CONNIE MARSHALL v. ARTHUR SAMUEL
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 1, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001412-MR
CONNIE MARSHALL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TOM MCDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-000550
v.
ARTHUR SAMUEL
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Connie Marshall, pro se, appeals the order
of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting the motion of Arthur
Samuel for judgment on the pleadings in her professional
malpractice action against him.
Because we believe the trial
court erred as a matter of law, we vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
In 2001, Arthur Samuel, an attorney practicing in
Louisville, represented Connie Marshall before the Jefferson
Family Court.
On July 21, 2001, he prepared and filed a
petition for her to gain permanent custody of her three
grandchildren.
The petition recited that the children had been
committed to the Cabinet for Families and Children in 1997.
However, Marshall had served as their custodian for several
months in 1999.
As Marshall explained, she relinquished custody
only when she felt that she could no longer provide adequate
care for the children.
The Cabinet sought to terminate the parental rights of
the mother of the children and to consider them for adoption
placement.
The Cabinet strongly resisted Marshall’s attempt to
intervene and to gain permanent custody of her grandchildren.
On January 18, 2002, after concluding that Marshall lacked
standing to petition the court for custody of the children, the
Jefferson Family Court granted the Cabinet’s motion to dismiss
the action.
On January 23, 2002, Samuel corresponded with his
client by certified mail.
He advised Marshall that the Family
Court had dismissed her petition for custody.
He also explained
the nature and importance of her right timely to appeal the
decision.
Finally, Samuel expressed the following concern:
I feel that since you have repeatedly
threatened to file a complaint against me
with the Kentucky Bar Association, that it
would be in both our interests that you
obtain another lawyer to handle the appeal.
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It appears to me that you have lost both
trust and confidence in me and having new
counsel would best serve your interest.
Samuel assured Marshall that he would work with her new counsel
to provide him or her with anything in his file as well as any
other information concerning the matter.
He urged Marshall to
retain counsel immediately.
On January 21, 2003, Marshall filed this legal
malpractice action against Samuel.
Samuel answered the
complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to CR1
12.03.
In his motion, Samuel contended that Marshall’s claim
was barred by the statute of limitations.
The trial court
agreed with Samuel’s assertion and entered judgment in his favor
on June 11, 2003.
This appeal followed.
The basis of a motion for a judgment on the pleadings
is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense.
City of
Pioneer Village v. Bullitt Co., Ky., 104 S.W.3d 757 (2003).
When a party moves for a judgment on the pleadings, he admits
for the purposes of his motion the truth of the nonmovants’
allegations of fact and all fair inferences that can flow from
those facts.
Archer v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., Ky.,
365 S.W.2d 727 (1963).
We review de novo the trial court’s
order granting judgment on the pleadings.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-3-
The trial court correctly concluded that this action
is governed by KRS2 413.245, which sets a one-year statute of
limitations for professional negligence claims.
That statute
provides in pertinent part as follows:
[A] civil action . . . arising out of any
act or omission in rendering, or failing to
render, professional services for others
shall be brought within one (1) year from
the date of the occurrence or from the date
when the cause of action was, or reasonably
should have been, discovered by the party
injured.
The sole issue on appeal is:
when did the statute begin to run
against Marshall’s claim?
Samuel contends that the statute began to run prior to
January 14, 2002.
During the course of the proceedings, Samuel
filed a motion with the Family Court on Marshall’s behalf
requesting a visitation schedule.
Although this motion was to
be heard on January 14, it was held in abeyance pending the
court’s decision regarding the standing issue.
According to
Samuel, this is the “last legal act which [he] performed for
[Marshall].”
Marshall, however, contends that the statute did not
begin to run before January 18, 2002 –- the date of entry of the
court’s order granting the Cabinet’s motion to dismiss the
custody action.
2
January 18, 2003, was a Saturday; the following
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4-
Monday, January 20, 2003, was a legal holiday.
Therefore,
Marshall contends that her complaint (filed January 21, 2003)
was timely.
In the context of legal malpractice claims, the
statute has been interpreted to mean that an injury is
discovered (and that, therefore, the statute of limitations
begins to run) only when the legal harm has become “fixed and
non-speculative.”
See Alagia, Day Trautwein & Smith v.
Broadbent, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 121 (1994).
In Faris v. Stone, Ky.,
103 S.W.3d 1 (2003), the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed
relevant case law and stated the rule as follows:
[I]n malpractice cases in which the
underlying negligence occurred during the
course of formal litigation, Kentucky
decisional law has consistently held that
the injury becomes definite and nonspeculative when the underlying case is
final. At that time, the one-year statute
of limitations begins to run.
Since no appeal was filed in the underlying custody
matter, the one-year statute of limitations did not begin to run
until thirty (30) days after January 18, 2002 -- the date on
which Marshall’s petition for custody was dismissed by the
Family Court and notation was entered on the court’s docket.
Consequently, Marshall’s action, commenced January 21, 2003, was
not untimely and the judgment in favor of Samuel must be set
aside.
Our judgment in no way addresses the merits or the
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viability of Marshall’s claim.
We conclude only that the
complaint was filed within the statutory period and that Samuel
is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings based on the issue
of the statute of limitations.
We vacate the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
and remand this matter for additional proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Connie Marshall, pro se
Louisville, Kentucky
Arthur R. Samuel
Louisville, Kentucky
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