BRIAN SPRINGER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 7, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2003-CA-001392-MR
BRIAN SPRINGER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN D. MINTON, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 01-CR-00211 & 01-CR-00211-002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Brian Springer appeals from a judgment of the
Warren Circuit Court, entered June 26, 2003, convicting him of
twenty-two counts of felony theft by deception1 and sentencing
him to a total of ten years’ imprisonment.
Springer contends
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion
1
KRS 514.040.
to withdraw his guilty plea.
Convinced that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
In March 2001, the Warren County grand jury indicted
Springer on 104 counts of theft by deception and complicity to
theft by deception.
The Commonwealth alleges that Springer sold
certificates of deposit to several dozen investors by falsely
representing that the certificates would mature in one year when
in fact they could not be redeemed for twenty years.
set for February 6, 2003.
Trial was
On February 3, 2003, Springer entered
an Alford plea2 to twenty-two of the theft counts in exchange for
the dismissal of the remaining counts and the ten-year sentence
noted above.
During the plea colloquy Springer indicated that
he understood his trial-related rights but wished to waive those
rights notwithstanding his asserted innocence because the
Commonwealth would be able to introduce evidence—testimony by
the duped investors—strongly indicative of guilt.
Final
sentencing was scheduled for June 26, 2003.
On May 29, 2003, Springer moved to withdraw his plea
on the ground that he had obtained exculpatory evidence and
wished to assert his innocence at trial.
The trial court
conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 26, 2003.
Springer
testified that at a deposition in a related matter he had
2
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 91 S.
Ct. 160 (1970).
2
obtained two documents, a disclosure statement by the bank that
had issued the certificates and a brokerage agreement by the
brokerage that distributed them.
Allegedly the documents
indicate the terms of the certificates including the requirement
that customers leave their funds invested for twenty years.
Although Springer testified that if he had obtained the
documents earlier he would not have pled guilty, when the court
asked him to explain what bearing the documents had on the
charges against him, he was not able to do so.
The court
concluded that the documents did not entitle Springer to
withdraw his plea and sentenced him accordingly.
It is from
that determination that Springer has appealed.
A criminal defendant has no constitutional right to
plea bargain,3 but when the state authorizes and engages in such
bargaining it must do so in a manner that is fundamentally fair.4
Before accepting a guilty plea, the court must assure itself, on
the record, that the defendant=s waiver of his right to trial and
all that right entails is knowing and voluntary.5
3
Commonwealth v. Corey, Ky., 826 S.W.2d 319 (1992); Cobb v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 821 S.W.2d 817 (1992).
4
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 25 L. Ed. 2d, 90 S. Ct.
1463 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274,
89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969).
5
Boykin v. Alabama, supra.
3
A voluntary plea is thus a solemn undertaking and is
not to be undone merely because the defendant has had a change
of heart.6
Under RCr 8.10 the trial court may permit the
defendant to withdraw his plea, but it should not do so absent a
substantial reason.
The trial court may not reject a bargained-
for sentence, for example, without giving the defendant an
opportunity to withdraw his plea.7 Otherwise motions to withdraw
a plea are addressed to the trial court=s sound discretion.8
When the court should not have accepted the plea in the first
place, because it did not satisfy constitutional standards of
voluntariness, it has been held an abuse of discretion to deny a
motion to withdraw.9
Other factors courts have found helpful in assessing
the merits of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea are the length
of time between the plea and the motion, the reason for any
delay, whether the defendant has admitted or denied guilt, the
defendant=s background, his familiarity with the criminal justice
6
United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 137 L. Ed. 2d 935, 117 S.
Ct. 1630 (1997).
7
RCr 8.10.
8
Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, Ky., 87 S.W.3d 8 (2002); Anderson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 187 (1974).
9
Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, supra; Maxwell v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
602 S.W.2d 169 (1980).
4
system, and potential prejudice to the Commonwealth.10
None of
these factors or precedents suggests that the trial court abused
its discretion in this case.
Springer asserts that his plea was not voluntary.
As
that term is ordinarily understood, however, it clearly
describes Springer’s plea.
He does not claim to have been
coerced, misled, incapacitated, or inadequately represented, the
usual reasons for deeming a plea involuntary.
He claims,
rather, that his plea was rendered “involuntary” after the fact
by discovery of the bank and brokerage documents.
The
constitution does not require, however, that the defendant be
perfectly informed before entering his plea;11 it requires only
that he understand that the plea entails the waiver of the many
trial-related constitutional rights and that the waiver is
freely undertaken.
The record of the plea colloquy demonstrates
that Springer had that understanding and chose freely.
There is
no reason to invalidate his plea.
As noted above, however, under RCr 8.10 the court may
permit even a valid plea to be withdrawn if the defendant
establishes an adequate reason.
Being legally innocent of a
10
United States v. Mader, 251 F.3d 1099 (6th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Spencer, 836 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1987).
11
Commonwealth v. Wirth, Ky., 936 S.W.2d 78, 82 (1996).
5
crime is such a reason.12 “However, a blanket claim of innocence
does not mandate the court to allow a defendant to withdraw his
plea.
The claim must be supported by credible evidence.”13
The
trial court found that Springer’s proffered documents did not
satisfy this evidentiary requirement.
The documents have not
been made a part of the record before us, so we must assume that
they support the trial court’s skepticism.14
Even without this
assumption, we agree with the trial court that Springer’s
failure to explain the relevance of the documents undermines his
claim that they are exculpatory.
If they were exculpatory, he
should have been able to explain how.
The trial court thus did
not abuse its discretion when it denied Springer’s motion to
withdraw his plea.
Accordingly, we affirm the June 26, 2003,
judgment of the Warren Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennie Hardin
Keen & Hardin, LLP
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
12
State v. McCallum, 561 N. W. 2d 707 (Wis. 1997).
13
United States v. Gomez-Orozco, 188 F. 3d 422, 425 (7th Cir.
1999) (citations omitted); United States v. Hodges, 259 F. 3d
655 (7th Cir. 2001).
14
Commonwealth v. Thompson, Ky., 697 S.W.2d 143 (1985).
6
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