AUDUBON METALS, LLC v. BERNARD THOMAS, JR.; HON. DONALD G. SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JUNE 4, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002435-WC
AUDUBON METALS, LLC
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-00-65407
BERNARD THOMAS, JR.;
HON. DONALD G. SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND THE WORKERS’
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
Audubon Metals, LLC, seeks review from an
order of the Workers’ Compensation Board, entered October 15,
2003, reversing a decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
regarding the commencement date of an award of permanent partial
disability benefits to Bernard Thomas Jr.
The issue on appeal
is whether the Board properly characterized this determination
as a matter of law rather than fact.
Thomas is employed as a maintenance mechanic at
Audubon.
On October 16, 2000, he was injured when a part
dislodged from some hydraulic machinery on which he was working
and struck him in the face.
His eye, nose, jaw and teeth were
seriously injured and he required immediate surgery.
As a
result of the injury, Thomas was unable to resume working until
December 26, 2000.
When he returned to work, he was placed on
light duty for some time.
He then resumed regular duty although
he has required the assistance of Billy Jones, a fellow
employee, to perform his job.
Thomas missed one week of work in
September 2002, for dental surgery related to the injury.
On
December 10, 2002, he filed an application for resolution of
injury claim with the Department of Workers’ Claims.
After considering several physicians’ reports and the
deposition of Billy Jones, and hearing testimony from Thomas and
Thomas’ supervisor, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded
temporary total disability benefits for the period immediately
following the accident when Thomas was unable to return to work
(October 17, 2000 through December 25, 2000) and for the week
Thomas had his dental surgery (September 12, 2002 through
September 18, 2002).
The ALJ also awarded permanent partial
disability income benefits based on a 36 percent impairment
rating beginning on September 19, 2002, and continuing until
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Thomas qualifies for old age Social Security retirement
benefits.
Thomas thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration,
requesting an award of permanent partial disability benefits for
the period between December 26, 2000, (when he returned to work
following his injury) and September 11, 2002, (the commencement
of the week he was away from work for the dental surgery).
The
motion was denied and Thomas subsequently appealed to the
Workers’ Compensation Board.
In reviewing the ALJ’s opinion, the Board found that
the ALJ had erred as a matter of law in failing to award
permanent partial disability benefits for the period immediately
following the first period of total temporary disability.
The
Board reversed the ALJ’s decision and remanded the case for an
award of permanent partial disability benefits commencing on
December 26, 2000.
This appeal by Audubon followed.
Audubon argues that the starting date of the permanent
partial disability was a factual determination within the
discretion of the ALJ.
Audubon maintains that the Board
therefore exceeded the scope of its review when it substituted
its judgment for that of the ALJ as to the weight of evidence on
a question of fact.
Audubon further argues that the ALJ made
adequate findings of fact to support the determination that the
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permanent partial disability benefits were to be awarded from
September 19, 2002.
The duty of this Court is to correct the Board only
where it has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so
flagrant as to cause gross injustice.
Western Baptist Hospital
v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (1992); Whittaker v.
Rowland, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1999).
We agree with the Board that, as a matter of law, in
most cases the period of permanent partial disability will
immediately follow the period of total temporary disability.
Although our review of the Board’s statutory
interpretations is less deferential than our
review of its factual determinations,
Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Garland, Ky.,
805 S.W.2d 116 (1991), nevertheless, an
administrative agency’s construction of its
statutory mandate, particularly its
construction of its own regulations, is
entitled to respect and is not to be
overturned on appeal unless clearly
erroneous. J.B. Blanton Company, Inc. v.
Lowe, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 376 (1967).
Homestead Nursing Home v. Parker, Ky. App, 86 S.W.3d 424, 426
(1999).
The Board based its decision on the statutory
provisions that govern the award of income benefits, stating as
follows:
“When read together, we believe KRS 342.730(1)(b) and
KRS 342.730(1)(d) require, in most instances, that the payment
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of permanent partial disability begins following the period of
TTD [total temporary disability] when a claimant first returns
to work.”
KRS 342.730(1)(b) provides in relevant part as
follows:
[I]ncome benefits for disability shall be
paid to the employee as follows:
For permanent partial disability, sixty-six
and two-thirds percent (66-2/3%) of the
employee’s average weekly wage but not more
than seventy-five percent (75%)of the state
average weekly wage as determined by KRS
342.740, multiplied by the permanent
impairment rating caused by the injury or
occupational disease . . . Any temporary
total disability period within the maximum
period for permanent, partial disability
benefits shall extend the maximum period [.]
(Emphasis added.)
KRS 342.730(1)(d) governs the length of the payment period,
stating as follows:
For permanent partial disability, if an
employee has a permanent disability rating
of fifty percent (50%) or less as a result
of a work-related injury, the compensable
permanent partial disability period shall be
four hundred twenty-five (425) weeks, and if
the permanent disability rating is greater
than fifty percent (50%), the compensable
permanent partial disability period shall be
five hundred twenty (520) weeks from the
date of the impairment or disability
exceeding fifty percent (50%) arises.
(Emphasis added.)
The Board also relied on the definition of temporary
total disability found in KRS 342.0011(11)(a).
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It states:
“Temporary total disability” means the condition of an employee
who has not reached maximum medical improvement from an injury
and has not reached a level of improvement that would permit a
return to employment[.] KRS 342.0011(11)(a).
We agree with the Board that the language of these
statutes supports the general principle that the period of
permanent partial disability will immediately follow the injury
or the period of temporary total disability caused by the
injury.
Furthermore, KRS 342.730(1)(b) clearly envisions that
periods of temporary total disability (such as the week of
Thomas’ dental surgery) may occur within periods of permanent
partial disability.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has also indicated that
periods of total temporary disability and permanent partial
disability are generally contiguous.
Awards of temporary total disability are
appropriate when a worker is totally
disabled by the effects of a compensable
injury but has not yet reached MMI [maximum
medical improvement], a term that refers to
the time at which the worker’s medical
condition has stabilized so that any
remaining physical impairment and occupation
disability can be viewed as being permanent.
Clemco Fabricators v. Becker, Ky., 62 S.W.3d 396, 397-98 (2001)
citing W.L. Harper Construction Company, Inc. v. Baker, Ky.
App., 858 S.W.2d 202 (1993). See also Pierson v. Lexington
Public Library, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 316, 319 (1999).
TTD [temporary total disability] exists only
until a worker’s condition stabilizes so
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that the extent and duration of any
permanent occupational disability can be
determined, and KRS 342.730(1)(b)
contemplates that periods of TTD may occur
within a period of permanent, partial
disability.
KI USA Corp. v. Hale, Ky., 3 S.W.3d 355, 358 (1999).
A situation could arise in which a worker made a
complete recovery following a period of total temporary
disability but then, after a period of time had passed, suffered
a relapse and an onset of permanent partial disability.
In his
findings, however, the ALJ did not highlight any facts clearly
distinguishing the period after Thomas’ dental surgery as the
time of the onset of the partial permanent disability.
Audubon
nonetheless argues that there was no proof of a permanent
partial disability in April 2001, when Thomas was examined by
Dr. Satish Shah, and that the first permanent partial disability
rating did not occur until November 2002, when Dr. Chris
Covington performed his examination of Thomas.
Although Dr.
Shah stated that Thomas “can continue to work at full duty at
his current position with no work restrictions necessary,” he
also noted various physical symptoms stemming from the work
injury.
Furthermore, Dr. Covington’s report, that the ALJ
deemed the “most persuasive,” stated that “the patient was sent
over today for consultation in regards to an impairment rating
and [in] regards to his original work related injury back on
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10/16/00.”
(Emphasis added.)
The ALJ also found that Billy
Jones has worked with and assisted Thomas on an almost daily
basis since he first returned to work following the injury,
because Thomas has difficulty walking and lifting.
Based on these findings of fact, we do not think the
Board “committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant
as to cause gross injustice.”
Western Baptist Hospital, 827
S.W.2d at 688.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
R. Christion Hutson
Whitlow, Roberts, Houston &
Straub, PLLC
Paducah, Kentucky
Sidney H. Hulette
Hulette & Arnett, LLP
Morganfield, Kentucky
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