PARKER TRANSFER v. LANNY RILEY; HON. LLOYD R. EDENS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 3, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000060-WC
PARKER TRANSFER
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-60437
v.
LANNY RILEY;
HON. LLOYD R. EDENS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Parker Transfer (hereinafter referred to as
“Parker”) petitions this Court to review an opinion rendered by
the Workers’ Compensation Board (hereinafter referred to as “the
Board”) and entered on December 10, 2003.
In the Board’s
opinion, it affirmed an opinion, order and award entered by Hon.
Lloyd R. Edens, Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter referred
to as “ALJ”), in which the ALJ found Lanny Riley, Parker’s
former employee, permanently and totally disabled.
On review, Parker argues that the ALJ failed to
address the issue of whether or not Lanny Riley (hereinafter
referred to as “Riley”) suffered from a pre-existing active
impairment when it concluded that Riley was permanently and
totally disabled.
Finding that the evidence did not compel a
contrary result, this Court affirms both the Board’s opinion and
the ALJ’s award.
Prior to working for Parker, Riley had previously
injured his back several times.
In the early 1980’s, Riley was
in a motorcycle accident and injured his back.
worked as an orderly at a local hospital.
At that time, he
In 1981, while
working for the hospital, Riley slid out of a chair and injured
his back.
Later in 1982, while lifting a patient, Riley injured
his back yet again.
Riley filed a workers’ compensation claim
regarding these prior work-related injuries.
He and that
hospital settled these claims by an agreement in which Riley was
awarded 33 weeks of temporary total disability benefits.
In October of 1997, Riley began working for Parker as
a truck driver.
As part of his duties, he was required to
retrieve large dumpsters at various industrial sites.
On
October 16, 1997, after working for Parker for approximately two
weeks, Riley injured himself when he fell into a dumpster that
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he was preparing to load onto the back of his truck.
Riley fell
approximately four feet; landed on his back; and immediately
experienced severe pain.
Riley testified that after the 1997
injury he was unable to return to work due to constant severe
back pain.
Riley’s claim proceeded to a hearing before the ALJ on
March 26, 2003.
In an opinion and award entered on May 23,
2003, the ALJ found Riley to be permanently and totally disabled
and found that, prior to the 1997, injury, Riley had not
suffered from a pre-existing active occupational disability.
The ALJ awarded Riley the sum of $163.33 per week to be paid
retroactively from October 17, 1997 and to be continued as long
as Riley remained disabled.
Parker filed a petition to
reconsider and argued that the ALJ failed to address whether
Riley suffered from a pre-existing active impairment prior to
the 1997 injury.
Parker claimed that overwhelming evidence
existed that established that Riley did have a pre-existing
active impairment.
The ALJ denied reconsideration.
After the
Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed, Parker filed a petition
for review with this Court.
In its petition for review, Parker argues that KRS
342.730(1)(a) specifically forbids an administrative law judge
from considering a nonwork-related injury when determining
whether or not an injured employee is partially or totally
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disabled.
Parker contends that an ALJ must determine that any
award for total disability was expressly not based on a preexisting active nonwork-related impairment.
According to
Parker, the ALJ merely found that Riley did not have a preexisting active occupational disability.
Parker avers that an
individual can have a pre-existing active impairment yet not
have a pre-existing occupational disability.
Since the ALJ
failed to make the statutory required analysis, Parker insists
that this Court must reverse and remand for the ALJ to make the
proper determination.
Parker also argues that the Board misstated the law
regarding the issue of pre-existing active impairment as it
relates to total disability, and that the Board failed to make
the proper analysis under KRS 342.730(1)(a).
Parker argues that
Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp., Ky., 65 S.W.3d 503 (2001), which
the Board cited in its opinion, does not apply to the instant
case.
According to Parker, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held
that a disability that resulted from the arousal of a prior
dormant condition by a work-related injury was still compensable
under the 1996 Act.
According to Parker, the ALJ in the Hill
case performed the analysis required by KRS 342.730.
Parker
claims the ALJ in Hill specifically addressed the issue of
whether or not the injured employee had a pre-existing active
impairment when said ALJ relied upon the testimony of Dr. Gaw, a
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physician who had determined that the injured employee’s
spondylolisthesis was dormant prior to his work-related injury.
In contrast, Parker avers that ALJ in the instant case made no
such finding; thus, Parker concludes this Court must reverse the
Board’s decision.
Despite Parker’s insistence, this Court finds Hill v.
Sextet Mining Corp., Ky., 65 S.W.3d 503 (2001) to be directly on
point.
In Hill, employee, a coal miner, suffered a work-related
injury to his back in 1998.
Prior to the 1998 injury, employee
had injured his back numerous times but had always recovered and
returned to work.
However, after the 1998 injury, employee
never recovered and was not able to return to work.
The ALJ
found that the employee was permanently and totally disabled.
The Board reversed regarding an issue of notice and remanded for
the ALJ to consider what effect, if any, the employee’s preexisting spondylolisthesis had on the extent to which the
employee’s disability was compensable.
Regarding the issue of
pre-existing condition, this Court adopted the Board’s
reasoning.
Both employee and employer appealed to the Supreme
Court. Id. at 505.
Like in the instant case, the employer in Hill cited
KRS 342.730(1)(a) and argued that the employee had an impairment
due to a pre-existing spondylolisthesis, and that the ALJ should
have excluded this impairment when he determined employee was
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totally disabled.
Id. at 508.
The Supreme Court noted that the
ALJ in Hill had determined that the injured employee did not
have a pre-existing active occupational disability, the same
determination made by the ALJ in the instant case, despite the
existence of spondylolisthesis. Id. at 509.
The ALJ pointed out
that the employee continued to perform physically demanding
manual labor and routinely ran up to 20 miles per week prior to
the last work-related injury.
Furthermore, the ALJ relied on
Dr. Gaw’s testimony in which he noted that the employee had
several flare-ups over the years but had always recovered and
returned to work until the last injury occurred.
Id.
The Supreme Court reinstated the ALJ’s decision and
stated:
Having reviewed the evidence and the ALJ’s
findings, we are persuaded that there is no
indication that nonwork-related impairment
was considered when the ALJ determined that
the claimant was totally disabled and
entitled to an award under KRS
342.730(1)(a). Furthermore, although the
decision was made without the benefit of our
subsequent interpretations of the 1996 Act,
there was substantial evidence that workrelated harmful changes, by themselves, were
sufficient to cause an AMA impairment and to
render the claimant unable to perform any
work. Under those circumstances, the ALJ's
refusal to exclude prior, active disability
on these facts should not have been
disturbed on appeal. Id.
In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hill, this
Court concludes that the ALJ in the instant case was not
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required by KRS 342.730(1)(a) to specifically address whether or
not Riley had a pre-existing active impairment.
The ALJ relied
upon Dr. Norworthy’s opinion and Riley’s testimony as the basis
for finding that Riley was permanently and totally disabled.
Dr. Norsworthy opined that Riley had a twenty-four percent
impairment; placed several work restrictions on Riley; and
concluded that Riley would have difficulty concentrating at any
job due to severe back pain.
Riley testified that since the
1997 injury he had suffered from severe low back pain, and that
this pain had seriously curtailed his physical activities to
such a point that he spent ninety percent of his time in a
recliner.
He also testified that he often felt dazed and found
it difficult to concentrate on any task for a long period of
time.
In determining that Riley had no pre-existing active
occupational disability, the ALJ considered Dr. Gleis’ report
and Riley’s testimony.
Riley testified that he had worked at
various jobs between 1984 and 1997.
he testified that he had
previously worked as a truck driver for at least two other
employers.
Moreover, he testified that he did not have any back
pain immediately before the 1997 injury.
Dr. Gleis’ report
corroborated Riley’s testimony since it indicated that Riley had
not sought any treatment for back pain between 1984 and 1997.
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As the Board noted in its opinion, substantial
evidence existed in the record to support a finding that Riley
suffered from no pre-existing active impairment.
The Board
noted that Dr. Guarnaschelli opined that Riley’s pain was caused
by a dormant, nondisabling condition that was aroused to
disabling reality by the 1997 accident.
It noted that Dr.
Eggers opined that Riley had a twenty-four percent impairment
but made no reference to any pre-existing active impairment.
This Court notes that Dr. Norsworthy also made no mention that
Riley suffered from any pre-existing active impairment when he
opined that Riley was 24 percent impaired.
Furthermore, Dr.
Quader opined that Riley’s back pain was caused by a preexisting spondylolisthesis that was aroused into disabling
reality by the 1997 injury.
Once more, no mention was made of a
pre-existing active impairment.
Like in Hill, there existed
substantial evidence in the record to support that Riley’s 1997
injury by itself warranted an AMA impairment and that it
rendered Riley unable to perform any work. Id.
Given the
Supreme Court’s holding in Hill and the evidence contained in
the record, the ALJ’s refusal to address whether Riley had a
pre-existing active impairment does not justify disturbing the
ALJ’s decision upon review.
Thus, this Court affirms both the Board’s opinion and
the ALJ’s award.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John S. Harrison
SHEFFER LAW FIRM, LLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Thomas M. Rhoads
RHOADS & RHOADS, P.S.C.
Madisonville, Kentucky
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