GILBERT and NELLAN HAHN, GENE HAHN, JERILYN and MIKE CARRIER, JESSE COLLINS, THELMA COULTER, JANE and FRANK CUNNINGHAM, GENEVA and HAROLD DAVIS, DOROTHY GRAY, BURTON HAHN, CHARLES LEE and INEZ HAHN, MARSHA HAHN, JESS and ROXIE HARDIN, MARGIE HOLT, CHARLES and IRENE HUPP, BOBBY and ADA INGRAM, LORETTA and LARRY MADDOX, JUNE and BILL METZWIELER, BETTY and JAMES PREWITT, LOUISE TERRELL, HALLIE THOMAS, CATHERINE WILSON, and CAROL JANE ZEIGLER v. WILLIAM and MARY HAHN, JOE and ELIZABETH HAHN, NANCY RUTH and RULDOLPH REDMON, AND FREIDA CAROL and HAROLD PRATHER
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RENDERED: July 30, 2004, 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001612-MR
GILBERT and NELLAN HAHN,
GENE HAHN, JERILYN and MIKE CARRIER,
JESSE COLLINS, THELMA COULTER,
JANE and FRANK CUNNINGHAM,
GENEVA and HAROLD DAVIS,
DOROTHY GRAY, BURTON HAHN,
CHARLES LEE and INEZ HAHN,
MARSHA HAHN,
JESS and ROXIE HARDIN,
MARGIE HOLT,
CHARLES and IRENE HUPP,
BOBBY and ADA INGRAM,
LORETTA and LARRY MADDOX,
JUNE and BILL METZWIELER,
BETTY and JAMES PREWITT,
LOUISE TERRELL, HALLIE THOMAS,
CATHERINE WILSON, and
CAROL JANE ZEIGLER
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY D. RAIKES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00535
WILLIAM and MARY HAHN,
JOE and ELIZABETH HAHN,
NANCY RUTH and RULDOLPH REDMON,
AND
FREIDA CAROL and HAROLD PRATHER
APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING APPEAL
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: The appellants are all nieces and nephews
and/or grandnieces and grandnephews of William Hahn, who died on
August 4, 1999, and their spouses.
The appellees are four other
nieces and nephews of Hahn and their spouses.
Because we lack
jurisdiction, we must dismiss this appeal.
When William Hahn died on August 4, 1999, he left a
will dated March 19, 1958.
In paragraph three of the will, Hahn
devised his farm near Chaplin, Kentucky, to the appellees at his
death, with a life estate reserved to his wife.
However, on
November 5, 1991, Hahn and his wife sold the farm to one of the
appellees, Joe Hahn, and his wife, Elizabeth, for $75,000.
William Hahn’s wife died on January 25, 1999, and he died later
the same year.
After Hahn’s death, the appellees filed a civil
complaint against the appellants in the Nelson Circuit Court,
alleging that the sale of the farm during Hahn’s life did not
constitute an ademption1 and, therefore, that they were entitled
1
Ademption is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) as “[t]he
destruction or extinction of a legacy or bequest by reason of a bequeathed
asset’s ceasing to be part of the estate at the time of the testator’s death;
a beneficiary’s forfeiture of a legacy or bequest that is no longer
operative.”
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to recover $75,000 from his estate in lieu of the farm.2
The
appellants answered the complaint, and the court entered an
order directing the parties to participate in mediation in an
attempt to settle the matter.
In addition to whether or not an ademption had
occurred, two other issues arose.
First, the parties disputed
whether, in the event an ademption had not occurred, the farm
should be valued at $75,000 based on the sale price or whether
it should be valued as of the date of Hahn’s death.
Second, the
parties disputed whether, assuming there was not an ademption,
the appellees were obligated to trace the amount of proceeds
from the sale of the farm in order to recover under their
complaint.
The parties then submitted these two issues for
ruling to the court.
On February 19, 2003, the court entered an order
addressing the value that should be assigned to the farm.
The
court described the issue as “what valuation should be assigned
to the farm if it is ultimately determined that the sale did not
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 394.360(1) provides that:
The conversion of money or property or the proceeds
of property, devised to one (1) of the testator’s
heirs, into other property or thing, with or without
the assent of the testator, shall not be an ademption
of the legacy or devise unless the testator so
intended; but the devisee shall have and receive the
value of such devise, unless a contrary intention on
the part of the testator appears from the will, or by
parol or other evidence.
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operate as an ademption.”
The court found that the farm should
be valued at $75,000, its sale price in 1991.
At the end of the
order, the court noted that it was interlocutory in nature.
On April 14, 2003, the court entered an order holding
that the appellees were “under no obligation to trace the amount
stemming from the sale of the decedent’s farm in order to make
the recovery sought in their Complaint should they prevail on
their claim to entitlement of the proceeds from the sale of the
farm.”
The court further noted that the remaining issue was
“whether the bequest of the farm [set] forth in William Hahn’s
will was adeemed when the farm was sold in 1991.”
As with the
first order, the court likewise noted that this order was
interlocutory in nature.
The appellants herein then submitted a motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the February 19, 2003, order determining
the value of the farm at $75,000 “for nonademption purposes.”
The court denied the motion and stated in the last sentence that
“[t]his is a final and appealable Order and there is no just
reason for delay.”
The order was entered on June 27 2003.
This
appeal followed.
The appellants argue on appeal that, assuming there
was not an ademption, then the appellees are limited to
recovering the amount of proceeds which they can trace.
Therefore, they urge this court to reverse the order of the
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trial court holding that the appellees were under no obligation
to trace the proceeds from the sale of the farm.
The appellees
argue in response that the court did not err in ruling that
tracing was unnecessary.
“A final or appealable judgment is a final order
adjudicating all the rights of all the parties in an action or
proceeding, or a judgment made final under Rule 54.02.”
54.01.
CR3
CR 54.02 provides in part as follows:
When more than one claim for relief is
present in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may grant a final
judgment upon one or more but less than all
of the claims or parties only upon a
determination that there is no just reason
for delay. The judgment shall recite such
determination and shall recite that the
judgment is final.
CR 54.02(1).
“Before the processes of CR 54.02 may be invoked
for the purpose of making an otherwise interlocutory judgment
final and appealable, there must be a final adjudication upon
one or more of the claims in litigation.”
Hale v. Deaton, Ky.,
528 S.W.2d 719, 722 (1975).
The first two orders in this case were interlocutory
in nature, and the court so stated.
Furthermore, the last
order, although it contained finality language, was likewise not
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-5-
a final order or judgment and was not appealable.
Therefore, we
lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal.4
Because the trial court did not make a conclusive
determination of the entire claim, the order was not a final and
appealable order within the meaning of either CR 54.01 or CR
54.02.
See City of Covington v. Peare, Ky. App., 769 S.W.2d
761, 764 (1989).
“This is true even though the trial court has
recited that the judgment is a final one and there is no just
reason for delay as provided for in CR 54.02.”
Id.
As we noted
in Revenue Cabinet v. Barbour, Ky. App., 836 S.W.2d 418 (1992),
“[w]here an order is by its very nature interlocutory, even the
inclusion of the recitals provided for in CR 54.02 will not make
it appealable.”
Id. at 422.
Further, as we noted in Bellarmine
College v. Hornung, Ky. App., 662 S.W.2d 847 (1983), “[s]ound
judicial administration requires the avoidance of piecemeal
dispositions of cases, and appellate courts must not be
indiscriminately thrust into the processes of single-party or
single-claim trials until they are final.
Id. at 848.
The orders entered in this case resolved two of the
issues that might ultimately have come before the court.
However, the resolution of the two issues did not resolve in any
4
Neither party raised the issue of jurisdiction in its brief. However,
“[T]his court on its own motion will raise the issue of want of jurisdiction
if the order appealed from lacks finality.” Huff v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., Ky.,
454 S.W.2d 705, 706 (1970).
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manner the appellees’ claim.
Before the claim may be resolved,
it must be determined whether or not there was an ademption.
As
the court noted in its orders, its rulings assumed that there
would not be a finding that an ademption had occurred.
However,
no determination in that regard had been made when this appeal
was filed.
In short, the orders entered by the court were
interlocutory in nature, and this court is without jurisdiction
to consider the appeal.
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that this appeal be
DISMISSED.5
ALL CONCUR.
__/s/_
ENTERED: __July 30, 2004__
David C. Buckingham_
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Christina L. Bradford
Bardstown, Kentucky
John Douglas Hubbard
Bardstown, Kentucky
5
An order to show cause as to why this appeal should not be dismissed was
entered by this court in this case. The appellants responded, but the
appellees did not. The arguments of the appellants did not persuade us that
the appeal should not be dismissed.
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