HOSEA CHATMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
November 19, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002529-MR
HOSEA CHATMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00150
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Hosea A. Chatman has appealed from an order
entered by the McCracken Circuit Court on November 17, 2003,
which denied his motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to RCr2
11.42.
Having concluded that the record conclusively resolves
all of Chatman’s claims, we affirm.
On May 12, 2001, Chatman entered a Wal-Mart store in
Paducah, McCracken County, Kentucky, placed 29 DVDs and two VHS
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
videotapes into a shopping cart, and took these items to WalMart’s garden center.
While in the garden center, Chatman
placed the stolen items outside the store’s fence.
Chatman then
took a plastic shopping bag with him and exited the store to
retrieve the items.
Unknown to Chatman, a small number of Wal-
Mart employees observed his activities; and as he was retrieving
the stolen items, the employees confronted him.
to flee, but was caught by the employees.
Chatman tried
After the police
arrived, Chatman was arrested for shoplifting.
On June 15, 2001, Chatman was indicted by a McCracken
County grand jury for theft by unlawful taking over $300.00,3 and
for being a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO
I).4
Despite the trial court appointing a public defender to
represent him, Chatman filed numerous pro se pre-trial motions.
In several of his pro se motions, Chatman pointed out that the
police never took the stolen items into custody.
Chatman
fervently argued that the Commonwealth did not have sufficient
evidence to convict him, since it could not produce the stolen
items at trial in order to prove their value.
The trial court
denied all of Chatman’s pro se motions and stated that it would
only consider motions filed by his attorney.
3
KRS 514.030.
4
KRS 532.080.
-2-
Despite this admonition, on March 1, 2002, Chatman
filed a pro se motion to have his public defender removed as
counsel.
Chatman argued that since he had filed a bar complaint
against his trial counsel, she had a conflict of interest and
could no longer represent him.
The trial court denied Chatman’s
pro se motion, but Chatman’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel and for Chatman to be allowed to proceed to trial pro
se.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on May 21,
2002, and denied the motion.
At Chatman’s trial on May 23, 2002, he was convicted
of felony theft and as being a PFO I.
The jury recommended a
sentence of five years on the theft conviction, enhanced to 20
years by the PFO I conviction.
Chatman appealed his conviction
and it was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Chatman then filed a motion to vacate his conviction
pursuant to RCr 11.42, arguing that his trial counsel had
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
According to
Chatman, he had told his attorney that he wanted to accept the
Commonwealth’s offer of 15 years and to plead guilty, but his
attorney refused to file a motion to enter a guilty plea.
Chatman argued that not only had his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance by refusing to assist him in pleading
guilty, but she also had rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to reveal to the trial court the severity of the
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conflict between them.
He also claimed that she had rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by filing a motion to withdraw
as counsel.
The trial court determined that the record
conclusively resolved all of Chatman’s allegations and denied
his RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing.
This
appeal followed.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
analyzed by applying the two-prong test set forth in Strickland
v. Washington.5
To satisfy Strickland’s first prong, a movant
must prove that his trial attorney’s performance was deficient
to such an extent that the attorney was not functioning as
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
When a movant has
pled guilty, the second prong of the Strickland test is replaced
with the test found in Hill v. Lockhart.6
To satisfy the Hill
test, a movant must prove that he was so prejudiced by the
attorney’s deficient performance that there exists, “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, movant
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.”7
In this case, Chatman asserts that his trial counsel
wrongfully induced him into standing trial instead of assisting
5
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
6
474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
7
Id.
-4-
him in pleading guilty.
In such situations, the Hill test is
still applicable.8
Chatman claims that the videotape of the hearing held
on November 19, 2001, regarding his motion to suppress evidence,
clearly shows that he attempted to plead guilty during the
hearing, but that his attorney stopped him.
We have thoroughly
reviewed the videotape record of the suppression hearing and at
no time during the hearing did Chatman try to plead guilty.
In
fact, he sat quietly while his attorney argued for suppression
of the evidence.
Chatman also claims that at the end of the suppression
hearing, the trial court asked if he and his attorney wished to
have another pretrial conference.
According to Chatman, he said
“yes” because he intended to plead guilty, but he insists his
attorney interrupted him and told the judge “no.”
evidence of this incident in the record.
There is no
The videotape reveals
that the trial court asked if the parties had already had a
pretrial conference, and Chatman’s attorney said “yes.”
At no
time during this exchange did Chatman attempt to speak.
Chatman also cites to a hearing on May 21, 2002,
regarding his attorney’s motion to withdraw, where his attorney
told the trial court that he had a very good case for trial.
Chatman contends that given the overwhelming evidence the
8
Osborne v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 992 S.W.2d 860, 863 (1998).
-5-
Commonwealth had against him that this statement demonstrates
the ineffectiveness of his counsel.
We have thoroughly reviewed
the videotape record of this hearing and at no time during this
hearing did Chatman’s attorney ever state what Chatman alleges.
Chatman also cites to one of his pro se motions and
claims that in the motion he clearly stated that he wished to
accept the Commonwealth’s offer and plead guilty.
Contrary to
Chatman’s insistence, the motion stated in pertinent part:
The terms of the [p]lea [a]geement, [i]f
[r]eached, [a]long with an executed plea
agreement [s]igned by the Commonwealth
Attorney, the Defendant and Counsel [or]
that the pending motion set before Court be
set for a hearing [w]hich is necessary for
[r]esolution of the [c]ase.9
Contrary to Chatman’s insistence, this motion does not establish
that he wished to accept the Commonwealth’s offer of 15 years.
At most, it indicates that Chatman may have wished to negotiate
a better plea offer.
Lastly, Chatman relies on a letter he received from
Damon Preston, the directing attorney for the Department of
Public Advocacy’s Paducah office, dated November 27, 2001.
Chatman argues that the letter shows that he wanted to accept
the Commonwealth’s offer and to enter a guilty plea.
stated in pertinent part:
9
Id.
-6-
The letter
I received your letter regarding a plea
offer. Although I am writing this while
Audrey [Chatman’s trial attorney] is in
court, I will inform her of your wishes when
she returns. Since you have had motion
hearings which could have affected the
outcome of your case, I believe (though I
cannot promise) that Judge Clymer and the
Commonwealth will agree to a plea at this
time. What that offer is, I cannot say as I
do not know enough about your case.
As can be seen, this letter does not indicate that Chatman
wished to accept the Commonwealth’s offer.
At most, it shows
that at one time prior to trial he was interested in negotiating
a plea.
Thus, instead of establishing that Chatman wanted to
accept the Commonwealth’s offer and to plead guilty, the record
reveals that from the beginning Chatman was convinced that
Commonwealth lacked sufficient evidence to convict him.
The
record shows that Chatman filed several motions, both pro se and
through his counsel, that raised the insufficiency of evidence
argument.
The trial court denied all of Chatman’s motions based
on the insufficiency of evidence argument and told him that his
argument was without merit.
Despite this, the record reveals
that during the hearing held on May 21, 2002, Chatman remained
convinced that the Commonwealth had insufficient evidence
against him.
The record indicates that he stated that he had
his own defense and his own evidence regarding the value of the
stolen items that he wished to present at trial, and he
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complained to the trial court that his trial counsel had refused
to present his defense.
Thus, the record conclusively refutes
Chatman’s allegation that he told his attorney that he wished to
accept the Commonwealth’s offer and to plead guilty.
Chatman also argues that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel because he had a conflict with his
attorney.
Prior to trial, Chatman received a second letter from
Damon Preston dated April 23, 2002.
In the letter, Preston
stated that Chatman had called his office numerous times and had
harassed and threatened Preston’s employees.
Preston stated
that such behavior was unacceptable, and he informed Chatman
that he had contacted the McCracken County Jailer about limiting
Chatman’s telephone privileges.
Chatman contends that his trial
counsel should have revealed the contents of Preston’s letter to
the trial court during the hearing held on May 21, 2002,
regarding the motion to withdraw.
According to Chatman, this
letter was evidence of the severity of the conflict of interest
between him and his attorney, and, if the trial court had known
the contents of this letter, it would have removed her as his
counsel.
Thus, he contends his attorney was ineffective for not
revealing to the trial court this evidence of a conflict.
According to the record of the hearing held on May 21,
2002, the conflict that Chatman had with his trial attorney
concerned proof regarding the value of the stolen items.
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The
Preston letter does not address this alleged conflict between
Chatman and his attorney.
Nor does the letter reveal an
additional conflict sufficient to have required the trial court
to grant the motion to withdraw.
Chatman also argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective because she filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.
According to Chatman, this motion was prima facie evidence that
his trial counsel’s representation fell below the objective
standard of reasonableness for criminal defense attorneys.
According to the videotape record of the hearing held
on May 21, 2002, Chatman’s attorney told the trial court that
she was required to file the motion to withdraw because of
Chatman’s bar complaint.
She also told the trial court that the
complaint had been dismissed, prior to the hearing, as being
without merit.
Since she was required to file the motion in
response to Chatman’s bar complaint, the fact that she filed the
motion is not evidence that she acted ineffectively.
Finally, Chatman argues that the trial court erred
when it denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Chatman insists that the record does not conclusively resolve
the issues that were raised in his RCr 11.42 motion.
Pursuant
to Fraser v. Commonwealth,10 if an RCr 11.42 motion raises
material issues of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved by
10
Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448 (2001).
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the record, then the trial court must grant an evidentiary
hearing.
Since the record conclusively refutes all of Chatman’s
claims, Chatman was not entitled to either appointment of
counsel or an evidentiary hearing.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the order of the
McCracken Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hosea A. Chatman, Pro Se
Central City, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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