MARTA HENSLEY AND TERRY HENSLEY v. BANK ONE, KENTUCKY, NA; AND KENTUCKY AUTO RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.
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RENDERED:
December 10, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001644-MR
MARTA HENSLEY AND
TERRY HENSLEY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILIP R. PATTON, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-01380
BANK ONE, KENTUCKY, NA; AND
KENTUCKY AUTO RECOVERY
SERVICES, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON, JUDGE; MILLER, SENIOR
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Marta and Terry Hensley appeal from the
trial order and judgment of the Warren Circuit Court in favor of
Bank One, Kentucky, NA (Bank One, or “the bank”), and Kentucky
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
Auto Recovery Service, Inc. (Kentucky Auto), following a jury
trial on their claim of wrongful repossession.
The Hensleys
contend that the trial court made several evidentiary errors
that deprived them of a fair trial.
They also argue that their
rights to due process were impaired by the hiatus of four years
between the filing of their complaint and the trial.
After a
careful review of the record, including the video recording of
the trial conducted by the Special Judge, Hon. Phillip R.
Patton, we have found no error.
Thus, we affirm.
On May 9, 1997, Marta Hensley purchased a 1997 Dodge
Ram pick-up truck from Martin Automotive in Bowling Green,
Kentucky.
The cost of the truck according to the purchase
agreement was $41,000.
That figure was adjusted by the
deducting of the Hensleys’ down payment of $5,000, the addition
of the cost of credit health and disability insurance, and the
addition of taxes and other fees -- leaving a balance of
$43,802.55.
In order to finance the sale, Marta entered into a
personal loan agreement with Bank One and gave the bank a
security interest in the vehicle.
According to the agreement,
she was obligated to repay Bank One in installments of $968.68
over the span of 66 months -- beginning August 7, 1997.
Before Marta’s first payment became due, she became
ill with a thyroid tumor.
She filed a claim with her disability
insurer, Protective Life Insurance Company (Protective Life),
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for payment of her installment loan.
Protective Life began
making monthly payments of $750, beginning with the August 1997
payment.
In January 1998, Marta discovered that Protective Life
was paying $220 less than the amount due -– resulting in an
arrearage of $1,100.
Thus, she made two payments that month
($600 and $500) to make the account current.
However, she did
not continue to make regular payments of the difference of $220.
By April 1999, she was again in arrears on the loan -– this time
in the amount of $1,800.
Bank One then decided to repossess the
vehicle.
On April 25, 1999, the bank dispatched Kentucky Auto,
a company located in Louisville, to repossess the truck.
After
satisfying the deficiency owed to the bank and paying additional
sums required by the bank to continue the loan, the Hensleys
recovered their truck from Kentucky Auto a few days later.
Upon
returning home, the Hensleys discovered that many items of
personalty were missing from the truck, including a cell phone,
numerous cassette tapes, ammunition, and a bag containing $3,600
in cash.
In addition, the truck had been damaged in the course
of the repossession.
On October 27, 1999, Marta filed a complaint against
Bank One and Kentucky Auto.
She claimed that the truck had been
wrongfully repossessed; that she was less than one month in
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arrears at the time of the repossession; and that the bank had
not informed her that she had to pay on the due date to avoid
repossession.
She sought compensation for the damages allegedly
resulting to the truck during the repossession and for the items
lost from the truck.
attorney’s fees.
She also claimed punitive damages and
Because many of the items missing from the
truck belonged to her husband, Marta was permitted to amend her
complaint to add Terry Hensley as a plaintiff.
Although the Hensleys’ complaint and amended complaint
did not assert any claims against the dealership, Martin
Automotive, they nonetheless made several allegations of
wrongdoing against it during the discovery process.
They
complained that Terry had not been allowed to accompany Marta
when she executed the sales contract and completed the
application for the installment loan.
They also claimed that
Marta signed those documents under duress, generally alleging
that the dealership took advantage of the fact that Marta was a
“shy person” of foreign descent who was unskilled at “dealing
with [a] pushy auto salesman.” (Record, p. 776.)
Prior to trial, Bank One filed a motion in limine to
prohibit the introduction of evidence relating to the Hensleys’
contract with Martin Automotive.
On August 13, 2001, the court
granted the motion and admonished the Hensleys not to make any
reference at trial as to:
their negotiations with Martin
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Automotive for the purchase of the truck, the conduct of the
dealership’s employees, and any dealings with Martin Automotive
that occurred after the purchase of the vehicle.
The trial was continued three times pursuant to
motions made by Kentucky Auto.
these motions.
The Hensleys did not object to
The trial did not begin until May 13, 2003 –
twenty-one months after the court had ruled on Bank One’s motion
in limine.
The Hensleys’ theory of the case changed several times
throughout the litigation.
At a pre-trial hearing in January,
2001, their attorney stated that all the payments made by the
Hensleys appeared to have been accounted for in the loan history
provided by Bank One during discovery.
However, on the day
before trial, the Hensleys alleged for the first time that they
had made a second payment of $5,000 the week following the
purchase that was never credited to their account.
The trial
court excluded evidence of the additional payment of $5,000, and
the Hensleys argue on appeal that it erred in so doing.
The Hensleys also alleged (again for the first time at
trial) that they sent a payment of $2,500 to Bank One in
December 1997.
This payment was not reflected in the bank’s
loan history nor was it credited against the loan.
Although
their testimony concerning this payment was admitted into
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evidence, the Hensleys had no receipt or cancelled check to
support their claim that they had paid this money to the bank.
At the conclusion of the Hensleys’ proof, the trial
court granted Kentucky Auto’s motion for a directed verdict in
part, concluding that the repossession of the truck had been
accomplished without a breach of the peace.
found:
The jury later
(1) that the Hensleys were in default on the loan with
Bank One at the time of the repossession and (2) that Kentucky
Auto had exercised ordinary care in protecting the vehicle while
it was in its possession.
A judgment consistent with the
verdict was entered on May 23, 2003.
The Hensleys filed a
motion to alter, amend, or set aside the trial order and
judgment, which was denied.
This appeal followed.
The Hensleys’ first two arguments involve the ruling
of the trial court that prevented them from introducing evidence
of an additional payment of $5,000 to Martin Automotive within a
few days of the vehicle’s purchase.
The Hensleys testified that
the $5,000 down payment for the truck was paid in cash on May 9,
1997.
Terry Hensley testified by avowal that a representative
of the bank came to his business a few days after the purchase
and demanded that they pay an additional $5,000 toward the loan.
He testified that he complied with the bank’s request.
As
evidence of this additional payment, the appellants presented
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two cancelled checks for $2,500, each payable to Martin
Automotive, dated May 12, 1997.
The bank made discovery requests early in the
litigation to obtain information from the appellants concerning
payments made by them -- or by others on their behalf -- that
were not credited against the loan.
However, the second $5,000
payment was not revealed until May 12, 2003 -- literally the eve
of trial.
Because the checks were paid to Martin Automotive
rather than to Bank One, Special Judge Patton ruled consistently
with the court’s prior decision on the bank’s motion in limine
and refused to allow the jury to hear evidence concerning the
payment.
The Hensleys argue that the court abused its
discretion in denying them the opportunity to establish that
they were not in default.
They also contend that the court
abused its discretion in allowing Bank One to introduce a
payment history that did not include the additional $5,000 paid
to Martin Automotive.
“The presentation of evidence . . . rests in the sound
discretion of the trial judge.”
S.W.2d 34 (1988).
Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 771
Therefore, our standard of review of an
evidentiary ruling of a trial court is abuse of discretion.
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s
decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
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sound legal principles.”
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (2001).
In this case, we
cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in its
ruling on this payment.
The payment at issue (consisting of the two checks for
$2,500 each) was not made to the bank but rather to Martin
Automotive.
The checks were not negotiated by Bank One.
The
Hensleys offered no evidence of why Martin Automotive demanded
this money.
(We note that the alleged payment of the first
$5,000 as the down payment had been made in cash.)
There was no
proof that the sum was used to offset any amounts that the
Hensleys owed to the bank.
If the checks been made payable to Bank One, or if
they had been negotiated by Bank One, they would constitute
relevant evidence as to Marta’s default.
However, because there
was no evidence that the alleged payment was ever associated
with or received by Bank One, it was not relevant to any issue
before the jury.
Thus, the trial court did not err in excluding
the checks along with Terry’s testimony concerning the payment.
The Hensleys next argue that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to allow them to read the deposition
of Richard Thomas to the jury.
Thomas, an employee of Bank One,
was in charge of the indirect loan department at the time of
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Marta’s purchase of the truck.
His job consisted of soliciting
business from third parties -- such as car dealers.
Thomas had no knowledge of Marta’s loan with the bank.
However, the Hensleys sought to offer Thomas’s testimony in
order to establish that Martin Automotive was the agent of Bank
One in order to render Bank One accountable for the alleged
misconduct of Martin Automotive during the purchase
negotiations.
They contend that Thomas’s testimony was relevant
and necessary to establish that Marta was fraudulently induced
to purchase the 1997 pick-up truck.
Nevertheless, as we have observed earlier, the
Hensleys did not sue Martin Automotive -- nor did they attempt
to rescind the purchase agreement.
Their claims of fraudulent
inducement and duress were never set forth either in their
original complaint or in their amended complaint.
Their only
claim was for wrongful repossession, a claim which required
proof that Marta was not in default at the time of the
repossession.
Thomas’s testimony related to the role of Martin
Automotive as the bank’s agent for the limited purpose of
processing the paper work associated with the financing of the
vehicle.
This limited agency would not have entitled the
Hensleys to a judgment against the bank for any tortious conduct
of Martin Automotive.
Thomas’s testimony did not create a nexus
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between the alleged hard-sell tactics of Martin Automotive and
the bank.
There was no indication that the dealership’s sales
techniques were of any benefit to Bank One or even that the bank
had any knowledge of such conduct.
Thomas’s deposition did not
have any bearing on the critical issue of whether Marta was in
default on her loan.
Consequently, the court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding this testimony.
The Hensleys also contend that Kentucky Auto was
liable as a matter of law for the damages that they claimed to
have sustained in the course of the repossession with respect to
missing articles.
Whether these losses were attributable to the
actions of Kentucky Auto was a matter properly submitted to the
jury for resolution.
As the finder of fact, the jury was not
required to believe the Hensleys’ account of events.
Therefore,
the trial court did not err in refraining from directing a
verdict on Kentucky Auto’s liability for the damages to the
vehicle and for the lost items of property.
Rainbo Baking Co.
v. S & S Trucking Co., Ky., 459 S.W.2d 155 (1970).
The Hensleys contend that the trial court also erred
in denying their motion for a mistrial because of a conversation
that occurred during a recess between Bank One’s attorney and
four jurors.
The contact was witnessed by the Hensleys’
attorney, who reported the incident to the court.
Bank One’s
counsel acknowledged that she had said “hello” to a “couple of
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the jurors” and that she had remarked to a group of jurors that
an approaching storm was visible through a window in the
courthouse.
In response to the motion for a mistrial, both Bank
One and Kentucky Auto requested that the court conduct a voir
dire of the jurors involved.
The Hensleys objected.
The trial
court denied the motion for mistrial and postponed any
questioning of the panel until after a verdict was returned.
At
the conclusion of the trial, the jurors acknowledged that
counsel’s comments had not concerned anything other than the
weather.
City of Catlettsburg v. Sutherland’s Adm’r., Ky., 57
S.W.2d 512 (1933), cited by the appellants, is not factually
congruent with the instant case.
In City of Catlettsburg, a
short conversation (10 to 15 minutes) took place between the
widow of the decedent and several jurors.
The widow also
engaged in a second conversation of unknown length with another
juror.
The court reversed the judgment on other grounds but
declined to hold that these contacts, standing alone, would
require a reversal of the judgment.
Id. at 514.
We believe the incident complained of in this case is
more similar to the facts of Hamilton v. Poe, Ky., 473 S.W.2d
840 (1971).
In Hamilton, the trial court denied a mistrial
where “the parties did not discuss any matters relating to the
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trial” and the conversation involving the jurors was so casual
that it “could not have had any effect in anyway on the outcome
of the trial.”
See also, Bee’s Old Reliable Shows v. Maupin’s
Adm’x, Ky., 226 S.W.2d 23 (1950), and C. V. Hill & Co. v.
Hadden’s Grocery, Ky., 185 S.W.2d 681 (1945).
Litigants and their attorneys should make every effort
not to attempt to associate or to ingratiate themselves with the
members of the jury.
Whether a contact is sufficiently
egregious to warrant a mistrial remains a matter for the sound
discretion of the trial court.
We find no abuse of that
discretion in the court’s refusal to end the trial because of
counsel’s brief, innocuous observations about the weather to the
jurors.
The Hensleys have raised two issues with respect to
the introduction of documents obtained by Bank One from Marta’s
credit health insurer, Protective Life.
In compliance with a
subpoena issued by Bank One, Protective Life produced forms
completed by Marta and her physician in seeking disability
insurance benefits.
Although they contained the diagnosis of
Marta’s physician, the dates of her treatment, and the nature of
those treatments, the documents which were produced were not
medical records as such.
However, they contained Marta’s
certification that she had performed no work since she filed for
the benefits and that she remained unable to work.
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Bank One introduced the forms as evidence bearing on
Marta’s credibility.
Marta testified that she became ill soon
after purchasing the pick-up truck.
During the months that
Protective Life was paying the bulk of her car payment, Marta
testified that she was working as the bookkeeper at Terry’s
grocery store, that she started a counseling business, and that
she worked a few hours each morning at the courthouse as an
interpreter.
Accordingly, her certification in the insurance
documents that she was unable to perform any work literally
placed Marta’s credibility in question.
Because the documents
constituted relevant evidence, we find no error in their
admission.
In defense of its use of these records, Bank One
argues that if Protective Life’s release of the documents
violated the Federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPPA), the Hensleys must look to Protective
Life for relief.
We agree.
We note, however, that the health
information on the documents as revealed to the jury did not
contain any information about Marta’s medical condition that she
had not already disclosed during her direct testimony.
Thus, we
perceive no abuse of discretion by the court in admitting this
evidence.
The Hensleys also cite as error the court’s refusal to
compel Kevin Vittitow, general manager of Kentucky Auto, to
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reveal his annual income.
The appellants claim that the amount
of his salary “was very relevant to know his real reason to not
tell the truth at trial and to make Appellee Kentucky Auto look
perfect.”
(Appellants’ brief, p. 12.)
Vittitow testified that he had worked at Kentucky
Auto, a small company with about six employees, since its
inception 12 years earlier.
He also testified that he hoped to
purchase the company upon the retirement of its current owner.
Thus, the jury was made aware of Vittitow’s close personal
relationship with the owners of the company as well as his
future aspirations.
We believe the jury had sufficient
information to allow it to assess his motivation and any
possible bias.
An evaluation of his credibility was not
dependent upon knowledge of his income.
The issue of any
discrepancies between Vittitow’s testimony and the other
evidence presented at trial was properly decided by the jury.
It is not our proper function on review to determine witness
credibility in lieu of a jury.
The Hensleys last argue that they were deprived of a
fair trial by the numerous and lengthy continuances granted to
Kentucky Auto.
Our review of the record reveals that the
Hensleys did not object to the continuances.
Thus, this issue
has not been preserved for our review.
The judgment of the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, BANK ONE:
Nancy Oliver Roberts
Bowling Green, KY
Helene Gordon Williams
Louisville, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, KENTUCKY
AUTO:
Michael S. Vitale
Bowling Green, KY
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