ROBERT LEWIS POWELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
December 3, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2003-CA-002440-MR
ROBERT LEWIS POWELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL W. ROSENBLUM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00053
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In October 2001, Robert Powell killed his wife,
Pamela, a Jefferson County Police Officer, by shooting her in
the head with her police handgun.
The shooting occurred at the
couple’s Oldham County residence.
That same month the Oldham
County grand jury indicted Powell for murder.
Initially Powell
denied any involvement and claimed that Pamela had committed
suicide.
But in April 2002, a few days before trial was
scheduled to begin, Powell entered an open guilty plea to the
murder charge.
He testified during the plea colloquy that
financial pressures had become unbearable and that he and Pamela
had entered a suicide pact.
He had helped her to shoot herself,
he testified, but then had been unable to shoot himself.
The
court accepted Powell’s plea and by judgment entered June 5,
2002, sentenced him to life in prison.
In August 2002, Powell moved pro se under RCr 11.42
for relief from that judgment.
supplemented Powell’s motion.
Appointed counsel eventually
By order entered October 20,
2003, the trial court denied relief.
that Powell has appealed.
It is from that denial
He contends that his guilty plea
should be vacated because it was based on the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.
Convinced that Powell is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on his claim, we must vacate the trial
court’s order and remand for additional proceedings.
“A guilty plea is valid only when it is entered
intelligently and voluntarily.”1
Because an uncounseled plea is
apt to be neither intelligent nor voluntary, “a guilty plea is
open to attack on the ground that counsel did not provide the
defendant with reasonably competent advice.”2
1
Counsel’s advice
Bronk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 58 S.W.3d 482, 486 (2001).
Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, Ky., 87 S.W.3d 8, 10 (2002)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
2
2
will be deemed reasonably competent unless the movant shows that
counsel “made errors so serious that counsel’s performance fell
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”3
Among the errors held to meet this seriousness
standard is counsel’s failure to conduct an appropriate
investigation into the facts of the client’s case.4
Even a
serious error such as this will not provide grounds for relief,
however, unless it also appears reasonably likely that the error
was prejudicial.5
Finally, a movant under RCr 11.42 is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing if he alleges facts which, if true, would
justify relief and which are not conclusively refuted by the
existing record.6
With respect to guilty pleas,
[g]enerally, an evaluation of the
circumstances supporting or refuting claims
of coercion and ineffective assistance of
counsel requires an inquiry into what
transpired between attorney and client that
3
Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d at 486; Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984).
4
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d
471 (2003); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.
1994) (“[C]ounsel must, at a minimum, conduct a reasonable
investigation enabling him to make informed decisions about how
best to represent his client.”).
5
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203
(1985); Bronk v. Commonwealth, supra.
6
Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448 (2001).
3
led to the entry of the plea, i.e., an
evidentiary hearing.7
Powell received nothing from the Commonwealth in
exchange for his guilty plea.
Before the plea and after it, the
Commonwealth accused Powell of murder and sought that he be
imprisoned for life, as in fact he was.
fared worse had he gone to trial.
Powell could not have
He alleges that trial
counsel’s advice to enter such a plea was ineffective because
counsel did not make a reasonable investigation into facts
suggesting that Powell killed Pamela while under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance and did not discuss with Powell
the possibility of raising an EED defense.
We agree with Powell
that that possibility should have been explored; if counsel
failed to do so, then such failure may constitute serious error
as discussed above.
Such an error may have been prejudicial
because even a tenuous defense is reasonably likely to have been
preferred to an open guilty plea, which left Powell exposed to
the maximum punishment.
Of course there may be strategic reasons for entering
an open plea,8 such as acceptance of responsibility in order to
improve his chances of parole, or reasons having nothing to do
with strategy, such as the defendant’s remorse or his desire to
7
Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d at 11.
8
Phon v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 51 S.W.3d 456 (2001).
4
spare himself or others the ordeal of trial.
Counsel’s advice,
in other words, may well have been reasonable and Powell’s plea
voluntary.
The record, however, does not refute Powell’s
allegation that the advice to enter a guilty plea was based on
counsel’s inadequate investigation.
This is so notwithstanding
Powell’s admission during the plea colloquy that he had read and
discussed with counsel the murder statute, which refers to
extreme emotional disturbance.
Powell was entitled to counsel’s
assistance, including reasonable investigation,9 regarding a
potential EED defense.
Without an appropriate investigation,
counsel’s discussion of that defense may not have been adequate.
The reasonableness of an investigation (or lack of one) is to be
judged not from hindsight but from the circumstances confronting
counsel at the time, including what the defendant has told him.10
An evidentiary hearing is necessary in this case to make plain
what those circumstances were.
Powell also alleges that counsel led him to believe
that he would be exposed to the death penalty if he went to
trial and that he would be paroled after serving twenty-five
years.
The record refutes the latter allegation.
At the plea
colloquy Powell acknowledged that a life sentence meant
9
10
Strickland v. Washington, supra.
Id.
5
confinement for life and that no promise of other treatment had
been made to him.
Were it not for Powell’s open guilty plea we would say
that the record refutes the death-penalty allegation too, for at
no point did the Commonwealth institute death-penalty
proceedings.
A desire to avoid the death penalty, however,
would provide a reason for Powell’s plea.
Powell may raise this
claim at the evidentiary hearing as well.
In sum, the record does not conclusively refute
Powell’s claims that his guilty plea was involuntary because it
resulted from counsel’s failures to investigate a viable defense
and to explain the potential penalties.
Powell is thus entitled
to assert those claims at an evidentiary hearing.
Accordingly,
we vacate the October 20, 2003, order of the Oldham Circuit
Court and remand for additional proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David Harshaw
Assistant Public Advocate
LaGrange, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
6
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