TIMOTHY TILLERY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 15, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002412-MR
TIMOTHY TILLERY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00162
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, MINTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
After entering a guilty plea, Timothy
Tillery was sentenced to eight years in prison by the Bell
Circuit Court for two counts of selling crack cocaine.
He did
not appeal, but he later filed postconviction motions to vacate
the judgment.
The motions were denied without an evidentiary
hearing being held, and Tillery filed this appeal.
We affirm.
On October 11, 1999, a Bell County grand jury indicted
Tillery on two counts of first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance, second offense, and for being a seconddegree persistent felony offender (PFO II).
The trafficking
offenses each carried possible prison sentences of ten to twenty
years.
Had Tillery been convicted of those offenses, his
sentences would have been enhanced had he also been found guilty
of the PFO charge.
Rather than stand trial for the crimes for which he
was indicted, Tillery entered into a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth.
Under the terms of the agreement, the two
trafficking charges were amended from second offense to first
offense.
Further, the PFO charge was dismissed.
Before being sentenced, Tillery filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas.
was denied.
A hearing was held, but the motion
Tillery was then sentenced by the court to eight
years in prison on each trafficking charge, with the sentences
to run concurrently with each other.
The final judgment was
entered on January 7, 2003.
With the assistance of counsel, on March 27, 2003,
Tillery filed an RCr1 11.42 motion to set aside the judgment.
He
later filed a pro se motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to
RCr 11.42 and/or CR2 60.02.
In the latter motion he moved the
court to appoint counsel, to conduct an evidentiary hearing, and
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis.
Furthermore, he
filed a motion for the trial judge to recuse.
All motions were
denied by the court without an evidentiary hearing in an order
entered on October 27, 2003.
Tillery’s appeal herein followed.
Tillery contends that the circuit court erred in not
granting an evidentiary hearing.
An evidentiary hearing on an
RCr 11.42 motion is required if there is a material fact issue
that cannot be conclusively resolved by examining the record.
See Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (2001).
Tillery makes three arguments in his brief alleging the
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty
plea.
We will examine each to determine whether the record
conclusively disproves his allegations.
Tillery first argues that his guilty plea was not made
knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
In support of this argument, he contends
that his counsel failed to investigate the case, failed to
interview prospective witnesses, and failed to “study the law
and facts” of his case.
He asserts that the record reflects
that his plea did not satisfy the requirements of Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1969).
However, he fails to state the facts that would have been
disclosed by further investigation, the names of the prospective
witnesses who could have helped his defense, and the law and/or
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facts that would have aided his counsel had he known of them.
See RCr 11.42(2) which states in part that “[t]he motion . . .
shall state specifically the grounds on which the sentence is
being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in
support of such grounds.”
The short answer to this argument is that the record
indicates that Tillery’s plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, and that the requirements of the
Boykin case were met.
Tillery signed two documents prior to
entering his guilty plea.
The first was the Commonwealth’s
Offer on a Plea of Guilty, and the second was a Motion to Enter
Guilty Plea.
The first document specifically set forth the
terms of the plea agreement, including the charges to which
Tillery would be pleading guilty and the sentence he would
receive.
The second document explained his constitutional
rights, including his right to a trial by jury, and acknowledged
that he would be waiving all rights should he plead guilty to
the charges.
Additionally, the circuit court engaged in an
extensive colloquy with Tillery explaining to him his
constitutional rights as well as the consequences of a guilty
plea.
“[T]he validity of a guilty plea is determined not by
reference to some magic incantation recited at the time it is
taken but from the totality of the circumstances surrounding
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it.”
Kotas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (1978).
See also Centers v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 51, 54
(1990).
The circumstances in this case are similar to those in
Kiser v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 829 S.W.2d 432 (1992).
In that
case the appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion to vacate the judgment on
the grounds that the plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently was denied where the transcript of the guilty
plea proceedings and the accompanying forms signed by the
Id. at
appellant indicated that he had entered a valid plea.
434.
Likewise, having reviewed the transcript of the guilty
plea proceeding in this case and having reviewed the
accompanying documents as well as the statements made by Tillery
concerning his guilty plea at the hearing where he sought to
have it withdrawn, we conclude that the record conclusively
demonstrates the validity of the plea.
Tillery’s second argument is that he received the
ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to
discuss with him the possibility of being convicted of a lesserincluded offense if he chose to stand trial.
However, he does
not state in either his brief or his motion what the lesser
offense was or why the evidence would have warranted a
conviction of a lesser offense.
Assuming that Tillery could
demonstrate that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in this
regard, he has not indicated how he was prejudiced.
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In short,
we conclude he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
this issue.
Tillery’s third argument is that he received the
ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel grossly
misadvised him as to parole eligibility on the sentence he
received.
In his RCr 11.42 motion, Tillery states that his
attorney advised him that he would be eligible for parole after
serving nineteen months and two days of the sentence.
Having
received an eight-year sentence, Tillery would have been
eligible for parole consideration after serving twenty percent
of it.
months.
Twenty percent of eight years (96 months) is 19.2
We fail to see any gross misadvise in this regard.
Although he does not make specific reference to it,
Tillery’s real complaint is that he discovered following
sentencing that his parole in Tennessee would likely be revoked
because of the judgment of conviction herein.
This matter was
specifically addressed by the trial court when Tillery entered
his guilty plea.
The court asked Tillery whether this
conviction was going to be a violation of his parole in
Tennessee.
Tillery stated that it would not because “[t]his was
prior.”
The failure of an attorney to advise a defendant of
parole eligibility prior to entering a guilty plea is not such a
failure as to warrant relief under RCr 11.42.
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See Turner v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 647 S.W.2d 500, 502 (1982).
Even if it
were grounds for such relief, Tillery has not shown how his
attorney’s statement as to parole eligibility was inaccurate.
Parole eligibility and the actual granting of parole are two
different matters, especially considering that Tillery was on
parole from Tennessee when he was convicted herein.
In short,
we conclude there was no constitutional violation to warrant
relief from the judgment.
Finally, Tillery also apparently appealed from the
circuit court’s denial of his motion to recuse.
Tillery did not
address that issue other than brief mention of it at the
conclusion of his brief.
He failed to demonstrate how his
motion had merit, and we conclude that the court properly denied
it.
Because the record conclusively refuted the
allegations made by Tillery in his motions, the order of the
Bell Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy Tillery, Pro Se
Beattyville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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