ANITA DRISKILL v. STEVE KNIGHT, Superintendent
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RENDERED: August 27, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001538-MR
ANITA DRISKILL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00444
STEVE KNIGHT, Superintendent
of MARSHALL COUNTY SCHOOLS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Anita Driskill appeals from the order of
the Marshall Circuit Court which affirmed a decision of a threemember tribunal of the Marshall County school system.
The
tribunal was convened in accordance with KRS1 161.790.
It
determined that the appellee, Superintendent Steve Knight, had
acted appropriately in terminating Driskill’s teaching contract
with the Marshall County Board of Education.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Driskill argues
that the circuit court erred in finding that there was
substantial evidence to support the tribunal’s findings.
She
also contends that her rights to due process were violated by
the manner in which the administrative hearing was conducted,
alleging that one of the members of the tribunal was biased
against her.
After a careful review of the lengthy evidentiary
record compiled during the administrative proceeding, we are
unable to find any error in the decision of the circuit court.
Thus, we affirm.
Driskill had enjoyed a long and unblemished career as
a schoolteacher and administrator in Marshall County when she
was promoted in the late 1980’s to the position of District
Technology Coordinator (DTC).
Since 1999, Driskill had a
continuing contract for 240 days per school year (185 days plus
55 extended days).
She also received a stipend ($5,800 in 1999,
which had increased to $7,300 for the 2001-02 school year) to
compensate her for the extra work related to her position as
DTC.
In addition to her base salary, extended day salary, and
stipend, Driskill submitted numerous forms requesting extra pay
for providing technology training to other district employees.
In February of 2002, an investigation was undertaken
as to Driskill’s requests for additional pay –- an inquiry which
ultimately led to the decision of the superintendent to
terminate her contract.
Driskill’s assistant, Connie McManus,
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testified that she suspected that Driskill had been obtaining
money from grants for providing technology training that was
actually conducted by others.
On February 13, 2002, those
suspicions were confirmed when Driskill provided McManus with an
extra pay form authorizing McManus to receive extra pay for work
which she had not performed.
McManus told Driskill that neither
she nor Driskill had performed any work on that day that would
justify a request for extra pay and that she would not submit
the form prepared by Driskill.
Nevertheless, Driskill submitted
an extra service pay form for herself, requesting three hours of
pay at $30 per hour.
Although no training had actually occurred
on that day, she identified the service for which she was
billing as “training.”
McManus reported the incident to Superintendent
Knight.
He then began an inquiry into Driskill’s extra pay
requests dating back to 1999.
He discovered that Driskill had
made numerous requests for extra pay for training sessions that
had actually been conducted by others.
The investigation also
uncovered evidence of other improprieties.
She had used the
Board’s tax exempt identification number to avoid paying sales
tax when purchasing items for her personal use -- including a
computer for her daughter.
She also caused the Board to incur
substantial unjustified expenses in arranging for herself and
three other teachers to leave a day early (in order to shop) for
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a conference in San Antonio, Texas, during the period February
15-19, 2002.
After completing his investigation, Superintendent
Knight confronted Driskill with the information which he had
gathered.
He gave her a letter listing multiple instances of
misconduct, including thirty-seven separate requests for payment
either for work which she had not performed or for work for
which she had already been compensated by the stipend associated
with her position as the DTC.
The superintendent gave Driskill
five days to provide an explanation to rebut the charges.
Although Driskill met with the superintendent, she failed to
offer a satisfactory explanation for her multiple billings.
On
March 23, 2002, the superintendent notified Driskill that he was
terminating her contract based on charges of insubordination and
conduct unbecoming that of a teacher.
A hearing before the tribunal was convened on May 6,
2002.
At the close of the Board’s proof, the hearing officer
dismissed the charge of insubordination.
On the third day of
testimony, the parties informed the hearing officer that they
had made progress in reaching a settlement of the matter.
They
jointly requested a suspension of the hearing in order to pursue
an amicable resolution of the disciplinary matter.
However, when the parties were unable to resolve their
differences, the hearing resumed on July 26.
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It was not
completed on that day.
Yet another significant delay in the
proceedings occurred due to vacation plans of Driskill’s
attorney.
On August 21, 2002, the tribunal reconvened, heard
closing arguments, and concluded its deliberations.
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final
Order, the tribunal found Driskill guilty of conduct unbecoming
a teacher as follows:
On numerous occasions between July 1999 and
February 2002, Anita Driskill submitted
forms for reimbursement for work she did not
perform. In making this finding the
tribunal did not find Ms. Driskill’s
testimony concerning time required for
facilitation of training programs a credible
explanation for her submission of
reimbursement forms for training sessions
she did not conduct and which did not
require significant preparation or set up on
her part.
On numerous occasions between July 1999
and February 2002, Anita Driskill submitted
reimbursement forms for work which she knew
or should have known she was not entitled to
receive extra compensation. In making this
finding the tribunal notes that Ms. Driskill
was able to draft her own job description
without assistance when requested to do so
by Superintendent Knight. Therefore, she
knew her job duties and turned in
reimbursement forms for work which clearly
fell into that description as well as the
category of work for which she received a
substantial additional stipend. Further, it
was found the explanation that many of the
days worked were “comp” for which she was
entitled to extra pay is not only
inconsistent with school board policy, but
is also not supported by Ms. Driskill’s
personal calendar which shows that she had
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not designated many of the days in question
as “comp” days.
The tribunal also found that Driskill obtained extra
pay at a rate which she knew was excessive and that she violated
school board policy “by purchasing items free of sales tax for
her personal use or benefit.”
However, it found no impropriety
or violation as to the San Antonio trip.
The tribunal concluded
that Driskill’s overall pattern of dishonest behavior
constituted conduct unbecoming a teacher and that the
appropriate sanction was the termination of her teaching
contract.
In her appeal in the Marshall Circuit Court, Driskill
argued that her behavior did not rise to the level of conduct
unbecoming a teacher as a matter of law.
She contended that the
tribunal’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence
and that its order was arbitrary and capricious.
She also
charged that Superintendent Knight had engaged in an ex parte
conversation with one of the members of the tribunal so as to
compromise her right to due process.
Contrary to the findings of the tribunal, the circuit
court expressed its belief that Driskill had presented a
credible defense to the charges of improper billing.
Nevertheless, it refrained from substituting its own assessment
of the evidence for that of the tribunal.
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According proper
deference to the tribunal’s role as fact-finder and judge of
Driskill’s credibility, the court concluded that the evidence
amply supported the tribunal’s findings with respect to the
issue of improper billings and tax avoidance.
The court also expressed displeasure with the lack of
continuity of the hearing; i.e., three days of testimony
beginning in May 2002, an adjournment until July for a single
day of testimony, and the passage of another month before
arguments were presented to the panel.
However, noting the
reasons for the delays (the parties’ mutual desire to pursue a
negotiated settlement and her own attorney’s vacation schedule),
the court found that Driskill was not entitled to complain about
the disjointed schedule.
Therefore, it found no substantive or
procedural grounds warranting a reversal of the tribunal’s
decision.
This appeal followed.
Our standard of review is governed by the substantial
evidence test, the same as that governing the review by the
circuit court.
Reis v. Campbell County Board of Education, Ky.,
938 S.W.2d 880, 887 (1996).
Unless the action taken by the tribunal was
supported by substantial evidence, it is
arbitrary and must be set aside.
“Substantial evidence” is defined as
evidence of substance and relevant
consequence, having the fitness to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable
persons. In its role as a finder of fact,
an administrative agency is afforded great
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latitude in its evaluation of the evidence
heard and the credibility of witnesses,
including its findings and conclusions of
fact.
Gallatin County Board of Education v. Mann, Ky.App., 971 S.W.2d
295, 300 (1998)(citations omitted).
In this appeal, Driskill argues that the evidence of
record does not sufficiently support the tribunal’s findings.
She claims that although she was negligent in completing the
forms used to obtain extra pay, she had acted in good faith in
seeking additional compensation.
She points to evidence that
her former superintendent had never questioned her requests for
extra pay and that a former supervisor had encouraged her to
submit such requests for the extra hours she was required to
work.
She also argues that there were no instructions to guide
her in completing the forms; that she was owed “comp” time; and
that there was no policy -- written or unwritten -- that her
stipend was designed to cover all of the extra hours she spent
on school-related work.
Driskill argues that the evidence
failed to establish her intent to obtain compensation to which
she was not entitled and that in reality it illustrated “a
mountain of misunderstandings on the issue of extra compensation
pay for certified employees.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
Driskill’s arguments represent one possible
interpretation of the evidence.
However, also at issue is the
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problem of her credibility, which was clearly compromised by the
testimony of several witnesses.
Her lack of credibility was
unquestionably a determinative factor in the tribunal’s
decision.
Although the tribunal could have accepted her
explanation for submitting requests for extra pay, it was
equally entitled to disbelieve her testimony that she acted in
good faith in completing the extra pay forms for work beyond
that contemplated by her stipend.
We find no error on this
point.
Next, Driskill alleges that her constitutional right
to equal protection was violated by the superintendent’s
termination of her contract because of her use of the Board’s
tax identification number and her use of an hourly rate of $30
on some of her extra pay forms.
Driskill testified that she was
not the only employee to purchase a computer for personal use
with the school’s tax I.D. number, nor was she unique in seeking
extra pay at the rate of $30 per hour.
However, she complained
that she was the only person disciplined for these activities.
The superintendent countered this contention by observing that
all of the employees alleged to have made similar purchases are
no longer employed by the school district and that no such
purchases have been made during his tenure as superintendent.
The circuit court declined to find any equal
protection violation.
It concluded that the sales tax and rate
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issues were not significant in the context of the proceeding as
a whole.
We agree with the court’s reasoning.
The primary
charges against her and the main focus of the tribunal’s inquiry
concerned her receipt of money for work she did not perform or
for work that she did perform that was covered by her stipend
and salary.
Even if the findings related to the tax and hourly
rate issues were set aside, the remaining findings were more
than sufficient to support the conclusion of the tribunal that
Driskill engaged in conduct warranting the termination of her
teaching contract.
Driskill has raised three additional concerns
implicating her rights to due process.
First, she contends that
the hearing was not held in a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.
The trial court correctly determined that
Driskill is not entitled to any consideration on this issue
because the delays in the hearing were caused by Driskill
herself.
Next, she cites the failure of the hearing officer to
define “conduct unbecoming a teacher” for the tribunal.
She
contends that the phrase does not have a common usage and that
without a definitional instruction, the tribunal was at liberty
to “find conduct unbecoming for minor [in]discretions.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 22.)
We agree with the appellee that the
nuances of the phrase “conduct unbecoming” do not need to be
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defined in the context of a disciplinary hearing.
not charged with trivial matters.
Driskill was
Her nefarious conduct
entailed the fraudulent receipt of school funds.
The tribunal
specifically found that she had engaged in a “pattern of
dishonest behavior” that spanned many years.
Thus, we find no
due process violation resulting from the omission of a
definition of “conduct unbecoming.”
Finally, Driskill argues that she was denied a fair
hearing based on the alleged bias of tribunal member Marsha
Hunt.
This allegation is based on a conversation which she
overheard between Superintendent Knight and Hunt on the last day
of the hearing concerning a recent golf outing attended by
Knight and Hunt’s superintendent, Harry Loy.
In reviewing this
issue, the circuit court concluded that Driskill failed to
properly preserve this issue for appellate review when she
neglected to bring the matter to the attention of the hearing
officer prior to the tribunal’s deliberations.
It further
reasoned that even if the issue had been preserved, the outcome
of the hearing would not have been “affected by such
communication.”
The court was correct in concluding that by
raising the issue for the first time on appeal, Driskill failed
to preserve it for appellate review.
Regional Jail Authority v.
Tackett, Ky., 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (1989).
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The judgment of the Marshall Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
C. Mark Blankenship
Murray, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael A. Owsley
Regina A. Jackson
Bowling Green, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Regina A. Jackson
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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