DEANNE DANIELS DARGAVELL v. ROBERT ALLEN DARGAVELL
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RENDERED:
October 22, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001656-MR
DEANNE DANIELS DARGAVELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-02630
v.
ROBERT ALLEN DARGAVELL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Deanne Daniels Dargavell1 appeals from the
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of dissolution
of marriage entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on July 11,
2003.
In her appeal, Deanne contends the trial court erred by
failing to require her husband, Robert Allen Dargavell, to
designate Deanne as the primary beneficiary on a life insurance
policy in order to protect her financial interests in the event
Robert’s retirement plan administrator does not recognize
1
We note that Deanne was restored her maiden name of “Daniels” in the decree
but has continued to use Dargavell throughout the appeal.
Deanne’s survivorship rights to his retirement benefits at a
later date.
We affirm.
Deanne and Robert were married on May 27, 1968.
are two adult children born of the marriage.
There
The parties were
able to agree as to the division of most of the marital
property.
However, a final hearing was held June 9-10, 2003,
and testimony taken as to several contested issues.
Following
the hearing, the trial court entered its findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree of dissolution of marriage.
Only
the issue of the life insurance policy remains and is the basis
of this appeal.
Robert was employed as a policeman for the LexingtonFayette Urban County Government (hereinafter “LFUCG”) during the
marriage.
Prior to the parties’ separation he retired and began
receiving monthly benefits from the retirement fund in the
amount of $3,111.74.
The trial court divided the pension funds
equally between the parties.
Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the decree
addresses the division of the pension as follows:
13. The Court finds that Wife is entitled
to equally share in Husband’s service
retirement annuity through the Lexington
Fayette Urban County Government which is
currently in pay status. Wife shall be
entitled to receive one-half (50%) of the
gross monthly retirement annuity, including
any future adjustments, less any required
tax withholdings from her proportionate
share, for the duration of Husband’s life.
Furthermore, the Court finds that Husband’s
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entire years of service as a police officer
occurred during the marriage; that all of
the service retirement benefits were
acquired during the marriage; and that the
service retirement annuity began pay status
during the marriage. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Wife should be deemed to be the
surviving spouse for purposes of
survivorship benefits. In that the
survivorship annual benefit is 60% of his
final annuity, which may exceed Wife’s
marital share, Wife shall be entitled to
receive survivorship annuity benefits equal
to the monthly gross amount received by Wife
immediately prior to Husband’s final annuity
payment. A Qualified Domestic Relations
Order shall be entered in accordance with
these findings.
14. In that this matter was originally
scheduled for trial on April 3, 2003 and
Wife reasonably anticipated receiving her
one-half share of Husband’s Lexington
Fayette Urban County Government Retirement
Annuity effective April, 2003, the Court
finds that Wife is entitled to receive her
one-half share of Husband’s retirement
annuity effective April, 2003. Husband
shall pay to Wife her one-half share of the
Retirement Annuity payments for April and
May within thirty (30) days of the entry of
the Decree herein. In addition, effective
June, 2003, Husband shall pay to Wife her
one-half share directly to her until such
time as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
takes effect and Wife receives direct
payments from the Plan Administrator.
Deanne contends that based upon the testimony of
Andrea Weddle, corporate counsel for LFUCG, there is no
guarantee that Deanne will receive her court-ordered benefits if
Robert pre-deceases her.
This situation may occur, according to
Ms. Weddle, because the pension fund may not honor a court order
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designating an ex-spouse’s right to survivor benefits.
Ms.
Weddle indicated that this issue had no yet been addressed by
the retirement administrator and may require additional
adjudication before the pension fund would release survivor
funds to an ex-spouse.
Based upon this potential problem,
Deanne argues the following in her appellate brief at pages 1315:
The appeal herein is based in equity as
to the Trial Court’s failure to provide
readily available equitable relief for
Deanne through life insurance.
The Trial
Court’s error and abuse of discretion arises
when it was uncontroverted that the parties’
major marital asset, the LFUCG retirement
fund, would provide Robert with undisputed,
unconditional financial security for his
lifetime but Deanne’s rights to receive
benefits for her lifetime are both disputed
and conditional.
If Robert dies tomorrow, Deanne gets
nothing. Deanne would lose her ½ monthly
annuity income and, in light of Ms. Weddle’s
testimony, her status as a surviving spouse,
as ordered by the Trial Court, would be
disputed and litigated by the LFUCG Pension
Board.
. . . .
The Trial Court did have readily
available equitable means to provide Deanne
with some form of limited financial
protection in the event that she was denied
survivorship benefits by LFUCG, but chose
not to employ any of them. As set forth in
Appellant’s Statement of facts hereinabove,
Counsel requested the Trial Court to require
Robert to maintain Deanne as the beneficiary
under his life insurance policy, subject to
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the reasonable contingency that she would
only receive life insurance proceeds if she
were denied survivorship benefits.
. . . .
Under these particular factual
circumstances, Appellant submits that the
Trial Court committed clear error and/or
abused its discretion in the division and
allocation of marital property.
Robert contends that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, that it divided the pension in just proportions and
that Deanne’s contentions are speculative and may never come to
fruition.
He further contends that KRS 67A.492(1) is
controlling in that it provides that a pension’s contingent
recipient must have been married to the beneficiary at least one
year prior to his death or six months prior to the beneficiary’s
retirement in order to be eligible for surviving spouse
benefits.
In this case the parties were married for six months
prior to Robert’s retirement and thus, Deanne qualifies for
surviving spouse benefits.
Although Deanne argues that “the trial court committed
clear error and/or abused its discretion in the division and
allocation of marital property,” we must disagree.
Findings of
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous with due
regard given to the opportunity of the trial judge to view the
credibility of the witnesses.
CR 52.01.
Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1986).
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Reichle v. Reichle,
First, it should be noted that
neither party argues that the trial court’s findings are
erroneous.
The trial court found the pension to be marital
property subject to distribution as a marital asset.
As to Deanne’s abuse of discretion contention, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky has held “[t]he test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Sexton v. Sexton, Ky., 125 S.W.3d 258, 272 (2004) citing
Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941 (1999).
Under the
facts of this case the court divided the pension equitably
giving each party a one-half interest in the benefits.
In
Brosick v. Brosick, Ky.App., 974 S.W.2d 498, 503 (1998), this
Court held, “it is the pension, not the benefits, which is the
marital asset which is divided by the court.”
The court divided
the asset and Deanne has no argument with the manner in which it
was assigned.
Her argument is that some future contingency may
occur which may prevent her from realizing the entire benefit
she was assigned.
We believe her argument to be too speculative
to reach the level of an abuse of discretion.
A trial court in
any proceeding, but especially a dissolution action, must
consider numerous and various consequences as to the impact of
his decision.
But we do not believe he must attempt to make
contingency provisions for every possibility that may or may not
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occur in the future.
To find otherwise would have a disastrous
effect on the orderly disposition of cases in the trial court.
As such, we find no abuse of discretion in this case
concerning the Fayette Circuit Court’s refusal to require Robert
to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of Deanne to
protect a contingency which may never come to fruition.
we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Debra Ann Doss
Lexington, KY
Martha A. Rosenberg
Lexington, KY
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Thus,
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