HARRY L. MATHISON, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF EILEEN N. DEEP, DECEASED v. NAN D. TERNES
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 3, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2003-CA-002565-MR
HARRY L. MATHISON, EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF EILEEN N. DEEP, DECEASED
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00560
NAN D. TERNES
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MINTON AND VANMETER JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
This appeal is from a decision of the
Henderson Circuit Court disqualifying counsel for plaintiff, as
counsel would be a necessary witness concerning certain missing
records.
For the reasons hereafter stated, we reverse and
remand.
In 2000, Eileen N. Deep (Deep) filed this action to
collect approximately $55,000 advanced to Nan D. Ternes between
March 1997 and July 1999.
During the course of this litigation
Deep was represented by the Honorable Harry L. Mathison.1
was a co-owner of a women’s clothing store, Bohn’s, Inc.
Ternes
The
other co-owner was Deep’s daughter, Michelle Deep (Michelle).
Ternes raised a number of defenses to the action: that part of
the funds were a gift, that the funds were not personal loans
from Deep to Ternes, that the funds were either a loan to or an
investment in Bohn’s, and/or that Deep purchased clothing
against her Bohn’s account in an amount equal to or in excess of
the funds advanced.
The funds apparently were tracked on a
ledger that Ternes kept at the business.
The record indicates
that Michelle had access to the ledger.
The case was initially set for a two-day trial
beginning October 18, 2001.
However, Ternes’s counsel moved for
a continuance for reasons of his health.
This motion was
granted and the trial was rescheduled for March 13, 2002.
However, on March 12 the trial court entered an order continuing
the trial due to Deep’s ill health.
The trial was reset for
September 25, 2002, but on that date apparently neither Ternes
nor her counsel appeared, and the trial was again continued over
Deep’s objection.
A new trial date was set for February 27,
2003.
On January 17, 2003, counsel for Ternes filed a motion
to withdraw.
During the February 3 hearing of the motion,
1
Eileen N. Deep died on March 31, 2003, and Mathison, as Executor of her
will, was substituted as party plaintiff.
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Honorable Joe Evans entered his appearance on Ternes’s behalf.
On February 14, Ternes filed a motion requesting production of
the store’s business records and accounts for the years involved
in the controversy.
At a pretrial hearing, the court continued
the trial date in order to give Deep an opportunity to produce
the business records requested.
In a subsequent deposition Michelle admitted that she
had possessed the store’s ledger and other business records, but
asserted that the records were no longer available.
In a 2001
pretrial brief, Deep’s counsel indicated he had possession of at
least some of the store’s business records.
During an October
2003 pretrial hearing, counsel described the store records in
his possession as being certain bank records.
Counsel for
Ternes stated these records were not included in the records
made available for him to inspect.
The circuit court granted
Ternes’s motion to disqualify Mathison as Deep’s counsel, noting
in its order that Ternes’s apparent theory justifying
disqualification was that the store’s records were apparently
lost, that both Michelle and Mathison had acknowledged
possession of at least some of the records, and that Ternes
“should be entitled to question Mr. Mathison concerning the
alleged missing records and to ask various questions of Mr.
Mathison in his capacity as executor of the estate which counsel
was precluded from asking Mrs. Deep as a result of her untimely
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death.”
The court’s order cited SCR 3.130, Rule 3.7(a),
implicitly finding that Mathison would be a necessary witness.
At Mathison’s request, the order disqualifying him as counsel
was made final and appealable.
This appeal followed.
SCR 3.130, Rule 3.7(a) provides that a lawyer “shall
not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely
to be a necessary witness.”
In Zurich Insurance Co. v. Knotts,
Ky., 52 S.W.3d 555 (2001), the court discussed this rule in
great detail, as well as the need to balance a party’s right to
be represented by counsel of his or her own choosing versus
prejudice to the opposing party’s case.
The court in Zurich
held that “disqualification is a drastic measure which courts
should be hesitant to impose except when absolutely necessary.”
Id. at 560.
The opposing party must prove that (a) counsel’s
testimony is important to its proof at trial; (b) it is probable
that counsel’s testimony will conflict with that of other
witnesses; and (c) the information obtained from counsel is
unattainable from other sources.
Id.
In the instant case, the circuit court record is
devoid of any description of the testimony which Ternes hoped to
elicit from Deep’s counsel, how that testimony would be
important to her proof, how that testimony would conflict with
the testimony of any other witness, and whether that information
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could be obtained from any other source.2
While it is possible
that Ternes ultimately might be entitled to a spoliation
instruction or some other sanction relating to a failure to
comply with discovery, we express no opinion as to that issue.
Instead, we simply conclude that the showing required under
Zurich for the disqualification of counsel was not made.
The order of the Henderson Circuit Court is reversed
and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Harry L. Mathison
Henderson, Kentucky
Joe A. Evans III
Madisonville, Kentucky
2
In fact, the main contention against Deep’s counsel is that he prepared his
pretrial brief using bank statements of the store, and that counsel for
Ternes was unable to find those bank statements in the produced records. The
record does not indicate that duplicate copies of any bank statements cannot
be obtained.
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