YORIG R. REYES V. JOHN M. COY, VERTNER TAYLOR, LUTITIA F. PAPAILLER, FRANCES G. CLINKSCALES, LAURENCE CARTER-HATCHETT, VERMAN RAY WINBURN, FRANK DEROSSETT, AND FAMES PROVENCE, KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD
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DECEMBER 17, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002682-MR
YORIG R. REYES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-CI-00083
V.
JOHN M. COY,
VERTNER TAYLOR,
LUTITIA F. PAPAILLER,
FRANCES G. CLINKSCALES,
LAURENCE CARTER-HATCHETT,
VERMAN RAY WINBURN,
FRANK DEROSSETT,
AND FAMES PROVENCE,
KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, MINTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
Yorig Reyes, a prisoner in the state’s
correctional system, was ordered by the Kentucky Parole Board to
serve out his life sentence.
Citing violations of numerous
constitutionally protected rights, Reyes sued in Franklin
Circuit Court to mandamus the Board to release him on parole or
determine that his parole be deferred or grant him another
parole hearing.
After reviewing the record in full and
considering all pertinent arguments, we conclude that the Board
has not violated Reyes’s constitutionally protected rights and
that the Franklin Circuit Court has properly granted summary
judgment.
Thus, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Reyes was convicted in 1989 of murder, attempted
murder, first-degree robbery, and two counts of first-degree
sodomy, for which he received a life sentence.
awaiting trial, Reyes escaped.
While in custody
And he was convicted in 1993 of
second-degree escape, for which he received an additional fiveyear sentence, to be served consecutively with his life
sentence.
Reyes’s initial hearing before the Board occurred in
1993.
The Board voted to have Reyes serve out his sentence.
The decision was based upon several factors, including the
seriousness of the crimes, the violence involved, the fact that
a life was taken, Reyes’s five felony convictions, his prior
incarceration, and the use of a firearm in the commission of the
offenses.
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Reyes was granted another hearing before the Board on
January 25, 1994.
The Board again voted to have Reyes serve out
his sentence, citing the same reasons articulated in its first
decision.
On July 4, 2002, and again on July 29, 2002, Reyes
wrote letters to the Parole Board Chairman, John M. Coy,
requesting that the denial of his parole be reconsidered.
The
Board conducted a review of Reyes’s case, on the record, on
September 24, 2002.
out his sentence.
Again the Board voted to have Reyes serve
The reasons listed were the seriousness of
the crime, the violence involved, the fact that a life was
taken, and the involvement of a firearm in the commission of the
crime.
On October 1, 2002, Reyes filed another request for
reconsideration, citing the Board’s failure to consider his
“personal outlook and change in character.”
denied.
Reyes’s request was
On January 22, 2003, Reyes filed his Petition for Writ
of Mandamus, Declaratory Judgment, and Injunctive Relief in the
Franklin Circuit Court.
The Board responded with a Motion for
Summary Judgment, which the court granted in an order entered on
December 4, 2003.
This appeal follows.
Reyes makes four arguments:
first, the Board violated
the prohibition against the use of ex post facto laws; second,
his due process rights were violated; third, the Board violated
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his right to equal protection; and fourth, that he cannot
receive a fair and impartial hearing before the Board because of
ethnic bias and prejudice.
We will discuss each argument
individually.
OUR STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of a grant of summary judgment is limited
to “whether the trial court correctly found that there were no
genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”1
Summary judgment
is to be cautiously applied, and the record is to “be viewed in
a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for
summary judgment . . . .”2
We believe the circuit court properly
found there to be no genuine issues of material fact in this
case.
THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS
The granting of a writ of mandamus “is a rare and
extraordinary measure with a difficult standard to meet.”3
A
party seeking a writ must prove that he “‘has no other adequate
remedy and that great and irreparable injury will result to
1
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
2
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d
476, 479 (1991).
3
Foster v. Overstreet, Ky., 905 S.W.2d 504, 505 (1995).
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[him].’”4
The purpose of a writ “is to compel an official to
perform duties of that official where an element of discretion
does not occur.”5
employed.
Mandamus should always be “cautiously
It is not a common means of redress and is certainly
not a substitute for appeal.”6
With these stringent standards in mind, we address
Reyes’s arguments.
VIOLATION OF PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF EX POST FACTO LAWS
Reyes first argues that the Board violated the
prohibition against the use of an ex post facto law when it
failed to review his parole eligibility every eight years, and
when it denied him parole and ordered him to serve out his
sentence.
We disagree.
501 KAR 1:011 was amended in 1988.
found at 501 KAR 1:030.
The new version is
Because Reyes committed the crimes in
1985, he argues the pre-amendment version should be applied to
his parole hearings.
Specifically, Reyes argues that
application of the pre-amendment version of the regulation
precludes the Board from requiring him to serve out his
4
Id., quoting Glasson v. Tucker, Ky., 477 S.W.2d 168, 169 (1972).
5
County of Harlan v. Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Ky., 85 S.W.3d
607, 612 (2002).
6
Id. at 613.
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sentence.
For purposes of clarity and comparison, we will
discuss both versions of the regulation.
501 KAR 1:011 §2 states, “[a]fter the initial review
for parole, subsequent reviews, so long as confinement
continues, shall be at the discretion of the board; except that
the maximum deferment given at any one time shall be eight (8)
years.”
In contrast, the “new” version, 501 KAR 1:030 §3(4)(f),
states:
After the initial review for parole, a
subsequent review, during confinement, shall
be at the discretion of the board; except
the maximum deferment given at one (1) time
shall not exceed the statutory minimum
parole eligibility for a life sentence. The
board shall reserve the right to order a
serve-out on a sentence.
The differences between the two versions of the
regulations are slight.
While 501 KAR 1:011 §2 specifically
states that the maximum deferment shall be eight years, 501 KAR
1:030 §3(4)(f) states that the maximum deferment “shall not
exceed the statutory minimum parole eligibility for a life
sentence”; coincidentally, 501 KAR 1:030 §3(4)(a) mandates that
for felony offenses committed after December 3, 1980, but before
July 15, 1998, the “statutory minimum parole eligibility for a
life sentence” is eight years.
Therefore, although the pre-
amendment version of the regulations provided a more
straightforward articulation of the maximum length of deferment,
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the two versions both provide that a deferment may not exceed
eight years.
So the only actual change made to the post-
amendment version is the addition of the phrase, “the board
shall reserve the right to order a serve-out on a sentence.”
Looking at the definition of the terms “deferment” and
“serve-out,” we do not believe this addition to be significant.
A “deferment” is defined in 501 KAR 1:030 §1(3) as “a decision
by the board that an inmate shall serve a specific number of
months before further parole consideration.”
The regulation
further defines a “serve-out” as “a decision of the board that
an inmate shall serve until the completion of his sentence.”7
Reyes argues that because 501 KAR 1:011 §2 did not
particularly mention serve-outs, the Board could not deny him
parole and order him to serve out his sentence.
However, we do
not believe that by failing explicitly to mention serve-outs,
501 KAR 1:011 §2 necessarily required the Board to review an
inmate’s parole every eight years.
A deferment and a serve-out
are two completely different concepts.
A deferment requires a
decision by the Board that an inmate will receive further parole
consideration at a later date; as such, a deferment inherently
means that a prisoner may be eligible for parole in the future.
But a serve-out requires a decision by the Board that an inmate
must serve out the remainder of his sentence.
7
501 KAR 1:030 §1(13).
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This means that
at no time in the future will the inmate be eligible for parole.
By mentioning deferments in 501 KAR 1:011 §2, we do not believe
the intent of the regulation was to prevent serve-outs.
Rather,
the purpose was to set a maximum amount of time within which the
Board could later consider an inmate’s parole eligibility, if
the Board determined that such future eligibility was possible.
In this case, the Board decided on three separate occasions that
Reyes was not, and never would be, eligible for parole.
Therefore, rather than issuing him a deferment, they chose to
have him serve out his sentence.
This decision was within the
Board’s discretion and did not violate either 501 KAR 1:011 or
501 KAR 1:030.
Based upon the grounds cited by the Board, this
was not an abuse of discretion.
Therefore, we affirm the
circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue.
DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
Second, Reyes argues that his due process rights were
violated by the Board’s actions.
Specifically, Reyes claims the
Board “failed to abide by the provisions of KRS 439.340(2) and
501 KAR 1:011 and denied [him] parole.”
He also argues his
rights were violated because the Board failed to give him timely
notice of the September 2002 parole review.
At the outset, we observe that the granting of parole
is a completely discretionary act subject to the prudence of the
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Board.
The right to parole is not constitutionally guaranteed,
nor is there an inherent right “‘to be conditionally released
before the expiration of a valid sentence.’”8
Although they may
choose to do so, states are under no duty to establish a parole
system.9
As this Court has articulated:
[t]he mere existence of a statutory
possibility of parole does not mean the full
panoply of due process required to convict
and confine must be employed by the Board in
deciding to deny parole and continue
confinement . . . . While the statute and
regulations entitle [appellant] to review,
even a finding that certain relevant
criteria have been met does not require the
Board to release him prior to the expiration
of his sentence. Nothing in the statute or
the regulations mandates the granting of
parole in the first instance, and nothing
therein diminishes the discretionary nature
of the Board’s authority in such matters.10
Because Reyes had no due process rights to parole, his
allegations are without merit.
Nonetheless, we will review his
arguments for any valid claims of error.
KRS 439.340(2) states:
A parole shall be ordered only for the best
interest of society and not as an award of
clemency, and it shall not be considered a
reduction of sentence or pardon. A prisoner
shall be placed on parole only when
8
Belcher v. Kentucky Parole Board, Ky.App., 917 S.W.2d 584, 586
(1996), quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2104, 60 L.Ed.2d
668 (1979).
9
Greenholtz, supra at 7, 8.
10
Belcher, supra n.8, at 586.
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arrangements have been made for his proper
employment or for his maintenance and care,
and when the board believes he is able and
willing to fulfill the obligations of a law
abiding citizen.
Reyes asserts that the use of mandatory language in
the statute“shall”requires the Board to release prisoners
once they have satisfied the requisite parole conditions.
Based
on the mandatory nature of the language, Reyes claims the Board
was required to release him since, in his opinion, he satisfied
the conditions of release.
But it is clear that the Board found differently.
The
Board unequivocally decided in 1993, 1994, and 2002 that Reyes
was not eligible for parole based on a variety of significant
factors; and, therefore, he should serve out the remainder of
his sentence.
We do not believe the Board’s decision was an
abuse of discretion, as there was ample evidence to support
their findings that Reyes’s crimes had, among other things, been
sufficiently serious and violent to preclude him from early
release.
The Board obviously felt that Reyes had not been
satisfactorily rehabilitated; therefore, we find no error with
their decision.
Reyes also claims that his due process rights were
violated because he did not receive notice of the 2002 parole
review.
Again Reyes argues the pre-amendment version of the
regulation should apply to his case.
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501 KAR 1:011 §7 states, “[t]he parole hearing will
consist of an interview by the board, or a quorum of the board,
with the inmate involved.”
Similarly, 501 KAR 1:030 §3(3), the
amended version of the regulation, reads, “[t]he parole hearing
shall consist of an interview with the inmate by the board, or a
panel.”
Despite Reyes’s assertions, we do not believe that
either version of the regulation is applicable because the
Board’s 2002 review of Reyes’s parole eligibility was not a
“parole hearing” but, rather, a “review” of Reyes’s request for
reconsideration.
Reyes’s letters to the Board explicitly
requested reconsideration of the denial of his parole.
The term
“reconsideration” is defined by the regulations as “a decision
to review a previous board action.”11
As the Board correctly
noted in its letter to Reyes explaining the outcome of their
evaluation, a review of parole eligibility only requires a
hearing on the record, with the inmate’s presence only necessary
if a Board member wishes to hear additional testimony.12
In this
case, there is no evidence that any members of the Board
requested Reyes’s presence.
Therefore, the fact that Reyes did
not receive notice of the Board’s review of his eligibility was
11
501 KAR 1:030 §1(11).
12
501 KAR 1:030 §4(5) (“If the case is set for review, it shall be
conducted from the record of the first hearing. The appearance of
the inmate shall not be necessary. If a board member wishes to have
additional testimony, an appearance hearing may be conducted.”).
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not erroneous.
So we affirm the grant of summary judgment with
regard to Reyes’s claims that his due process rights were
violated.
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Reyes’s third argument is that he was denied equal
protection of the law.
He claims that similarly situated
prisoners were paroled, while he, a Latino male convicted of
murdering a white woman, was not.
Therefore, Reyes argues his
constitutional rights were violated.
When considering a claim that is based upon equal
protection, “the Court must first determine the proper level of
scrutiny to be applied.
Courts have consistently held that the
difference in treatment of incarcerated persons does not
constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws, in the
absence of a showing of suspect classification.”13
Unless a
suspect classification is at issue, the government need only
show a rational basis for its actions.14
As the United States
Supreme Court noted in City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living
Center:15
The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State
13
Mahoney v. Carter, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 575, 577 (1997).
14
Id.
15
473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.E.2d 313 (1985).
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shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws," which is essentially a direction that
all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike. Section 5 of the Amendment
empowers Congress to enforce this mandate,
but absent controlling congressional
direction, the courts have themselves
devised standards for determining the
validity of state legislation or other
official action that is challenged as
denying equal protection. The general rule
is that legislation is presumed to be valid
and will be sustained if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest. When social
or economic legislation is at issue, the
Equal Protection Clause allows the States
wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes
that even improvident decisions will
eventually be rectified by the democratic
processes.
The general rule gives way, however,
when a statute classifies by race, alienage,
or national origin. These factors are so
seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded
in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy--a view that those
in the burdened class are not as worthy or
deserving as others. For these reasons and
because such discrimination is unlikely to
be soon rectified by legislative means,
these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny
and will be sustained only if they are
suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.16
Reyes’s equal protection argument is based upon three
different claims:
first, that other inmates convicted of murder
were granted parole; second, that women convicted of murder are
16
Id. at 439, 440 (citations omitted).
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paroled more frequently than men convicted of murder; and third,
that he, a Latino man convicted of killing a white woman, was
treated differently than other inmates.
We disagree on all
points, mainly because Reyes has failed to identify the suspect
class of which he is a member.
As the Commonwealth establishes
in its brief, neither “inmates-who-have-murdered” nor “male
inmates” are considered suspect classes.
Reyes’s status as a
Latino could have placed him in a suspect class.
But he failed
to establish how he or any other Latino inmate has been treated
differently or unfairly by the Board.
Reyes argues that a week after his parole was denied,
a white man convicted of murder was paroled.
He claims this
establishes that he was treated differently.
Of course, Reyes’s
argument ignores the myriad variety of factors capable of
consideration in individual cases.
Reyes was not only convicted
of murder but also of attempted murder, robbery, two counts of
sodomy, and escape.
Taking into account all of these factors,
it is clear that the denial of Reyes’s parole was not based upon
his being a male, or being Latino, or the fact that he killed a
white woman, but, rather, the violent, serious nature of his
crimes.
Again, as the Commonwealth stated, the Board is charged
with the task of protecting the public; and an inmate will not
be released if the Board determines that the inmate still poses
a risk to society.
The Board has decided that Reyes poses such
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a risk, so his parole has been denied.
We believe this decision
was rationally related to the legitimate government interest of
protecting the public.
Therefore, we find no fault with the
Board’s decision and no violation of Reyes’s right to equal
protection.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL HEARING
Finally, Reyes argues he cannot receive a fair and
impartial hearing before the Board because of bias and
prejudice.
He claims that the Board is obviously biased because
it granted parole to a white man after it denied his parole, and
because Coy’s last written response to Reyes’s numerous requests
for reconsideration stated “any further correspondence regarding
this matter shall be filed without response.”
Since we have already decided that Reyes was not
denied any rights and, having been properly ordered to serve out
his sentence, is not eligible for future parole hearings, we
hold that this issue is moot.
There is no credible evidence
upon which to conclude that the Board’s decision was motivated
by bias or prejudice.
Reyes received more consideration from
the Board than he was actually due.
Therefore, we affirm the
grant of summary judgment with regard to this issue.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the
decision of the Franklin Circuit Court granting the Parole
Board’s Motion for Summary Judgment and overruling Reyes’s Writ
of Mandamus is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Yorig R. Reyes, Pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Karen Quinn
Frankfort, Kentucky
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