OWEN DAVIDSON ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN EX REL. JOYCE ANDERSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: October 8, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002532-DG
OWEN DAVIDSON
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-X-00007
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN
EX REL. JOYCE ANDERSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Owen Davidson brings this appeal from a November
3, 2003, judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court.
We vacate and
remand.
In 1982, Owen and Joyce Anderson were divorced by
decree of Laurel Circuit Court.
1
During the marriage, the
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
parties had one child, William James Davidson, born January 24,
1981.
Joyce was awarded custody of William, and Owen was
ordered to pay $100.00 per month in child support.
On December 20, 1995, the child support division of
the Laurel County Attorney's Office filed a "Complaint for Child
Support" in the Laurel District Court.
The complaint alleged
that Owen failed to make the $100.00 per month child support
payment and accumulated an arrearage.
When the complaint was
filed, William had not yet reached the age of majority.
On
October 22, 2001, the parties entered into an agreed order,
wherein Owen admitted that he owed $13,195.40 in child support
to the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet For Families and
Children (Cabinet).
He also agreed to pay the sum of $200.00
per month beginning November 1, 2001.
On February 20, 2003, the Cabinet filed a motion for
contempt in the Laurel District Court.
The Cabinet alleged that
Owen failed to make the required support payments as ordered by
the October 22, 2001, agreed order.
The district court
subsequently held a hearing on the show cause order.
By order
entered August 25, 2003, the district court found Owen in
contempt for failure to pay child support as required by the
agreed order.
The district court then sentenced Owen to six
months’ imprisonment to be purged by payment of the child
support arrearage.
-2-
On appeal, the Laurel Circuit Court affirmed the
district court's order.
Consequently, Owen filed a motion for
discretionary review with the Court of Appeals.
By order
entered December 22, 2003, this Court granted Owen's motion for
discretionary review.
This appeal follows.
Owen initially contends the district court improperly
invoked its contempt power to enforce the agreed order.
Appellant essentially argues that once a child has been
emancipated the district court no longer has the authority to
enforce its child support orders through contempt.
We disagree.
This very issue has been squarely addressed by the
Court of Appeals in Goodman v. Goodman, Ky. App., 695 S.W.2d 865
(1985).
Our Court held the power of contempt may be utilized to
compel compliance with child support orders even after the child
has reached the age of majority.
The Court pointed out that a
different result may have been reached if an action for child
support arrearage was initially brought after the minor child
reached majority.
In this case, the initial action to collect
child support arrearage was brought in 1995, well before the
child reached the age of majority.
Therefore, we hold the
district court may properly utilize its contempt powers to
enforce the agreed order.
Next, Owen argues the district court improperly found
him to be in criminal contempt for failure to abide by the terms
-3-
of the agreed order.
Having reviewed the record, we observe
that the district court's order is handwritten and constitutes
some eleven words.
There are no findings of fact in this order.
Upon review of this order, we are unable to discern whether the
court intended to find Owen in criminal contempt or civil
contempt.
It is our opinion that civil contempt would be
appropriate under these circumstances.
Before finding Owen in
civil contempt, the district court has a duty to make a specific
finding of fact upon his ability to pay and, then may only find
him in contempt for that sum of child support arrearage for
which he possesses an ability to pay.
See Lewis v. Lewis, Ky.,
875 S.W.2d 862 (1993); Commonwealth v. Bailey Ky. App., 970
S.W.2d 818 (1998).
Upon remand, we direct the district court to
conduct another hearing and make a specific finding of fact upon
Owen's ability to pay.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Laurel
District Court is vacated and this cause is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Stephen Charles
Manchester, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elmer Cunnagin, Jr.
Laurel County Attorney
London, Kentucky
-4-
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
J.L. Albright
Assistant County Attorney
London, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.