DOUGLAS LESTER V. DAGS BRANCH COAL COMPANY, INC.; HONORABLE LLOYD EDENS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
November 19, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000538-WC
DOUGLAS LESTER
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
CLAIM NO. WC-02-01402
V.
DAGS BRANCH COAL COMPANY, INC.;
HONORABLE LLOYD EDENS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MINTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
The two-year limitations period for filing
workers’ compensation claims may be tolled where the employer or
its workers’ compensation insurance carrier make false
representations or fraudulent concealments that lull a claimant
into not filing a claim within the prescribed time.
Douglas
Lester, who was injured while working for the Dags Branch Coal
Company, filed his injury claim more than three months after the
limitations period expired.
Lester argues that the employer
should be precluded from using the limitations defense.
He
asserts that the carrier’s adjuster’s delay in responding to
Lester’s timely request for pre-approval of surgery caused him
to delay filing his claim.
The ALJ found, and the Board agreed,
that the adjuster’s inaction in responding to Lester’s request
did not amount to the sort of false or fraudulent representations that toll the running of the limitations period.
Our
review of the record supports the findings of the ALJ and the
Board.
Therefore, we affirm.
Lester was employed by Dags Branch as a coal mine
supervisor.
He was injured on the job on June 21, 2000, when he
lifted a 300-pound tire from a roof bolter.
Although he did not
suspect that his injuries were serious at the time, he nevertheless filed an accident report with his employer.
Lester did not
seek immediate medical attention for his injuries; but, some
time later, his pain worsened, and he was forced to see a
doctor.
He received lumbar facet joint injections and took
significant doses of medication to alleviate the pain.
Despite
the pain, Lester was never absent from work for any considerable
period.
In May 2002, Dr. Timothy Kriss evaluated Lester and
recommended surgery.
A pre-certification for a myelogram was
sent to Doug Graham, the adjuster for Dags Branch’s workers’
compensation insurance carrier.
Graham was away on vacation
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when the request was made; but he eventually authorized the
procedure on May 30, 2002.
On June 12, 2002, Dr. Kriss faxed
Graham a pre-certification request for Lester’s surgical
procedure.
Again, Graham was out of the office on vacation.
returned on June 17, 2002.
He
However, Graham testified that he
did not review the request until June 21, 2002, which happened
to be the exact date the statute of limitations ran on Lester’s
claim.
Graham advised Lester that his claim had been rejected
because it was not within the statute of limitations.
Despite
the fact his claim had been rejected, Lester proceeded with back
surgery on July 22, 2002.
Lester ceased his employment with Dags Branch on
July 19, 2002, three days before his surgery.
unable to return to work since that time.
He has been
His Form 101,
Application for Resolution of Injury Claim, was filed with the
Department of Workers’ Claims on September 16, 2002, but was
rejected because it was filed outside the two-year statutory
period.
An ALJ reviewed Lester’s case and affirmed the
rejection of his claim.
The ALJ stated there was no evidence of
false representations or misconduct that would toll the statute
of limitations.
Specifically, the ALJ stated, “[w]hile I can
sympathize with the plight of the Plaintiff, the standard for
overcoming the two year limitation requirement of KRS 342.185(1)
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is stringent.
In this instance, the testimony does not convince
me that the actions by Mr. Graham on behalf of the insurance
carrier have risen to that level.”
The ALJ also noted that
Lester had not been given any indication from Dags Branch that
the statute of limitations for his claim would be ignored or
waived.
Accordingly, Lester’s claim was dismissed.
Lester appealed to the Board.
In addition to the
reasons stated by the ALJ, the Board’s opinion also noted that
the statute of limitations would have been tolled had Lester
missed more than seven consecutive days of work for his injuries
and been awarded temporary income benefits.
the decision of the ALJ was affirmed.
Since he had not,
This appeal follows.
Lester argues that Dags Branch should be estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations.
He claims Graham’s
actions “lulled” him into believing his claim was being
considered and that approval for his surgery was pending.
Lester further asserts that if the insurance carrier had
informed him that Graham was on vacation and would not be able
to evaluate his claim before the expiration of the statute of
limitations, he would have hired a lawyer and filed the
appropriate paperwork in time for his claim to have been
covered.
This Court’s scope of review is limited.
It is solely
within the province of the ALJ to make findings of fact in a
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workers’ compensation case.1
Those findings will only be
reversed if “the evidence was so overwhelming, upon consideration of the entire record, as to have compelled a finding in
[the claimant’s] favor.”2
Likewise, we will only correct a
decision of the Board when the controlling law has been disregarded or misinterpreted.3
This case presents us with a difficult set of circumstances.
We agree that Lester’s situation is sympathetic.
However, as the ALJ noted, the standard for overcoming a statute
of limitations is stringent.
As the Kentucky Supreme Court
stated in Barker v. Miller,4 “[l]imitations . . . are creatures
of statute which are intended by the Legislature to bring
finality to the legal process.
‘Thus, limitations act
arbitrarily, sometimes extinguishing otherwise viable claims and
at other times extinguishing speculative claims.’”5
We believe
that in this case, the statute of limitations prescribed by
1
Miller v. East Kentucky Beverage/Pepsico Inc., Ky., 951 S.W.2d 329,
331 (1997).
2
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky.App., 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (1984).
3
Daniel v. Armco Steel Company, L.P., Ky.App., 913 S.W.2d 797, 798
(1995), quoting Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d
685, 687-688 (1992).
4
Ky.App., 918 S.W.2d 749 (1996) (citations omitted).
5
Id. at 751.
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KRS 342.185 extinguished what otherwise would have been a viable
claim.
KRS 342.185(1) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (2) of this
section, no proceeding under this chapter
for compensation for an injury or death
shall be maintained unless a notice of the
accident shall have been given to the
employer as soon as practicable after the
happening thereof and unless an application
for adjustment of claim for compensation
with respect to the injury shall have been
made with the department within two (2)
years after the date of the accident . . . .
The notice and the claim may be given or
made by any person claiming to be entitled
to compensation or by someone in his behalf.
If payments of income benefits have been
made, the filing of an application for
adjustment of claim with the department
within the period shall not be required, but
shall become requisite within two (2) years
following the suspension of payments or
within two (2) years of the date of the
accident, whichever is later.
There are only two ways in which the KRS 342.185
limitations period can be tolled.
First, if income benefits are
paid to the employee as a result of his injury, the limitations
period is tolled until after the payments are suspended.
Second, the period may be tolled by estoppel if a claimant can
prove fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment by his
employer.6
6
Newberg v. Hudson, Ky., 838 S.W.2d 384, 389 (1992).
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Neither of these situations is present in this case.
The record indicates Lester missed very few days from work, much
less the required seven consecutive days needed to receive
temporary income benefits and toll the limitations period.
Likewise, there is insufficient proof that Lester’s employer or
the insurance company acted in bad faith.
The ALJ found that
Graham had not made a false representation concerning the
statute of limitations, nor had he fraudulently concealed it
from Lester.
this finding.
We believe the evidence in the record supported
There is not such overwhelming proof to the
contrary that a finding in Lester’s favor is compelled.7
Graham’s action or inaction is insufficient to estop Dags Branch
from asserting the statute of limitations.
For these reasons, we must affirm the decision of the
Board.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Robert J. Greene
Pikeville, Kentucky
7
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE DAGS BRANCH
COAL COMPANY, INC.:
H. Brent Stonecipher
Lexington, Kentucky
See, Wolf Creek Collieries, supra, at 736.
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