of the appellees to
the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act
and the Act’s up-the-ladder immunity defense.
ELEMENTS OF UP-THE-LADDER-IMMUNITY
The elements of up-the-ladder immunity are set forth
in KRS 342.690(1) and KRS 342.610(2).
KRS 342.690(1) provides,
in relevant part, as follows:
If an employer secures payment of
compensation as required by this chapter,
the liability of such employer under this
chapter shall be exclusive and in place of
all other liability of such employer to the
employee, his legal representative, husband
or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin,
and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer at law or in
admiralty on account of such injury or
death. For purposes of this section, the
term "employer" shall include a "contractor"
covered by subsection (2) of KRS 342.610,
6
whether or not the subcontractor has in
fact, secured the payment of compensation.
KRS 342.610(2) defines a “contractor” for purposes of
KRS 342.690(1), in relevant part, as follows:
A person who contracts with another:
. . . .
(b) To have work performed of a kind which
is a regular or recurrent part of the work
of the trade, business, occupation, or
profession of such person . . .
shall . . . be deemed a contractor, and such
other person a subcontractor.
These statutes make it clear that if an appellee is a
contractor, then it has no liability in tort to an injured
employee of its subcontractor, Rapid Installation.
It is also
apparent from the statute that an appellee is a contractor if
the work it subcontracted to Rapid Installation is a kind which
is a “regular or recurrent” part of the work or trade of the
appellee.
Daniels v. Louisville Gas and Electric Company, 933
S.W.2d 821, 823 (Ky.App. 1996).
“REGULAR OR RECURRENT”: QUESTION OF FACT OR LAW
We first address the appellants’ contention that the
determination of whether certain work is of a kind which is a
regular or recurrent part of the work of a particular business,
trade or occupation, presents a question of fact for a jury to
7
decide or presents a question of law to be decided by the
presiding court.
When the underlying facts concerning the type of
business engaged in and/or the type of work the employee
performed in his association with the company are disputed, the
resolution of the factual disputes is a question of fact to be
decided by a jury.
However, when the underlying facts are
undisputed, the question of whether certain work is of a kind
which is a regular or recurrent part of the work of a particular
business, trade or occupation, becomes a question of law for the
court to decide.
See Daniels v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co.,
933 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Ky.App. 1996); See also Schuck v. John
Morrell & Co., 529 N.W.2d 894, 897 (S.D. 1995) (mixed questions
of law and fact arise when the historical facts are admitted or
established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is
whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard).
underlying facts in this case are not in dispute.
The
It is the
legal interpretation of those facts that is in dispute, which is
a question of law.
The appellants rely upon Goldsmith v. Allied Building
Components, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1992), to support their
argument that the issue of “regular or recurrent” is an issue of
fact rather than an issue of law.
reliance on Goldsmith is misplaced.
8
However, the appellants’
Goldsmith turned upon the
issue of whether the subcontractor was an up-the-ladder employer
of the plaintiff rather than turning on the question of what
constitutes a “regular or recurrent” business activity.
This
Court affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment in
favor of the subcontractor; however, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded after concluding that genuine issues of material
fact existed regarding whether the plaintiff was in the
employment ladder.
The majority opinion concluded as follows:
Prior to concluding, we observe that if it
should be determined that Components is up
the ladder from Goldsmith, KRS 342.610 and
our decision in Fireman's Fund [Ins. Co. v.
Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d 459 (Ky.
1986)], impose an additional requirement for
Components to prevail. To have benefit of
the immunity provision of the Act,
Components must also demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the trier of fact that
providing rough carpentry labor was a
regular or recurrent part of its business.
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 381.
Although this excerpt refers to a possible future
determination of the “regular or recurrent” issue by the “trier
of fact,” Goldsmith specifically did not address or attempt to
resolve that issue, and the language is clearly dicta.
Dicta in an opinion is not authoritative or binding on a
reviewing court.
Stone v. City of Providence, 236 Ky. 775, 778,
34 S.W.2d 244, 245 (1930); Cawood v. Hensley, 247 S.W.2d 27, 29
(Ky. 1952); Board of Claims of Kentucky v. Banks, 31 S.W.3d 436,
9
439 (Ky.App. 2000).
We believe that we are neither bound by the
dicta in the Goldsmith opinion nor do we believe that the
Kentucky Supreme Court intended to pronounce in that case that
the issue of “regular or recurrent” is an issue of fact to be
decided by a jury when the underlying facts concerning the
business operations of the contractor and the work performed by
the subcontractor are not in dispute.
Daniels v. Louisville Gas
and Electric, supra, decided the issue as a matter of law, and
we believe that is the proper disposition.
“REGULAR OR RECURRENT”: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
When analyzing a statute, we must interpret statutory
language with regard to its common and approved usage.
446.080.
KRS
In so doing, we must refer to the language of the
statute rather than speculating as to what may have been
intended but was not expressed.
S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ky. 1998).
Commonwealth v. Allen, 980
In other words, a court "may not
interpret a statute at variance with its stated language."
(citation omitted);
Id.
See also Gurnee v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Government, 6 S.W.3d 852, 856 (Ky.App. 1999).
Therefore,
any statutory analysis must begin with the plain language of the
statute.
In so doing, however, our ultimate goal is to
implement the intent of the legislature.
10
See Wesley v. Board of
Education of Nicholas County, 403 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Ky. 1966); AK
Steel Corp. v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 15, 17 (Ky.App. 2002).
Although dictionary definitions can sometimes offer
guidance as to statutory construction, they are not conclusive.
The predominant element is the legislative intent.
v. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d 47, 49 (Ky. 2002).
Commonwealth
By way of guidance,
then, we note that “regular,” in the context relevant here, is
defined as “orderly, methodical . . . recurring, attending, or
functioning at fixed or uniform intervals . . . constituted,
conducted, or done in conformity with established or prescribed
usages, rules or discipline."
Dictionary (10th ed. 1999).
Merriam Webster's Collegiate
Similarly, “routine” is defined as
“of a commonplace or repetitious character: ordinary . . . of,
relating to, or being in accordance with established procedure.”
Id.
The term “regular or recurrent” was addressed by the
Supreme Court in Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Sherman &
Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1986).
The principal point made
in that case is that it makes no difference whether the work at
issue is of a type which the contractor-company usually does for
itself or usually subcontracts out to others.
supra at 461.
Fireman’s Fund,
Even though a company may never perform a
particular job with its own employees, it is still a contractor
if the job is one that is usually a regular or recurrent part of
11
its trade or occupation.
Id.
Fireman’s Fund arose out of the
death of an employee of a framing subcontractor, Elder, Inc.
A
contract existed between Sherman & Fletcher and Elder whereby
Elder agreed to perform the rough framing carpentry work for
Sherman & Fletcher on a townhouse construction project.
& Fletcher was in the building construction business.
Sherman
The
Supreme Court concluded that "rough framing carpentry is work of
a kind which is a regular or recurrent part of the work of the
occupation or trade of building construction [.]"
Id. at 461.
Consequently, the Supreme Court held that pursuant to KRS
342.690, Sherman & Fletcher was immune from tort liability for
claims arising out of the death of Elder's employee. Id. at 462.
In Daniels v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 933
S.W.2d 821 (Ky.App. 1996), this Court addressed the term
“regular or recurrent.”
We stated "’Recurrent’ simply means
occurring again or repeatedly.
‘Regular’ generally means
customary or normal, or happening at fixed intervals.
However,
neither term requires regularity or recurrence with the
preciseness of a clock or calendar.”
Based upon this
construction of the term we concluded that emissions testing
required by the EPA constituted a regular or recurrent part of a
coal-fired electric plant's business.
Aside from Fireman's Fund and Daniels, Kentucky law is
rather undeveloped as to what work is of a kind which is a
12
regular or recurrent part of the work of a particular business.
In the only other published opinion in which a Kentucky state
court specifically addressed the "regular or recurrent" issue,
this Court concluded that the work of transporting coal was of a
kind which was a regular or recurrent part of the work of the
business of coal mining.
See Tom Ballard Co. v. Blevins, 614
S.W.2d 247, 249 (Ky.App. 1980).
Several federal courts have addressed the issue.
See, e.g., Thompson v. The Budd Co., 199 F.3d 799 (6th Cir.
1999)(holding that changing the filters in a heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning system was "part" of the
business of stamping automotive parts); Granus v. North American
Philips Lighting Corp., 821 F.2d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the renovation of a glass melting furnace was a
regular and recurrent part of the manufacturing operations at a
glass making factory); Smothers v. Tractor Supply Co., 104
F.Supp.2d 715, 718 (W.D.Ky. 2000) (holding that the transporting
of merchandise from a storage facility to a retail store was
"part" of a tractor supply store's retail operation); and Sharp
v. Ford Motor Co., 66 F.Supp.2d 867, 869-70 (W.D.Ky. 1998)
(holding that loading and unloading vehicles from railcars was a
regular and recurrent part of the business of manufacturing and
distributing automobiles).
But see Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 244
F.Supp.2d 784, 789 (W.D.Ky. 2003) (holding that a mere purchaser
13
of goods is not a statutory contractor of the seller under KRS
342.610(2)); and Gesler v. Ford Motor Co., 185 F.Supp.2d 724,
728 (W.D.Ky. 2001) (holding that the demolition, removal, and
replacement of an anti-corrosion system for automobiles was not
a regular or recurrent part of the business of designing,
manufacturing, and selling automobiles).
For the most part, the federal courts have broadly
applied Fireman's Fund and Daniels to create an expansive
interpretation of the definition of "contractor" as it appears
in KRS 342.610(2).
However, the approach followed in the
majority of these federal cases interpreting KRS 342.610(2) runs
counter to the basic principles that most courts have
traditionally adhered to in interpreting the coverage and
immunity provisions contained in workers' compensation acts.
As
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Boggs v. Blue
Diamond Coal Co. 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444
U.S. 836, 100 S.Ct. 71, 62 L.Ed.2d 47 (1979):
The dominant purpose of the movement to
adopt workmen's compensation laws in the
early decades of this century was Not (sic)
to abrogate existing common law remedies for
the protection of workmen. It was to provide
social insurance to compensate victims of
industrial accidents because it was widely
believed that the limited rights of recovery
available under the common law at the turn
of the century were inadequate to protect
them.
. . . .
14
Employers generally opposed the movement for
“reform”; labor generally favored it.
Workmen’s compensation laws were adopted as
a compromise between these contending
forces. Workmen were willing to exchange a
set of common-law remedies of dubious value
for modest workmen’s compensation benefits
schedules designed to keep the injured
workman and his family from destitution.
Since the adoption of workmen’s compensation
laws, common law tort principles have been
modified gradually. Liability has expanded.
The defenses of contributory negligence,
assumption of the risk and the fellow
servant rule have been narrowed or
abolished. But workmen’s compensation
benefits have remained low, and the
compromise which extended immunity from
common-law liability to employers has
remained in place.
. . . .
Courts have responded by liberally
construing the coverage provisions of
workmen’s compensation acts while narrowly
construing the immunity provisions.
Id. at 658-59.
The justification for this approach has been explained
as follows:
[T]here is no strong reason of compensation
policy for destroying common law rights
. . . [and] [e]very presumption should be on
the side of preserving those rights, once
basic compensation protection has been
assured. . . . The injured employee has a
right to be made whole, not just partly
whole. . . . [A]ll the reasons for making
the wrongdoer bear the costs of his
wrongdoings still apply, including the moral
rightness of this result as well as the
salutary effect it tends to have as an
15
incentive to careful conduct and safe work
practices.
Id. at 660 (quoting 2A Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation, § 72.50 at 14-95 (1976)).
See also Roberts v.
Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 634 So.2d 341, 346 (La.
1994)("[b]ecause workers' compensation benefits have lagged far
behind the expansion of liability and the curtailment of tort
defenses, courts have responded by liberally construing the
coverage provisions of workers' compensation acts while narrowly
construing the immunity provisions"); and Larson's, Workers'
Compensation Law, Vol. 3 § 47.42(a)(1997) ("[i]f this seems to
be lack of perfect symmetry, it should be remembered that there
also is not perfect symmetry in what is at stake in the two
situations: The first is a matter of providing protective
statutory benefits, while the second is a matter of destroying
valuable common-law rights that have existed for centuries").
Thus, when a person, who has contracted with another
to have work performed of a kind which is a regular or recurrent
part of the work of the person, claims immunity from liability
in a tort action based on workers' compensation being the
exclusive remedy pursuant to KRS 342.690(1) and KRS 342.610(2),
the entitlement to such protection should be strictly construed.
Our conclusion that immunity protection should be
strictly construed is supported by the previous interpretation
16
of the Supreme Court that KRS 342.610(2) was enacted to
discourage owners and contractors from hiring financially
irresponsible subcontractors and thus eliminate workmen's
compensation liability.
Elkhorn-Hazard Coal Land Corp. v.
Taylor, 539 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Ky. 1976).
APPLICATION OF UP-THE-LADDER IMMUNITY TO APPELLEES
With the foregoing in mind, we now turn to the trial
court’s award of summary judgment in favor of the sixteen
appellees in this case.
To avoid redundancy, we first address the evidence the
appellants filed in opposition to the appellees’ motions for
summary judgment.
In opposition to summary judgment the
appellants submitted various affidavits of expert and lay
witnesses.
Because we believe the trial court did an exemplary
job of addressing the issues presented by these affidavits, we
adopt its discussion of the issue:
Affidavit of James Rehm
[James] testified that each company employed
its own maintenance staff for the regular
maintenance of the property. However,
“[e]ven though he may never perform that
particular job with his own employees, he is
still a contractor if the job is one that is
usually a regular or recurrent part of his
trade or occupation.” Fireman’s Fund Ins.
Co. v. Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d 459,
462 (Ky. 1986). In Fireman’s Fund, while
the deceased employee’s estate attempted to
argue that the “subcategory of carpentry
17
which is designated as ‘rough framing’ was a
type of carpentry [that the employer] did
not do for itself but usually subcontracted
to others,” the Court concluded that it
could “not be disputed that rough framing
carpentry is work of a kind which is a
regular or recurrent part of the work of the
occupation or trade of building construction
in which Sherman & Fletcher was engaged.”
Id. at 461.
While [James] generally testifies that the
work he performed for the defendants “did
not occur at fixed intervals” and that it
was not the “regular and/or routine
maintenance” for the companies, (Rehm Aff.,
¶19), he did not testify that he had
personal knowledge of the companies’
respective regular maintenance procedures
and thus, he is not competent to testify as
to the maintenance work performed by others.
Furthermore, even assuming that the work he
performed was not regular and recurrent
maintenance, the statute does not require
“maintenance.” The statute merely requires
that the work be a “regular or recurrent
part of the work of the trade, business
. . . .” Thus, any type of work, whether it
is maintenance or otherwise, that is regular
or recurrent to the business, even if not
performed by its own employees, may
transform a contractor into a statutory
employer for purposes of workers’
compensation coverage and thus provide “upthe-ladder” immunity.
Furthermore, [James’s] affidavit presents no
affirmative evidence contradicting the
evidence submitted by the property owners
regarding the quantity or types of work that
they engaged in or whether the work was
instrumental to their business. Thus
[James’s] affidavit fails to present any
affirmative evidence that the work he
performed was not regular or recurrent to
the defendants’ respective businesses.
18
Affidavit of Dr. Suraj M. Alexander
[The appellants] submit[ted] the affidavit
of Dr. Suraj M. Alexander, a professional
engineer on faculty in the Department of
Industrial Engineering at the University of
Louisville. Alexander testifies to the
following in pertinent part:
I hold the opinion that major capital
expenditures for tear down and renovation
are as a result of strategic level decisions
and they would not be regular and recurrent
at a specific plant owing to cost/benefit
tradeoffs and uncertainty; i.e. major
capital expenditures decisions [sic] are
made considering the return on investment
over a longer time horizon, over which the
forecasts of benefits, such as increased
demand, is uncertain. These decisions, in a
sense, bind a company to a certain course of
action for several years. Hence, by
definition, they cannot be regular and
recurrent at a specific plant. (Alexander
Aff. ¶11.)
Alexander then proceeds to list projects at
Ford, GE, International Harvester, B.F.
Goodrich, DuPont, Phillip Morris, and
Reynolds that he considers not to be
“regular or recurrent.” While the Court
appreciates Dr. Alexander’s opinion, the
issue is not whether the decision to make a
capital expenditure is “regular or
recurrent,” but whether the work contracted
for is “of a kind which is a regular or
recurrent part of the work of the trade [or]
business . . . .” Even Alexander agreed that
manufacturers would have to regularly
replace or repair motors and pumps and that
the repair and replacement of those would
occur over and over. (Alexander Depo., p.
211-12.) In addition, Alexander admits that
he had no personal knowledge regarding the
defendants’ maintenance procedures. For
example, regarding Allied Chemical,
Alexander testified that he had “no reason
19
to disagree” that the repair, periodic
removal and replacement of pumps, motors,
piping, [and] lines “was a necessary element
of the maintenance and operation” of
Allied’s plant and that the same work was
[a] “regular and reoccurring [sic] activity
performed by Allied’s own employees.” (Id.
at 135-136.) Regarding DuPont, he testified
that he had no personal knowledge of DuPont
or its operations, (Id. at 123-24, 227) that
he had no opinion as to whether the work
performed by [James] at DuPont was a regular
or recurrent part of DuPont’s business, and
that he had no personal knowledge about how
regularly DuPont replaced equipment. (Id.
at 126-27.) Furthermore, Alexander
testified that he would have no reason to
disagree that the maintenance of equipment
was a regular and recurrent part of DuPont’s
business. (Id. at 227-28.) Regarding Ford,
Alexander also agreed that he could not
dispute the factual information provided by
V. Bruce Hepke and William McKinney in their
affidavits in support of Ford’s motion for
summary judgment, that he had no knowledge
of Ford’s assembly line replacement
strategies, and that he was “not expressing
any opinions as to whether the work
performed by James Rehm at the Ford
Louisville Assembly Plant was a regular or
recurrent part of the work or business of
Ford Motor Company.” (Id. at 215-16).
Alexander further agreed that he had no
knowledge of “the frequency with which Ford
was involved in tearing out portions of
assembly lines and related components in
plants . . . .” (Id. at 72-73.) Thus, not
only does Alexander admit to having no
knowledge of the defendants’ businesses, the
information which he provided was not
relevant to the precise issue at question.
Affidavit of Thomas J. Feaheny
[The appellants] submitted the affidavit of
Thomas Feaheny, a mechanical engineer who
20
was employed by Ford for twenty-six years.
Feaheny submits that, after reviewing Rehm’s
deposition, the work performed was “clearly
not ‘regular and recurrent’ work but rather
an important part of the implementation of
the very major Product Program “that he
described as a “very major strategic program
for Ford as it involved numerous complex and
risky product, marketing, legal and
competitive issues . . . .” (Feaheny Aff.,
¶7.) Feaheny concludes with stating that
the affidavits and depositions of V. Bruce
Hepke and William McKinney regarding the
conversion of Ford’s LAP being regular and
recurrent were “both wrong.” (Feaheny Aff.
¶8.)
While Feaheny attempts to testify that the
work was not a regular or recurrent part of
Ford’s business, he submits no facts to
support his legal conclusion. Feaheny has
completely failed to present any facts to
dispute those presented by the defendants,
as discussed below. The fact that he
disagrees with a legal conclusion does not
present an issue of material fact that would
preclude judgment as a matter of law.
Furthermore, Feaheny testifies only to the
work at Ford, and thus, even if this Court
were to consider the legal conclusion
submitted in his affidavit, the only
defendant that it could impact would be
Ford.
Affidavits of Richard Sweazy, Mark Draper,
and Rick Williams
[The appellants] submit[ted] the affidavits
of Richard Sweazy, Mark Draper, and Rick
Williams, all former employees of Rapid
Industries who worked as millwrights with
[James] on various projects in the
Louisville area. These co-workers testified
that the projects that they and [James]
performed were “specially customized,” that
they “were not [] regular and routine
maintenance,” and did not occur at “fixed
21
intervals.” (Sweazy Aff., ¶¶7-8; Draper
Aff., ¶¶8, 10; Williams Aff., ¶¶ 7-8.)
First, considering these affidavits in a
light most favorable to [the appellants],
the fact that the work did not occur at
“fixed intervals” does not preclude a
finding that the work was routine. In fact,
neither “regular” nor “recurrent” requires
“regularity or recurrence with the
preciseness of a clock or calendar.”
Daniels, 933 S.W.2d at 824. In addition,
the fact that the work was not “maintenance”
does not eliminate it from the category of
“work.” There may be other types of “work”
besides “maintenance” that will transform a
contractor into a statutory employer for
workers’ compensation purposes.
The co-workers submit no facts which
contradict the regular or recurrent nature
of the work other than the mere conclusion
that the work was not “regular and recurrent
maintenance.” As previously stated, such a
conclusory statement does not raise a
material issue of fact. In addition, some
of the general statements from the
affidavits are contradicted by the affiant’s
own specific testimony. For example,
Williams testified that he knew nothing
about Reynolds’ staff of mechanics and
maintenance workers and he had no knowledge
of what work Reynolds might consider regular
or recurring, (Williams Depo., Vol I, pp.
103-4), that he knew nothing about how often
or at what intervals Reynolds performed the
type of work that he and [James] performed
at Reynolds, that he could not classify the
work that he performed for Reynolds as
“major construction,” and that he could not
say whether the work was “special or
customized.” (Williams Depo., Vol II, pp.
195-98).
Affidavit of James King
22
[The appellants] submit[ted] an affidavit
from James King, a certified public
accountant who rendered an opinion that
major tear-downs and renovations of
industrial plants are capital expenditures
and thus not properly classified as a
regular or recurrent expense from an
accounting standpoint. (King Aff., ¶8.)
However, King agreed that he was “not able
to offer any opinion whether the work
performed by Mr. Rehm at . . . Allied
Chemical’s Ashland Coke Plant was a regular
or recurrent part of Allied Chemical’s
business.” (King Depo., pp. 118-119.) He
also testified that he had no personal
knowledge of DuPont or its operations and
that he had no personal knowledge as to
whether [James] worked on any particular
project. (King Depo., pp. 67-70.) He
agreed that he was “not familiar with how
Ford Motor company routinely makes
modifications, repairs, changes or additions
to its conveyor system” (King Depo., p. 76)
and stated that “it would be common sense
that [Ford] would have to make modifications
to their process to accommodate changes in
models” and that he “certainly” thought that
“the modification of the vehicles is
probably predictable . . . .” (King Depo.,
pp. 82-83.)
Whether a business engaged in a “capital
expenditure” has no bearing on whether the
work to perform the capital expenditure was
the type of work that was a regular or
recurrent part of the business and there is
no evidence that King considered the legal
definitions of “regular or recurrent” for
purposes of the exclusive remedy of workers’
compensation coverage. In fact, King
clearly offered his opinion based on his
experience and knowledge “of Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles and the
relevant sections of the Internal Revenue
Code,” (King Aff., ¶6.) and agreed that
standards set in the Workers’ Compensation
23
law was not his area of expertise. (King
Depo., p. 35.) While the Court appreciates
this testimony, King’s statements are
conclusory assertions about ultimate legal
issues which do not present factual evidence
raising an issue of fact on the issue of
whether the work performed by Rehm was a
regular or recurrent part of the business of
these defendants.
Don Boaz
[The appellants] submit[ted] the affidavit
of Don Boaz, an engineer employed by Rapid
[Installation] who testifies that Rapid
[Installation] employees performed
“customized” projects, that Rapid
[Installation] was in the “business of
manufacturing and installing conveyor
systems and equipment,” and that Rapid
[Installation] was not responsible for the
regular or routine maintenance of the
companies with which it contracted. (Boaz
Aff. ¶¶5-7.) Boaz also states that he could
not testify as to whether [James’s] work at
Reynolds was “regular or recurrent,” that he
had no personal knowledge of [James] working
at Reynolds, that he could not remember the
type of work that Rapid [Installation]
performed at Reynolds, and that he knew
nothing about Reynolds’ manufacturing
process at the Louisville plant (Boaz Depo.,
pp. 133-35.)
Although the projects may have been
“customized,” such evidence has no relevance
to whether the work performed in carrying
out those projects was regular or recurrent.
Certainly, each manufacturer would require
specific or custom equipment and assembly
lines. In addition, while Rapid may not
have been “responsible” for regular
maintenance, such evidence simply does not
address whether the work performed by
[James] was a recurrent part of the
manufacturers’ business.
24
In addition, each of the defendants has
presented evidence that the work performed
by [James] was a regular or recurrent part
of its manufacturing business.
In summary, while the appellants attempted to provide
evidence in opposition to the appellees’ motions for summary
judgment so as to defeat an award of summary judgment, the
testimony presented is either not based upon personal knowledge,
applies the wrong standard in reaching a conclusion of whether
the work performed by Rapid Installation was “regular or
recurrent,” provides a conclusory legal opinion on whether the
work is “regular or recurrent,” or applies irrelevant factors in
determining whether the work performed by Rapid Installation is
regular or recurrent.
Notably absent from the affidavits and
testimony is an alternative assertion of facts as to the
specific work tasks performed by Rapid Installation, the
frequency and regularity that those tasks are performed at the
appellees’ facilities, and whether the tasks performed by Rapid
Installation are a part of the business of the various
appellees.
As such, the affidavits and deposition testimony
presented by the appellants in opposition to summary judgment do
not comprise affirmative evidence which would defeat the
properly supported motions filed by the appellees.
Next, we review case-by-case our conclusion of why
each of the appellees is entitled to summary judgment.
25
Allied Chemical Corporation (Allied Chemical)
Allied Chemical is a company in the business of
processing coal into coke and various by-products.
James
testified that he worked at Allied Chemical’s metallurgical coke
processing plant located in Ashland, Kentucky, for approximately
two months sometime between 1975 and 1982 during a scheduled
shut-down and retooling during which he removed, replaced, and
installed approximately ten to fifteen pumps and pump motor
assemblies.
In support of its motion for summary judgment Allied
Chemical filed the affidavit of engineer H. D. Fuller.
In his
affidavit Fuller testified that Allied Chemical's Ashland coke
plant contains numerous pumps, pump motors and associated pipes,
and that these pumps and their components are required in the
process of converting coal into coke; that pumps, pump motors
and piping play an important and integral role in the coke
production process, and that the repair, periodic removal and
replacement of old pumps, pump motors and associated piping and
the installation of new pumps, pump motors and associated piping
is a necessary element of the maintenance and operation of
Allied Chemical’s coke plant; and that the repair, periodic
removal and replacement of pumps, pump motors and associated
piping, as well as the setting and installation of new pumps,
26
pump motors and related piping, are regular and recurring
activities performed at Allied Chemical's Ashland coke plant at
times by Allied Chemical’s own employees and at times by outside
contractors.
In his capacity as an employee for Rapid Installation
James removed, replaced, and installed pumps and pump motor
assemblies.
Allied Chemical’s affidavit in support of summary
judgment reflects that this equipment is required in the process
of converting coal to coke, which is part of the business of
Allied Chemical.
The affidavit also reflects that the periodic
repair, removal, and replacement of these pumps and pump motors
is a regular and recurring part of Allied Chemical’s business.
The appellants have failed to produce affirmative evidence
refuting these sworn statements.
While James did produce the
affidavits of co-workers to the effect that the work performed
by Rapid Installation at Allied Chemical was not regular or
recurring, we agree with the trial court that these co-workers
did not demonstrate sufficient qualifications to establish that
they had personal knowledge of the maintenance procedures at
Allied Chemical.
The appellants have failed to produce any affirmative
evidence that the work James performed in his capacity as an
employee for Rapid Installation was of a type that was not a
regular or recurrent part of Allied Chemical’s business.
27
There
are no genuine issues of material fact concerning up-the-ladder
immunity regarding Allied Chemical, and Allied Chemical is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to the
exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
American Standard
The primary business of the American Standard Enamel
Iron Plant in Louisville when it contracted with Rapid
Installation was the manufacture of cast iron bathtubs,
lavatories, and sinks.
James testified that he worked at the
American Standard plant on approximately six different occasions
with each job lasting from a few weeks to a month.
James
testified that his work consisted of removing, replacing, and
installing conveyor systems and manufacturing equipment, and
repairing cupolas, which were used to melt scrap iron into a
liquid form, when the line was shut down.
With respect to the
specific jobs he performed, James testified that he worked on a
conveyor system which ran from the foundry into the enamel shop,
and repaired or replaced the system’s chains as they would wear
out.
James also stated that he worked on the conveyors and
other types of machinery in the faucet facility and that on one
or two occasions, he helped repair the cupola.
As James
described it, because of the high temperatures at which the
cupola operated, its steel shell would sometimes burn through.
28
When this happened the cupola would be shut down, and the bad
area would be cut out and replaced with new steel.
James
admitted that all of the machinery and equipment on which he
worked was equipment used by American Standard in order to make
the bathtubs and other products manufactured at the facility.
In support of its motion for summary judgment,
American Standard submitted affidavits to the effect that the
cupolas, furnaces, conveyer systems and other types of equipment
serviced by Rapid Installation were essential to the
manufacturing process at the plant; that to keep its plant in
operation American Standard was required to conduct regular
maintenance and periodic repairs and replacement of the
equipment; that in addition to day-to-day maintenance, major
maintenance repair and replacement work had to be performed at
least once a year and that this work was typically performed
when the plant was shut down for three weeks in the summer
and/or winter; that American Standard maintained a maintenance
staff of approximately 100 people who performed most of the dayto-day maintenance, but that outside contractors were retained
to assist whenever a job was more specialized or needed
immediate attention and the regular maintenance staff was either
too small or too busy to handle it; and that the maintenance,
repair and periodic replacement of parts of the cupolas,
furnaces and conveyor systems were regular and recurrent
29
activities required for American Standard to continue its
manufacturing operations.
James admitted that the work he performed at American
Standard was on equipment used by American Standard to
manufacture its products.
Moreover, the appellants have failed
to come forward with affirmative evidence refuting American
Standard’s affidavit that regular maintenance and periodic
repairs were necessary to maintain this equipment, and that it
would employ outside entities, such as Rapid Installation, to
assist its maintenance staff as necessary in this ongoing
process, and that the type of work performed by Rapid
Installation was a regular and recurrent part of its business
operations.
There is no genuine issue of material fact concerning
whether the work performed by Rapid Installation at American
Standard’s facilities, i.e., removing, replacing, and installing
conveyor systems and manufacturing equipment, and repairing
cupolas when the line was shut down, was regular or recurrent
work necessary to American Standard’s manufacturing process.
Thus, American Standard is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
Brown & Williamson
Brown & Williamson manufactures tobacco products.
30
The manufacture of those products requires the use of machinery,
equipment, and their component parts, which were serviced by
Rapid Installation on several occasions during James’s
employment at the company.
James testified that he worked at
Brown & Williamson for approximately two months on and off over
a period of five to seven years and that the work he performed
involved the removal and installation of equipment used to make
cigarettes.
In its motion for summary judgment, Brown & Williamson
attached the affidavit of Thomas L. Sarver, which stated that
the machinery, equipment and component parts serviced by Rapid
Installation was used to produce cigarettes and tobacco
products, which was the principal business of the plant; that
the machinery and equipment had to be regularly maintained,
repaired, and on occasion, replaced; and that the maintenance,
repair, and replacement of this machinery and equipment was a
regular and recurrent part of the business of the company.
James’s own testimony supports the position that the
machinery and equipment he worked on was a part of Brown &
Williamson’s business.
James testified that his work involved
the removal and installation of equipment used to make
cigarettes.
The only remaining issue is whether the removal
and installation of such equipment is regular and recurrent.
31
The affidavit produced by Brown & Williamson asserted that the
maintenance, repair, and replacement of its cigarette production
machinery and equipment is a regular and recurrent part of its
business, and the appellants have produced no affirmative
evidence challenging this assertion.
To defeat a properly
supported motion for summary judgment, the party opposing
summary judgment must produce affirmative evidence demonstrating
that there is a genuine issue of material fact.
There are no
genuine issues of material fact concerning up-the-ladder
immunity as relates to Brown & Williamson, and the cigarette
manufacturer is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Brown-Forman Corporation
Brown-Forman manufactures and sells alcoholic beverage
products and consumer products such as Hartmann luggage and
Lenox China.
James testified that he worked at Brown-Forman for
approximately six weeks at a bottling line at a distillery in
the Shively area of Louisville.
Brown-Forman maintains that it
never operated a bottling line at the facility where James
claims to have worked, and that James therefore could not have
worked at a Brown-Forman facility.
However, for purposes of
summary judgment, the company accepts James’s claim that he
worked at one of its facilities, assumes the facility where
32
James worked to be its Howard Street facility, and argues in the
alternative that it is entitled to up-the-ladder immunity.
James testified that he worked at a Brown-Forman
facility for approximately six weeks repairing and removing an
old bottling system and installing a new bottling line.
His
work involved removing machinery, plumbing and piping systems.
In support of its motion for summary judgment BrownForman submitted the affidavit of Gerald Hubbs.
Hubbs stated
that during 1975–1982, the period James was employed by Rapid
Installation, that sixteen engineering projects were performed
by or for Brown-Forman relating to its bottling lines at the
Howard Street facility; that some of these projects were
performed entirely by Brown-Forman employees and some were
performed in whole or in part by outside contractors; that none
of the projects were considered by Brown-Forman to be routine
maintenance of its bottling lines and all were capitalized; that
it was normal and customary for Brown-Forman to perform, or to
contract with outside contractors to perform, renovations to its
bottling lines from time to time; that although these projects
are not performed at fixed intervals, they are usually scheduled
for plant shutdowns during the Christmas holidays or summer
vacation shutdowns; that each of the projects performed at the
facility included the installation or replacement of one or more
pieces of equipment, usually on a single bottling line; that the
33
equipment replaced or installed during these projects were
standard components of bottling lines, including uncasers,
cappers, stamp machines, air cleaners, automatic packers,
labelers, fillers, cartons, work tables, checkweighers, and
exhaust systems; that each project was designed to improve the
efficiency of Brown-Forman’s bottling operations or to replace
an obsolete piece of equipment; that each project was necessary
to permit Brown-Forman to operate its bottling operations in an
efficient and economically competitive manner; and that
renovation of one or more of Brown-Forman’s bottling lines is a
regular part of Brown-Forman’s business and is performed on a
yearly or semiannual basis.
James testified that his work at the distillery
involved repairing and removing an old bottling system and
installing a new bottling line.
the business of a distiller.
The bottling line is part of
Further, James failed to produce
affirmative evidence that the renovation of the bottling lines
is not a regular part of Brown-Forman’s business and is not
performed on a yearly or semiannual basis.
There is no genuine
issue of material fact concerning whether the installation or
replacement of bottling line equipment is an essential part of
Brown-Forman’s liquor bottling business and is performed on a
regular or recurrent basis.
Because there are no genuine issues
34
of material fact on the up-the-ladder immunity issue, BrownForman is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Colgate-Palmolive
Colgate-Palmolive is a manufacturer of detergents,
soaps, and toothpaste.
James testified that he worked at
Colgate-Palmolive’s Louisville area cleaning and hygiene
products plant for approximately six weeks.
James testified
that at the facility he removed and installed “machinery, pipes,
boilers, just every type of equipment that was used in the
process of making whatever they were making.”
James also
testified that Colgate-Palmolive employees did not help on the
six-week job.
In support of its motion for summary judgment ColgatePalmolive submitted the deposition testimony and affidavit of
facilities manager/plant engineer Michael Hubbs.
Hubbs
testified to the effect that the manufacturing process at the
facility involves the use of machinery, equipment, and their
component parts; that the machinery and equipment must be
regularly maintained, repaired and/or replaced in order to
manufacture the various products; that while certain jobs are
large, capitalized projects, such renovation and repair projects
are a regular or recurrent part of Colgate-Palmolive’s business;
that the work performed by Rapid Installation usually involved
35
the renovation or replacement of part or all of a conveyor
system, but sometimes involved the replacement of tanks or
moving of a boiler; and that although the projects do not occur
at fixed intervals, they occur with sufficient frequency so as
to demonstrate that they are a part of an ongoing process of
updating, renovating and reconfiguring the machinery and
equipment at Colgate-Palmolive’s business in order to
accommodate the production of new products or to improve
efficiency.
James conceded that the equipment he worked on was
“equipment that was used in the process of making” the products
Colgate-Palmolive manufactured, which is a part of its business.
Colgate-Palmolive filed an affidavit to the effect that this
equipment must be regularly maintained, repaired, and/or
replaced.
James did not submit affirmative evidence refuting
this sworn statement.
It follows that for purposes of summary
judgment the work that Rapid Installation performed at ColgatePalmolive was a regular or recurrent part of Colgate-Palmolive’s
business and that pursuant to the up-the-ladder immunity
provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act Colgate-Palmolive is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company (DuPont)
36
DuPont is in the business of manufacturing and selling
chemicals and related products.
James testified that he worked
at DuPont for approximately three months removing insulated
pipes, pumps, steel, and other equipment and that he maintained,
replaced and installed pumps, motors and piping at the facility.
The evidence is undisputed that James was involved in
the removal, maintenance and installation of pumps and other
equipment and the grinding of concrete pads; however, James
asserted that he had worked on a tear out at Dupont’s Baghouse
project, whereas DuPont asserts that the Baghouse project was a
new construction project performed exclusively by DuPont’s
Construction Division.
James conceded that he did not work on
the construction of the Baghouse project.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, DuPont
submitted the affidavit of Terry L. Tempel.
In his affidavit
Tempel stated that maintenance, replacement and installation of
pumps, motors and pipes, including work with flanges and
gaskets, was a regular and recurrent part of the work of
DuPont’s business; that DuPont used its own employees, in
addition to contract employees, to perform portions of this
routine maintenance work at its facilities; that during the
relevant period the installation of new pumps, motors and pipes,
including work with flanges and gaskets, as well as the
maintenance, removal and replacement of old pumps, motors and
37
pipes, including flanges and gaskets, at the Louisville facility
was an ongoing and frequently recurring part of DuPont’s
operations at the facility; that maintenance of adequate pumps,
motors and pipes, including flanges and gaskets was necessary to
DuPont’s manufacturing process; that, among other things, these
machines were necessary to transfer raw feedstock materials,
intermediate materials, and finished products through the tanks
as part of the manufacturing process; that without adequate
pumps, motors and pipes, including flanges and gaskets, DuPont’s
operations would cease to exist; and that the work James
described as having performed was not only regular maintenance
work performed routinely at the Louisville site, but was often
performed by DuPont employees themselves.
The pumps, motors, and piping Rapid Installation
maintained and replaced at the DuPont facility had a direct
nexus to DuPont’s regular business of manufacturing and selling
chemicals and related products.
was part of that business.
This machinery and equipment
Moreover, the appellants have failed
to present affirmative evidence that the upkeep, maintenance,
repair, and replacement of these assets is not a regular and
recurring part of DuPont’s business.
There is no genuine issue
of material fact concerning DuPont’s qualification for up-theladder immunity, and thus DuPont is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
38
Ford Motor Company (Ford)
Ford is in the business of designing, manufacturing,
and selling motor vehicles.
James testified that he worked at
two Ford plants while employed at Rapid Installation, the
Louisville Assembly Plant (LAP) and the Kentucky Truck Plant
(KTP).
James testified that he demolished an assembly line
and installed a new one at LAP, repaired or replaced metal
sheeting on furnaces at LAP which were used to bake the paint
onto newly produced automobiles, and installed a new conveyor
system equipment at KTP.
James also testified that he worked
for approximately six months in a changeover project involving
the demolition and tear out of an assembly line for conversion
from the LTD to the Ranger.
The tear out included the removal
of furnaces, pipes and other equipment and the plant was
completely shut down while he worked there.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Ford
submitted the affidavits of engineer William McKinney and Ford’s
manager of plant facilities, Bruce Hepke.
According to these
affidavits, all Ford Motor Company automotive and truck assembly
plants have assembly lines, ovens, steel components, and
extensive conveyor systems which are necessary and essential to
the production and manufacture of automobiles and trucks; in
order to accommodate changes to existing vehicles or to convert
39
assembly lines from one vehicle to a newer vehicle, it is
necessary for Ford to demolish all or portions of existing
assembly lines and components, and install new assembly lines,
including conveyor systems; the demolition of assembly lines,
machinery, related components and ovens, and the installation of
new assembly lines and new conveyor systems, has been done on a
regular and recurrent basis at Ford assembly plants for decades;
that significant reconfiguration of the LAP assembly line system
occurred in 1984, 1985, 1988, 1995, 1998, and 1999; that in
order to maintain the assembly line equipment, including the
conveyor systems involved in the manufacturing and production
process, Ford must routinely replace, modify, update and repair
equipment; that although the repairs, updates and modifications
vary from year to year in accordance with necessity, some
portion of the assembly line is replaced, repaired or modified
each year during one of the annual shutdowns; and that the very
nature of Ford’s business is one of constant, year-to-year
change.
Historically, Ford Motor Company was instrumental in
the development of the assembly line manufacturing process, and
the assembly line systems of Ford and similar manufacturing
companies are an essential part of the work of such businesses.
In his deposition testimony James agreed that it is “fair to
say” that “building new vehicle assembly lines was part of
40
Ford’s regular business” and that it was “something that they do
on a recurrent basis.”
The appellants failed to present affirmative evidence
challenging Ford’s position that the work performed by Rapid
Installation was a regular or recurrent part of its business.
The record demonstrates that Ford’s conveyor systems were torn
out on a regular and recurrent basis and that Rapid Installation
performed this type of work at Ford.
Because the type of work
performed by Rapid Installation was a regular or recurrent part
of the work at the Ford facility, Ford is entitled to up-theladder immunity.
General Electric Company (GE)
GE is in the business of manufacturing various
consumer appliances.
James testified that he worked at GE for
nine months to one year on a job that included the removal of an
old conveyer system along with associated furnaces, pipes
equipment and machinery equipment and the installation of a new
conveyer and rack system.
The work was required because GE was
putting in a new assembly line system to build its
refrigerators.
The new assembly line system was built and
installed by GE.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, GE
submitted the affidavit of Michael Phillips.
41
In his affidavit
Phillips stated that during the relevant period GE recurrently
contracted with Rapid Installation to do the demolition,
redesign, rebuilding, and reinstallation of conveyor systems
that are a regular part of GE’s manufacturing business.
GE
submitted evidence that from 1970 to 1985 GE paid Rapid
Installation over $30 million for 3,840 separate jobs, which
amounts to over 250 jobs per year.
Phillips stated that all of
these jobs were necessary to GE’s business.
The work performed by Rapid Installation was directly
connected to the manufacture of the products produced at the GE
facilities.
The assembly line conveyor systems Rapid
Installation was employed to convert were central to the
production of appliances at the GE facility.
Rapid Installation
performed, on average, approximately 250 jobs per year at the
facility, or almost five jobs per week.
Based upon this volume
of work, the type of work performed by Rapid Installation was a
regular or recurrent part of GE’s business.
James did not
present any affirmative evidence contradicting the affidavit
filed by GE in support of its motion for summary judgment; there
are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the up-theladder immunity issue; and GE is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Goodrich Corporation f/k/a B.F. Goodrich Company (Goodrich)
42
The Louisville Goodrich plant was in the business of
manufacturing vinyl resins and compounds, vinyl latex, various
rubbers, and chlorinated polyvinyl chloride.
James testified
that he worked at Goodrich on two or three different occasions
for approximately one to two weeks each time removing and
installing insulated machinery, pumps, motors, and other
equipment.
In support of its motion for summary judgment,
Goodrich submitted the affidavits of Bill Simpson and Ron
Kaminski.
These affidavits stated that every processing area
throughout the Louisville plant contained pumps and motors used
to transport raw materials, in-process goods, and finished
goods; that pumps and motors played an important role in the
manufacturing process and were also used as component parts of
hydraulic systems; that repair of pipes and machinery, including
replacement of pumps and motors on the production lines, was an
almost continuous ongoing process, and outside contractors were
present somewhere at the Louisville plant virtually 365 days a
year; that in addition to periodic updates, replacement of pumps
and motors also occur when a production line is shifted from one
product to another and when equipment is repaired; that these
activities are ongoing and one or more processing areas at the
Louisville plant is being renovated much of the time; that
replacement of pumps and motors is a routine and essential part
43
of the regular maintenance of Goodrich’s physical plant; and
that without routine work on its production equipment Goodrich
would have been unable to manufacture and sell its chemical
products.
The work performed by Rapid Installation at Goodrich
involved the removal and installation of machinery, pumps,
motors, and other equipment and it is unrefuted that such
machinery, pumps, motors, and other equipment were fundamental
to the production of the products produced at the Louisville
Goodrich plant.
The appellants also failed to submit
affirmative evidence to contradict Goodrich’s claim that the
repair and replacement of its equipment is a continuous process
in its business.
Hence there are no genuine issues of material
fact concerning up-the-ladder immunity as it relates to
Goodrich, and the company is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
International Truck and Engine Corporation (ITEC) f/k/a
International Harvester Company and Navistar International
Transportation Corp.
ITEC is a leading producer of mid-range diesel
engines, medium trucks, school buses, heavy trucks, service
vehicles, and parts and service sold under the International
brand.
The company also is a private label designer and
44
manufacturer of diesel engines for the pickup truck, van and SUV
markets.
James testified that he worked at International
Harvester on “different occasions” and that his work “involved
the tear out of the entire assembly line and all equipment in
the foundry to mechanize the line,” . . . “including furnaces,
piping, and boilers.”
In his deposition James stated that he
worked at ITEC on “maybe 50 different jobs” during a five-year
period and that the jobs would involve routine repairs as well
as updating assembly equipment.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, ITEC
presented affidavits and deposition testimony to the effect that
ITEC employed its own millwrights who did the same kinds of work
as that performed by James, but would bring in outside
millwrights if they needed them; that the work performed by
James, including the relining and repair of furnaces, the update
of production equipment, and the repair of various pieces of
machinery, was a regular and recurrent part of ITEC’s business;
that the relining and repairing of furnaces, updating of
production equipment, and repairing of various pieces of
machinery was a regular and recurrent part of ITEC’s business;
and that Rapid Installation provided millwright services and
day-to-day maintenance to ITEC on a daily basis from 1975 to
1982.
45
James stated that he worked approximately 50 different
jobs at ITEC during his tenure at Rapid Installation, and ITEC
stated in its affidavit in support of summary judgment that it
employed Rapid Installation on what amounted to a daily basis to
perform repair and maintenance on its manufacturing machinery
and equipment.
The machinery and equipment was used to
manufacture the products produced by ITEC.
As such the work
performed by Rapid Installation was a regular or recurrent part
of the work of ITEC, and ITEC is entitled to up-the-ladder
immunity against any common law tort claims of Rapid
Installation employees.
Kentucky Utilities (KU)
KU is a utility company engaged in the business of
providing electricity and natural gas to customers in Kentucky
and Virginia.
James alleges that he was exposed to asbestos
while repairing and replacing equipment that powered the coalburning furnaces at KU’s Ghent Powerhouse.
James testified that
he worked at KU for approximately one month removing powergenerating equipment such as motors, furnaces and piping.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, KU
filed the affidavit of Larry E. Byrd.
The affidavit stated that
KU generates electricity by burning coal in furnaces to generate
steam, which turns large turbine-generators; that the combustion
46
process is aided and controlled by fans, pulverizers and other
equipment driven by hundreds of electric motors such as those
serviced by Rapid Installation; that each motor and related
equipment and machinery is an essential link in the chain that
constitutes the power generation process at its plants, the
periodic repair and/or replacement of which when they fail is
vital to achieve KU’s primary business objective of reliably and
consistently furnishing electricity to its customers; that such
repairs and replacements are an ordinary part of plant
maintenance, without which KU could not function or operate as a
utility company; that such repairs and maintenance are performed
by both its employees and on occasion by an outside company such
as Rapid Installation; and that the repair and replacement of
motors and associated equipment and machinery that powers its
coal-burning furnaces is, therefore, a regular and recurrent
part of the work of KU’s business.
The appellants failed to produce affirmative evidence
refuting KU’s affidavit that equipment and machinery serviced by
Rapid Installation is an essential link in the chain that
constitutes the power generating process in its power plants.
The appellants also failed to refute KU’s assertion that the
removal, repair, maintenance, and replacement of this equipment
and machinery is an ordinary part of the functioning of the
utility company.
Because the evidence is undisputed that this
47
was the type of work performed by Rapid Installation and that
this type of work was regular or recurrent in KU’s business
operations, there are no remaining issues of fact concerning upthe-ladder immunity and KU is entitled to summary judgment on
the issue.
Lorillard, Inc.
Lorillard is a manufacturer of tobacco products,
including cigarettes, cigars, and chewing tobacco.
James
testified that he worked at Lorillard for approximately one
month removing, replacing, and installing the assembly lines and
machines used in the cigarette manufacturing process.
In support of its motion for summary judgment,
Lorillard submitted the affidavit of Sherwood G. McNiel.
McNiel’s affidavit stated to the effect that the machinery at
Lorillard’s Louisville facility included assembly lines and
conveyor systems; that this machinery was necessary for
Lorillard’s production of products at the facility; that the
repair, maintenance, and replacement of the machinery was
necessary for Lorillard’s production of products at the
facility; and that the use of the machinery and equipment, as
well as the replacement, maintenance, and repair of the
machinery and equipment, and their components, was a regular and
recurrent part of the business at the facility.
48
In his deposition testimony James admitted that the
machinery and equipment he worked on in the performance of his
duties for Rapid Installation was machinery used in the
cigarette manufacturing process, and it follows that the work
performed by Rapid Installation was a part of the business of
Lorillard.
The appellants cite the affidavit of Sherwood G.
McNiel, a Lorillard witness, for the proposition that Lorillard
admitted that all regular and recurrent work was performed by
its own employees and, therefore, any outside work would not be
regular or recurrent.
However, we agree with the trial court
that the appellants misconstrue McNiel’s testimony and that
McNiel’s statement regarding “regular and recurrent” was in
reference to Lorillard’s contracts with Rapid Installation.
McNiel’s testimony is not affirmative evidence that the type of
work performed by Rapid Installation was not regular and
recurrent.
As the appellants failed to present affirmative
evidence to refute Lorillard’s affidavit that the replacement,
maintenance, and repair of its cigarette machinery and equipment
is a regular or recurrent part of the business of the cigarette
company, Lorillard is entitled to summary judgment on the issue
of up-the-ladder immunity.
Louisville Gas & Electric Company (LG&E)
49
LG&E is a utility company engaged in the business of
providing natural gas and electricity to customers.
James
alleges that he was exposed to asbestos while repairing and
replacing equipment that powered the coal-burning furnaces at
LG&E's Cane Run and Mill Creek electric generating plants.
James testified that he worked at LG&E for approximately three
months on three separate jobs removing, replacing, and
installing motors, equipment, and piping on six to eight
different units.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, LG&E
submitted the affidavits of Charles R. Jacobs and Joseph M.
Didelot.
The affidavits stated that the motors and related
equipment and machinery serviced by Rapid Installation are an
essential link in the chain that constitutes the power
generating process at its power plants; that the periodic repair
and/or replacement of the motors and related equipment and
machinery is vital to achieve LG&E’s primary business objective
of reliably and consistently furnishing electricity to its
customers; that such repairs and replacements are an ordinary
part of plant maintenance without which LG&E could not function
or operate as a utility company; and that the repair and
replacement of motors and associated equipment and machinery
that power its coal-burning furnaces is a regular and recurrent
part of the work of LG&E’s business.
50
The appellants failed to produce affirmative evidence
refuting LG&E’s affidavit that equipment and machinery serviced
by Rapid Installation was an essential link in the chain that
constitutes the power generating process in its power plants.
The appellants also failed to refute LG&E’s assertion that the
removal, repair, maintenance, and replacement of this equipment
and machinery is an ordinary part of the functioning of the
utility company.
Because the evidence is undisputed that this was the
type of work performed by Rapid Installation and that this type
of work was regular or recurrent in LG&E’s business operations,
there are no remaining issues of fact concerning up-the-ladder
immunity and LG&E is entitled to summary judgment on the issue.
Philip Morris Incorporated
Philip Morris is in the business of manufacturing
cigarettes.
James testified that he worked at Philip Morris for
approximately one year installing a conveyor and rack system.
James stated that his work at the Louisville Philip Morris
facility involved the tearing out of old equipment and the
installation of new equipment used in the manufacture of
cigarettes.
More specifically, James’s work involved repairs to
the furnace or dryer in the stemmery and on the conveyor system
running into the dryer.
Furthermore, James testified that he
51
worked on approximately 15 different job assignments at the
Philip Morris facility.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Philip
Morris attached the affidavit of Terry W. Bowman.
The affidavit
stated that the cigarette manufacturing process involves many
different steps and operations which are conducted at numerous
areas of the manufacturing facility; that the conveyor systems
such as those serviced by Rapid Installation were used to
transport tobacco through dryers and were an integral component
of the manufacturing process; that conveyor systems of various
types were likewise used to transport tobacco throughout the
remainder of the manufacturing process, and were an integral
component of the manufacturing process; that like all equipment
used in the cigarette manufacturing process, conveyor systems
must be regularly maintained and occasionally repaired and
replaced; that the dryers in the stemmery required occasional
maintenance and repair as well; that as part of its business
operations in Louisville, Philip Morris contracted with
companies such as Rapid Installation to perform this type of
work, which was a necessary incident to its manufacturing of
cigarettes; and that the type of work Rapid Installation
performed at Philip Morris’ Louisville facilities was a regular
and recurrent part of its business operations.
52
James admitted in his deposition that the old
equipment that he tore out and the new equipment he installed
was equipment used in the manufacture of cigarettes, and thus
his work was part of the business of Philip Morris.
Philip
Morris’ affidavit reflected that this equipment was an integral
component of the business of manufacturing cigarettes.
James
testified that he worked on about 15 different job assignments
at the facility and Philip Morris’ affidavit reflected that it
was necessary to regularly maintain, repair, and replace the
equipment.
The appellants did not present any affirmative
evidence that it was not necessary to regularly maintain,
repair, and replace the cigarette manufacturing equipment and to
the contrary admitted that maintaining cigarette manufacturing
equipment was a regular part of Philip Morris’ business.
The appellants failed to present any affirmative
evidence refuting Philip Morris’ assertion that the work
performed by Rapid Installation at its cigarette manufacturing
facility was a regular or recurrent part of its business, there
are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the up-theladder immunity issue, and Philip Morris is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
Reynolds Metals Company
53
Reynolds manufactures aluminum foil and other consumer
packaging products.
James testified that he worked at Reynolds
for approximately six weeks removing and installing machinery,
piping, and other equipment.
James further stated that he
performed intermittent work at the Reynolds plant replacing
machines and repairing overhead cranes.
In support of its motion for summary judgment,
Reynolds submitted the affidavit of William Darden.
The
affidavit stated that the manufacture of aluminum foil and
Reynolds Metals’ other products is a highly mechanized process
and consists of numerous conveyors, machines and equipment; that
although Reynolds employs various laborers to operate the
machinery and equipment, the bulk of the manufacturing process
at its facilities is performed by machines; and that the
installation, removal and maintenance of these machines is a
regular and necessary part of Reynolds Metals’ operations at its
facilities.
The machinery, piping, and equipment worked on by
Rapid Installation was crucial to the highly mechanized process
utilized by Reynolds to produce its aluminum products.
The
appellants failed to produce affirmative evidence demonstrating
that the maintenance, installation, and removal of these assets
is not a regular or recurrent part of Reynolds Metals’ business
operations.
There are no genuine issues of any material facts
54
concerning whether Reynolds qualifies for up-the-ladder immunity
under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Since the work performed
by Rapid Installation was a regular and recurrent part of
Reynolds’ business of producing aluminum products, the company
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Rohm and Haas
Rohm and Haas is a chemical manufacturer which uses
pumps, blowers, and motor or turbine driven appliances in its
manufacturing processes.
James testified that he removed and
installed pumps, pipes, motors, and blowers at the Rohm and Haas
plant at various times during his career with Rapid
Installation.
James testified “they had a lot of pumps with
that - - in the process of making what they make out there,
piping and pumps, and we would come in and install, set the
pump, align the motor to it with dial indicators, set all that
up for the manufacturing process.”
James testified that he
worked at the Rohm and Haas site “throughout his career.”
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Rohm
and Haas filed the affidavit of Dennis E. McCormick, who during
his thirty-year career with Rohm and Haas served as a
maintenance engineer, maintenance manager, maintenance utility
production manager, and maintenance superintendent.
The
affidavit stated that Rohm and Haas employs a full-time
55
maintenance crew which is responsible for the maintenance of the
manufacturing plant, including removal and installation of
manufacturing equipment, including piping, pumps, blowers,
motors, and any motor or turbine driven appliances; that
employees in the full-time maintenance crew would perform these
functions on a daily basis; that Rohm and Haas would
periodically subcontract work, including millwright and ironwork
to either supplement the full-time maintenance crew’s functions,
or participate in engineering projects to increase the
manufacturing plant’s capacity or correct manufacturing
problems; that Rohm and Haas periodically subcontracted with
Rapid Installation to perform necessary millwright work,
including installation and removal of pumps, blowers, motors and
motor or turbine driven appliances; and that the pumps, blowers,
motors and motor or turbine driven appliances move various
substances, including water, air and chemicals about the
manufacturing plant, and are a necessary function for production
of the end product from which Rohm and Haas derives its profit.
By James’s own testimony the pumps, pipes, motors and
blowers he worked on were part of the manufacturing process at
Rohm and Haas and thus the work performed by Rapid Installation
was part of the work of the business.
Similarly, James worked
there “all through his career,” which is in effect an admission
that the work performed there by Rapid Installation was regular
56
and recurrent.
Rohm and Haas employed its own full-time
maintenance crew to do the same type work performed by Rapid
Installation which, again, indicates that the work performed by
Rapid Installation was regular and recurrent.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the appellants, there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding the work performed by Rapid Installation at Rohm and
Haas, and that the work performed was of a kind that was a
regular or recurrent part of this defendant’s business.
Rapid
Installation was engaged by Rohm and Haas to perform work on the
manufacturers’ equipment and machinery to accommodate new
technology or products and to improve the efficiency of the
business.
Thus Rohm and Haas was a contractor and Rapid
Installation was a subcontractor under the provisions of the
Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act.
Rohm and Haas is thus
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
JURAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Next, the appellants contend that the application of
the up-the-ladder immunity defense under KRS 342.610 and 342.690
is unconstitutional when applied to a landowner in a premises
liability suit pursuant to the jural rights doctrine.
The
appellant contends that application of the defense under these
circumstances violates Kentucky Constitution §§ 14, 54, and 241.
57
Together these constitutional provisions form this
jurisdiction’s constitutional "jural rights" doctrine, which
precludes any legislation that impairs a right of action in
negligence that was recognized at common law prior to the
adoption of the Commonwealth’s 1891 Constitution.
See McDowell
v. Jackson Energy RECC, 84 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Ky. 2002).
Kentucky Constitution §14 provides that:
All courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay.
Section 54, a constitutional counterpart to Section 14,
prohibits the legislature from abolishing jural rights
established prior to the enactment of our constitution.
v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347, 350 (1932).
Specifically, the section provides as follows:
The General Assembly shall have no power to
limit the amount to be recovered for
injuries resulting in death, or for injuries
to person or property.
Section 241 provides as follows:
Whenever the death of a person shall result
from an injury inflicted by negligence or
wrongful act, then, in every such case,
damages may be recovered for such death,
from the corporations and persons so causing
the same. Until otherwise provided by law,
the action to recover such damages shall in
all cases be prosecuted by the personal
58
Ludwig
representative of the deceased person. The
General Assembly may provide how the
recovery shall go and to whom belong; and
until such provision is made, the same shall
form part of the personal estate of the
deceased person.
The Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act is a
legislative remedy which affords an injured worker a remedy
without proof of the common law elements of fault.
It is,
however, exclusive of the remedies available under common law.
KRS 342.690.
The earliest version of the Act was compulsory,
giving the employee no right to reject or accept coverage under
the Act, and it failed to pass constitutional scrutiny.
Ky.
State Journal Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Board, 161 Ky. 562,
170 S.W. 437 (1914).
The right to accept or reject the Act, now
embodied in KRS 342.395, was added and the Act was later upheld:
It is quite correct to say that this section
operates as a restraint on the General
Assembly and prohibits it from attempting to
limit the amount of recovery in the cases
described in the section. But in this
legislation the General Assembly did not
arbitrarily or at all undertake to limit the
amount of recovery. It merely proposed a
statute to a certain class of people for
their individual acceptance or rejection.
It did not assume to deprive these classes
or individuals without their consent of any
constitutional rights to which they were
entitled. The General Assembly merely
afforded by this legislation a means by and
through which individuals composing classes
might legally consent to limit the amount to
which the individual would be entitled if
59
injured or killed in the course of his
employment.
Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, 580-581, 186 S.W. 648 (1916).
Greene v. Caldwell held in effect that if the employer
and employee voluntarily agreed to operate or work under the
Act, they would be bound by its provisions.
Whitney v. Newbold,
270 Ky. 209, 109 S.W.2d 406, 408 (1937).
In 1952, the legislature amended the provisions of the
Workers’ Compensation Act relating to acceptance of the
Compensation Act by employees.
Prior to 1952 the Act had
provided that an employee must indicate his elections to accept
the Act by signing a written notice of acceptance.
The 1952
amendment provides, in substance, that an employee is deemed to
have accepted the Act unless and until he files with his
employer a written notice of rejection.
Wells v. Jefferson
County, 255 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1953).
There is no allegation by the appellants that James
ever filed a written notice of rejection of coverage under the
Act, and thus he is deemed to have consented to coverage under
the Act.
James’s consent to the provisions of the Act,
including its remedies and limitations, negates any argument
that the application of KRS 342.610 and KRS 342.690 in this case
is unconstitutional under the jural rights doctrine.
The
legislature's decision to provide up-the-ladder immunity to
60
contractors who hire subcontractors to perform functions which
are a regular and recurrent part of the contractors business is
a provision which James accepted when he elected coverage under
the Act.
FAILURE TO PLEAD UP-THE-LADDER DEFENSE
The appellants contend that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment to Brown-Forman, GE, Ford, Lorillard,
LG&E, KU, Brown & Williamson, Colgate, and DuPont because these
defendants failed to affirmatively plead up-the-ladder immunity
as a defense in their answers to the original complaint.
The nine defendants identified by the appellant did in
fact fail to plead up-the-ladder immunity in their answers to
the original complaint.
However, each of the nine subsequently
moved to amend its answer to include the defense, and in each
instance the trial court granted the motion to amend.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 15.01 states in
pertinent part that a party may amend its pleading, following
the twenty-day period after it is served, "only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires."
CR 15.01.
“Amended pleadings should be permitted to the extent that they
are an aid in the proper disposition of the controversy,
provided the party acts in good faith and not for the purpose of
delay, and the opposing party is not prejudiced or the trial
61
unduly delayed.”
1995).
Philipps, 6 Kentucky Practice § 15.01 (5th ed.
The trial court should permit a pleading to be amended
absent a suggestion that the filing of the amended pleading
could prejudice the opposing party or work an injustice.
Shah
v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Ky.
1983).
Although leave to amend shall be freely given when
justice so requires, the decision is within the discretion of
the trial court.
Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co., 37 S.W.3d
770, 779 (Ky.App. 2000).
Furthermore, the discretion of the
trial court will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Id.; M.A. Walker Co., Inc. v. PBK Bank, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 70, 74
(Ky.App. 2002).
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
or unsupported by sound legal principles."
The Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
The appellants have not identified any prejudice
associated with the trial court’s decision to permit the nine
defendants to amend their answers pursuant to CR 15.01.
The
appellants had ample notice of the defense and were given an
adequate opportunity to respond.
For these reasons the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the appellees
leave to amend their answers to assert the up-the-ladder
defense.
FAILURE TO SECURE COVERAGE
62
The appellants contend that summary judgment was
improper because the defendants failed to establish that they
qualified for up-the-ladder immunity by demonstrating that they
had secured workers’ compensation coverage for James or his
employer, Rapid Installation, as required by KRS 342.690(1).
In
order for up-the-ladder immunity to apply, an appellee, in its
capacity as a contractor, must have had in force and effect
workers’ compensation insurance which would have covered the
employees of its subcontractor, Rapid Installation, including
James.
In conjunction with their respective motions for
summary judgment, each of the defendants submitted evidence that
it had complied with the Workers’ Compensation Act by either
securing coverage through an insurance policy or by being selfinsured.
On the other hand, the appellants failed to present
affirmative evidence to the contrary so as to defeat summary
judgment.
We would note that the Act does not require that each
subcontractor used by a statutory employer or contractor be
specifically named on the workers’ compensation coverage policy.
The appellants have failed to demonstrate that there
is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether any of the
appellees had secured coverage which would apply to Rapid
Installation and its employees, and summary judgment on this
issue was proper.
63
COMPLETION OF DISCOVERY
Finally, the appellants contend that the trial court
erred in refusing to allow the completion of discovery prior to
entering summary judgment.
In early May 2001, several of the appellees moved the
trial court to enter a protective order limiting the scope of
the appellants’ discovery.
The appellees stated that they would
soon be moving for summary judgment based on up-the-ladder
immunity and requested that the trial court limit discovery to
that issue.
On May 15, 2001, the trial court entered an order
granting the motion to limit discovery to up-the-ladder immunity
issues.
The May 15, 2001, order provided the appellees with
forty-five days to submit their motions for summary judgment.
On July 13, 2001, the trial court entered an order granting the
appellants thirty days to depose the individuals who provided
affidavits in support of the appellees’ motions for summary
judgment and thirty days from the expiration of that time to
respond to the motions for summary judgment.
this time was extensive.
Discovery during
Counsel for the appellants took
twenty-one depositions relating to the issues of workers’
compensation coverage, and counsel for the appellees took eight
depositions.
64
The appellees then filed their respective motions for
summary judgment and the appellants filed their response.
In
their reply briefs to the appellants’ response, several of the
appellees filed affidavits from witnesses who had not previously
been disclosed.
The appellants then filed a motion to depose
the newly-disclosed witnesses or, in the alternative, to strike
their depositions.
On May 31, 2001, the trial court entered an
order denying the motion on the basis that issues raised in the
affidavits had either been previously raised; were cumulative;
or were outside the scope of the up-the-ladder immunity issue.
The trial court enjoys broad discretion in matters
pertaining to discovery.
Berry v. Commonwealth, 782 S.W.2d 625,
627-28 (Ky. 1990); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.
574, 598-99, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 1597, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998)
(noting trial court's "broad discretion" to tailor and limit
discovery).
Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Overstreet, 103 S.W.3d 31, 36 (Ky. 2003).
Based upon the reasoning stated in its May 31, 2001,
order, we cannot say that the trial court abused its broad
discretion by denying the appellants’ motion to depose the
newly-disclosed witnesses or, in the alternative, to strike
their affidavits.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
65
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent.
I conclude that summary judgment was improperly granted because
as a matter of law the work at issue in this case was not “a
regular or recurrent part of the work” of the appellees.3
Further, based on the record before the trial court there was a
genuine issue as to whether the appellees had secured payment of
workers’ compensation coverage for employees such as James.4
It is well-established that KRS 342.610(2) was enacted
primarily to discourage owners and contractors from hiring
financially irresponsible contractors and subcontractors, in an
attempt to eliminate the expense of workers’ compensation
coverage.5
Thus, the purpose of the statute is not to shield
owners or contractors from potential tort liability; but rather,
to protect the employees of contractors or subcontractors in the
event of a work-related injury.
Had the Legislature intended
the former result, surely it would have simply omitted the
phrase “of a kind which is a regular or recurrent part of the
work of the trade, business, occupation, or profession of such
person[.]”
The “regular or recurrent” provision contained in
3
KRS 342.610(2)(b).
4
KRS 342.690(1); and KRS 342.340(1).
5
Elkhorn-Hazard Coal Land Corp. v. Taylor, 539 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Ky. 1976).
66
KRS 342.610(2)(b) was intended by the Legislature as a
limitation, not an expansion, of the immunity granted to
employers under KRS 342.690(1).
To hold otherwise would
contravene the very purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act,
which is to aid injured or deceased workers, or their
dependents.
The mere fact that the appellees had workers’
compensation coverage during the relevant time period does not
establish that they had the appropriate coverage, i.e., while
some workers may have been covered, workers such as James may
not have come within the coverage.
Consequently, the evidence
presented at this stage of the proceedings was insufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that the appellees had secured
workers’ compensation coverage as required by the statute.
Regardless, based on my proposed disposition of the “regular or
recurrent” issue, there would be no need for additional proof or
for the trial court to make a factual finding as to whether the
appellees met the statutory requirement of providing workers’
compensation coverage on James or hiring contractors which
provided such coverage.
I now turn to the question of whether, pursuant to KRS
342.610(2)(b), the appellees contracted with another “[t]o have
work performed of a kind which is a regular or recurrent part of
the work of [their] business[.]”
67
More specifically, I will
examine whether the work performed by James at the appellees’
businesses comes within the coverage of the statute.
The
resolution of this issue turns upon the application of KRS
342.690(1) and KRS 342.610(2).6
In Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Sherman & Fletcher,7
the Supreme Court of Kentucky was asked to interpret the
“regular or recurrent” provision contained in KRS 342.610(2).
The case arose out of the death of an employee of a framing
subcontractor, Elder, Inc.
A contract existed between Sherman &
Fletcher and Elder whereby Elder agreed to perform the rough
framing carpentry work for Sherman & Fletcher on a townhouse
construction project.
Sherman & Fletcher was in the building
construction business.
The Supreme Court concluded that “rough
framing carpentry is work of a kind which is a regular or
recurrent part of the work of the occupation or trade of
building construction[.]”8
Consequently, the Supreme Court held
that pursuant to KRS 342.690, Sherman & Fletcher was immune from
6
The exclusive remedy provision of KRS 342.690 is an affirmative defense,
which must be pled and proven by the employer. Gordon v. NKC Hospitals, Inc.,
887 S.W.2d 360, 362-63 (Ky. 1994). Thus, the burden of establishing that the
work performed by James was of a kind which was a regular or recurrent part
of the work of their business was on the appellees.
7
705 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1986).
8
Id. at 461.
68
tort liability for claims arising out of the death of Elder’s
employee.9
In Daniels v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co.,10 this
Court concluded that emissions testing required by the EPA
constituted a regular or recurrent part of a coal-fired electric
plant’s business.11
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court
explained that “‘[r]ecurrent’ simply means occurring again or
repeatedly” and that “‘[r]egular’ generally means customary or
normal, or happening at fixed intervals.”12
The Court noted,
however, that “neither term requires regularity or recurrence
with the preciseness of a clock or calendar.”13
In sum, the
Court reasoned that since the testing was mandated by the EPA,
it fell within the definition of regular or recurrent.
Aside from Fireman’s Fund and Daniels, Kentucky law is
rather undeveloped as to what work is of a kind which is a
regular or recurrent part of the work of a particular business.14
9
Fireman’s Fund, 705 S.W.2d at 462.
10
933 S.W.2d 821 (Ky.App. 1996).
11
Id. at 822.
12
Id. at 824.
13
Id.
14
We are aware of only one other published opinion in which a Kentucky state
court specifically addressed the “regular or recurrent” issue. In Tom
Ballard Co. v. Blevins, 614 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Ky.App. 1980), this Court
concluded that the work of transporting coal was of a kind which was a
regular or recurrent part of the work of the business of coal mining.
69
However, several federal courts have addressed the issue.15
For
the most part, the federal courts have broadly applied Fireman’s
Fund and Daniels to create an expansive interpretation of the
definition of “contractor” as it appears in KRS 342.610(2).
However, the approach followed in the majority of these federal
cases interpreting KRS 342.610(2) runs counter to the basic
principles that most courts have traditionally adhered to in
interpreting the coverage and immunity provisions contained in
workers’ compensation acts.
As the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated in Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co.:16
The dominant purpose of the movement to
adopt workmen’s compensation laws in the
early decades of this century was Not to
abrogate existing common law remedies for
the protection of workmen. It was to
provide social insurance to compensate
victims of industrial accidents because it
was widely believed that the limited rights
of recovery available under the common law
15
See, e.g., Thompson v. The Budd Co., 199 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
that changing the filters in a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
system was “part” of the business of stamping automotive parts); Granus v.
North American Philips Lighting Corp., 821 F.2d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the renovation of a glass melting furnace was a regular and
recurrent part of the manufacturing operations at a glass making factory);
Smothers v. Tractor Supply Co., 104 F.Supp.2d 715, 718 (W.D.Ky. 2000)
(holding that the transporting of merchandise from a storage facility to a
retail store was “part” of a tractor supply store’s retail operation); and
Sharp v. Ford Motor Co., 66 F.Supp.2d 867, 869-70 (W.D.Ky. 1998) (holding
that loading and unloading vehicles from railcars was a regular and recurrent
part of the business of manufacturing and distributing automobiles). But see
Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 244 F.Supp.2d 784, 789 (W.D.Ky. 2003) (holding that
a mere purchaser of goods is not a statutory contractor of the seller under
KRS 342.610(2)); and Gesler v. Ford Motor Co., 185 F.Supp.2d 724, 728
(W.D.Ky. 2001) (holding that the demolition, removal, and replacement of an
anti-corrosion system for automobiles was not a regular or recurrent part of
the business of designing, manufacturing, and selling automobiles).
16
590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 836, 100 S.Ct. 71, 62
L.Ed.2d 47 (1979).
70
at the turn of the century were inadequate
to protect them [emphasis original].
. . .
Employers generally opposed the
movement for “reform”; labor generally
favored it. Workmen’s compensation laws
were adopted as a compromise between these
contending forces. Workmen were willing to
exchange a set of common-law remedies of
dubious value for modest workmen’s
compensation benefits schedules designed to
keep the injured workman and his family from
destitution.
Since the adoption of workmen’s
compensation laws, common law tort
principles have been modified gradually.
Liability has expanded. The defenses of
contributory negligence, assumption of the
risk and the fellow servant rule have been
narrowed or abolished. But workmen’s
compensation benefits have remained low, and
the compromise which extended immunity from
common-law liability to employers has
remained in place.
. . .
Courts have responded by liberally
construing the coverage provisions of
workmen’s compensation acts while narrowly
construing the immunity provisions.17
The justification for this approach has been explained as
follows:
“[T]here is no strong reason of compensation
policy for destroying common law rights
. . . [and] [e]very presumption should be on
the side of preserving those rights, once
basic compensation protection has been
assured . . . . The injured employee has a
17
Boggs, 590 F.2d at 658-59.
71
right to be made whole not just partly whole
. . . . [A]ll the reasons for making the
wrongdoer bear the costs of his wrongdoings
still apply, including the moral rightness
of this result as well as the salutary
effect it tends to have as an incentive to
careful conduct and safe work practices.”18
Thus, when a person, who has contracted with another
to have work performed of a kind which it claims is a regular or
recurrent part of the work of the person, asserts a defense of
immunity from liability in a tort action based on workers’
compensation being the exclusive remedy pursuant to KRS
342.690(1) and KRS 342.610(2), the entitlement to such
protection should be strictly construed.
I would hold that the
work performed by James for the appellees was not of a kind
which was a regular or recurrent part of the work of the
appellees’ businesses.
Since all of the appellees are either in the business
of manufacturing a product or providing electricity or natural
gas and since all the work James performed at these businesses
involved replacement of or repair to equipment when the plant
18
Boggs, 590 F.2d at 660 (quoting 2A Larson, The Law of Workmen’s
Compensation, § 72.50 at 14-95 (1976)). See also Roberts v. Sewerage & Water
Board of New Orleans, 634 So.2d 341, 346 (La. 1994) (stating “[b]ecause
workers’ compensation benefits have lagged far behind the expansion of
liability and the curtailment of tort defenses, courts have responded by
liberally construing the coverage provisions of workers’ compensation acts
while narrowly construing the immunity provisions”); and Larson’s, Workers’
Compensation Law, Vol. 3 § 47.42(a) (1997) (stating “[i]f this seems to be
lack of perfect symmetry, it should be remembered that there also is not
perfect symmetry in what is at stake in the two situations: The first is a
matter of providing protective statutory benefits, while the second is a
matter of destroying valuable common-law rights that have existed for
centuries”).
72
was either partially or totally shut down, I will briefly
summarize my reasons for concluding that the work at issue was
not regular or recurrent.
For example, James presented evidence
that his work for Rapid Installation took place at Allied
Chemical Corporation during a plant shutdown when he helped
remove, replace, and install pumps and pump motor assemblies.
Obviously, the business of installing pumps is distinct and
separate from the business of producing chemicals.
James’s work
was not a regular or recurrent part of Allied Chemical’s
business of producing chemicals because it was only performed
when the plant was shut down and it was not regularly performed
by maintenance employees.
If the type of work James performed
had been the type of routine maintenance work that a maintenance
employee would perform on a regular basis, such as replacing
filters or gaskets, then the result would be different.
However, it required more specialized skills and was performed
when the plant was shut down or production was stopped or
limited.
The same can be said about the work that James
performed while working for Rapid Installation at all of the
other appellees’ businesses.
Perhaps the impact of the Majority’s decision can be
demonstrated more clearly by using an example involving a
different type of work.
The Majority’s holding would also apply
to a technician who, while working for a computer services
73
company, went to the offices of a business such as a medical
clinic for the purpose of repairing, updating, or replacing the
office’s computers.
Even if the medical clinic employed
computer specialists in-house and even if the technician went to
the clinic to perform those computer repairs, updates, or
replacements only periodically, the Majority would hold his work
to be regular and recurrent.
Thus, he would be entitled to
workers’ compensation coverage from the medical clinic and he
would be barred from making any common-law negligence claims
against the medical clinic.
If the technician, while making a
periodic service call at the clinic, ruptured a disc by lifting
one of the clinic’s computers, the clinic would be responsible
for workers’ compensation coverage.
Concurrently, if the
technician was injured through the negligence of the clinic,
e.g., he slipped on a substance on the floor or an item fell and
struck him, the clinic would be immune from any premises
liability claim.
This would be an absurd result.19
Accordingly, since Rapid Installation’s business and
James’s work of installing equipment is distinct and separate
from the appellees’ businesses of manufacturing products or
providing electricity or natural gas, I would reverse the
19
Commonwealth, Central State Hospital v. Gray, 880 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky.
1994) (stating that “[i]n construing statutory provisions, it is presumed
that the legislature did not intend an absurd result”).
74
Jefferson Circuit Court’s granting of summary judgment to the
appellees.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES:
Joseph D. Satterley
Kenneth L. Sales
Louisville, Kentucky
Navistar International Corp.
(International Truck & Engine
Corp.):
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS:
James J. Montgomery
Elizabeth P. Sherwood
Timothy C. Ammer
Cincinnati, Ohio
Kenneth L. Sales
Louisville, Kentucky
Ford Motor Company:
Byron N. Miller
Rheanne D. Falkner
R. Thad Keal
Louisville, Kentucky
Louisville Gas & Electric
Company and Kentucky
Utilities:
Scott A. Davidson
David W. Hemminger
Edward H. Stopher
Louisville, Kentucky
Brown-Forman Corp. & ColgatePalmolive Co.:
Rebecca Schupbach
Julie M. McDonnell
Louisville, Kentucky
General Electric Co.:
Scott T. Dickens
Louisville, Kentucky
Goodrich Corp.:
75
Rosemary D. Welsh
Cincinnati, Ohio
Richard D. Schuster
Columbus, Ohio
Allied Chemical Corp.:
Wendell S. Roberts
Donald R. Yates, II
Ashland, Kentucky
Lorillard, Inc.:
David L. Schaefer
Kristin M. Lomond
Louisville, Kentucky
John J. Repcheck
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania
Philip Morris, Inc.:
David T. Schaefer
Kristin M. Lomond
Louisville, Kentucky
John J. Repcheck
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania
Reynolds Metals Co.:
John B. Moore
William P. Swain
Louisville, Kentucky
John D. Epps
Alexandra B. Cunningham
Richmond, Virginia
American Standard:
J. Mark Grundy
Melissa Norman Bork
Louisville, Kentucky
76
Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp:
John J. Repcheck
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.:
Walter M. Jones
Angela McCorkle Buckler
Louisville, Kentucky
Rohm and Haas Co.:
Cynthia Blevins Doll
Roxanne Baus Edling
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR APPELLEES:
Byron N. Miller argued for
Ford Motor Co.
Rebecca F. Schupbach argued
for Joint Appellees as listed
on Joint Brief for Appellees
and:
Brown-Forman and ColgatePalmolive.
77
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