JOHNNY W. BROWN AND AMY BROWN v. HEALTH CARE COLLECTION SERVICE, INC., ASSIGNEE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF Kentucky MEDICAL CENTER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
December 23, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000112-MR
JOHNNY W. BROWN AND
AMY BROWN
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00201
HEALTH CARE COLLECTION
SERVICE, INC., ASSIGNEE
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF Kentucky
MEDICAL CENTER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Johnny W. Brown and Amy Brown appeal from a
summary judgment entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on
December 11, 2003, ordering them to pay to Health Care
Collection Service, Inc., a Kentucky Corporation, and assignee
of the University of Kentucky Medical Center the sum of
$7,675.73, plus costs and interest.
We affirm.
The Browns incurred various medical expenses at the
Medical Center between 1995 and 1999.
Some of Johnny’s expenses
were covered by Medicare and the Medical Center took a
contractual adjustment loss on some.
However, after these
payments and adjustments, Johnny still owed $2,101.46 and $8.73
for medical services.
No adjustments or payments were made
towards Amy’s medical treatment and the Medical Center alleged
she owed $42.00, $320, $5,103.54 and $100 for various medical
services rendered.
The Medical Center assigned the outstanding
balances to Health Care Collection Services, Inc., which
eventually filed a complaint to recover these sums on January
16, 2003.
The Browns filed an answer admitting that they had
received the medical services but asserting as an affirmative
defense that they qualified or should have qualified upon proper
notice, for payment of these services by the Kentucky Hospital
Care Program pursuant to KRS 205.640 et. seq.
After limited discovery (interrogatories which are not
included in the record) had occurred, the collection service
filed a motion for summary judgment.
Its motion included an
affidavit of Dennis Kamann, executive director of Health Care
that indicated the Medical Center had provided the medical
services in question and that the Browns still owed $7,675.73.
The affidavit also stated the following:
-2-
4) In the Answers to Interrogatories,
the Defendants indicated that they did
receive the medical treatment at the
University of Kentucky Medical center
claimed in the Complaint but they take the
position that following payment by Medicare
they should have been covered by a “spenddown” program or received benefits through
the Kentucky Hospital Care Program. They
indicate they did not recall receiving
statements from UKMC regarding their account
balances.
5) The computer pad notes of the
Patient Accounts Department and also of
Health Care Collection Service, Inc.,
indicate that many statements were sent to
the Defendants after each date of service
and after any payment by Medicare. Also,
there were numerous telephone contacts with
the Defendants regarding their unpaid
account balances. The Defendants indicated
that they were attempting to obtain a spenddown medical card but never provided any
type of card or further information to the
Plaintiff or UKMC. If they are eligible for
Medicare or Medicaid benefits under a spenddown program, they are not eligible for KHCP
benefits.
The Browns responded to the motion for summary
judgment and argued that genuine issues of material fact existed
as to whether or not the Medical Center had complied with KRS
205.640(5).
Specifically, the Browns argue that:
[Health Care’s] [a]ffidavit raises
other issues of material fact related to
UKMC’s dealings with [the Browns]. [Health
Care] states that UKMC sent [the Browns]
“many statements” and had “numerous
telephone contacts” with them. [The Browns]
have answered through interrogatories that
they heard nothing from UKMC until they
received correspondence from [Health Care’s]
-3-
counsel in early 2003. Additionally, an
issue of material fact exists regarding the
[Brown’s] attempts to qualify for a spenddown program. Under KRS 205.640(5), UKMC
should have requested [the Browns] to apply
for Medicaid if they did not qualify for
that statute’s benefits. Again, this
relates to the aforementioned fact issue of
whether UKMC evaluated [the Browns’]
economic status.
...
In this case, it would not be impossible for
[the Browns] to show they were not liable
for these charges. KRS 205.640(5) required
UKMC to determine whether [the Browns] were
eligible for its benefits, and if not, to
assist them in applying for other benefits.
Thus, UKMC should have given [the Browns]
the opportunity to seek assistance under the
law. Whether that was done goes to the
heart of [the Browns’] response, and that
issue has not been conclusively resolved.
Indeed, the facts in this case have not
developed sufficiently to show that [Health
Care] would prevail under every
circumstance. Accordingly, summary judgment
is inappropriate.
No affidavit or additional exhibits were included in the Browns’
response.
On August 29, 2003, the circuit court held a hearing
on Health Care’s motion for summary judgment.
Each party was
represented by counsel and presented arguments to the court.
The court submitted on the motion and allowed Health Care to
file a reply to the Browns’ response.
Health Care subsequently
did file a reply in which it argued that the requirements under
KRS 205.640(5) do not apply to individuals who have health
-4-
insurance such as Medicare.
It also stated that the Medical
Center uses an indigent care eligibility form (DSH-001) to
assess a patient’s financial situation.
Finally, it reiterated
the statement that the Browns had indicated that they had
applied for a Medicaid spend-down card but never informed the
Medical Center whether they had received Medicaid coverage or
not.
Health Care also argued that the Browns had not provided
any factual or legal basis why summary judgment should not be
entered.
On November 13, 2003, the circuit court entered an
opinion and order granting Health Care’s motion for summary
judgment.
In its opinion and order, the court determined that
KRS 205.640(5) did not apply because the Browns “had Medicare
health insurance coverage.”
The court further held that the
Medical Center had complied with 907 KAR 1:013E§§ 18 and 19 by
providing form DSH-001 to the Browns.
Based upon this opinion
and order, the court entered summary judgment in favor of Health
Care on December 11, 2003.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the Browns continue to argue that summary
judgment was not appropriate because there remains disputed
issues of fact as to whether the Medical Center assessed the
Browns for the hospital indigent care program.
Health Care on
the other hand contends that there are no disputed issues of
fact based upon the uncontroverted affidavit of Dennis Kamann.
-5-
While the record is unusually sparse as to documentation, we
believe the uncontroverted affidavit attached to the motion for
summary judgment placed the burden upon the Browns to present at
least some affirmative evidence showing that there was a genuine
issue of material facts for trial.
The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment
is well settled and expressed in Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916
S.W.2d 779 (1996), as follows:
The standard of review on appeal of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 56.03. There is no
requirement that the appellate court defer
to the trial court since factual findings
are not at issue. Goldsmith v. Allied
Building Components, Inc., Ky., 833 S.W.2d
378, 381 (1992). “The record must be viewed
in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment and
all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.”
Steelvest v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.,
Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991). Summary
“judgment is only proper where the movant
shows that the adverse party could not
prevail under any circumstances.”
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480, citing
Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683
S.W.2d 255 (1985). Consequently, summary
judgment must be granted “[o]nly when it
appears impossible for the nonmoving party
to produce evidence at trial warranting a
judgment in his favor ...” Huddleston v.
Hughes, Ky.App., 843 S.W.2d 901, 903 (1992),
citing Steelvest, supra (citations omitted).
-6-
Id. at 781.
In Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 482, the Court also
addressed the issue of the party opposing summary judgment
presenting some affirmative evidence when it stated:
Finally, under both the Kentucky and
the federal approach, a party opposing a
properly supported summary judgment motion
cannot defeat it without presenting at least
some affirmative evidence showing that there
is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. See, Gullett v. McCormick, Ky., 421
S.W.2d 352 (1967); Continental Cas. Company
v. Belknap Hardware & Manufacturing Co.,
Ky., 281 W.W.2d 914 (1955).
In this case, Health Care met its burden by providing
the Court an affidavit which stated that the Browns had incurred
the medical expenses at issue, failed to pay for the services
and failed to provide any proof that they were entitled to have
the medical expenses charged to the Hospital Indigent Care
Program.
The Browns had a duty to present “at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial.”
Steelvest, at 482.
There is nothing
in the record that indicates they notified the Medical Center
that they were eligible for the indigent care program, or that
they provided the Medical Center with any financial data, or
that they conveyed to the Medical Center their need for
additional financial assistance.
The Browns also failed to
refute the Medical Center’s assertion that the Browns had
notified it that they had applied for a Medicaid spend-down card
-7-
but never advised the Medical Center with proof of coverage or
denial.
In fact, the Browns, in their brief, concede that
previous trial counsel “could have created a more compelling
record in support of their eligibility by offering proof of
their financial status at the time of service.”1
On appeal, the Browns continue to make various
arguments that the Medical Center failed to meet its burden of
complying with KRS 205.640(5) and that the circuit court erred
in finding that the Medical Center complied with its statutory
duties and 907 KAR 1:013E.
However, based upon the record
before the circuit court we believe it correctly found that the
Browns had failed to present any evidence on which they could
succeed at trial.
Without presenting some affirmative evidence
on their behalf, the Browns failed to show that they could
prevail under any circumstances.
Based upon the evidence before
the court, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact
and Health Care was entitled to summary judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment
entered by the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
1
Browns reply brief at 4.
-8-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Stutsman
Legal Aid for the Bluegrass
Lexington, KY
John W. Oakley
Lexington, KY
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
