JAMES EARL MCCONNELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: July 30, 2004, 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001477-MR
JAMES EARL MCCONNELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00218
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, SCHRODER AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
Appellant, James Earl McConnell, appeals the
judgment of the Fayette County Circuit Court sentencing him to
five (5) years enhanced to ten (10) years imprisonment.
On June
24, 2003, the jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty
of second degree assault.
Appellant waived jury sentencing and
in agreement with the Commonwealth, entered a plea of guilty to
second degree persistent felony offender (“PFO”).
reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
For the
On November 24, 2001, appellant and Kimberly Kay
McConnell1 (“Kimberly”) were house sitting in Lexington,
Kentucky.
Appellant and Kimberly had been drinking heavily and
smoking crack cocaine until a violent fight arose.
Kimberly,
who is five feet tall, weighing approximately ninety pounds,
testified that appellant lifted her over his head and threw her
to the ground for a total of three times.
Appellant
subsequently struck the side of Kimberly’s head with his fist
thereby causing serious physical injury.
Paula Lewis (“Paula”)
witnessed the assault and assisted Kimberly out of the house.
Despite becoming very ill as a result of the assault,
Kimberly waited sixteen days before going to the hospital
because there was an outstanding warrant against her.
was diagnosed with a blood clot injury to the brain.
Kimberly
Life
threatening surgery was subsequently performed to Kimberly’s
brain.
On February 25, 2002, the grand jury returned an
indictment against appellant for one count of first degree
assault and one count of first degree PFO.
Appellant’s first
trial resulted in a mistrial when Kimberly unintentionally
revealed aspects of appellant’s prior criminal proceedings.
Appellant’s second trial was held on June 24, 2003.
This appeal
followed.
1
Appellant and Kimberly Kay McConnell were married in 1996, but divorced in
1999. Apparently, in November 2001, appellant and Kimberly had reconciled.
2
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in
prohibiting him from questioning Kimberly about a specific
instance of untruthfulness.
Appellant contends that Kimberly
lied to appellant about the paternity of her unborn child.
On
cross-examination, appellant’s counsel asked Kimberly if she
fabricated this story so that appellant would marry her.
The
trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection because the
alleged paternity fabrication was irrelevant to the present
assault charge.
Here, appellant contends that the evidence is
admissible under KRE 608(b),2 as it is probative of Kimberly’s
character for untruthfulness and establishes a pattern of lying.3
At the time of this trial, KRE 608 permitted opinion or
reputation evidence of character only as to "general reputation
2
Effective July 1, 2003, Kentucky Rule of Evidence (“KRE”) 608(b) states:
“Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking
or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of crime as
provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness: (1)
concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2)
concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another
witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has
testified. . . .”
3
Appellant testified that on the night in question the fight erupted after
appellant suggested that Kimberly, Paula, and he do a “three-some.”
Appellant contends that Kimberly testified differently stating that the fight
erupted when appellant wanted to leave and buy more drugs. Appellant argues
that he could have proven Kimberly’s character for untruthfulness since she
lied about (1) the paternity of her unborn child and (2) the events leading
up to the assault. However, upon a careful review of Kimberly’s testimony,
she did in fact state that the fight erupted after appellant suggested a
“three-some.” Thus, the testimonies do not conflict. See Tape No.A-1,
6/24/03; 13:30:00. Also, we note that appellant failed to state on avowal
that if admissible, Kimberly would have admitted to the fabrication.
3
in the community."
Thus, appellant requests that we apply KRE
608(b) retroactively.
Kentucky law prohibits retroactive application of a
statute to an event which occurred prior to the effective date
of the statute, unless the statute expressly provides for
retroactive application.
KRS 446.080(3).
Commonwealth Dept. of
Agriculture v. Vinson, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 162, 168 (2000).
Similarly, we will not apply a Rule of Evidence retroactively,
as it would engender chaos in the courtroom and demand that
trial judges apply rules before effective dates.
As such, the
trial court did not err.4
Next, appellant contends that the trial court should
have declared a mistrial concerning improperly admitted
statements about appellant’s prior criminal proceedings.
The
Commonwealth asked Kimberly to read portions of the letters that
appellant wrote to her from prison.
Given that appellant’s
first trial was declared a mistrial after portions of these
letters were inadvertently admitted, the trial court carefully
advised both parties that Kimberly could not read the portions
concerning appellant’s prior criminal trials, his drug use, or
previous arguments between appellant and Kimberly.
4
Appellant suggests that “manifest injustice” occurred based on Commonwealth
v. Pace, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 894 (2002); however, appellant’s reliance on Pace is
misplaced, as it involves failure to properly object. And here, the
Commonwealth, not appellant, made the objection.
4
In reading the letters, appellant objected to the
statement, “the state will try to give me ten to twenty years,”
because it suggests that appellant was a persistent felony
offender.
Appellant also objected to the statement, “I know I
will lose, I always do,” as it implied prior criminal
proceedings.
The trial court overruled both objections finding
that the statements were general and did not imply prior
criminal involvement.
Appellant subsequently moved for a
mistrial on the grounds that the statement “I know I will lose,
I always do” was prejudicial.
A mistrial is appropriate only where the record
reveals “a manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or
real necessity.”
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672,
678 (1985) (quoting Wiley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 575 S.W.2d
166, 168 (1978)).
A trial court has discretion in deciding
whether to declare a mistrial, and its discretion should not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Jones v. Commonwealth,
Ky.App., 662 S.W.2d 483, 484 (1983) (“Here again we must rely
upon the good sense of the trial court in declaring a mistrial
unless a matter of substance is involved”).
Here, the trial court denied appellant’s motion for a
mistrial because the statement was “generic enough” so that
appellant was not prejudiced.
The portion Kimberly read
specifically stated: “Jimbo told me the prosecutor wants me bad
5
and all they need is you to testify at the grand jury.
Honey I
am still scared because I know I will lose I always do!”5
Upon a
careful review, we find that the statement did not present the
trial court with an urgent or real necessity to declare a
mistrial.
broad.
Taken as a whole, the statement was “generic” and
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Despite appellant’s contention, he did not move for a
mistrial regarding the statement “they will try to give me ten
to twenty years.”
Appellant merely objected to the statement.
A party’s failure to move for a mistrial following a concluded
objection from the court indicates that satisfactory relief was
granted and thus, the issue may not be raised on appeal.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (1989).
West
See also
Jenkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 477 S.W.2d 795 (1972) (if a party
claims entitlement to a mistrial, he must timely ask the court
to grant him such relief).
As such, the second statement is not
preserved for our review.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
5
“Jimbo” referred to the name of appellant’s attorney during arraignment.
However, at trial the attorney’s first or last name was not mentioned and the
Fayette County Legal Aid, Inc. represented appellant.
6
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Alicia A. Sneed
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Elizabeth A. Heilman
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
7
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