L. MICHAEL LAVENDER, M.D., OB/GYN SPECIALISTS OF NORTHERN KENTUCKY, INC.; AND LINDA AND MATTHEW JUSTICE v. AMERICAN PHYSICIANS ASSURANCE CORPORATION
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December 3, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001544-MR
L. MICHAEL LAVENDER, M.D.,
OB/GYN SPECIALISTS OF NORTHERN
KENTUCKY, INC.; AND
LINDA AND MATTHEW JUSTICE
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-01352
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS ASSURANCE
CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DYCHE AND McANULTY, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
McANULTY, JUDGE:
SUMMARY
On May 24, 1997, L. Michael Lavender, M.D., delivered
Linda Justice’s son by crash cesarean section.
Once Dr.
Lavender opened Linda Justice in the operating room, he
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
discovered that her uterus had ruptured.
Secondary to the
uterine rupture, Linda Justice’s baby, Joseph, suffered a severe
brain injury, and Linda Justice had to have a hysterectomy.
At
the time of the delivery, Dr. Lavender and his practice group,
OB/GYN Specialists of Northern Kentucky, Inc. (OB/GYN), were
insured by the P.I.E. Mutual Insurance Company (P.I.E.).
But
P.I.E. went out of business in the fall of 1997, and the doctors
in the practice were left to find another insurance carrier.
When completing his insurance application to the predecessor in
interest of American Physicians Assurance Corporation (APAC),
Dr. Lavender answered “No” to the following question: “Have any
incidents occurred in your practice (treatment results less than
anticipated, complications that prolonged treatment/
hospitalization, patient expressions of dissatisfaction, fee
disputes, etc.), that, from your knowledge of the patient’s
situation, have any realistic potential of developing into a
formal claim against you?”
After being notified that Linda
Justice filed a medical negligence action against Dr. Lavender,
APAC filed a declaratory judgment action in which it contended
that Dr. Lavender’s answer to this question was a
misrepresentation entitling it to rescind coverage.
The trial
court agreed with APAC and granted its motion for summary
judgment.
At issue in this appeal is whether genuine issues of
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material fact precluded summary judgment.
Because we believe
that they do, we vacate and remand for a jury trial.
LINDA JUSTICE’S LABOR AND DELIVERY
Linda Justice is the mother of three children.
first two children were born by cesarean section.
Her
But she
desired to have her third child, Joseph (Joey), by vaginal
delivery.
There are certain risks involved in having a vaginal
birth after cesarean section (VBAC), one of which is a uterine
rupture.
Linda Justice’s due date with Joseph was in late-May
of 1997.
She sought prenatal medical care at OB/GYN.
After
discussing the risks of a VBAC with her, the doctors at OB/GYN
eventually agreed to let her be a VBAC candidate.
Dr. Lavender was the group physician on call when
Linda Justice went into labor on May 24, 1997.
He allowed Linda
Justice to proceed with the trial of labor, as she desired to
do.
But when Linda Justice complained of break-through
abdominal pain after having been administered an epidural and
fetal monitoring indicated the baby was in severe distress, Dr.
Lavender attempted a vaginal delivery using forceps.
But he
could not deliver the baby that way, so he performed a crash
cesarean section.
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When Dr. Lavender opened Linda Justice in the
operating room, he discovered that her uterus had ruptured.
She
had to have a hysterectomy and required blood transfusions.
Joey was blue and limp.
His APGAR scores -- an
indication of a baby’s condition immediately after birth, a
score of 7-10 considered normal and a score of 3 and below
requiring advanced medical care and emergency measures -– were 1
at one minute, 3 at five minutes and 5 at 10 minutes.
Joey’s
prognosis for months after his birth was “guarded.”
In the early hours after Joey’s birth, Linda Justice’s
sister, who used to work as a nurse in obstetrics and
gynecology, asked Dr. Lavender if he used an internal uterine
pressure catheter (IUPC) on Linda during her labor.
The IUPC is
an internal device that is most valuable if external monitors
are not picking up contractions.
Dr. Lavender replied that he
did not insert an IUPC.
The day after Joey’s birth, Linda Justice remained in
the intensive care unit.
Dr. Lavender went to check on her.
According to Dr. Lavender, Linda Justice acknowledged to Dr.
Lavender that one of the other doctors in the practice, Dr.
Burchell, had carefully explained the serious problems that
could develop in a VBAC with both the baby and the mother.
In
spite of the risks, she wanted to attempt a vaginal delivery,
and she did not feel coerced by any doctor at OB/GYN to VBAC.
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About a week and a half after Joey’s birth, Dr.
Lavender called Linda Justice at home to see how she and Joey
were doing.
At this point, Joey was still in the hospital.
Dr.
Lavender asked Linda if she had any questions for him, and she
said “No.”
And she told Dr. Lavender that she did not blame him
or the other doctors at OB/GYN for what happened.
After this
phone call, Dr. Lavender did not speak with Linda or any member
of her family again.
Dr. Lavender had never had a patient rupture under
these circumstances.
He had some concerns about the way in
which the nurses had read the fetal monitoring strips that
night.
So shortly after Joey’s birth, Dr. Lavender took the
fetal monitoring strips to another doctor, Dr. Kim Brady, for
review.
After examining the strips, Dr. Brady advised Dr.
Lavender that everything he had done was appropriate.
Although not known by Dr. Lavender until about six
months after Joey’s birth, St. Elizabeth Medical Center, the
hospital where Linda had Joey, performed a peer review of the
birth.
The peer review process resulted in a finding of no
fault in Dr. Lavender’s care of Linda.
On August 1, 1997, the Lawrence Firm, a law firm in
the Cincinnati area that specializes in medical malpractice,
sent a letter to Dr. Lavender’s office at OB/GYN requesting
Linda Justice’s medical records.
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This letter was addressed
incorrectly, however, and was not received by OB/GYN or Dr.
Lavender.
OB/GYN’S MALPRACTICE INSURANCE COVERAGE
At the time of Linda Justice’s delivery, May 24, 1997,
Dr. Lavender and OB/GYN had a claims-made medical malpractice
insurance policy with P.I.E.
P.I.E. went out of business in
late 1997, leaving OB/GYN to obtain insurance coverage with
another carrier.
In December 1997, the doctors at OB/GYN
submitted insurance applications to Kentucky Medical Insurance
Company (KMIC) through KMIC’s agent, KMA.
At the time, there
were six doctors in the group, and each doctor, including Dr.
Lavender, submitted his own application.
Angie Ball, OB/GYN’s
office manager at the time, submitted Dr. Lavender’s application
in early December of 1997.
The application had the following question (Question
22):
22. Have any incidents occurred in your
practice (treatment results less than
anticipated, complications that prolonged
treatment/hospitalization, patient
expressions of dissatisfaction, fee
disputes, etc.) that, from your knowledge of
the patient situation, have any realistic
potential of developing into a formal claim
against you?
Dr. Lavender answered “No” to this question.
A few weeks after Dr. Lavender submitted his
application to KMIC’s agent, the Lawrence Firm faxed the letter
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originally dated August 1, 1997, to Dr. Lavender’s office.
In
the letter, the Lawrence Firm stated that it represented Linda
Justice and requested a complete copy of her medical records and
bills.
On the authorization for release of the records signed
by Linda Justice, the Lawrence Firm specified that it was
requesting the following: “any and all monitoring strips,
including but not limited to fetal monitoring strips.”
Dr.
Lavender did not see the faxed request, but he did authorize the
release of the records when Angie Ball asked him if he had any
objection to copying Linda Justice’s chart.
A member of
OB/GYN’s office staff sent the records to the Lawrence Firm on
January 7, 1998.
KMA finally gave all of OB/GYN’s completed
applications to KMIC’s underwriter on January 20, 1998.
After
receiving the applications, the underwriter instructed KMA to
obtain a “no known loss letter” from OB/GYN.
A “no known loss
letter” is a recitation that the prospective insured has not had
any claims or incidents since the proposed retroactive date of
the policy (November 14, 1997) up to the date of the signing of
the letter.
The representative of KMA recalled that KMIC’s
underwriter asked him to get a “no claim letter” from OB/GYN.
“no claim letter” is slightly different than a “no known loss
letter.”
It is a letter from the prospective insured stating
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A
that there have been no claims filed from the proposed effective
date through the date of the signing of the letter.
OB/GYN
wrote a letter on January 20, 1998, signed by all six physicians
stating that “[f]rom November 15, 1997, none of our six
physicians . . . have had any new malpractice claims brought
against them.”
KMIC issued coverage to Dr. Lavender and OB/GYN in the
amount of $3,000,000 on January 28, 1998.
The policy written
had a retroactive effective date of November 14, 1997 to
November 14, 1998.
On May 22, 1998, Linda and Matthew Justice,
individually and on Joey’s behalf, filed a medical negligence
lawsuit against Dr. Lavender, OB/GYN and St. Elizabeth Medical
Center.
In response to the lawsuit and under the terms of the
insurance policy, KMIC provided a defense to OB/GYN and Dr.
Lavender.
At some point after the Justice’s filed their
lawsuit, APAC bought out KMIC.
in interest.
So APAC became KMIC’s successor
After acquiring KMIC, on June 29, 2001, APAC filed
the underlying action in this case –- a complaint for
declaratory judgment that the insurance coverage was void
because Dr. Lavender misrepresented Linda Justice’s catastrophic
delivery on the insurance application to KMIC.
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The Justice
family was permitted to intervene in the declaratory judgment
action.
Discovery ensued and APAC eventually filed a motion
for summary judgment, which the trial court granted,
precipitating this appeal.
In its order granting summary
judgment, the trial court held that APAC’s motion was “well
taken” and found as a matter of law that “Question #22 is not
vague, not ambiguous, and is enforceable as a matter of law.”
Appellants, Dr. Lavender, OB/GYN and the Justice
Family (Dr. Lavender), raise three arguments on appeal.
First,
Dr. Lavender argues that there are genuine issues of material
fact that preclude summary judgment.
Second, Dr. Lavender
argues that APAC’s failure to obtain a “no known loss” letter
before deciding to issue coverage precludes it from denying
coverage for the Justice lawsuit.
Third, Dr. Lavender argues
that the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that
Question 22 was not vague and ambiguous and was enforceable as a
matter of law.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE
The standard of review of a trial court's granting of
summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found
that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and
that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
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We review the record in a light most favorable to Dr. Lavender
and resolve all doubts in his favor.
See Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
Dr. Lavender contends that summary judgment was
inappropriate in this case because there are genuine issues of
material fact that his answer to Question 22 was a
misrepresentation.
In support, Dr. Lavender argues that
Question 22 sought his subjective opinion based solely on his
knowledge of Linda Justice’s delivery.
He does not deny that a
brain-injured baby and an unanticipated hysterectomy are bad
outcomes; and he does not deny that Linda Justice and her baby
had prolonged hospitalizations.
But he asserts that he
considered the fact that Linda Justice acknowledged that she was
advised of the risks of a VBAC and wanted to proceed anyway.
She told Dr. Lavender she did not blame him for what happened.
And another physician reviewed the fetal monitoring strips and
felt his care was appropriate.
Finally, a request for medical
records is simply that -- a request for medical records.
The
request did not render his initial negative response to Question
22 a misrepresentation.
APAC contends that Dr. Lavender’s admissions belie any
assertion today that he answered Question 22 truthfully when he
completed his application.
He has admitted to the catastrophic
outcome of Linda Justice’s delivery.
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And he has admitted that
his internal office procedures called for his insurance carrier
to be notified under the circumstances of this case.
Based on
the undisputed facts, Dr. Lavender should have answered “Yes” to
Question 22.
If Dr. Lavender had answered “Yes,” KMIC would not
have issued the coverage as requested.
Under KRS 304.14-110, a
misrepresentation, omission or incorrect statement on an
application for insurance prevents recovery under an insurance
policy if it is (1) material to the risk, or (2) the insurer in
good faith would either not have issued the policy or would not
have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in
the loss.
Because it is undisputed that Dr. Lavender’s
misrepresentation meets both of these criteria, the policy was
void from the beginning.
And APAC argues that even assuming that Dr. Lavender
answered Question 22 truthfully when he completed his
application, he failed to supplement his application to change
his negative response to “Yes” after receiving the letter from
the Lawrence Firm.
Dr. Lavender admits in a sworn statement
given as part of the claims investigation that he should have
changed his response but did not do so.
APAC contends that Dr. Lavender should have notified
the insurer of the receipt of the Lawrence Firm Letter for two
reasons.
First, he had a good faith duty to give true
information.
Second, the United States Supreme Court has spoken
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on the issue of an applicant’s duty to supplement the initial
application if, while the insurer is deliberating, facts come to
light that make portions of the application no longer true.
See
Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 317, 48 S.
Ct. 512, 72 L. Ed. 895 (1928) (cited with approval in MacKenzie
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 411 F.2d 781, 783
(6th Cir.
1969), which predicts that Kentucky courts would adopt this rule
if faced with the issue).
Simply, the applicant must inform the
insurer of those facts, and if he does not and the insurer
decides to write a policy, the insurer has a valid defense to a
claim on the policy.
See id.
We begin our analysis by considering the wording of
Question 22.
It is subjective.
It is subjective because it
seeks to probe Dr. Lavender’s state of mind in contrast to
objective questions calling for information within his
knowledge.
See Liebling v. Garden State Indemnity, 337
N.J.Super. 447, 767 A.2d 515, 518 (2001) (addressing subjective
question on attorney’s application for professional liability
insurance and holding that even viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the attorney, his answer to the
subjective question did not reflect an opinion he truthfully
held).
Since Question 22 was subjective the answer is to be
judged on Dr. Lavender’s state of mind.
See id. at 522.
“If he
honestly believed that a malpractice claim was unlikely, his
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negative answer to the question posed in this case is not a
misrepresentation.”
Id.
Contrary to APAC’S assertions, Dr. Lavender has not
admitted that he honestly believed that a medical malpractice
claim arising from his treatment of Linda Justice was likely.
His acknowledgment that she had treatment results less than
anticipated or prolonged hospitalization is only one part of the
subjective question he was asked on the insurance application.
He was then asked to consider his knowledge of her situation.
She never said she intended to sue him.
In fact, she expressed
that she did not blame him for what happened to her.
And she
knew the risks and made her choice to proceed with a VBAC in
spite of the risks.
As for the request for medical records and his duty to
supplement the insurance application, viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Dr. Lavender, he does not recall reading
the actual letter faxed December 30, 1997, from the Lawrence
Firm.
He recalls that his office staff informed him that the
office had received a faxed request from a law firm for Linda
Justice’s medical records.
The staff asked if the chart was
complete for them to send the records out.
He said it was, and
they sent the records within a week of the request.
The question on the application asked “[h]ave any
incidents occurred in your practice . . . that, from your
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knowledge of the patient situation, have any realistic potential
of developing into a formal claim against you?”
The questions
asked by APAC’s attorney in the sworn statement pertaining to
the issue of medical records spoke in hypothetical terms and
pinned Dr. Lavender down to phrases like his awareness of a
possibility or a heightened likelihood of a medical malpractice
claim.
This is not an admission establishing that he
misrepresented his belief in Question 22 about what would occur
in Linda Justice’s case.
It is unfair to presume to know that a
doctor is untruthful when he maintains that a case with a bad
outcome and in which a lawyer gets involved does not necessarily
mean that he would be sued.
It is the insurance company’s responsibility to ask
the questions on the application to which it wants answers.
See
Waxse v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 248 Kan. 582, 809 P.2d 533, 537
(1991).
If it wanted to know if a patient whose treatment
results were less than anticipated had requested her medical
records or if Dr. Lavender had delivered any brain-injured
babies or babies with poor APGARs, it could have asked those
questions, but it did not do so.
It is clear that Dr. Lavender’s credibility will be
the crucial factor in the ultimate factual determination made in
this case.
See Ogden v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., Ky., 503
S.W.2d 727, 729 (1973).
“In such a situation summary judgment
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is an inappropriate tool and trial is indispensable.”
Id.
It
is for this reason –- the determination of Dr. Lavender’s
credibility -- that the testimony of the officer manager, Angie
Ball, pertaining to inter-office handling of patient matters
with bad outcomes is important.
But her testimony is not
dispositive of whether Dr. Lavender’s answer on his application
for insurance was truthful.
That question is for the jury.
WHY KMIC’S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A “NO KNOWN LOSS” LETTER DOES NOT
PRECLUDE IT FROM RESCINDING COVERAGE
We move to Dr. Lavender’s second argument that KMIC’s
failure to obtain a “no known loss” letter before writing a
policy precludes it from rescinding coverage for the Justice
lawsuit.
We note that Dr. Lavender cites no judicial authority
directly in support of this argument.
Kentucky case law is
clearly against Dr. Lavender on this point.
See State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crouch, Ky. App., 706 S.W.2d 203, 206 (1986)
(rejecting similar argument that insurer was estopped from
raising issue of material misrepresentation based on insurer’s
alleged negligent failure to investigate).
“[T]he rule is that
as between the applicant and the insurance company it is the
applicant’s responsibility to see that the application is
correctly filled out.”
Paxton v. Lincoln Income Life Ins. Co.,
Ky., 433 S.W.2d 636, 638 (1968).
It is fundamental that “an
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insurer must have clear notice and full cognizance of the true
facts to be bound by its policy.”
Crouch, 706 S.W.2d at 206.
DISPOSITION
We hold that Question 22 is subjective and this case
will turn on whether Dr. Lavender honestly believed that a
medical malpractice claim was unlikely.
The facts of this case
do not allow for only one conclusion respecting Dr. Lavender’s
true state of mind.
granted.
Thus, summary judgment was prematurely
We need not decide whether Question 22 was vague and
ambiguous as a matter of law.
We vacate the trial court’s order
granting APAC’S motion for summary judgment and remand this case
for trial.
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I must respectfully
dissent, as there is no final judgment in this declaratory
judgment action.
The Order from which the appeal is prosecuted
“finds that said [summary judgment] motion is well taken and
summary judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff American
Physicians Assurance Corporation.”
adjudicates nothing.
It declares no rights, it
A judgment should say, on its face, what
it adjudicates or what it decides.
The judgment, standing
alone, should inform a reader of its nature and the result of
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its entry.
We have none of that here, and therefore no final
and appealable judgment.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
Christopher J. Mehling
Tamara T. Pitts
Taliaferro, Mehling, Shirooni,
Carran & Keys
Cincinnati, Ohio
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Walter E. Haggerty
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Cincinnati, Ohio
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT
MICHAEL LAVENDER, M.D.:
Christopher J. Mehling
Cincinnati, Ohio
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT
OB/GYN SPECIALISTS OF NORTHERN
KENTUCKY, INC.:
E. Andri Busald
Busald Zunk Zevely, PSC
Florence, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS
LINDA AND MATTHEW JUSTICE:
Jennifer Lawrence
Cincinnati, Ohio
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