RANDY AKERS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
September 24, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002393-MR
RANDY AKERS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00265
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, TACKETT AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Randy Akers (hereinafter “Akers”) has appealed
from the Bell Circuit Court’s September 25, 2003, order denying
his RCr 11.42 motion to vacate judgment without an evidentiary
hearing and from the October 15, 2003, order denying his CR
59.05 motion to vacate the previous ruling.
Having closely
examined the record and the applicable case law, we must reverse
the circuit court’s ruling and remand this matter for an
evidentiary hearing.
On December 13, 2001, the Bell County Grand Jury
indicted Akers on one count of theft by unlawful taking over
$3001 and for being a persistent felony offender in the second
degree (hereinafter “PFO II”).2
According to the indictment, the
theft charge stemmed from a November 2, 2001, incident in which
Akers took a 1968 Mack DM 600 dump truck from Marvin Brock
without his permission.
At his arraignment on January 18, 2002,
the circuit court appointed public defender Richard O’Leary to
defend Akers, and scheduled a pretrial conference for March 4,
2002.
By order entered January 23, 2002, the circuit court
ordered both sides to furnish discovery.3
At the March 4, 2002,
pretrial conference, Akers, now represented by public defender
Cotha V. Hudson, indicated that he had rejected an offer by the
Commonwealth and wanted a jury trial.
Although the circuit
court assigned a trial date of June 4, 2002, that date was later
reassigned and a pretrial conference was scheduled for June 17,
2002.
At the beginning of the June 17, 2002, court appearance,
attorney Hudson indicated that Akers wanted to enter an open
plea.
However, Akers failed to appear at that court date.
Accordingly, the circuit court issued a bench warrant, which was
served on August 28, 2002.
The circuit court scheduled another
pretrial conference for September 16, 2002.
1
2
3
KRS 514.030.
KRS 532.030(2).
The record does not contain any discovery material.
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Akers appeared at the September 16, 2002, pretrial
conference, at which time he indicated his desire, after
conferring with his attorney, to enter an open guilty plea.
The
circuit court then conducted a hearing pursuant to Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), to
determine whether Akers’s judgment was impaired by medication,
alcohol, or drugs; whether he had reviewed the facts of the case
with his attorney and was fully informed about the case; whether
he understood all of his constitutional rights and that he was
waiving those rights by pleading guilty; and whether he had been
coerced or threatened into entering a guilty plea.
His attorney
indicated that Akers was pleading guilty to both the theft by
unlawful taking and the PFO II charges, for which he could
receive a maximum sentence of ten years.
The circuit court then
asked Akers questions related to the offense to which he was
pleading guilty, and Akers admitted that at the time he
committed the offense, he was twenty-one years old and had
previously been convicted of a felony.
At the conclusion of the
hearing, the circuit court accepted Akers’s plea as voluntary.
The matter proceeded to a final sentencing hearing on November
6, 2002, and the final judgment was entered on November 20,
2002.
The circuit court sentenced Akers to a five-year sentence
on the theft conviction, enhanced to eight years due to the PFO
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II conviction, and provided for a seventy-one day credit for
time already served.
From March to September 2003, Akers filed four motions
for shock probation, each of which the circuit court denied.
On
September 22, 2003, Akers filed a pro se motion to correct
sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42.
In his motion and memorandum in
support, Akers indicated that he did not want his sentence
vacated or set aside, but rather wanted the sentence to be
corrected to show that he should not have been charged with
theft by unlawful taking, but with unauthorized use of an
automobile or other propelled vehicle pursuant to KRS 514.100.
Akers argued that he received ineffective assistance from his
attorney because she failed to fully inform herself of the facts
and law of the case, and was inadequately prepared.
Akers also
moved for an evidentiary hearing because his allegations were
not refuted by the record, as well as for the appointment of
counsel.
On September 25, 2003, the circuit court denied
Akers’s RCr 11.42 motion, indicating that there was no need for
an evidentiary hearing and that because his plea was voluntarily
entered, he was not entitled to any relief.4
Akers filed a CR
59.05 motion to vacate that ruling, which was also denied
without a hearing on October 15, 2003.
4
This appeal followed.
The circuit court did not rule on the motion for appointment of counsel.
-4-
On appeal, Akers continues to argue that he was
improperly charged and that he received ineffective assistance
from his appointed counsel, and thus is entitled to relief
pursuant to RCr 11.42.
On the other hand, the Commonwealth
argues that the circuit court properly denied Akers’s motion
without an evidentiary hearing because he did not cite grounds
sufficient to support his motion, his plea was voluntary, and
his attorney was not ineffective.
In order to establish a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, a movant must meet the requirements of a
two-prong test.
A movant must establish:
1) that counsel’s
performance was deficient and 2) that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986).
Pursuant to
Strickland, the standard for attorney performance is reasonable,
effective assistance.
A movant must show that his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, or under the prevailing professional norms.
The
movant bears the burden of proof, and must overcome a strong
presumption that counsel’s performance was adequate.
Jordan v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 878 (1969); McKinney v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 874 (1969).
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If an evidentiary
hearing is held, our review entails a determination as to
whether the circuit court acted erroneously in finding that the
defendant below received effective assistance of counsel.
v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 655 S.W.2d 506 (1983).
Ivey
If an
evidentiary hearing is not held, our review is limited to
“whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not
conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would
invalidate the conviction.”
S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967).
Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 411
See also Sparks v. Commonwealth,
Ky.App., 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (1986)
In Sparks, this Court addressed the validity of guilty
pleas:
The test for determining the validity of a
guilty plea is whether the plea represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the
defendant. North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162
(1970). There must be an affirmative
showing in the record that the plea was
intelligently and voluntarily made. Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct.
1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). However,
“the validity of a guilty plea is determined
not by reference to some magic incantation
recited at the time it is taken but from the
totality of the circumstances surrounding
it.” Kotas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d
445, 447 (1978), (citing Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S.Ct. 1463,
1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)).
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Sparks, 721 S.W.2d at 727.
The Sparks Court also addressed the
two-part test used to challenge a guilty plea based upon
ineffective assistance of counsel:
A showing that counsel’s assistance was
ineffective in enabling a defendant to
intelligently weigh his legal alternatives
in deciding to plead guilty has two
components: (1) that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel’s performance fell
outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance; and (2) that the
deficient performance so seriously affected
the outcome of the plea process that, but
for the errors of counsel, there is a
reasonable probability that the defendant
would not have pleaded guilty, but would
have insisted on going to trial. Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370,
80 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Cf., Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25
L.Ed.2d 763 (1970).
Sparks, 721 S.W.2d at 727-728.
In the present matter, the circuit court did not hold
an evidentiary hearing, so that our review is limited to
determining whether the motion states grounds not conclusively
refuted by the record that would invalidate the conviction, if
true.
Based upon our review, we must hold that the record does
not conclusively refute the grounds Akers presented in his RCr
11.42 motion.
Rather, the record, limited as it is and with
Akers’s statements taken as true, appears to support findings
that Akers’s plea was involuntary and that his appointed counsel
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was ineffective.
The transcript of the September 16, 2002,
guilty plea hearing reveals that Akers did not understand the
elements of the offense to which he was pleading guilty.
Akers
was indicted for, and pled guilty to, theft by unlawful taking
over $300 pursuant to KRS 514.030(1), a Class D felony, which
provides that a person is guilty of that offense “when he
unlawfully: (a) Takes or exercises control over moveable
property of another with intent to deprive him thereof[.]”
On
the other hand, Akers asserts that he should have been charged
with and convicted of the unauthorized use of an automobile or
other propelled vehicle pursuant to KRS 514.100, a Class A
misdemeanor, which provides:
“(1) A person is guilty of the
unauthorized use of an automobile or other propelled vehicle
when he knowingly operates, exercises control over, or otherwise
uses such vehicle without consent of the owner or person having
legal possession thereof.”
At the guilty plea hearing, the
following colloquy took place between the circuit court and
Akers regarding the theft charge:
THE COURT: Are you entering a plea of
guilty to the charge of Theft Over $300.00,
because on November 2, 2001, you took a 1968
Mack Dump Truck valued at more than $300.00,
from Marvin Brock without his permission and
with the intent to steal the truck from
Marvin Brock?
MR. RANDY AKERS:
I did take it.
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THE COURT: Was it you intent to deprive him
of that vehicle?
MR. RANDY AKERS:
What is that now?
THE COURT: Was it your intent to deprive
him of that vehicle, and that he was never
going to get it back?
MR. RANDY AKERS:
it back.
THE COURT:
When?
MR. RANDY AKERS:
THE COURT:
Yes, I was going to bring
That same night.
What were you using it for?
MR. RANDY AKERS:
drive.
I just took it for a
MRS. COTHA V. HUDSON:
Judge.
And wrecked it,
It certainly appears that Akers did not understand the elements
of the crime for which he was charged and to which he was
entering a guilty plea.
In light of Akers’s contradictory
responses, the circuit court should have further questioned
Akers to ensure that his plea was both intelligent and knowing.
Furthermore, his appointed counsel should have ensured that
Akers understood the elements of the offense before recommending
that he enter a guilty plea.
Although we recognize and agree
with the Commonwealth’s argument that he may not attack the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction due to the
entry of a guilty plea, Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 724
S.W.2d 223 (1986), Akers is permitted to collaterally attack his
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conviction based upon the validity of the plea itself and upon
the conduct of his appointed counsel.
Because the circuit court did not hold an evidentiary
hearing, we must reverse the denial of the RCr 11.42 motion as
well as the denial of the motion for an evidentiary hearing.
We
remand this matter for a ruling on Akers’s motion for
appointment of counsel and for an evidentiary hearing regarding
the validity of the guilty plea and as to whether his appointed
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea
proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s order
denying the RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing is
reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Randy Akers, pro se
Central City, KY
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Janine Coy Bowden
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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