ROSCOE DEES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
November 12, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001737-MR
ROSCOE DEES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00327
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Roscoe Dees has appealed from an order of the
Fayette Circuit Court entered on August 1, 2003, which denied,
without holding an evidentiary hearing, Dees’s motion to vacate,
set aside, or correct judgment brought pursuant to RCr1 11.42.
Dees’s motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
associated with his conditional guilty plea to possession of
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
drug paraphernalia (second offense)2 and to being a persistent
felony offender in the first degree (PFO I).3
Having concluded
that Dees has failed to establish that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, we affirm.
While on routine patrol on the night of January 29,
1998, in an area known for high drug activity, Officer Ed Hart
of the Lexington Division of Police observed a black male
approach and get in on the passenger side of a vehicle being
driven by Dees shortly after it stopped next to the curb on Elm
Street.
After approximately one minute, Officer Hart saw the
passenger exit the vehicle, and he approached to investigate
based on his experience with drug activity in this specific
area.
Officer Hart motioned for Dees, who is African-American,
to wait while he went to speak with the other suspect.
Dees
initially acknowledged Officer Hart’s request, but then drove
away.
Officer Hart radioed for assistance and Dees was stopped
a few blocks away by Officer Pike Spraggins.
During a
protective Terry4 pat-down search, the police recovered a crack
pipe in Dees’s pants pocket.
The police arrested Dees and
seized a piece of crack cocaine found in a search of his
vehicle.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.500.
3
KRS 532.080.
4
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
-2-
On March 24, 1998, a Fayette County grand jury
indicted Dees on one felony count of possession of a controlled
substance (cocaine) in the first degree,5 one felony count of
possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense), and for PFO
I.
The indictment listed six felony convictions in Ohio and
Kentucky between 1975 and 1997 as support for the PFO I count.
On April 10 and 24, 1998, the trial court conducted hearings on
Dees’s motion to suppress the evidence seized in the stop and
search of him based on the alleged lack of reasonable
articulable suspicion to support the stop under the requirements
of Terry.
Officer Hart and Officer Spraggins testified at the
hearings.
The trial court denied the motion holding that there
was sufficient cause to justify the stop.
On May 8, 1998, Dees entered a conditional plea of
guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense) and
PFO I.
At the guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth stated the
parties had reached an agreement whereby Dees would plead guilty
in return for a recommendation for a sentence of one year on the
charge of possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense)
enhanced to ten years for PFO I and dismissal of the charge for
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) in the first
degree.
The Commonwealth also asked that the record show that
Dees agreed not to file an RCr 11.42 based on the grounds that
5
KRS 218A.1415.
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the then-recent amendment to KRS 532.080(8),6 which was to become
effective on July 15, 1998, and which stated that no conviction
for possession of drug paraphernalia would be subject to PFO
enhancement, might be available to him.
Dees engaged in a short
conversation with his attorney and then expressed an
understanding that he could not later claim he was unaware of
the new law and that his attorney had not explained to him it
did not apply to his situation.
Dees also acknowledged that he
was subject to a possible sentence of one to five years on the
count for possession of drug paraphernalia7 that could be
enhanced to ten to 20 years for conviction under the count for
PFO I,8 that no one had promised he would be probated, and that
the trial court was not bound to follow the Commonwealth’s
recommendation.
The trial court accepted the plea but postponed
sentencing pending review of the pre-sentence investigation
report.
On May 29, 1998, the trial court conducted the
sentencing hearing where Dees moved for probation despite his
6
The amendment consisted of adding Subsection 8, which provides as follows:
“No conviction, plea of guilty, or Alford plea to a violation of KRS 218A.500
shall bring a defendant within the purview of or be used as a conviction
eligible for making a person a persistent felony offender under this
section.”
7
Possession of drug paraphernalia is a Class A misdemeanor for the first
offense and a Class D felony for the second offense. See KRS 218A.500(5);
and KRS 532.020(1)(a)(stating Class D felony punishable by one to five years
imprisonment).
8
See KRS 532.080(6)(b).
-4-
long criminal history, conditioned on drug abuse treatment.
Bishop Lucian Booker, the director of the Road to Deliverance
rehabilitation program appeared to explain his willingness to
accept Dees into his program.
The trial court stated that it
would be willing to grant probation subject, however, to certain
conditions and a longer sentence of 20 years.
Dees’s attorney
explained to him that the trial court was increasing the
sentence to 20 years.
The trial court told Dees that he could
withdraw his guilty plea, rather than accept the new terms
associated with the grant of probation.
Dees’s counsel also
told him that he could ask the court to adhere to the original
terms offered by the Commonwealth.
Dees assured the trial court
that he was willing to accept the new terms offered by the trial
court.
The trial court sentenced Dees to two years for
possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense) enhanced to 20
years for PFO I, but suspended imposition of sentence and
granted probation for five years subject to several conditions
including good behavior, refraining from violating the law,
complying with the regulations of Probation and Parole,
enrollment in the Road to Deliverance program, and completion of
drug treatment.
In July 1998 Dees’s probation officer filed an
affidavit with the circuit court requesting revocation of Dees’s
probation for his failure to complete drug treatment, his
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admitted use of illegal drugs, and his failure to obey the law
associated with an arrest for driving without a license or
insurance and theft by unlawful taking.
On July 31, 1998, the
trial court conducted a hearing at which Dees stipulated to the
probation violations, but stated the Road to Deliverance program
had agreed to readmit him.
The trial court told Dees that it
would continue his probation but warned that it would be
unwilling to accept further violations.
In September 1998 Dees's probation officer filed
another affidavit with request to revoke probation for Dees’s
failure to complete the Road to Deliverance program and to pay
supervision fees.
The affidavit also noted that Dees had been
arrested on August 28, 1998, for possession of drug
paraphernalia, wanton endangerment in the first degree, reckless
driving, operating on a suspended license, and having no vehicle
insurance.
Following a hearing on October 23, 1998, the trial
court revoked Dees’s probation for his failure to complete the
Road to Deliverance program, not paying supervision fees, and
his failure to refrain from violating the law as evidenced by
his August 1998 arrest.
Dees immediately filed a notice of
appeal.
While the direct appeal was pending, the attorney who
represented Dees on the probation revocation filed a motion to
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vacate judgment pursuant to CR9 60.02 on January 27, 1999, based
on the fact that the criminal statutes had been amended to
prohibit the enhancement of the sentence for conviction of
possession of drug paraphernalia because of PFO status.
On
January 29, 1999, the trial court summarily denied the motion
after a hearing.
Dees appealed the denial of this motion.
On May 5, 1999, Dees filed a pro se motion to vacate
pursuant to CR 60.02(f) arguing the possession of drug
paraphernalia (second offense) could not be used as an
underlying felony offense subject to enhancement under the PFO
statute because it had already been enhanced from a misdemeanor
offense because of a repeat violation.
On May 18, 1999, the
trial court summarily denied this motion.
Dees appealed the
order denying this motion.
On December 16, 1999, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
issued an unpublished memorandum opinion affirming the trial
court’s judgment and order revoking Dees’s probation on direct
appeal, as well as the trial court’s denial of his first CR
60.02 motion.10
The Court stated the record demonstrated that
Dees entered his plea freely, voluntarily, and knowingly in that
he had agreed to the longer sentence without coercion.
The
Court held that the amendment to KRS 532.080(8) did not apply
9
10
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dees v. Commonwealth, 1999-SC-000056-T.
-7-
because Dees’s conviction became final ten days after his
sentencing on June 2, 1998, which was prior to the effective
date of the amendment of July 15, 1998, and the statute did not
apply retroactively.
On August 24, 2000, the Supreme Court
issued another opinion affirming the trial court’s denial of
Dees’s pro se CR 60.02(f) motion.11
The Court held that Dees was
not subjected to double enhancement because the PFO I count was
supported by several prior felony convictions and did not rely
on the same prior conviction to support both the underlying
possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense) conviction and
the PFO conviction.12
On November 2, 2000, Dees filed a second pro se CR
60.02(f) motion arguing that the 1998 amendment to KRS
532.080(8) should be applied retroactively because it served a
mitigating or ameliorative purpose by prohibiting use of a
felony conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia in a
prosecution as a PFO.13
motion.
11
The trial court summarily denied the
On March 29, 2002, this Court affirmed the trial
Dees v. Commonwealth, 1999-SC-000683-TR (not-to-be-published).
12
See Commonwealth v. Grimes, Ky., 698 S.W.2d 836 (1985); Eary v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 659 S.W.2d 198 (1983); and Newcomb v. Commonwealth,
Ky.App., 964 S.W.2d 228 (1998).
13
See KRS 446.110.
-8-
court’s denial of this CR 60.02 motion noting that the Supreme
Court previously found this argument without merit.14
On November 6, 2002, Dees filed a pro se RCr 11.42
motion alleging several instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Dees asserted that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the PFO charge, for providing faulty
information on the maximum sentence, and for failing to
challenge the police stop on racial grounds.
Dees also filed
motions requesting appointment of counsel and an evidentiary
hearing.
The trial court appointed counsel to represent Dees,
who informed the court that she had determined there was no need
to supplement the record and requested a ruling on the motion on
the then-existing record.
On August 1, 2003, the trial court
entered an order denying the RCr 11.42 motion.
The court held
Dees failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance
and noted the extensive prior litigation of his guilty plea.
This appeal followed.
Dees raises several issues involving ineffective
assistance of counsel related to his guilty plea.
In order to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a person must
satisfy a two-part test showing both that counsel’s performance
was deficient and that the deficiency caused actual prejudice
14
Dees v. Commonwealth, 2001-CA-000228-MR (not to be published).
-9-
resulting in a proceeding that was fundamentally unfair.15
Where an appellant challenges a guilty plea based on ineffective
counsel, he must show both that counsel made serious errors
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance,16
and that the deficient performance so seriously affected the
outcome of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not
have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.17
The burden is on the defendant to overcome a strong presumption
that counsel’s assistance was constitutionally sufficient.18
A
court must be highly deferential in reviewing defense counsel’s
performance and should avoid second-guessing counsel’s actions
based on hindsight.19
“‘A defendant is not guaranteed errorless
counsel, or counsel adjudged ineffective by hindsight, but
counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably
15
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984); accord Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985); Foley v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 878, 884 (2000).
16
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d
763 (1970); Phon v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 51 S.W.3d 456, 459 (2001).
17
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203
(1985); Russell v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 992 S.W.2d 871 (1999).
18
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 460,
463 (1999).
19
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 315 (1998); Russell, 992
S.W.2d at 875.
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effective assistance.’”20
Both the performance and prejudice
prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard are
mixed questions of fact and law.21
While the trial court’s
factual findings pertaining to determining ineffective
assistance of counsel are subject to review only for clear
error, the ultimate decision on the existence of deficient
performance and actual prejudice is subject to independent or de
novo review on appeal.22
Dees also asserts that the trial court erred by
failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
RCr 11.42 provides
persons in custody under sentence a procedure for raising
collateral challenges to a judgment of conviction entered
against them.
A movant is not automatically entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on the motion.23
An evidentiary hearing is
not required on an RCr 11.42 motion where the issues raised in
the motion are refuted on the record, or where the allegations,
even if true, would not be sufficient to invalidate the
20
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 911 (quoting McQueen v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 70 (1997)).
21
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1164 (6th
Cir. 1997).
22
See McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1310-11 (6th Cir. 1996); and
Groseclose, 130 F.3d. at 1164.
23
Harper, 978 S.W.2d at 314; Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 901, 904
(1998); Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 89 S.W.3d 380, 386 (2002).
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conviction.24
While often involving factual issues, even claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel may be rejected without an
evidentiary hearing if they are refuted on the record.25
Dees first maintains that defense counsel was
ineffective for not requesting that the PFO charge be dismissed
during plea negotiations with the Commonwealth.
Dees asserts
that counsel told him there was “no way” the Commonwealth would
dismiss the PFO charge because “this prosecutor did not do
that,” but he notes that authorities in Ohio did not prosecute
him as a habitual offender despite his extensive criminal record
because his prior convictions involved non-violent offenses.
Dees argues the PFO charge was based in part on a misdemeanor
conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia that was used to
enhance the subsequent or second possession of drug
paraphernalia offense to felony status.
These arguments are without merit.
To the extent that
the latter argument suggests that the PFO charge was invalid,
the Supreme Court has already rejected Dees’s challenge to the
PFO conviction based on double enhancement.
In addition, at the
guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth expressed a willingness to
dismiss either count one of the indictment (possession of
24
Sanborn, 975 S.W.2d at 909; Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436, 442
(2001); Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448 (2001).
25
Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 442; Sanders, 89 S.W.3d at 385.
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controlled substance) or count two (possession of drug
paraphernalia), but not the PFO charge, and it also included a
requirement that Dees not file a RCr 11.42 motion concerning
application of the amendment to KRS 532.080(8).
These factors
demonstrate that the Commonwealth was not inclined to dismiss
the PFO charge as part of a plea bargain.
Thus, Dees has not
shown that even if defense counsel did not request dismissal of
the PFO charge in plea negotiations, he was prejudiced because
there is no evidence suggesting a reasonable probability the
prosecutor would have assented to do so.
Dees claims defense counsel was ineffective for not
specifically informing the trial court that the Commonwealth did
not oppose probation.
He asserts that the Commonwealth’s lack
of opposition to probation was an implied aspect of the plea
agreement and was important in the trial court’s decision to
reject the lower ten-year sentence recommended by the
Commonwealth in favor of the 20-year sentence in association
with a grant of probation.
This assertion is sheer speculation.
The trial court informed Dees at the guilty plea hearing that
the Commonwealth’s recommendation was not binding on it and Dees
confirmed that no one had promised him probation.
The
Commonwealth did not voice opposition to Dees’s request for
probation, so defense counsel’s express affirmation of this fact
would have added little to the proceedings.
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Probation is
discretionary with the trial court.26
The trial court gave Dees
an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea after fully
explaining to him that the grant of probation was conditioned on
the longer 20-year sentence.
In addition, Dees’s attorney
advised him that he could request adherence to the original plea
agreement with the Commonwealth.
Nevertheless, Dees
emphatically indicated that he wanted to accept the new offer
with the longer sentence.
The Supreme Court held that this
procedure complied with RCr 8.10.27
Consequently, defense
counsel was not deficient and Dees suffered no actual prejudice
in connection with counsel’s failure to assert the
Commonwealth’s lack of objection to probation.
Dees’s third issue involves a claim that defense
counsel erroneously advised him that he would have been subject
to a sentence of 40 years had he gone to trial.
He further
contends that counsel was ineffective for advising him to accept
the offer presented by the trial court of the longer 20-year
sentence with probation knowing that he was a poor candidate for
probation given his extensive history of drug abuse.
This
26
See KRS 533.010; and Aviles v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 17 S.W.3d 534
(2000)(holding that 1998 amendments to KRS 533.010 did not entitle defendant
to probation and retained discretion of trial court).
27
Dees asserts in his brief that the trial court did not have authority to
impose the 20-year sentence citing to Galusha v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 834
S.W.2d 696 (1992). Galusha is distinguishable because it involved increasing
a sentence in connection with granting shock probation and modifying an
original final sentence. Cf. Stallworth v. Commonwealth, Ky., 102 S.W.3d 918
(2003).
-14-
argument lacks merit because during the guilty plea proceeding
the trial court specifically advised Dees that the maximum
sentence for the charges against him was 20 years.
Furthermore,
the document signed by Dees and entitled Waiver of Further
Proceedings with Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty explicitly
states that the maximum sentence for the offenses charged in the
indictment of possession of a controlled substance in the first
degree, possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense), and
PFO I was 20 years.
Even if defense counsel erroneously advised
him on the maximum sentence he faced at trial, the record shows
that Dees was provided, and acknowledged, prior to entering his
guilty plea, that the maximum sentence he could have received
upon conviction at trial was 20 years.
Thus, assuming defense
counsel was deficient for providing faulty sentencing
information, Dees has not shown that he was prejudiced because
he was aware of the correct potential maximum sentence before he
entered into the plea agreement and accepted the trial court’s
guilty plea.
During the proceedings, Dees persisted in his
request for probation and assured the trial court that he could
conquer his drug addiction with assistance.
The defense
attorney advised Dees that he could request adherence to the
Commonwealth’s original offer of 10 years without probation.
Defense counsel did not pressure Dees to accept the trial
court’s terms and left the ultimate decision to Dees.
-15-
We
discern no deficient performance by counsel in seeking probation
and his handling of the new terms presented by the trial court.
Dees’s fifth issue involves a claim that defense
counsel was ineffective for allegedly failing to disclose to him
the mitigating effects of the amendment to KRS 532.080(8).
Dees
complains that counsel made no effort to research and to seek to
have the mitigating effects of the new law apply to him.
As
discussed earlier, the application and effect of the amendment
was fully addressed at the guilty plea hearing.
Dees was fully
aware of the modification in the law and agreed not to challenge
his conviction based on the modifications.
The Supreme Court
held that the modifications did not apply to Dees and that he
entered his guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently.
This claim is without merit.
Finally, Dees contends that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the stop and search of him
by the police based on racial profiling during the suppression
hearing.
Dees asserts that he mentioned this issue to his
attorney but was ignored.
Racial profiling generally involves
associating members of particular racial groups with particular
crimes often based on statistical differences in crime rates or
patterns of criminal involvement among groups.
In the criminal
arena, racial profiling often involves allegations of selective
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enforcement of laws by police against minority races.28
Racial profiling implicates both the unreasonable
search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment, and the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29
These two
constitutional provisions embody different interests with unique
standards, so compliance with one does not necessarily resolve
the question of compliance with the other.30
For instance,
discriminatory motivation is an essential aspect of an equal
protection violation while the subjective motivation of the
police is irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes.
In Whren v.
United States,31 the United States Supreme Court specifically
rejected the claim that a racial motivation of police rendered a
stop and/or search of an individual “unreasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment.
The Court did indicate, however, that such a
motivation raised equal protection concerns.
We think these cases foreclose any
argument that the constitutional
28
See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross and Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under
Attack, 102 Colum.L.Rev. 1413, 1415 (2002)(“‘racial profiling’ occurs
whenever a law enforcement officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or
otherwise investigates a person because the officer believes that members of
that person’s racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at
large to commit the sort of crime the officer is investigating”).
29
See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 281 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Mesa-Roche,
288 F.Supp.2d 1172 (D.Kan. 2003); and State v. Velez, 763 A.2d 290
(N.J.Super.App.Div. 2000).
30
See Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hospital, 345 F.3d 1157, 1166 (10th
Cir. 2003); and Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2002).
31
517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
-17-
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on
the actual motivations of the individual
officers involved. We of course agree with
petitioners that the Constitution prohibits
selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race. But the
constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory application of
laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.32
With equal protection racial profiling claims, the
courts have generally analogized selective enforcement
associated with alleged racial profiling with selective
prosecution, and applied the standards delineated in United
States v. Armstrong.33
In order to state a claim of selective
enforcement, a claimant must show that the government official
singled out a person of an identifiable group, that the official
was primarily or partially motivated by a discriminatory purpose
or intent, and that the action had a discriminatory effect.34
To
establish discriminatory effect, a claimant must show that the
law was enforced against him, but not similarly situated
32
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
745, 749 (2001).
See also Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 37 S.W.3d
33
517 U.S. 456, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996). See, e.g., United
States v. Barlow, 310 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002); Bradley, 299 F.3d at
205-06; Gardenshire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 319 (6th Cir. 2000); and
Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2003).
34
See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464; Gardenshire, 205 F.3d at 303; Barlow, 310
F.3d at 1010; and State v. Ballard, 752 A.2d 735, 740 (N.J.Super.App.Div.
2000).
-18-
individuals of other races.35
Discriminatory effect can be shown
by naming such individuals or through the use of statistics that
are reliable and relevant.36
Statistics and circumstantial
evidence also may be utilized to create an inference of
discriminatory purpose, but rarely will statistics alone be
sufficient to establish discriminatory intent.37
Discriminatory
purpose implies more than intent as awareness of consequences,
and implies that the decision maker selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part “because of,”
rather than “in spite of” its adverse effects on an identifiable
group.38
Once a claimant makes a prima facie showing of both
discretionary effect and discriminatory purpose, the burden of
producing evidence shifts to the government to rebut the
inferences, but the claimant retains the ultimate burden of
proving discrimination.39
35
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; Bradley, 299 F.3d at 206; United States v.
Duque-Nava, 315 F.Supp.2d 1144 (D.Kan. 2004).
36
See Barlow, 310 F.3d at 1011; Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d
612, 637-38 (7th Cir. 2001); Avery, 137 F.3d at 355-57.
37
See, e.g., Chavez, 251 F.3d at 647-48 (citing McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 293 n.12, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987)); and Avery, 137 F.3d at
356-57.
38
McClesky, 481 U.S. at 298; Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610, 105
S.Ct. 1524, 1531-32, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985); Chavez, 251 F.3d at 645; United
States v. Hare, 308 F.Supp.2d 955, 991 (D.Neb. 2004)(claimant must show
automobile stop partially or primarily motivated by race).
39
See Avery, 137 F.3d at 356; United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th
Cir. 1996); Farm Labor Organizing Committee v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308
F.3d 523, 539 (6th Cir. 2002)(police may rebut inference of intent by
presenting evidence decision motivated by race-neutral reasons and they would
-19-
In the current case, Officer Hart approached Dees
after seeing him engaged in actions that Officer Hart was
personally aware were consistent with drug transactions in an
area of known high drug activity.
After Officer Hart motioned
for Dees to stay while he went to speak with the other suspect,
Dees drove off.
Factors such as suspicious behavior in a high
crime area and flight are recognized factors supporting
reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.40
A protective pat-down
search of Dees by Officer Spraggins uncovered a crack pipe and a
subsequent search of Dees’s vehicle incident to arrest led to
discovery of crack cocaine.
The trial court held that the stop
was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.
The search
of Dees’s person was a justified protective pat-down search and
the search of his vehicle was supported by probable cause and
subject to the exception for searches incident to arrest.
Defense counsel attacked the validity of the police officers’
actions under the Fourth Amendment as lacking reasonable
articulable suspicion and did not render ineffective assistance
with respect to this issue.41
have acted regardless of discretionary motive); Hare, 308 F.Supp.2d at 992;
and State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div. 1996).
40
See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570
(2000); and Commonwealth v. Banks, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 347 (2001).
41
We note that Dees did not challenge the validity of the stop and search
under the Fourth Amendment on direct appeal, although that issue was
preserved by his conditional guilty plea, nor in his prior CR 60.02 motions.
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Much of Dees’s argument in his brief goes to the
validity of the stop.
He contends that the stop was motivated
by racial bias because Officer Hart did not have reasonable
suspicion that a crime had occurred or was occurring.
To the
extent this raises a Fourth Amendment challenge, it lacks merit
because the subjective motives of the police officer are
irrelevant to the existence of reasonable articulable suspicion
under the Fourth Amendment.42
To the extent Dees raises an Equal
Protection claim based on racial profiling, he has failed to
present sufficient evidence to create even a prima facie case.
He presents no statistical or circumstantial evidence to support
his claim, other than the fact that he is African-American.
Dees simply has not offered sufficient evidence of
discriminatory effect or discriminatory purpose to support a
claim of selective enforcement.
His attempt to draw an
inference of racial motivation under the situation in this case
is unpersuasive.
As a result, Dees has not demonstrated that
defense counsel was deficient in not raising this issue at the
suppression hearing, or that he suffered actual prejudice in
that there was a reasonable probability of success on such a
challenge had counsel raised it.43
42
See Whren, 517 U.S. at 816.
43
See Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 80 S.W.3d 405, 415 (2002)(counsel not
ineffective for failing to perform futile act).
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In conclusion, we hold that all of Dees’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are refuted on the record, and
the trial court did not err in denying the RCr 11.42 motion
without a hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roscoe Dees, Pro Se
Fredonia, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Natalie L. Lewellen
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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