KENNETH R. BREWER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 4, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001418-MR
KENNETH R. BREWER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-01159-001
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, MINTON AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Kenneth R. Brewer has appealed from the final
judgment and sentence entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on
June 4, 2003, finding him guilty pursuant to a jury verdict of
robbery in the second degree,1 possession of a controlled
substance in the third degree,2 and as being a persistent felony
offender in the first degree (PFO I).3
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 515.030.
2
KRS 218A.1417.
3
KRS 532.080(3).
Having concluded that any
error committed by the trial court by allowing inadmissible
testimony was not preserved for appellate review and does not
rise to the level of palpable error, we affirm.
The trial testimony most favorable to the Commonwealth
revealed that Jason Reeves was working at a BP gasoline station
on North Broadway in Lexington, Kentucky on September 13, 2002,
when Kenneth Brewer, Timothy Brewer,4 and Joe Bennett, whose wife
worked at the BP, came into the store at approximately 10:40
p.m.
The three men, who apparently came into the store for
cigarettes, beer, and food, appeared to be intoxicated.
Reeves
witnessed the three men “carrying on and pushing things over” in
the store.
Brewer approached Reeves and offered to sell him
some “little white pills,” but Reeves declined the offer.
The
three men left the store at approximately 11:00 p.m., but
according to Reeves, Brewer came back about 15 minutes later and
took eight, 12-pack containers of beer from the store.
Reeves testified that employees of the store and their
relatives were authorized to take merchandise from the store, so
long as a “tab” was kept on the items.
Consequently, Reeves
took no action in stopping the three men from removing the items
from the store.
However, Reeves testified that after the three
men took the beer to their car, Brewer came back inside the
4
Kenneth and Timothy are brothers.
this robbery.
Timothy was also charged as a result of
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store, hit Reeves with a baseball bat, and stated “you are being
robbed.”
Reeves stated that Brewer demanded money and asked for
the keys to Reeves’s car.
Reeves testified that Brewer then
took some money from the cash register and store safe and
apologized for hitting him with the baseball bat.
Brewer also
allegedly offered to split the money with Reeves if Reeves would
give Brewer his phone number.
Reeves gave Brewer a false phone
number, and Brewer instructed Reeves to tell the police that a
black man had robbed the store.5
Subsequently, Reeves stated
that he observed Kenneth and Timothy Brewer pushing their
vehicle off the station’s parking lot onto North Broadway.6
Joe
Bennett, who had re-entered the store while Kenneth Brewer was
taking money from the cash register and store safe, remained at
the scene.
Officer Jared Harris of the Lexington Police
Department responded to the police dispatch and went to the BP
station to investigate.
Officer Harris obtained a description
of the Brewer brothers from Reeves and their names from Bennett.
Officer David Hart also responded to the dispatch and began
patrolling the area where the BP station was located.
Officer
Hart soon noticed two men pushing a blue Chevrolet Nova, which
matched the description of the car Kenneth Brewer had been
5
Brewer is Caucasian.
6
At that time, the vehicle would not start because of mechanical problems.
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driving, on North Broadway.
After circling back towards the two
men, Officer Hart stopped and asked the men if they needed
assistance.
As Officer Hart walked by the vehicle, he saw in
plain view several 12-packs of beer, cartons of cigarettes, and
a baseball bat.
Shortly thereafter, Officer James Ison arrived to
assist Officer Hart.
Officer Ison, who had already been to the
BP station, recognized the beer and cigarettes as being items
that had been taken from the store.
Officer Hart and Officer
Ison then placed Kenneth and Timothy Brewer under arrest.
A
search of Kenneth Brewer’s person revealed three pills, which
turned out to be a generic form of the prescription drug Xanax,
and $650.00 in cash.
Kenneth Brewer was then taken back to the
BP station where Reeves identified him as being the individual
who had struck Reeves with the baseball bat.
After his arrest,
Kenneth Brewer alleged that he, Timothy Brewer, Bennett, and
Reeves were all “in” on the robbery.
On November 13, 2002, Kenneth Brewer was indicted by a
Fayette County grand jury on one count of robbery in the first
degree,7 one count of possession of a controlled substance in an
improper container,8 and as being a PFO I.9
At a trial held on
May 7, 2003, the jury found Brewer guilty on one count of
7
KRS 515.020.
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robbery in the second degree, one count of possession of a
controlled substance in the third degree, and as being a PFO I.
The jury recommended that Brewer be sentenced to six months in
jail for his conviction for possession of a controlled substance
in the third degree, and five years’ imprisonment for his
conviction for robbery in the second degree, which would then be
enhanced to 15 years’ imprisonment pursuant to his PFO I
conviction.
On June 4, 2003, after a pre-sentence investigation
had been completed, the trial court followed the jury’s
recommendations and sentenced Brewer to a total sentence of 15
years’ imprisonment.10
This appeal followed.
Brewer claims that during the presentation of the
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Officer Harris and Sergeant
Wallace Hayes impermissibly gave opinion testimony regarding
their beliefs as to the veracity of the statements Reeves had
made to the officers on the night of the robbery.
Brewer
specifically points to four instances in which this allegedly
inadmissible testimony was given:
8
KRS 218A.210.
9
Timothy Brewer was indicted under the same indictment on identical charges,
and both men were tried together. At the close of all evidence, the trial
court granted Timothy’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on all
charges.
10
Pursuant to KRS 532.010(1)(a), Brewer’s sentence for his conviction for
possession of a controlled substance in the third degree was ordered to run
concurrently with his other sentences.
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Q: After speaking with [Reeves], did you
consider him to be a suspect?
Officer Harris: I did not consider him to
be a suspect. He seemed pretty shaken up.
He had a visible injury where he was struck
by something. He claimed it was a baseball
bat.
. . .
Q: After speaking with [Bennett], did you
consider him to be a suspect?
Officer Harris: I did not consider him to
be a suspect. He seemed to be blown away
that they actually did it. He was kind of
in awe, and he didn’t seem to want to be a
part of it.
. . .
Q: Tell the jury why you didn’t request any
other type of fingerprinting, or, just any
other type of police processing [at the
scene]?
Officer Harris: Everything happened as far
as the suspects being located and whenever
that happened, [Reeves], his story matched
up with the scene. There were busted beer
bottles at the scene like he had stated
previously, and everything seemed to match
up. They got out with the suspects’
vehicle, it was pretty close to the scene.
Later, Sergeant Hays testified in part as follows:
Q: Can you tell us why [you didn’t charge
Reeves and Joe Bennett]?
Sergeant Hays: [Reeves] was the clerk at
the store. He had [a] visible injury to his
back, which was allegedly caused by being
struck with a baseball bat. No information
was gained which led me to believe that he
was involved in this as far as being an
inside from the top operation. Also,
nothing he said implicated Mr. Bennett.
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As Brewer has conceded on appeal, no objection was
made at trial to the introduction of the above testimony.
Thus,
these alleged errors were admittedly not preserved for appellate
review.
However, Brewer argues that his convictions should
nevertheless be reversed pursuant to the palpable error rule.11
We disagree.
“A palpable error is one which affects the substantial
rights of a party and relief may be granted for palpable errors
only upon a determination that a manifest injustice has resulted
from the error.”12
For an error to be palpable, it must have
been “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily
noticeable.”13
Moreover, “[t]he reviewing court must conclude
that a substantial possibility exists that the result would have
been different in order to grant relief.”14
Essentially, Brewer argues that Officer Harris and
Sergeant Hays impermissibly stated that, in their respective
opinions, Reeves’s version of the events should be believed over
11
See generally Commonwealth v. Pace, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (2002)(stating
that “[t]he general rule is that a party must make a proper objection to the
trial court and request a ruling on that objection, or the issue is waived.
An appellate court may consider an issue that was not preserved if it deems
the error to be a ‘palpable’ one which affected the defendant’s ‘substantial
rights’ and resulted in ‘manifest injustice’” [citations omitted]); and
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 10.26.
12
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996).
13
Burns v. Level, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (1998)(citing Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1995)).
14
Partin, supra at 224.
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the version of the events as stated by Brewer.
In other words,
Brewer claims that the officers impermissibly testified that
Brewer’s defense at trial, i.e., that Reeves was “in on it” with
the other three men, was not credible.15
In a related argument,
Brewer claims that if any one of the officers’ statements was
not a sufficient error to warrant a reversal of his conviction,
the cumulative effect of all four statements constitutes
palpable error, which justifies a reversal.
We reject both
contentions.
Although the testimony at issue probably was
inadmissible evidence,16 there was a substantial amount of other
evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that Reeves
was not an accomplice to the robbery.
In addition to Reeves’s
own testimony in which he identified Brewer as the man who had
hit him with the baseball bat and who had stolen cigarettes and
15
Since a robbery is committed against a person and not a store, we assume
that Brewer’s contention is that Reeves could not have been robbed because he
was a co-conspirator in the theft from the store. See Morgan v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 730 S.W.2d 935, 937 (1987)(stating that “[w]hereas theft
has always been considered to be a crime against property, the distinguishing
element between theft and robbery is the additional element of the use or the
threat of immediate use of physical force against a person”). Of course,
Brewer could still be found guilty of theft by unlawful taking over $100.00,
but that offense is a Class D felony, while robbery in the second degree is a
Class C felony.
16
See generally Bussey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 797 S.W.2d 483, 485
(1990)(stating that “[t]here is little doubt that Officer Shirley’s statement
amounted to a declaration that he believed the story told by the victim. In
a number of cases, this has been held reversible error”). It should be noted
that the Court in Bussey expressly found that the defendant’s counsel at
trial had properly objected to Officer Shirley’s testimony, which thereby
preserved the issue for appellate review.
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money from the cash register and store safe, Officer Harris
testified that Bennett also identified Brewer as the individual
who had committed those same acts.
Furthermore, Reeves had
visible injuries on his right shoulder as a result of being hit
with a baseball bat.
Therefore, based on this evidence, we cannot conclude
that a “manifest injustice” resulted from the introduction of
the testimony at issue,17 or that there was a “substantial
possibility” that the result would have been different if that
testimony had been objected to and excluded at trial.18
Accordingly, we reject Brewer’s argument that the introduction
of this evidence resulted in a “manifest injustice” warranting a
reversal of his convictions.
Based on the foregoing, the final judgment and
sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
John R. Tarter
17
See Pace, 82 S.W.3d at 895.
18
See Partin, 918 S.W.2d at 224.
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Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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