KERRY L. DICKERSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
December 10, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
2003-CA-002252-MR
KERRY L. DICKERSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
HONORABLE STEPHEN K. MERSHON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-000269
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER, JUDGE; MILLER, SENIOR
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Appellant Kerry L. Dickerson (Dickerson)
brings this appeal from a judgment on a plea of guilty and
sentence of probation entered September 24, 2003 in the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
The question presented concerns the
trial court’s denial of Dickerson’s motion to suppress on two
grounds.
First, Dickerson argues that the trial court
improperly failed to suppress statements made by him and his
girlfriend, Stacy King, while both were detained during the
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Senior Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
search of 233 Cecil Avenue pursuant to a valid warrant.
Second,
Dickerson argues that the trial court improperly failed to
suppress the fruits (crack cocaine, digital scales and $13,000)
of the search of 337 South Shawnee Terrace.
Having concluded
that the trial court properly denied the suppression motion, we
affirm.
The facts are these.
Police obtained a search warrant
for 233 Cecil Avenue, Dickerson and Thomas H. Pendergrass.
While conducting the search of the residence the police found
Dickerson and his girlfriend, Stacy King, parked in front.
The
police gave Dickerson and King their rights pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)
and both were detained during the search of the residence.
Recovered from the residence were several firearms, crack
cocaine residue and marijuana.
While being detained Dickerson
told police that he had $6,000 and some “ounces” at King’s
residence, 337 South Shawnee Terrace.
there, consented to a search.
King’s mother, who lived
Dickerson took police to a
curtain above his bed and showed them where he had hidden
approximately thirteen ounces of crack and digital scales.
also showed them where he had hidden $13,000 in cash.
On January 31, 2001, Dickerson was indicted for
trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree
(Schedule II:
cocaine), Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
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He
218A.1412; misdemeanor illegal use or possession of drug
paraphernalia, KRS 218A.500; and as a persistent felony offender
(PFO) in the second degree, KRS 532.080.
On April 2, 2002, Dickerson filed a motion to
suppress, claiming that he and others were detained without
probable cause; that he and others were not Mirandized after
being taken into custody and that the consent forms to search
his residence were obtained through coercion, threat and fraud.
On July 19, 2002, following a suppression hearing, the trial
court concluded that the search warrant was supported by
probable cause; that Dickerson was properly Mirandized and the
detention of him and King during the search of 233 Cecil was
legal; and that the search of 337 South Shawnee Trace was valid
as consented to by owner and resident Yvonne King.
On August 5, 2003, on recommendation by the
Commonwealth of dismissal of the PFO II charge, Dickerson
pleaded guilty to first degree trafficking in a controlled
substance and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia.
On
September 24, 2003, the trial court sentenced Dickerson to ten
years on the trafficking charge and twelve months on the drug
paraphernalia charge to run concurrently for a total of ten
years to serve, and then probated Dickerson for five years.
This appeal follows.
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The Commonwealth argues initially that Dickerson’s
appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09.
We conclude that Dickerson has
sufficiently reserved the right to appeal these suppression
issues by the reference to “conditional plea” written at the
bottom of the first page of the Commonwealth’s Offer on a Plea
of Guilty.
We further conclude that Dickerson is complaining of
an abridgement of rights secured to him by the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Section Ten of the
Kentucky Constitution.
The standard for appellate review of a trial court's
decision on a suppression motion following a hearing is twofold.
First, we must determine whether the factual findings of the
trial court are supported by substantial evidence.
If so, we
must then determine if the trial court violated the rule of law
in applying it to the established facts.
RCr 9.78; Adcock v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998).
With regard to Dickerson’s suppression arguments, we
are bound to assume that the trial court’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence because the record does not
contain the videotape of the suppression hearing.
When the
complete record is not before the appellate court, the appellate
court must assume that the omitted record supports the decision
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of the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Thompson, Ky., 697 S.W.2d
143, 145 (1985).
Having concluded that the trial court’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, we next address whether the
trial court correctly applied the law.
Dickerson argues that
the detention of both him and King was unlawful and improperly
used to induce consent to search 337 South Shawnee Terrace.
This argument fails on several grounds.
With regard to the
whether the detention was proper, a warrant to search for
contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it
the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises
while a proper search is conducted.
Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2595, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981).
Herein, the warrant not only authorized the search of 233 Cecil
Avenue but also authorized the search of Dickerson.
detention was valid.
The
And the validity of the consent given by
Dickerson and Stacy King is irrelevant, as valid consent to
search 337 South Shawnee Terrace was given by owner and resident
Yvonne King.
With regard to Dickerson’s argument that the search of
337 South Shawnee Terrace was illegal due to the failure of the
Commonwealth to produce Yvonne King’s signed form authorizing
the search, Yvonne King’s voluntary consent validated the
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search.
Dickerson did not live at the address and had no
standing to give consent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mark Hyatt Gaston
Louisville, KY 40202
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Susan R. Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY 40601
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