COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. LINZIE DOUGLAS RICE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
OCTOBER 1, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002206-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LESLIE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. CLETUS MARICLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-00007
LINZIE DOUGLAS RICE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an
order of the Leslie Circuit Court vacating Linzie Douglas Rice’s
conviction and sentence for murder and two counts of firstdegree wanton endangerment.
The circuit court entered the order
vacating the judgment pursuant to Rice’s RCr1 11.42 motion.
We
affirm.
As a result of a jury trial that was held in the
circuit court on July 22, 1997, Rice was convicted of murder and
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment.
On September 4,
1997, the circuit court entered a judgment wherein it sentenced
Rice to life in prison for the offenses pursuant to the jury’s
recommendation.
His conviction and sentence was affirmed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court on direct appeal in an unpublished
opinion.
See Rice v. Commonwealth, 97-SC-000750-MR, rendered
April 22, 1999.
The incident which led to Rice’s conviction occurred
on March 12, 1996.
On that date Rice was living with his
girlfriend, Tammy Roberts, and her four-year-old son, Corey
Roberts, in Leslie County, Kentucky.
They were living in a
house that belonged to Rice’s family.
Late that evening David McAllister, a friend of Rice,
stopped at the residence to get a rolling paper to smoke a
marijuana joint.
Rice was asleep in bed when McAllister
arrived, but Roberts was in the living room and had been
watching a movie while Corey slept on a nearby love seat.
Rice
awoke, arose from the bed, and entered the living room.
Various accounts of exactly what happened next were
told to the jury by Rice, Roberts, and McAllister.2
Rice
testified that he fired a warning shot in McAllister’s direction
after he ordered McAllister to leave but he refused to do so.
2
Rice gave three statements to the police in addition to testifying at trial.
Two of those statements were different from his trial testimony.
-2-
The single shot fired by Rice in McAllister’s direction hit
Corey who was asleep on the love seat.
The bullet struck Corey
on the back, right side of his head near his right ear and
killed him instantly.
Although Rice did not intentionally kill Corey, he was
prosecuted for murder under KRS3 507.020(1)(b) which states that
“[a] person is guilty of murder when: . . . . (b) [i]ncluding,
but not limited to, the operation of a motor vehicle under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he
wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death
to another person and thereby causes the death of another
person.”
After he was convicted and sentenced and the judgment
was upheld on direct appeal by the Kentucky Supreme Court, Rice
filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42.
The motion was filed on February 18, 2000, and supplemented on
September 8, 2000.
A hearing was held on May 23, 2002.
Thereafter, Rice renewed his RCr 11.42 motion on September 27,
2003.
In an order entered following a hearing on October 1,
2003, the circuit court granted Rice’s motion and vacated the
judgment.
This appeal by the Commonwealth followed.
The circuit court gave no explanation for its ruling
in its written order.
3
However, the video record provides an
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3-
indication of the court’s findings and conclusions.
The issue
involved three jurors who sat on this case and who had also
served as jurors in a murder trial approximately two months
prior to the trial herein.
The earlier trial involved the prosecution of a man
named Merrill Pelphrey.
Pelphrey was charged with killing
another person in Rice’s residence at a time when Rice was not
at home.
During the Pelphrey trial, Rice’s name was mentioned
several times.
Specifically, a Kentucky State Trooper who
investigated the Pelphrey case testified at the Pelphrey trial
that he had discovered cocaine, guns, scales, spoons, and
syringes at the Rice residence during his investigation.
The
trooper also told the jury that there had been two drug raids on
the Rice residence and that two murders had been committed there
in the past.
He further told the Pelphrey jury that he had
opened a new drug investigation against Rice while investigating
the Pelphrey case.
Three of the jurors in the Pelphrey trial also served
as jurors in Rice’s trial.
During the jury selection process in
Rice’s trial, neither the court nor the attorneys inquired
concerning whether any of the jurors had been jurors in the
Pelphrey case.
However, Rice’s attorney asked the jurors
whether any of them had ever served as a juror on a criminal
case in the past.
Although one of the jurors responded that she
-4-
had served as a juror in a criminal case three or four years
earlier, none of the three jurors who had served as jurors in
the Pelphrey case responded in any manner.
After the prosecuting attorney and Rice’s attorney
completed their questioning of the prospective jurors, the court
had the clerk call additional jurors.
Several of the additional
jurors were excused for various reasons, including two,
Juanadean McKinney and Bobby Barrett, who approached the bench
and stated to the court that they had served as jurors in the
Pelphrey trial and had formed or expressed an opinion about this
case.
Those two jurors were excused, but neither the court nor
the attorneys further inquired of the remaining prospective
jurors as to whether any of them had served in the Pelphrey
trial.
At some point following this trial, Rice learned that
three of the jurors had served as jurors in the Pelphrey case
despite their failure to respond to Rice’s attorney’s question
as to whether any juror had served in a criminal trial in the
past.
As it relates to this issue, Rice’s RCr 11.42 motion
asserted two separate grounds.
First, it alleged that the
jurors’ failure to disclose that they had participated as jurors
in the prior trial was implied bias and violated his right to a
fair and impartial jury.
Second, it alleged that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel due to his counsel’s failure
-5-
to determine that the three jurors had served in the prior case.
It is unclear whether the circuit court based its ruling on the
first or second argument.4
Regardless, we agree that the court
properly granted Rice’s motion and vacated his conviction and
sentence.
In support of its argument in this appeal, the
Commonwealth contends that Rice’s attorney did not render
ineffective assistance in connection with the jury selection
process.5
Specifically, the Commonwealth notes that Rice’s
attorney conducted a thorough questioning of the prospective
jurors, including inquiries as to whether any of them had
previously served as a juror on a criminal case and whether
there was any matter that would prevent any of them from judging
the case fairly.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth notes that the
circuit court did not allow any additional inquiry by the
attorneys regarding the issue after the two jurors came forward
near the end of the selection process and that the court did not
make further inquiry of its own.
The Commonwealth states that
4
At the first hearing on Rice’s motion, the court stated that counsel was
“somewhat ineffective in his voir dire.” He also stated that “there should
have been a more extensive voir dire by defense counsel as to the question of
publicity.” However, the court also made reference to counsel’s “trial
strategy.” He concluded by stating that the “likely result on guilt or
innocence would not have been different.” Nonetheless, in the second hearing
on Rice’s motion, the court stated that “[t]here should have been more work
done on selecting that jury.” The court made no specific statement
concerning whether its decision was based on ineffective assistance of
counsel or on violation of the right to a fair and impartial jury.
5
At the time of the hearing on Rice’s RCr 11.42 motion, his trial counsel was
deceased. Thus, there was no testimony from him in the record.
-6-
Rice’s attorney had no way of knowing that the three jurors had
previously served as jurors in the Pelphrey trial.
The
Commonwealth also contends that even if Rice’s attorney rendered
ineffective assistance in connection with the jury selection
process, there was no prejudice that warranted relief from the
conviction and sentence.
On the other hand, Rice contends that his attorney
rendered ineffective assistance by not specifically questioning
the prospective jurors concerning whether any of them had served
as jurors in the Pelphrey case.
Rice maintains that his
attorney should have at least requested the judge to ask the
jurors additional questions after gaining information near the
end of the selection process that two jurors had served on a
previous case that might have some relation to his case.6
Rice
states that his “right to trial by impartial jury was denied
when his trial attorney failed to conduct a reasonable voir dire
that would have eliminated those jurors who had previously heard
unfavorable testimony against appellee.”
He asserts that his
attorney should have followed up “on a clear red flag warning
about the jury pool.”
Finally, he contends that had counsel not
rendered ineffective assistance in this regard, there was a
6
There is an indication in the record that Rice’s attorney was aware of the
Pelphrey trial and Rice’s connection to it.
-7-
reasonable probability that the result in his trial or sentence
would have been different.
We are hesitant to conclude that Rice’s attorney
rendered ineffective assistance during the jury selection
process.
His attorney asked the jurors a number of questions to
determine whether there was any reason that any of them could
not serve as a fair and impartial juror.
He specifically asked
whether any of the jurors had served on a criminal case in the
past.
Despite the fact that three jurors had served in the
Pelphrey trial, none of the three responded so as to alert
Rice’s attorney of this fact.
In Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 479 (1998),
the Kentucky Supreme Court faced a similar, yet somewhat
different, argument from a defendant who was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death.
The appellant in that case alleged that
his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the voir
dire proceedings by failing to ask a list of several questions
he believed counsel should have asked the prospective jurors.
In rejecting the argument, the court stated:
Although Appellant would like it to be so,
counsel could not possibly have asked every
conceivable question which might reveal a
potential bias of venire persons. The
record reflects that counsel asked several
thought-provoking questions directed at
discovering any bias or inability to fairly
judge the evidence presented. Counsel’s
-8-
performance was well within the range of
acceptable professional judgment.
Id. at 487.
It is entirely conceivable that Rice’s attorney
asked whether any of the jurors had ever served in a criminal
trial in the past without mentioning the Pelphrey trial as a
matter of trial strategy so as not to inject that case into this
one any more than was necessary.
See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Regardless of whether Rice’s attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the jury
selection process, the circuit court correctly vacated the
conviction and sentence.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution gives an accused person in a criminal prosecution
the right to a trial by an impartial jury.
Likewise, Section 11
of the Kentucky Constitution gives an accused in a criminal
prosecution the right to a trial by an impartial jury.
“The
right to an unbiased decision by an impartial jury in a criminal
trial is a basic principle of due process.”
Hodge v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 338, 342 (2001).
We conclude that Rice was denied his constitutional
right to an impartial jury.
The three jurors who served in both
the Pelphrey case and in Rice’s case heard evidence extremely
unfavorable to Rice in the Pelphrey trial that was not before
them in Rice’s trial and was not relevant to it.
-9-
Specifically,
in the Pelphrey trial the jurors heard about another murder in
the Rice residence as well as the presence of a considerable
amount of cocaine, numerous guns, scales, spoons, and syringes.
In an attempt to defeat the argument of a violation of
the right to an impartial jury, the Commonwealth cites Bowling
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293 (1997).
The Commonwealth
refers to the portion of the Bowling case where the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated that “[b]ias is not automatically implied
even where a juror has heard evidence at a previous trial of the
same case.”
Id. at 299.
Citing other authority, the
Commonwealth states that there is also no implied bias when a
juror has heard a witness speaking about a case prior to trial
and when a juror is merely acquainted with a criminal defendant.
Regardless, the tainting of the three jurors in this
case is clear.
They had previously heard evidence that another
murder had taken place in the Rice residence, that Rice was the
subject of a drug investigation by the Kentucky State Police,
and that a large bag of cocaine and drug paraphernalia
indicating drug dealing had been found in his residence.
We
believe the implied bias was clear and that Rice was denied his
right to an impartial jury.
See Montgomery v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713, 717 (1991), for discussion of implied bias.
Numerous cases have dealt with the situation where a
prospective juror gave false information in the voir dire
-10-
proceeding.
In Paenitz v. Commonwealth, Ky., 820 S.W.2d 480
(1991), the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed a first-degree rape
conviction where a juror failed to disclose a pretrial
conversation she had with a doctor who testified at trial as the
examining doctor of the victim.
The court stated that “[i]t was
a flagrant abuse of juror responsibility for this juror to have
failed to disclose the discussion during voir dire examination.”
Id. at 481.
Further, the court held that the denial of the
right to impartial jury is so basic that it can never be treated
as harmless error.
Id. at 482, quoting Gray v. Mississippi, 481
U.S. 648, 668, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1977).
In Anderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 909
(1993), the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed a first-degree rape
conviction because one of the jurors failed to disclose that he
was related to the complaining witness’s boyfriend and lived in
the same area of the county.
The court noted that the
information “may have justified a challenge for cause in and of
itself on grounds of implied bias, and which, at the least, if
truthfully given, would have enabled the appellants to exercise
their peremptory challenges intelligently.”
Id. at 911-12.
Quoting from Sizemore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 832
(1957), the Anderson court also stated as follows:
The right of challenge includes the
incidental right that the information
elicited on the voir dire examination shall
-11-
be true; the right to challenge implies its
fair exercise, and, if a party is misled by
erroneous information, the right of
rejection is impaired; a verdict is illegal
when a peremptory challenge is not exercised
by reason of false information. [Emphasis
added.]
864 S.W.2d at 912.
In the Sizemore case the court reversed a conviction
in a homicide case where two jurors gave negative responses to
questions in the jury selection process as to whether they had
ever been “interested” in any other homicide prosecution.
S.W.2d at 834.
306
Although the court stated that neither of the
jurors had acted in bad faith, it nonetheless reversed the
conviction on the ground that the defendant’s attorney was
deprived of the opportunity to exercise peremptory challenges.
Id.
In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 182, 223 S.W.2d
741 (1949), the court reversed a manslaughter conviction where
the defendant was deprived of his right to make peremptory
challenges based on false answers given by jurors during voir
dire.
See also Olympic Realty Co. v. Kamer, 283 Ky. 432, 141
S.W.2d 293, 297 (1940).
Finally, in Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky.
758, 57 S.W.2d 969 (1933), a judgment was vacated in a civil
automobile accident case where four jurors failed to respond
affirmatively when asked if any of them had ever been involved
-12-
in an automobile collision.
The court reasoned that “[t]he
information which was sought to be elicited by the question
addressed to the jury panel was pertinent to enable the
plaintiffs to intelligently exercise their challenges, a
valuable right.
If the truth had been learned, they might have
challenged some of these jurors peremptorily.”
57 S.W.2d at
984.
“To obtain a new trial because of juror mendacity, ‘a
party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer
honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show
that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a
challenge for cause.’”
Adkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 96 S.W.3d
779, 796 (2003), quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v.
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663
(1984).
There is no question that three jurors who served in
this case failed to honestly answer a material question in the
jury selection process concerning whether they had previously
served as a juror in a criminal trial.
Had they properly
responded to the question, Rice’s attorney could have learned
that the three jurors had served in the Pelphrey trial.
Due to
the damaging testimony relative to Rice in that trial, there
would have been a valid basis for challenging the jurors for
cause.
Furthermore, due to the failure of the jurors to
affirmatively respond to the question, Rice’s attorney was
-13-
without relevant information upon which he could exercise
peremptory challenges in the event the court declined to excuse
the jurors for cause.
In short, the circuit court correctly
determined that Rice is entitled to a new trial.
The order of the Leslie Circuit Court granting Rice’s
RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
John R. Tarter
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Edward L. Gafford
Department of Public Advocacy
LaGrange, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Ken Riggs
Frankfort, Kentucky
-14-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.