MATTHEW DEEGAN JOHNSON v. LYNN HELTON
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RENDERED:
December 10, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
2004-CA-000438-MR
MATTHEW DEEGAN JOHNSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KATHLEEN VOOR MONTANO, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-D-500193-001
v.
LYNN HELTON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER, JUDGE; MILLER, SENIOR
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Appellant Matthew Deegan Johnson
(Johnson) appeals from a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) of the
Jefferson Family Court entered January 28, 2004.
The question
presented is whether there was sufficient evidence of domestic
violence and abuse to support the entry of the order.
We
affirm.
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
On January 18, 2004 appellee Lynn Helton (Helton)
filed a domestic violence petition against Johnson.
The
petition alleged:
The pet and rsp lived together for
about three months, and the parties
seperated (sic) in 1999. On 01/16/2004 the
rsp came over to the pet home, and began
banging on the pet daughter’s window (age
16). The pet called the police, but the rsp
left before the police got there. The
police suggested that the pet file for an
epo . . . The parties have not talked for a
year. The pet states that the rsp used to
have a problem with alcohol, and drugs. The
pet fears the rsp may be stalking the pet,
because the rsp should not know where the
pet is. The pet is scared of the rsp
behavior. The pet does not want the rsp
around the pet, pet daughter, or the pet
property.
At the hearing on the petition Helton testified that Johnson
knew where she lived because it was the same address where they
resided together and that evening Johnson did not speak to
Helton or her daughter and left when asked.
The family court
entered a DVO finding by a preponderance of the evidence that an
act of domestic violence or abuse has occurred and may again
occur.
The DVO directed that Johnson be restrained from
committing further acts of abuse or threats of abuse; be
restrained from any contact or communication with Helton; be
restrained from disposing of or damaging any property of the
parties; remain at all times and places at least 1000 feet away
from Helton and her daughter and place of employment and that he
2
not possess, purchase or attempt to possess, purchase or obtain
a firearm during the duration of the order.
effective for three years.
The DVO was made
This appeal followed.
Before us, Johnson contends that the trial court erred
by entering a DVO against him, arguing that neither the petition
nor the evidence established “that an act or acts of domestic
violence and abuse have occurred and may again occur.”
We
disagree.
The standard for entry of a DVO is if the trial court
finds “from a preponderance of the evidence that an act or acts
of domestic violence and abuse have occurred and may again
occur.”
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.750(1).
This
preponderance of the evidence standard merely requires that the
evidence believed by the fact-finder be sufficient that the
petitioner was more likely than not to have been a victim of
domestic violence.
276, 278 (1996).
Commonwealth v. Anderson, Ky., 934 S.W.2d
KRS 403.720 defines domestic violence and
abuse as:
[P]hysical injury, serious physical injury,
sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of
fear of imminent physical injury, serious
physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault
between family members or members of an
unmarried couple.
Under the above statute, domestic violence and abuse occurs with
the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury.
3
In this case, the petition specifically alleged that
although the parties had not lived together for several years
and had not talked for a year, Johnson, with a history of drug
and alcohol problems, came over unexpectedly to Helton’s home
and began banging on the window to Helton’s sixteen-year old
daughter’s room.
The incident occurred in the early morning
hours at the house where the parties formerly resided together
and where Helton and her daughter continued to reside.
Despite
the fact that Johnson left that night upon Helton’s request,
Helton indicated that she was scared of Johnson’s behavior.
Considering Johnson’s behavior, we must conclude that
there exists substantial evidence upon which to conclude that
Helton was in fear of imminent physical injury.
The allegations
of the petition, coupled with Helton’s testimony concerning
these allegations, were sufficient to support the issuance of
the DVO.
We are thus of the opinion that the family court did
not commit reversible error by entering the DVO.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Udell B. Levy
Louisville, KY
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
40202
4
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