JENNIFER MILLER v. STEARNS TECHNICAL TEXTILES COMPANY; HON. W. BRUCE COWDEN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
September 10, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000683-WC
JENNIFER MILLER
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-00-98391
STEARNS TECHNICAL TEXTILES
COMPANY; HON. W. BRUCE COWDEN,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MINTON, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
This is a petition for review from an order
entered by the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) affirming the
dismissal of a claim by an administrative law judge (ALJ) as
barred by the statute of limitations.
For the reasons stated
hereafter, we affirm.
Appellant Jennifer Miller was injured in December 1999
during the course of her employment with appellee Stearns
Technical Textiles Co.
Appellant was paid temporary total
disability benefit payments (TTD) for several weeks ending on
January 23, 2000.
On January 26, 2000, appellee submitted, to
the Department of Workers’ Claims (DWC), an IA-2 form (Workers’
Compensation-Subsequent Report) which stated the date upon which
TTD payments began and the period of time for which they would
run, but not the specific date of termination.
No letter of
termination was generated by the DWC on behalf of appellant.
However, on December 28, 2000, appellee transmitted to the DWC a
second IA-2, which plainly stated the termination date.
At that
time, a termination letter was generated to inform appellant of
her rights, including the fact that any claim for additional
benefits must be filed within two years of the last TTD payment.
The letter specified that such benefits had terminated on
January 23, 2000.
After seeking legal counsel in the spring of
2002, appellant filed a claim on December 30, 2002, which was
within two years of the letter generated by the DWC, but more
than two years after the time of her injury and the termination
of TTD payments.
The ALJ sustained appellee’s motion to dismiss
the claim as having been filed outside of the applicable
statutory limitations period.
The Board affirmed and this
appeal followed.
Appellee’s sole contention on appeal is that the Board
erred by dismissing her claim as barred by the statute of
limitations.
We disagree.
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KRS 342.185(1) provides in part:
If payments of income benefits have been
made, the filing of an application for
adjustment of claim with the department
within the period shall not be required, but
shall become requisite within two (2) years
following the suspension of payments or
within two (2) years of the date of the
accident, whichever is later.
The record indicates that the DWC mailed the WC-3
form, dated December 28, 2000, to appellant at her correct
address.
The form, which showed a “Termination Date” of January
23, 2000, stated:
Re:
File: 00-98391
Termination Date:
01/23/2000
The Department of Workers Claims recently
received notice from your employer’s workers
compensation claims administrator that
income benefits being paid to you as a
result of a work-related injury/illness were
terminated as of the above date. Any
medical bills that you incur for necessary
treatment of this injury/illness should
still be forwarded to the claims
administrator.
If you continue to be disabled because of
this injury/illness, you may request
additional benefits by filing an
“Application for Resolution of Claim” with
the Department of Workers Claims. The
claim, including one for medical expenses,
must be filed within two years after the
date your injury occurred, or, within two
years after the last voluntary payment of
income benefits to you, whichever event last
occurs.
If a claim is not filed within this time
frame, any claim for workers compensation
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benefits as a result of this injury/illness
will be barred.
Thus, the letter clearly advised appellant, less than a year
after the stated date of termination of TTD payments, that any
claim for additional payment must be filed within two years of
the termination of benefits date, i.e., within approximately,
the next thirteen months after receipt of the WC-3 letter.
In arguing that she is entitled to relief because
appellee blatantly disregarded its obligation under KRS 342.040
to inform the DWC of termination of TTD payments, appellant
relies on the cases of H. E. Neumann Co. v. Lee, Ky., 975 S.W.
2d 917 (1998), Ingersroll-Rand Company v. Whittaker, Ky. App.,
883 S.W. 2d 514 (1994), and City of Frankfort v. Rogers, Ky.
App., 765 S.W. 2d 579 (1988).
However, appellant’s reliance on
those cases is misplaced as, in each instance, the employers
never provided the DWC with notice that TTD payments had been
terminated or in one case, that an injury had even occurred.
As
a result, the DWC, in these cases, did not provide notice to the
employees of the two-year statute of limitations applicable to
their claims.
Here, by contrast, although the notice which
appellee provided to the DWC three days after termination of TTD
payments evidently was not complete and did not trigger the
DWC’s sending of notice to appellant, appellee did provide the
DWC with complete notice of the termination of TTD payments some
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eleven moths later.
The DWC, in turn, provided appellant with
notice of her rights concerning the time in which she could file
a claim, thereby allowing her some thirteen months in which to
file a timely claim.
As noted by the Board, appellant “failed to show how
that period of noncompliance deprived her of notice concerning
the need to file a claim and the applicable period of
limitations prior to the running of that period.”
There is
nothing in the record to indicate that the tardiness of the
letter so adversely affected appellant’s rights so as to make it
impossible for her to act in accordance with the statute of
limitations.
For the reasons stated above, the opinion of the
Worker’s Compensation Board is affirmed.
MINTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTING:
While I agree that
the appellant did receive notice as to termination of payments
within an arguably adequate time within which to seek counsel
and to file a claim, the statute (KRS 342.185(1)) contemplates a
two-year period following suspension of payments.
The fact that
the DWC delayed eleven months in sending that required letter of
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notice effectively deprived her of nearly one-half the time
contemplated and provided to her by the General Assembly.
The statutory language should not be disregarded –especially where such a lengthy period of delay on the part of
DWC is involved.
Such logic could presumably justify a longer
period of dilatory notification -– thus by administrative fiat
truncating even more the time provided by a clear statutory
provision.
The philosophy underlying Workers’ Compensation
legislation requires that it be liberally construed in favor of
the injured employee – not in deference to bureaucratic notice
procedures that run afoul of statutory limitation periods
granted to the employee.
As her claim was timely filed if measured by the
letter of notification, I would reverse the Board and allow this
claim to proceed.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
James D. Howes
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE STEARNS
TECHNICAL TEXTILES COMPANY:
Mary E. Schaffner
Louisville, Kentucky
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