RICHARD JORDAN v. STEFANIE JORDAN
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RENDERED: AUGUST 27, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001708-MR
RICHARD JORDAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KATHLEEN VOOR MONTANO, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-D-502110
STEFANIE JORDAN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MINTON, SCHRODER, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Richard Jordan brings this appeal from a July
16, 2003, order of the Jefferson Family Court.
We affirm.
On July 5, 2003, appellee filed a domestic violence
petition in the Jefferson Family Court.
Therein, appellee
specifically alleged:
The parties were married for seven years and
[were] divorced in January. The parties
have three children in common. The
pet[itioner] states that when she got back
from her vacation she found that her car was
damaged. The pet[itioner] states that on
July Fourth the resp[ondent] smacked his
mother and spit in her face while the
parties children were there. The
resp[ondent]’s mother dropped the children
off at a neighbors house. The
pet[itioner]’s friend had to pick up the
children from the nei[gh]bors home. The
neighbor said that the resp[ondent] had all
his guns out and to leave with the children.
The neighbor called the pet[itioner]’s
friend and told them that the resp[ondent]
was after the pet[itioner]’s friend because
she had picked up the children. The
pet[itioner] states that the resp[ondent]
was suppose to go to a 30 day program at
Timbrooke and only stayed three days and
checked himself out.
Following a hearing, the family court entered a domestic
violence order prohibiting appellant from being within 1000 feet
of appellee or of her residence.
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends the circuit court erred by entering
a domestic violence order against him.
Specifically, appellant
contends neither the petition nor the evidence established “that
an act of domestic violence occurred . . . or that such an act
may occur.”
We disagree.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.720 defines
domestic violence and abuse as:
[P]hysical injury, serious physical injury,
sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of
fear of imminent physical injury, serious
physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault
between family members or members of an
unmarried couple . . . .
-2-
Under the above statute, domestic violence and abuse occurs when
a family member inflicts fear of imminent physical injury.
In the case at hand, the petition specifically alleged
appellee’s car had been “damaged”; appellant had hit his mother
and spit in her face in front of his children; appellant had
firearms in his possession; and appellant had recently
discontinued a drug treatment program.
Additionally, appellee
testified that appellant had entered a substance abuse center
because of alcoholism and cocaine abuse, but unilaterally left
the center.
Appellee stated that her truck had been spray
painted and all four tires had been slashed.
Appellee indicated
she was afraid of appellant and was not currently residing in
her home.
Appellant admitted to hitting his mother and spitting
in her face in front of his children.
appellee’s vehicle.
He denied vandalizing
He admitted he owned ten firearms and had
“turned in” only six of those firearms.
He also admitted to
recently discharging himself from the substance abuse center.
The record indicates appellant left the substance abuse center
on July 4, 2003, and appellee filed the domestic violence
petition one day later, July 5, 2003.
Considering appellant’s erratic behavior, appellant’s
domestic violence directed at his own mother, his possession of
firearms, and appellee’s vandalized vehicle, we must conclude
-3-
there exits substantial evidence upon which to conclude that
appellee was in fear of imminent physical injury.
In short, we
think the allegations of the petition coupled with appellee’s
testimony concerning these allegations were sufficient to
support the issuance of the domestic violence order.1
Hence, we
are of the opinion the circuit court did not commit reversible
error by entering the domestic violence order against appellant.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Grant M. Helman
SMITH & HELMAN
Louisville, Kentucky
Kimberly Withers Daleure
DeCAMILLIS LAW OFFICE
Louisville, Kentucky
1
As we view the allegations contained in the petition coupled with the
evidence adduced at the hearing as sufficient, we do not reach the issue of
whether the circuit court erred by considering allegations and evidence
thereupon not contained in the petition.
-4-
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