MICHAEL DEWAYNE BECKHAM v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 23, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002111-MR
MICHAEL DEWAYNE BECKHAM
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00655
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND KNOPF, JUDGES; AND EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE. Michael Dewayne Beckham (“Beckham”) appeals
from a judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court on a conditional
plea of guilty to one count each of operating a motor vehicle
under the influence, fourth offense, and operating on a
suspended license.
1
He argues that the trial court erred in
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 100(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
failing to grant a motion to suppress.
For the reasons stated
herein, we affirm the judgment.
On April 17, 2003, at approximately 2:00 a.m.,
Transylvania University Department of Public Safety officers
Scott Anderson (“Anderson”) and Brian Miller (“Miller”) were
traveling in a university vehicle off campus on 6th Street in
Lexington, Kentucky.
They observed a vehicle being operated by
Beckham run a red light.
In an apparent attempt to scare
Beckham or otherwise dissuade him from running other red lights,
Anderson flashed the emergency lights on the university patrol
car.
Anderson would later state that it was not his intention
to stop Beckham’s vehicle.
Beckham’s vehicle continued on and
passed the university patrol car.
Beckham then pulled the
vehicle to the side of the road, stopping the car and exiting
it.
Anderson observed Beckham staggering, and stopped the
university patrol car.
Anderson spoke with Beckham and noted
that Beckham appeared to be intoxicated.
were summoned.
Lexington Metro police
Lexington Metro officer Kyle Sorenson
(“Sorenson”) determined that Beckham was intoxicated, and placed
him under arrest.
On June 2, 2003, Beckham was indicted by the Fayette
Grand Jury on charges of operating a motor vehicle under the
-2-
influence, fourth offense, and operating on a suspended license.2
On June 11, 2003, Beckham filed a motion to suppress, arguing
that the university police had no lawful authority to stop his
vehicle and that any evidence of his alleged intoxication should
be suppressed.
A hearing on the motion was conducted, where Anderson
testified that he did not stop Beckham’s vehicle.
not testify.
Beckham did
Upon considering the testimony, the trial judge
denied the motion.
It was her opinion that though Anderson
should not have flicked the lights on the university patrol car,
he did not effectuate a traffic stop.
On August 8, 2003, Beckham entered a plea of guilty to
both counts of the indictment, conditioned on the reservation of
his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
The
plea was accepted by the trial court, and Beckham was sentenced
to a combined sentence of one year in prison.
The sentence was
suspended, and Beckham was placed on probation for a period of
three years.
This appeal followed.
The sole issue now before us is whether the trial
court committed reversible error in denying Beckham’s motion to
suppress the evidence obtained by the Metro Lexington police
2
The indictment was combined with a separate indictment of one
count of flagrant non-support, and the matters were prosecuted.
Beckham’s sentence included a period of incarceration for
flagrant non-support.
-3-
after Beckham stopped his car.
Beckham argues that Anderson had
no lawful authority to stop his vehicle, and that Anderson’s act
of flashing the university patrol car’s lights and stopping the
car behind Beckham’s car constitutes an unlawful stop.
Relying
in part on the “fruit of the poison tree” doctrine, Beckham
contends that any evidence collected as a result of the unlawful
stop should have been suppressed.
As such, he argues that the
trial court erred in denying his motion, and he seeks an order
reversing his conviction.
We have closely studied the record and the law, and
find no error in the trial court’s denial of Beckham’s motion to
suppress.
The trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
shall be sustained if supported by substantial evidence.
9.78;
RCr
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 665 (1985).
In
the matter at bar, substantial evidence exists in the record
sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling.
Anderson
testified that it was not his intention to pull over Beckham’s
car; that he flashed the vehicle’s lights only “briefly”; that
Beckham drove past him after the lights were flashed; that had
Beckham not stopped, Anderson would not have pursued him; and,
that Anderson never used the university patrol car’s siren.
Since Beckham did not testify at the suppression hearing,
Anderson’s statements are uncontroverted.
These statements were
not rebutted by Beckham and constitute substantial evidence
-4-
sufficient to support the trial judge’s conclusion that Anderson
had not effectuated a police stop outside the bounds of his
university jurisdiction.
The record may be sufficient to support an opposite
conclusion, to wit, that the flashing of lights and request to
Beckham to produce a driver’s license constitutes an exercise of
police action beyond that which the law allows.
The relevant
inquiry, however, is not whether the evidence might support such
a conclusion, but whether substantial evidence exists in support
of the conclusion reached by the trial judge.
Such evidence
does exist, and as such the order denying the motion to suppress
was proper.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court entered following its denial of
Beckham’s motion to suppress.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Herbert T. West
Lexington, KY
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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