SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY REHABILITATION INDUSTRIES, INC. (as Insured by AIK) v. SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY REHABILITATION INDUSTRIES, INC., (as Insured by Evergreen National Insurance Company), MAUDY ISON GREENE, HON. JAMES L. KERR, AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 5, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001092-WC
SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY REHABILITATION
INDUSTRIES, INC. (as Insured by AIK)
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-02-80697
SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY REHABILITATION
INDUSTRIES, INC., (as Insured by
Evergreen National Insurance
Company), MAUDY ISON GREENE,
HON. JAMES L. KERR, AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, MINTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Southeastern Kentucky Rehabilitation
Industries, Inc. (SKRI), as insured by AIK, petitions for review
of an opinion by the Workers’ Compensation Board reversing and
remanding a determination by an administrative law judge (ALJ).
The issue is whether SKRI, as insured by AIK, or SKRI, as
insured by Evergreen National Insurance Company, is liable for
income and medical benefits to Maudy Ison Greene as a result of
her cumulative trauma injury.
We conclude that the ALJ
correctly resolved the issue in favor of AIK.
Thus, we reverse
and remand.
Greene was a sewing machine operator for SKRI.
On
March 28, 2002, she sprained her left wrist while lifting
bundles of materials.
She saw Dr. Bari five days later and
missed work for the rest of the week.
When she returned to her
work on the following Monday, her left wrist was wrapped in a
Ace bandage.
Greene testified that she first began to notice
numbness and tingling in both hands in April 2002.
She stated
that the pain from her left wrist sprain had gone by that time.
Greene further testified that the pain was different from the
wrist sprain pain and that it was worse on the left.
Greene
initially ignored the pain and worked through it, but the pain
continued to the point where she sought further medical
treatment.
On May 14, 2002, Greene returned to Dr. Bari’s office
and saw Dr. Dye.
She testified that she told her supervisor two
or three days prior to seeing Dr. Dye that her hands were
bothering her.
Dr. Dye advised Greene that she had carpal
2
tunnel syndrome, and Greene informed SKRI’s personnel office of
her condition on the following day.
Although her job duties
were subsequently altered, Greene returned to work for only one
or two days because the job was too difficult.
Dr. James Templin evaluated Greene on October 10, 2002.
He diagnosed early bilateral upper extremity overuse syndrome,
probable bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and chronic hand,
wrist, and forearm syndrome bilaterally.
Dr. Templin indicated
that Greene’s complaints were the result of a work-related
injury that occurred on March 28, 2002.
He opined that her
condition was dormant until that date, when she became
symptomatic.
He assessed a 12% impairment for Greene’s
bilateral upper extremity conditions.
Dr. Templin also stated
that Greene does not retain the physical capacity to return to
the type of work performed at the time of the injury.
Although Greene had claimed an injury for left wrist
sprain on March 28, 2002, and a separate cumulative trauma
injury on May 14, 2002, the ALJ determined that there was no
work-related injury on May 14, 2002.
Rather, the ALJ determined
that Greene had become aware of her injury and its workrelatedness prior to May 1, 2002, and that the March 28, 2002,
injury caused her to alter the manner in which she performed her
work and caused both hands to become symptomatic.
Evergreen was
the insurance carrier for SKRI until May 1, 2002, and AIK was
3
the carrier after that date.
Therefore, the ALJ determined that
Evergreen was responsible for all income and medical benefits
owed to Greene.
Evergreen appealed to the Board.
In an opinion
rendered on May 5, 2004, the Board reversed the ALJ’s decision,
concluding that there was not “substantial evidence to support
the proposition that manifestation of disability occurred any
time prior to the May 14, 2002 diagnosis of the work-related
nature of her carpal tunnel syndrome.”
Therefore, it remanded
the case to the ALJ so that liability for the injury could be
imposed upon AIK.
This petition for review by AIK followed.
AIK argues that there was substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s decision that Greene’s condition resulted from
the March 28, 2002, injury.
AIK states that the evidence from
Dr. Templin on causation constitutes such evidence.
AIK argues
that the ALJ did not decide this case as a typical cumulative
trauma claim and that the Board improperly substituted its
judgment for the judgment of the ALJ in violation of KRS1
342.285(2).
The Board began its analysis by noting that Greene
testified that the pain she experienced in April was
considerably different from the wrist sprain pain and that the
wrist sprain pain had ceased when she began experiencing this
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
pain.
The Board also noted that Greene testified that the pain
she began experiencing in April was now in both hands and that,
therefore, the pain could not have been from the sprain to her
left wrist.
The Board concluded that there was no evidence in
the record which might support an inference that Greene knew she
had sustained a gradual injury caused by her work prior to May
1, 2002.
The Board also noted that Greene did not inform her
employer of her pain until after May 1 and did not give notice
of the work-related injury until May 15, the day after her
physician informed her that her cumulative trauma injury was
work-related.
The Board stated that “[e]ven if it could be
reasonably inferred that Greene suspected or assumed her pain
was attributable to her work, we believe such a finding does not
rise to the level of knowledge contemplated by case law to
establish the date of manifestation of disability.”
The Board
stated that “the operative date is when the worker first
acquires knowledge of work-relatedness.”
As has been noted herein, Greene claimed separate
injuries for left wrist sprain and for cumulative trauma.
Since
the ALJ determined that Greene suffered an injury on March 28,
2002, and further determined that no injury occurred on May 14,
2002, a question has arisen concerning whether the ALJ found
that Greene suffered a cumulative trauma injury.
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We believe
that he clearly did.
First, the ALJ relied on the findings of
Dr. Templin who concluded that Greene suffered from bilateral
upper extremity overuse syndrome, probable bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome, and chronic hand, wrist, and forearm pain
syndrome bilaterally.
Further, when the ALJ concluded that
Greene’s injury manifested itself prior to May 1, 2002, because
she had knowledge of her injury and its work-relatedness prior
to that date, he relied on the principle that a cumulative
trauma injury becomes manifest when a worker first acquires
knowledge of the injury and knows that it is work-related.
Furthermore, the Board addressed this case in terms of
cumulative trauma injury.
Since the ALJ and the Board rendered their decisions in
this case, the Kentucky Supreme Court rendered an opinion in
American Printing House for the Blind v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 145
(2004), a case in which the facts are similar to those in this
case.
In that case there was likewise a dispute concerning
which insurance company was liable for the claimant’s cumulative
trauma injury.
The claimant therein testified that on June 5,
2000, she experienced pain in her wrists and immediately
informed her employer that she thought her symptoms were caused
by her repetitive work.
However, she was not diagnosed with
carpal tunnel syndrome until later, and on January 11, 2001, she
6
was informed by her treating physician that he thought her
condition was work-related.
Because her employer changed insurance carriers on
October 1, 2000, a dispute arose concerning whether the
claimant’s injury became manifest on June 5, 2000, or on January
11, 2001, the date her physician informed her that her carpal
tunnel syndrome condition was work-related.
Our supreme court
in the Brown case discussed its prior decisions in Alcan Foil
Products v. Huff, Ky., 2 S.W.3d 96 (1999), and Hill v. Sextet
Mining Corp., Ky., 65 S.W.3d 503 (2001).
The court in Brown
stated that it had determined in the Hill case that a worker was
not required to self-diagnose the cause of a harmful change as
being a work-related gradual injury for the purpose of giving
notice.
However, referring to the Alcan case, the Brown court
stated that there was nothing in that case that indicated
liability for an injury begins when the notice and limitation
requirements are triggered.
Therefore, the court reasoned that
the claimant had sustained an injury as defined by KRS
342.0011(1) on June 5, 2000, even though the notice and
limitation provisions were not triggered until she received a
medical diagnosis in January 2001.
Therefore, the court held
that the company providing coverage on June 5, 2000, must
provide the claimant benefits rather than the company providing
7
coverage when the claimant was informed by her physician that
her condition was work-related.
Greene testified that both hands started bothering her
in April 2002 and that she attributed the problem to
overworking.
The Board held that “it is our belief that
Greene’s testimony does not constitute substantial evidence to
support the proposition that manifestation of disability
occurred anytime prior to the May 14, 2002 diagnosis of the
work-related nature of her carpal tunnel syndrome.
That date
triggered the requirement of timely notice, statute of
limitations, and employment liability.”
The Board reasoned that
“there is no other evidence in the record which might support an
inference that Greene knew she sustained a gradual injury caused
by her work.”
The Board also noted that Greene did not inform her
employer of her pain until after May 1, 2002, and did not give
notice of the injury until May 15, 2002, the day after her
physician informed her that her cumulative trauma injury was
work-related.
The Board reasoned that “[e]ven if it could be
reasonably inferred that Greene suspected or assumed her pain
was attributable to her work, we believe such a finding does not
rise to the level of knowledge contemplated by case law to
establish the date of manifestation of disability.”
8
We conclude that the Board erred in its analysis, as it
did not have the benefit of our supreme court’s opinion in the
Brown case when it rendered its decision.
Relying on the Hill
and the Alcan cases, the Board concluded that the “operative
date” for determining the manifestation of the injury was when
the worker first acquired knowledge of its work-relatedness.
See also Special Fund v. Clark, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 487, 490 (1999).
However, the court in the Hill case was concerned with when the
worker must give notice of a work-related injury to the
employer, and the court in the Alcan case was concerned with
when the statute of limitation begins to run on an injured
worker’s claim.
The court in the Brown case noted that “[n]othing in
Alcan indicated that liability for an injury begins when the
notice and limitations requirements are triggered.”
Further,
the court determined in that case that the injury occurred on
June 5, 2000, even though the notice and limitations provisions
of the statutes were not triggered until the worker received a
medical diagnosis on January 11, 2001.
In short, we believe the
Brown case clarifies the fact that the “operative date” for
determining when an injury occurs for purposes of assigning
liability to insurance carriers differs from determinations that
must be made in cases where notice and limitations issues exist.
9
The question on appeal is whether there was substantial
evidence of probative value to support the ALJ’s conclusion that
Greene’s injury became manifest before May 1, 2002.
See Wolf
Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky. App., 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (1984).
Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of substance and
relevant consequence, having the fitness to induce conviction in
the minds of reasonable people.
Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chem.
Co., Ky., 474 S.W.2d 367 (1971).
In this case the testimony of
Greene and Dr. Templin was substantial evidence to support the
finding of the ALJ that Greene’s cumulative trauma injury became
manifest prior to May 1, 2000.
Therefore, the Board erred in
reversing the ALJ’s decision.
The opinion of the Board is reversed, and the ALJ’s
decision is reinstated.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
James B. Cooper
Guillermo A. Carlos
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, MAUDY ISON
GREENE:
Sherry Brashear
Harlan, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY
REHABILITATION INDUSTRIES:
Ronald J. Pohl
Crystal L. Moore
Lexington, Kentucky
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