JAMES FLEMING v. COASTAL COAL, LLC; HON. RICHARD M. JOINER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
December 10, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000374-WC
JAMES FLEMING
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-03-00399
COASTAL COAL, LLC;
HON. RICHARD M. JOINER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
James Fleming (“Fleming”) petitions this Court
to review an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board
(“Board”) entered on January 21, 2004.
In the Board’s opinion,
it affirmed an opinion and award of the Hon. Richard M. Joiner,
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) entered on September 8, 2003.
The ALJ awarded Fleming permanent partial disability benefits
after he determined that Fleming had a 5.5% impairment rating
for a work-related, cumulative trauma injury to his low back.
According to Fleming, he began working in the coal
mining industry in 1968.
He worked as a general laborer for
several different coal mines over the years.
In April of 2000,
Fleming was hired by Coastal Coal, Inc. (“Coastal Coal”).
According to Fleming, he performed hard manual labor for Coastal
Coal at one of its underground mines.
Fleming testified that he
injured his back in either 2000 or 2001.
After this initial
injury, Coastal Coal placed Fleming on light outside duties for
approximately two weeks but Fleming soon returned to his normal
work duties underground.
Later, in 2001, Fleming began to
experience numbness and tingling in his arms and hands.
Fleming
notified Coastal Coal and told his supervisors that he had been
diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome.
Fleming testified that
in April of 2002, he injured his back again.
And Coastal Coal
again placed him on light outside duties for one to two weeks.
But Fleming soon returned to his normal duties.
According to
Fleming, he continued to work for Coastal Coal in his regular
capacity until Coastal Coal closed the mine on June 7, 2002.
On February 24, 2003, Fleming filed a workers’
compensation claim.
He claimed that on June 7, 2002, when the
mine closed, he was suffering from repetitive trauma injuries to
his low back, wrists and arms.
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MEDICAL EVIDENCE
On July 23, 2003, Fleming proceeded to hearing on his
claim.
At that hearing, he testified on his own behalf.
In
addition to Fleming’s testimony, the ALJ considered medical
records from Mountain Comprehensive Health Consultants
(“Mountain Comp”) and the reports and depositions of Dr. David
E. Muffly (“Dr. Muffly”), Dr. Ronald S. Dubin (“Dr. Dubin”), and
Daniel D. Primm, Jr. (“Dr. Primm”).
According to Mountain Comp records, an x-ray of
Fleming’s lumbar spine from 1994 revealed that he had
spondylosis.
An x-ray of Fleming’s cervical spine showed that
he had a decrease in the C6-7 disc height with osteophytes from
the C7 disc protruding into the right neural foramina.
Also, in
2001, he was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in both
wrists.
Dr. Muffly examined Fleming on January 9, 2003.
During the examination, Fleming did not tell the doctor about
any specific work-related injuries.
But Fleming told the doctor
that, during thirty-six years of working in coal mines, he was
required constantly to bend down, to stoop, to lift, and to
shovel.
Dr. Muffly diagnosed Fleming with carpal tunnel
syndrome, lumbar osteoarthritis, and degenerative disc disease.
He opined that Fleming’s problems were caused by repeated workrelated mini-traumas.
Dr. Muffly opined that Fleming was 10%
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whole body impaired due to carpal tunnel syndrome and opined
that Fleming was 10% impaired due to his back problems.
Dr.
Muffly restricted Fleming to lifting a maximum of 20 pounds, to
infrequent bending and stooping, and to sitting and standing no
more than three hours in an eight-hour period.
In May of 2003, Dr. Primm examined Fleming.
The
doctor also reviewed Mountain Comp’s records and took x-rays of
Fleming’s neck, low back, and arms.
Dr. Primm opined that
Fleming had mild degenerative changes at C6-7 and had moderate
disc space narrowing and osteophytes at L5-S1, T11-12, and L2-4.
He opined that Fleming did not suffer from carpal tunnel
syndrome.
But he did diagnose Fleming with pre-existing
degenerative changes in the thoracolumbar spine, with a history
of superimposed injury and arousal.
He further opined that
Fleming could return to his previous type of work without any
restrictions.
He opined that Fleming fell between a DRE
Category I and II which meant Fleming would be from 0-5%
impaired.
The doctor felt that any impairment would be due to
the arousal of the pre-existing degenerative changes.
On June 17, 2003, after Dr. Primm’s examination, Dr.
Dubin examined Fleming as well.
Dr. Dubin diagnosed Fleming
with carpal tunnel syndrome and with lumbar spondylosis with
moderate to severe radiculopathy.
Dr. Dubin opined that
Fleming’s problems were caused by repetitive use of his back and
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hands.
The doctor opined that Fleming suffered from a 10%
permanent partial impairment due to carpal tunnel syndrome and
that Fleming suffered from an 11% impairment due to his low back
condition.
Dr. Dubin restricted Fleming from repetitive
bending, stooping, lifting, or crawling.
Dr. Dubin opined that
Fleming was no longer physically capable of working in the coal
mining industry.
ALJ’S OPINION AND AWARD
In the ALJ’s opinion and award, the ALJ relied on the
opinions of Dr. Muffly and Dr. Dubin and determined that Fleming
had suffered a work-related, cumulative trauma injury to his low
back.
The ALJ relied on Dubin’s opinion and found that Fleming
had a DRE Category III, 11% impairment.
But the ALJ determined
that only half of the 11% impairment, 5.5%, was compensable
since Fleming had a history of prior back complaints.
Relying
on Fleming’s own testimony that he continued to do his regular
job duties until the mine closed, the ALJ determined that
Fleming retained the physical capacity to return to the same
type of work that he did at the time of the injury.
Since
Fleming could return to the same type of work, the ALJ
determined that the three-multiplier found in Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 342.730(1)(c)1 was inapplicable.
And the ALJ did
not apply the four-multiplier found in KRS 342.730(1)(c)3 for
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employees with less than eight years of education.
But the ALJ
did apply the two-multiplier found in KRS 342.730(1)(c) since
Fleming was earning less than his average wage at the time of
the injury and awarded Fleming $45.43 per week.
Although the
ALJ found that Fleming had suffered a work-related injury to his
back, the ALJ determined that Fleming did not suffer from carpal
tunnel syndrome based on Dr. Primm’s opinion.
Being unsatisfied with the ALJ’s opinion and award,
Fleming appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board, but the
Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
Now, Fleming petitions this
Court for review.
FLEMING’S ARGUMENTS
In Fleming’s petition for review, he argues that the
Board erred when it affirmed the ALJ’s decision that he retained
the physical capacity to return to the same type of work that he
performed at the time of his injury.
Fleming also argues that
the Board erred when it affirmed the ALJ’s determination that
Fleming had an eighth grade education.
To support Fleming’s argument that he could not return
to the same type of work, Fleming points to the reports and
depositions of both Dr. Muffly and Dr. Dubin.
Fleming relies on
the fact that both doctors had placed work restrictions upon
him, which Fleming argues prohibited him from returning to his
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prior work.
In addition, Fleming points out that the ALJ relied
on and found to be credible Dr. Muffly’s and Dr. Dubin’s
opinions when the ALJ determined that Fleming had suffered a
work-related, cumulative trauma injury.
Yet despite this, the
ALJ did not rely upon nor did the ALJ find credible the doctors’
opinions when the ALJ determined that Fleming retained the
physical capacity to return to the same type of work.
Fleming
insists that if the doctors’ opinions were credible for one of
the ALJ’s determinations then their opinions should have been
credible for all of the ALJ’s determinations.
According to Fleming, the Board also applied the wrong
standard of appellate review.
Fleming cites Special Fund v.
Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986), and argues that the Board
should have applied the clearly erroneous standard.
He insists
that the ALJ’s decision was unreasonable and clearly erroneous
since the restrictions that the doctors had placed upon him
prevented him from ever returning to work in the coal mining
industry.
In addition, Fleming argues that the ALJ should have
applied the four-multiplier found in KRS 342.730(1)(c)3 since
Fleming testified that he never completed the eighth grade.
When reviewing one of the Board’s decisions, this
Court will only reverse the Board’s decision when it has
overlooked or misconstrued controlling law or so flagrantly
erred in evaluating the evidence that it has caused gross
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injustice.
Daniel v. Armco Steel Company, Ky. App., 913 S.W.2d
797, 798 (1995).
To properly review the Board’s decision, this
Court must ultimately review the ALJ’s underlying decision.
If
the ALJ finds against the claimant who has the burden of proof
and if the claimant appeals, then this Court must determine
whether the evidence compelled a finding in the claimant’s
favor.
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641, 643
(1986); see also Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky., 673 S.W.2d
735, 736 (1984).
This Court has defined compelling evidence as
evidence that is so overwhelming that no reasonable person could
reach the same conclusion as the fact-finder.
REO Mechanical v.
Barnes, Ky. App., 691 S.W.2d 224, 226 (1985).
But as the fact-
finder, the ALJ, not this Court and not the Board, has sole
discretion to determine the quality, character, and substance of
the evidence.
Whittaker v. Rowland, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479, 481
(1999), quoting Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695
S.W.2d 418 (1985); see also Snawder v. Stice, Ky. App., 576
S.W.2d 276 (1979).
Not only does the ALJ weigh the evidence but
the ALJ may also choose to believe or disbelieve any part of the
evidence, regardless of its source.
Whittaker v. Rowland, supra
at 481, quoting Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky., 560
S.W.2d 15, 16 (1977).
In addition, whether an injured employee
has retained the physical capacity to return to the same type of
work that was performed at the time of the injury is a question
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of fact for the ALJ to determine based on the evidence.
Carte
v. Loretto Motherhouse Infirmary, Ky. App., 19 S.W.3d 122, 126
(2000).
While the restrictions placed on Fleming by Dr. Muffly
and Dr. Dubin may constitute evidence of substance that supports
Fleming’s contentions, this evidence does not compel a finding
in Fleming’s favor.
According to the record, Dr. Primm opined
that Fleming could return to the same type of work that he
previously did without any restrictions.
But more importantly,
Fleming himself testified that he continued to perform hard
manual labor for Coastal Coal until the company closed the mine.
Given this evidence, any reasonable person could have reached
the same conclusion as the ALJ that Fleming retained the
physical capacity to return to the same type of work he
performed at the time of his injury.
And any reasonable person
could have reached the same conclusion as the ALJ that the
three-multiplier found in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 was not applicable
since Fleming did retain the capacity to return to the same type
of work.
Since Fleming could return to the same type of work,
the ALJ could not, as a matter of law, apply the four-multiplier
found in KRS 342.730(1)(c)3.
But even if the four-multiplier
were applicable, any reasonable person could have reached the
same conclusion as the ALJ that the four-multiplier was
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inapplicable since Fleming himself stated not only in his
application for resolution of injury claim but stated also in
his deposition that he had, in fact, an eighth grade education.
CONCLUSION
Since the evidence did not compel a result in
Fleming’s favor, this Court concludes that the Workers’
Compensation Board did not overlook or misconstrue any
controlling law nor did the Board err in evaluating the
evidence.
Therefore, this Court affirms the Board’s opinion.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I dissent as I am
wholly persuaded that the Board flagrantly erred in affirming
internally contradictory determinations of the ALJ that were
refuted by the evidence of record.
Mr. Fleming argues correctly
that the opinions of the two doctors upon whom the ALJ relied
contained restrictions which made it factually and physically
impossible for him to return to work in the mining industry.
There is no other interpretation of which the evidence is
reasonably susceptible.
Therefore, the three-multiplier of KRS
342.730(1)(c)1 should have been implicated.
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Additionally, he
testified that he had fewer than eight years of education, thus
activating the four multiplier of KRS 342.730(1)(c)3.
While our standard of review of both the Board and an
ALJ is necessarily deferential, nonetheless we cannot disregard
such clear contradictions in the evidence.
We are not only
justified but compelled to correct the errors in this case.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for entry of an opinion
and award reflecting a consistent and comprehensive analysis of
the evidence in this case.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Shawn C. Conley
Harlan, Kentucky
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