BESSIE WILKERSON and CHARLES WILKERSON, EXECUTOR OF THE BESSIE WILKERSON ESTATE v. HARDIN COUNTY, KENTUCKY, D/B/A HARDIN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; CYNTHIA RANDOLPH; HOPE WARREN; RICK KIRCHHOFER;
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 17, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002514-MR
BESSIE WILKERSON and CHARLES WILKERSON,
EXECUTOR OF THE BESSIE WILKERSON
ESTATE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE T. STEVEN BLAND, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00874
v.
HARDIN COUNTY, KENTUCKY, D/B/A
HARDIN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL;
CYNTHIA RANDOLPH;
HOPE WARREN;
RICK KIRCHHOFER;
and MALINDE CHILDRESS
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, McANULTY, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant Charles Wilkerson, the Executor of the
Estate of Bessie Wilkerson, (Wilkerson), appeals a Hardin
Circuit Court ruling on the expiration of the Statute of
Limitations for reviving a cause of action.
We reverse the
order of the Hardin Circuit Court, and remand the action.
Wilkerson’s decedent was an elderly woman.
While in
the hospital for medical care, Bessie Wilkerson fell out of bed
and broke her hip.
negligence.
Bessie filed an action for medical
The hospital claimed sovereign immunity, and this
claim was appealed.
In an opinion dated August 9, 2002, this
Court held that the hospital could not properly claim sovereign
immunity, and the action was remanded for trial.
During the
pendency of the appellate action, Bessie Wilkerson passed away.
Her date of death was July 16, 2002.
Charles Wilkerson was appointed Executor of Bessie’s
Estate.
On July 21, 2003, the defendants in Bessie’s lawsuit
made a motion that the action be dismissed as it had not been
revived by her personal representative within a year of Bessie’s
death.
In his response to the motion to dismiss, Wilkerson
informed the court that the insurer for the defendants/appellees
had become insolvent on June 20, 2003.
Charles noted that as a
matter of law, this insolvency stayed the action for a period of
six months.
Wilkerson attached a letter from counsel for
Appellees to Wilkerson’s lawyer as an exhibit to his response to
the motion to dismiss.
This letter stated that the insurer was
insolvent, and that counsel for Appellees could take no further
action in the case at that time.
Counsel for Appellees also
stated that he would be filing a motion for a stay based on the
insolvency.
That letter was dated May 13, 2003.
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The formal
order of liquidation and insolvency was entered in Virginia on
June 20, 2003.
The record shows that all parties had notice of
entry of this order.
The Hardin Circuit Court dismissed the action on
August 20, 2003, in reliance upon KRS 395.278, the Statute
imposing a time limit for revival of a personal injury action in
which the plaintiff is deceased.
The court held that
“Plaintiff’s personal representatives have failed to revive
Plaintiff’s action within one year of her death on July 16,
2002.”
Charles’ post-judgment motion to set aside the Court’s
order and to revive the action after that date was denied.
Charles Wilkerson notes that in June, 2003, less than
a year after Bessie died, the insurance carrier for the
defendant hospital became insolvent.
He argues that KRS 304.36-
085 tolled the time limit imposed by KRS 395.278, and granted
him an additional six months within which to revive the action.
KRS 304.36-085 provides:
All proceedings in which the insolvent
insurer is a party or is obligated to defend
a party in court in this state shall,
subject to waiver by the association in
specific cases involving covered claims, be
stayed for six (6) months and any additional
time that may be determined by the court
from the date that the insolvency is
determined or an ancillary proceeding is
instituted in the state, whichever is later,
to permit proper defense by the association
of all pending causes of action.
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Id.
Wilkerson asserts that this Statute clearly stayed Bessie
Wilkerson’s action against the hospital, and provided him an
additional six months in which to revive the action following
her death.
Wilkerson claims that after the court and parties
received the insolvency order on June 30, 2003, the defendants
were barred from taking any action with regard to Bessie’s case
for six months.
Wilkerson argues that a mandatory stay tolls
the Limitations period for the term provided by law.
Appellee Hardin County d/b/a Hardin Memorial Hospital
admits that Reciprocal of America (ROA) insured the hospital,
and that ROA was deemed insolvent by the Virginia Courts, which
also ordered liquidation of the ROA assets.
Hardin County was a
party to the Virginia proceeding, and had knowledge that ROA was
insolvent.
The Virginia order noted that the rights and
liabilities of all parties with an interest in the property or
assets of ROA were fixed on the date of the entry of the
insolvency order.
Hardin County claims that the Virginia order
did not place a stay on any action involving ROA, and asserts
that imposition of Kentucky statutory language imposing a stay
is improper.
Hardin County argues that the stay permitted by KRS
304.36-085 is not automatic, but requires a party to move the
Court for enforcement of a stay.
Hardin County contends that as
Wilkerson failed to move for an enforcement of a stay, his
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allegation that the stay was in effect is incorrect.
authority supports Hardin County’s assertion.
No
The Statute does
not contain any language indicating that compliance with its
directive is discretionary.
The Statute contains no language
requiring a separate motion or court order before a stay is
considered enforceable.
Wilkerson contends that imposition of the stay is
automatic, and did not require any affirmative action by the
Virginia or Kentucky courts.
The Statute provides for a stay in
order that the parties formerly insured by the insolvent
insurer, and the insurance commissioner or the insurance
guaranty association may determine how best to manage the
situation.
We find that the Statute imposes a stay on the
action as a matter of law for the benefit of both the insured
and any party making a claim against the insured.
Hardin County contends that KRS 304.36-085 is not
applicable to the underlying action because that Statute imposes
a stay only on those cases pending before the court.
Hardin
County asserts that Kentucky courts have found that non-revived
actions are considered in a state of limbo.
See Daniel v.
Fourth and Market, Ky. App., 445 S.W.2d 699 (1968).
Hardin
County asserts that Bessie Wilkerson’s case was not pending at
the time the insolvency order was entered, but was rather “in
limbo.”
As the case was in active litigation prior to
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Wilkerson’s death, and was stayed prior to expiration of the
revival period, we hold that the case was in fact pending at the
time of the stay, and therefore may be revived after the stay is
lifted.
Kentucky law provides that actions instituted by a now
deceased person must be revived within one year from the
decedent’s date of death, or must be dismissed at the request of
the defendant.
(1989).
Snyder v. Snyder, Ky. App., 769 S.W.2d 70, 72
Appellee, Cynthia Hall, cites to Hammons v. Tremco,
Inc., Ky., 887 S.W.2d 336 (1994), which states that “the
[Limitations] period set forth in the Statute [KRS 395.278] is
mandatory and not subject to enlargement.”
Hall contends that
this language prohibits imposition of a tolling of the
Limitations period for revival of a decedent’s claim for any
reason.
No authority is provided in support of the contention
that a stay is an enlargement of time in which to file an
action, such that it would be prohibited by the applicable
Statute and related caselaw.
The stay is provided by Statute
for the benefit of the insured party, and may not be used as a
weapon to prejudice the rights of litigants seeking recompense
from the insured.
The stay does not constitute an impermissible
enlargement of time in which to revive the action.
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For this reason, the case is reversed and remanded to
the Hardin Circuit Court for proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MINTON, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
MINTON, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent.
As a result of Bessie Wilkerson’s death, the status of her
personal injury claim in the circuit court was – using
terminology from Daniel v. Fourth and Market, Inc. – in a state
of limbo.
This claim would remain in limbo until a personal
representative took steps to revive the action under KRS
395.278.
As discussed in Daniel, “reviver is not a simple
matter of straightening up the record of a lawsuit.”
688.
Id. at
“[R]evivor is much in the nature of a new action as
distinguished from an act done during the course of a
proceeding....”
Id.
Since the claim was in limbo, not pending,
when the insurer became insolvent, I do not agree that KRS
304.36.085 ever prevented Bessie Wilkerson’s personal
representative from taking steps to revive this action.
This
means that the mandatory time limitation for revival could not
have been tolled by any stay, automatic or otherwise, created by
KRS 304.36-085.
So I would affirm the circuit court’s
dismissal.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
James T. Kelley
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CYNTHIA
RANDOLPH HALL, R.N.
Craig L. Johnson
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, HARDIN
COUNTY, KENTUCKY, D/B/A HARDIN
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, MALINDE
CHILDRESS, HOPE WARREN AND
RICHARD KUCHOWICZ:
Ken Howard
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
Thomas N. Kerrick
Thomas B. Russell
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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