LEROY ROCKCORRY LEE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 5, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002240-MR
LEROY ROCKCORRY LEE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00804
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Leroy Rockcorry Lee has appealed from the final
judgment and sentence of imprisonment entered by the Fayette
Circuit Court on October 7, 2003, which convicted him of
trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree (crack
cocaine),1 and possession of prescription drugs not in a proper
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412.
container.2
Having concluded that (1) the trial court did not
err in denying Lee’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal;
(2) the Commonwealth did not improperly bolster the credibility
of a police informant who testified at trial; (3) the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lee’s motion to
strike for cause a juror who was employed as a police officer;
and (4) Lee received a fundamentally fair trial, we affirm.
On June 30, 2003, a Fayette County grand jury returned
an indictment against Lee charging him with trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree and possession of
prescription drugs not in a proper container.
The charges
stemmed from a drug transaction involving Lee and a confidential
informant, Harold Torkle, Jr., that took place in Lexington,
Kentucky, on May 21, 2003.
Lee entered pleas of not guilty to
both charges and the case proceeded to trial.
Detective Shawn Ray, a member of the narcotics unit of
the Lexington Metro Police Department, testified at trial
concerning the procedures employed by the police to ensure that
informants used to purchase drugs are “qualified.”
Det. Ray
stated that an informant must perform two controlled buys to be
considered “qualified” and he explained that this procedure is
designed, inter alia, to ensure that a particular informant is
“trustworthy.”
2
Det. Ray testified that Torkle “had been
KRS 218A.210.
-2-
qualified.”
Det. Ray further testified that Torkle was working
under his supervision on May 21, 2003, and he stated that he met
Torkle at police headquarters in Lexington that afternoon.
Det.
Ray further stated that he placed an electronic transmission
device in the trunk of Torkle’s car and provided him with some
“buy money.”
Det. Ray testified that he then followed Torkle to
the 100 block of Rand Avenue.
Det. Ray explained that he pulled
into a “park area” located nearby while Torkle continued along
Rand Avenue.
Det. Ray stated that Torkle proceeded to purchase
$20.00 worth of crack cocaine from an individual he met on Rand
Avenue.3
Det. Ray testified that he called Torkle’s cell phone
shortly after the transaction took place and obtained a
description of the individual who sold him the drugs, which he
relayed to the other officers from his unit that were in the
area.
Det. Ray stated that he then met Torkle at a
predetermined rendezvous point.
Det. Ray testified that Torkle
gave him a baggie which contained what appeared to be
approximately .2 grams of crack cocaine.4
Det. Ray stated that
he escorted Torkle back to Rand Avenue, where he identified Lee,
who had already been arrested at this point based on the
3
Det. Ray explained that he listened to the transaction over the transmission
device.
4
Lab tests later revealed that the baggie contained approximately .116 grams
of crack cocaine.
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description Torkle provided to Det. Ray, as the individual who
sold him the crack cocaine.
Torkle explained that he agreed to act as a
confidential informant in April 2003, after he was charged with
a drug-related offense.
In sum, Torkle’s testimony was
consistent with Det. Ray’s account of the transaction.
Torkle
testified that he purchased $20.00 worth of crack cocaine from
Lee on May 21, 2003.
Torkle stated that when he turned onto
Rand Avenue, Lee approached his car.
Torkle explained that he
asked Lee if he had a “deuce,” the street term for .2 grams of
crack cocaine.
Torkle testified that Lee proceeded to a house
on Rand Avenue and returned with the drugs.
Torkle stated that
he rendezvoused with Det. Ray shortly thereafter.
Torkle
explained that Det. Ray then escorted him back to Rand Avenue,
where he identified Lee as the individual who sold him the
drugs.
Det. Albert Dixon, who is also a member of the
narcotics unit of the Lexington Metro Police Department,
testified that he arrived on the scene shortly after the
transaction took place.
Det. Dixon stated that he found Lee
sitting in front of a house on Rand Avenue and placed him under
arrest.
Det. Dixon explained that he identified Lee based on
the description provided by Torkle.
Det. Dixon stated that Det.
Ray arrived with Torkle shortly thereafter.
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Det. Dixon
testified that Torkle identified Lee as the individual who sold
him the drugs.
Officer Eric Rice, who is also employed by the
Lexington Metro Police Department, testified that he searched
Lee and discovered in one of his pockets a clear plastic baggie
containing 12 blue pills, which turned out to be Zyprexa.5
Officer Rice stated that Lee consented to the search.
At the
close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Lee moved for a
directed verdict of acquittal on both charges, which the trial
court denied.
Lee presented no evidence.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts
of the indictment.
On October 7, 2003, the trial court
sentenced Lee to prison for six years and six months on the
conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance in the
first degree, and 90 days in jail on the conviction for
possession of prescription drugs not in a proper container.6
This appeal followed.
Lee raises several issues on appeal.
Lee contends (1)
the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal; (2) the Commonwealth improperly bolstered
Torkle’s credibility during Det. Ray’s testimony; (3) the trial
court erred in denying his motion to strike for cause a juror
5
Zyprexa is a prescription drug used to treat psychotic mental disorders,
such as schizophrenia.
6
The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently.
532.110(1)(a).
-5-
See KRS
who was employed as a police officer; and (4) he was denied a
fair trial due to certain comments made by the Commonwealth’s
Attorney during closing arguments in the penalty phase of the
trial.
In Commonwealth v. Benham,7 our Supreme Court explained
the test for a trial court to follow when ruling on a motion for
a directed verdict:
On motion for directed verdict, the trial
court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.8
The Court went on to state the appropriate standard
for an appellate court to follow when reviewing a trial court’s
ruling on a motion for a directed verdict.
On appellate review, the test of a
directed verdict is, if under the evidence
as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable
for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal.9
7
Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991).
8
Id. at 187.
9
Id.
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Lee contends he was entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal due to the fact he was never “identified” in open
court.
In sum, Lee maintains that the Commonwealth was required
to identify him by name as the perpetrator during the trial in
order to obtain a conviction.
We disagree.
Although a direct
in-court identification is the preferred procedure for
identifying a defendant as the alleged perpetrator, where the
circumstances do not indicate a likelihood of confusion, that
type of identification is not required.10
The record reflects
that the appellant was introduced to the jury during voir dire
as “Leroy Lee.”
The indictment names “Leroy Rockcorry Lee” as
the “defendant”11 and the jury instructions are styled under the
caption “Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Leroy Rockcorry Lee.”
Moreover, during her opening statement the Commonwealth’s
Attorney identified “Leroy Lee” as the “the defendant.”12
In
addition, Torkle repeatedly referred to Lee as “the defendant”
or “the suspect” throughout his testimony.13
Although Torkle
10
See generally Clark v. State, 47 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex.App. 2001)(quoting
Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex.App. 2000))(stating that
“[i]dentity may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. In fact,
identity may be proven by inferences. When there is no direct evidence of
the perpetrator’s identity elicited from trial witnesses, no formalized
procedure is required for the State to prove the identity of the accused”).
11
The trial court read the indictment to the jury during voir dire.
12
Specifically, the Commonwealth’s Attorney began her opening statement with
the following remark, “ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant, Leroy
Lee, is a drug dealer.”
13
In fact, the Commonwealth’s Attorney asked Torkle during direct examination
“if he had any doubt that it was the defendant” who sold him the drugs, to
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never specifically identified Lee by name, we are persuaded that
the jury was adequately apprised that he was referring to Lee as
“the defendant” or “the suspect.”14
Consequently, we cannot
conclude that the trial court erred in denying Lee’s motion for
a directed verdict of acquittal.
Lee next contends that the Commonwealth improperly
bolstered Torkle’s credibility during Det. Ray’s testimony.
Specifically, Lee takes issue with Det. Ray’s testimony
concerning the procedures employed by the police to ensure that
informants are “qualified.”
As previously discussed, Det. Ray
testified at trial that an informant must perform two controlled
buys to be considered “qualified” and he explained that this
procedure is designed, inter alia, to ensure that a particular
informant is “trustworthy.”
Det. Ray further testified that
Torkle “had been qualified.”
Thus, Lee maintains that Det.
Ray’s testimony improperly bolstered Torkle’s credibility,
thereby prejudicing his right to a fair trial.
We disagree.
First and foremost, Lee has failed to preserve this
issue for appellate review.
“The general rule is that a party
which Torkle responded, “No.” Det. Ray, Det. Dixon, and Officer Rice also
referred to Lee as “the defendant” or “the suspect” throughout their
testimony.
14
See generally, Rohlfing v. State, 612 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex.Crim.App.
1981)(stating that “[a]lthough at no time did the prosecutor request that the
record be made to reflect that the person referred to in the courtroom was
appellant, we conclude from a totality of the circumstances the jury was
adequately apprised that the witnesses were referring to appellant”).
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must make a proper objection to the trial court and request a
ruling on that objection, or the issue is waived.”15
object to Det. Ray’s testimony at trial.
Lee did not
Nevertheless, Lee
urges us to review this issue for palpable error pursuant to RCr
10.26.
“A palpable error is one which affects the substantial
rights of a party and relief may be granted for palpable errors
only upon a determination that a manifest injustice has resulted
from the error.”16
For an error to be palpable, it must have
been “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily
noticeable.”17
Moreover, “the reviewing court must conclude that
a substantial possibility exists that the result would have been
different in order to grant relief.”18
In addition, “[t]he
palpable error rule set forth in RCr 10.26 is not a substitute
for the requirement that a litigant must contemporaneously
object to preserve an error for review.”19
A thorough review of Det. Ray’s testimony reveals that
he never offered an opinion concerning the truthfulness of
Torkle’s testimony.
Det. Ray merely explained departmental
procedures designed to produce reliable information, which laid
15
Commonwealth v. Pace, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (2002). See also Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.22.
16
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996).
17
Burns v. Level, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (1998)(citing Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1995)).
18
Partin, 918 S.W.2d at 224.
19
Pace, 82 S.W.3d at 895 (2002).
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a proper foundation for the admission of the Commonwealth’s
evidence.20
Although Det. Ray’s testimony corroborated some
elements of Torkle’s testimony, “admissible testimony that has
the incidental effect of bolstering or corroborating other
testimony is not inappropriate.”21
Regardless, Lee has failed to
demonstrate that a substantial possibility exists that the
result would have been different had the trial court sua sponte
excluded this portion of Det. Ray’s testimony.
Consequently, we
find no palpable error with respect to this issue.
Lee further complains that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to strike juror #566 for cause.
During voir
dire, juror #566 informed the trial court that he was a police
officer and that he had testified on behalf of the Commonwealth
in prior drug cases.
Juror #566 was then asked to approach the
bench where he was questioned by defense counsel and the
Commonwealth’s Attorney regarding whether his experience as a
police officer would prevent him from acting as a fair and
impartial juror.
In sum, the following colloquy took place at
the bench:
Defense counsel:
fair?
Juror #566:
Do you think you could be
Yes.
20
Det. Ray’s testimony was probative of how the drugs came into Torkle’s
possession.
21
Contreras v. State, 7 P.3d 917, 921 (Wyo. 2000).
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Defense counsel: Do you think you would
believe the testimony of a police officer
over another witness based on the fact that
they were police officers?
Juror #566:
No.
Defense counsel: Right now in your head do
you think that he [the defendant] probably
did something or he wouldn’t be here?
Juror #566:
Right now he’s not guilty.
Defense counsel: Do you feel like the
police ever charge people that are not
guilty?
Juror #566: [inaudible] Not guilty is up to
the court to determine.
Defense counsel: Okay good. Right now do
you feel that he did anything illegal?
Juror #566:
Right now he’s not guilty.
Commonwealth’s Attorney: The officers we
intend to call are Shawn Ray . . . Det.
Albert Dixon . . . and Eric Rice. Do you
know any of them?
Juror #566:
I know all three of them.
Commonwealth’s Attorney: Would you consider
any of them to be a close friend of yours .
. . ?
Juror #566:
No.
Defense counsel: Do you feel like it would
be difficult for you to explain to your
friends or co-workers if you sat on a
criminal jury and came back with a not
guilty verdict?
Juror #566:
No.
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Lee then moved to strike juror #566 for cause.
The
trial court denied the motion, reasoning that juror #566
“answered all the questions appropriately.”
Lee subsequently
exercised one of his peremptory challenges to remove juror
#566.22
It is well-established that “[i]t is within the trial
court’s discretion to excuse a juror for cause, and great
deference is afforded that decision in the absence of an abuse
of discretion.”23
Moreover, “the mere fact that a person is a
current or former police officer is insufficient to warrant
removal for cause.”24
must be shown.”25
Simply put, “[a]dditional evidence of bias
“[H]aving some acquaintance with or knowledge
about the participants and their possible testimony does not
automatically disqualify for cause.”26
22
It is important to note that Lee exercised all of his peremptory
challenges, thereby preserving this issue for appellate review. See e.g.,
Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 252, 259 (1993)(stating that “‘[a]
party must exercise all of his peremptory challenges in order to sustain a
claim of prejudice due to the failure of the court to grant a requested
challenge for cause’”[citation omitted]), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177, 114
S.Ct. 1218, 127 L.Ed.2d 564 (1994).
23
Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 838, 842 (2003). See also Furnish v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 34, 44 (2002)(stating that “[t]he decision
whether to excuse a juror for cause is a matter within the sound discretion
of the trial court”).
24
Mills, supra at 842.
25
Id.
26
Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293, 299 (1997), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 986, 118 S.Ct. 451, 139 L.Ed.2d 387 (1997).
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In sum, Lee contends that “[t]here can be no question
that there would be at least a doubt whether a [ ] police
officer . . . who has been a witness for the prosecution on
previous drug cases, and who knows the three police officers
listed to testify for the Commonwealth . . . could be free of
any subconscious bias in favor of the prosecution.”
In other
words, Lee asserts that juror #566 should have been excused
based on an implied bias arising from his status as a police
officer and his relationship with the officers scheduled to
testify at trial.27
We disagree.
“[T]he doctrine of implied bias is limited in
application to those extreme situations where the relationship
between a prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation is
such that it is highly unlikely that the average person could
remain impartial in his deliberations under the circumstances.”28
The case before us simply does not present one of those
situations.
The responses elicited from juror #566 during voir
dire indicate that he was committed to rendering a fair and
impartial verdict.
Juror #566 and the officers scheduled to
testify at trial were casual acquaintances, i.e., they knew each
27
See Randolph v. Commonwealth, Ky., 716 S.W.2d 253, 255-56 (1986)(stating
that “[a] potential juror may be disqualified from service because of
connection to the case, parties or attorneys and that is a bias that will be
implied as a matter of law”), overruled on other grounds Shannon v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 767 S.W.2d 548 (1988). See also Godsey v. Commonwealth,
Ky.App., 661 S.W.2d 2, 4-5 (1983).
28
Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th.Cir. 1988).
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other but did not have a close relationship.29
Thus, we are not
persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that juror #566 could “render a fair and impartial
verdict on the evidence[.]”30
Consequently, we cannot conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Lee’s
motion to strike juror #566 for cause.
In closing, Lee asserts that he was denied a fair
trial due to certain comments made by the Commonwealth’s
Attorney during closing arguments in the penalty phase of the
trial.
Specifically, Lee contends the Commonwealth’s Attorney
made an improper appeal to the interests of the community.
The
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s closing argument including the
following remarks:
The last and final thing we ask you to take
into consideration is the victim of this
crime. Many people say drugs in our
community and any drug trafficking is a
victimless crime. However, it isn’t ladies
and gentleman. The victim of this crime is
our community, the people who live in the
area of Rand Avenue who have to constantly
call the police because they see drug
dealers on the street. . . . The people who
will never feel safe because they know the
area of town they live in is targeted as a
29
See Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 665, 670 (1990)(fact that
juror was a police officer in county of trial and knew several testifying
officers did not establish bias as a matter of law).
30
RCr 9.36. Lee’s reliance on Godsey, supra, is misplaced as the juror in
that case was the County Attorney when the defendant’s preliminary hearing on
the charges in question proceeded through district court. Godsey, 661 S.W.2d
at 4. Juror #566’s connection to the case before us was far more attenuated
than the juror in Godsey. Lee’s reliance on Randolph, supra, is similarly
misplaced as the juror in that case was the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s
secretary. Randolph, supra, 716 S.W.2d at 255-56.
-14-
drug infested area. Also, the victims of
this community are families who are
destroyed by people using crack cocaine. . .
. So ladies and gentlemen the Commonwealth
would contend that this is not a victimless
crime. . . . There is a victim here and it
is the community, the citizens of Fayette
County.
We begin by noting that Lee failed to preserve this
issue for appellate review by way of a contemporaneous
objection.
“[A]n objection to improper statements made during
closing arguments must be contemporaneous.”31
Nevertheless, Lee
urges us to review this issue for palpable error pursuant to RCr
10.26.
When analyzing claims of improper argument, we must
“‘determine whether the conduct was of such an “egregious”
nature as to deny the accused his constitutional right of due
process of law.’”32
“‘The required analysis, by an appellate
court, must focus on the overall fairness of the trial, and not
the culpability of the prosecutor.’”33
In addition, it is well-
established that “prosecutors are allowed wide latitude during
31
Weaver v. Commonwealth, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 722, 728 (1997). Lee did request a
mistrial at the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s closing argument, which the
trial court denied.
32
Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 953 S.W.2d 924, 939 (1997), cert. denied, 523
U.S. 1053, 118 S.Ct. 1375, 140 L.Ed.2d 522 (1998)(quoting Slaughter v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 407, 411 (1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1113,
109 S.Ct. 3174, 104 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1989)).
33
Foley, supra at 939 (quoting Slaughter, supra at 411-12).
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closing arguments[.]”34
Bearing these principles in mind, we
cannot conclude that the remarks made by the Commonwealth’s
Attorney during her closing argument were so egregious as to
render the penalty phase of Lee’s trial fundamentally unfair.
Simply put, Lee has failed to demonstrate that a substantial
possibly exists that the result would have been any different
had the statements he complains of not been made.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the final judgment and
sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
34
Maxie v. Commonwealth, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 860, 866 (2002).
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